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Beware of false prophets, which come to
you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they
are ravening wolves.
Ye shall know them by their fruits.
Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of
thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth
forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth
forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring
forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree
bring forth good fruit. Every tree that
bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down
and cast into the fire.
Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know
them.
Not every one that saith unto me, Lord,
Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of
heaven; but he that doeth the will of my
Father which is in heaven. Many will say to
me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not
prophesied in thy name? and in thy name
have cast out devils? and in thy name done
many wonderful works? And then will I
profess unto them, I never knew you: depart
from me, ye that work iniquity.
(Matthew 7:15–23, King James Version)
Foreword
In 1905, Max Weber asked the provocative question, “why do Protestant lands seem
to be more prosperous?” He was not wrong. Since the spread of the Reformation in
the sixteenth century, the world’s leading economy has been predominantly Protes-
tant: first, the Dutch Republic after it won independence from Spain, then Britain
took the lead in the eighteenth century, and the USA took its place in the twentieth
century. Protestant success has also been apparent at the local level. In Weber’s
Prussia, where he gained the inspiration for his famous thesis, Protestant areas
seemed to well out-pace Catholic ones. Is this just a coincidence? Or is there
something about Protestantism that has enabled economic success? A century’s
worth of work following in the footsteps of Weber has attempted to answer this
question. Jason García Portilla’s “Ye shall know them by their fruits”: Corruption,
Competitiveness, and Christianity in Europe and the Americas is a worthy addition
to this literature.
The question is not so much about the correlation Weber pointed to. There was a
clear correlation in Weber’s time, which still exists today (although it is much
weaker) that places with more Protestants tend to be better off economically. The
question is whether Weber had the right causal story. Weber claimed there was a
certain “Protestant Ethic”, stemming in part from the Calvinist doctrine of predes-
tination, that encouraged Protestants to work harder, save more, and be thriftier.
These are all characteristics that should lead to economic success if widely shared
among a population. Recent research contests Weber’s argument, however.
García Portilla’s book fits nicely with this research. He notes, correctly, that at
best Weber’s “Protestant Ethic” is one of many pathways connecting Protestantism
to economic success. I think that is probably too generous to Weber!
For my money, the two most convincing mediating causes connecting Protes-
tantism and economic outcomes are literacy and political economy. Recent work,
especially that of economists Sascha Becker and Ludger Woessmann, has combined
impressive data analysis with historical anecdote to understand the “Protestant edge”
in literacy. The reason for this edge likely dates to Luther himself. Luther was
adamant that his followers learn to read—although the main reason he desired this
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was so that they could read the bible. Luther practised what he (literally) preached.
He wrote in German, which was nearly unheard of for a man of the church at the
time. He translated the bible into the vernacular. From a very early period, Protes-
tants set up schools for both boys and girls. In one study, Becker and Woessmann
find that the entire Protestant economic edge in late-nineteenth century Prussia
(home to Weber!) can be explained by literacy differences. Once these are accounted
for, there is no “Protestant edge”. This telling leaves little room for the Protestant
ethic.
Another factor contributing to the Protestant edge is political economy. Specif-
ically, where the Reformation spread in the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church
was removed from power. The ramifications of this went well beyond the religious
sphere. In the political sphere, the medieval church was a major player. Not only was
it the largest landowner in Europe (by a large margin) but it also played a key role in
legitimating political rule. In return, the Church tended to receive favourable poli-
cies, tax exemption, and help suppressing “heresies”. This political economy “equi-
librium” was undermined by the Reformation. The question is—and it is one I have
spent much of my career trying to answer—where did Protestant European rulers
turn when they could no longer count on the Church for legitimation? Of course,
they still desired to stay in power. The Reformation undercut one of the sources of
their power by removing the Church as an agent of legitimacy.
To whom did they turn? I have argued in many places (including my book Rulers,
Religion, and Riches: How the West Got Rich and the Middle East Did Not) that
parliaments were the natural group for rulers to turn to supplement their legitimacy.
Parliaments already existed throughout Europe, bringing together landed elites,
urban elites, and churchmen together in a forum in which they could bargain with
the crown. They were the obvious group for power-starved rulers to turn. This ended
up being a key turning point in European economic history. Those places that
adopted the Reformation—especially England and the Dutch Republic—saw an
immense rise in the power of their parliaments over the subsequent centuries. The
economic elites in these parliaments were certainly self-interested. However, their
self-interest tended to align with the types of things that portend broader economic
success: property rights, investment in infrastructure, protection for shipping, and
the like. Policies along these lines were key for the economic rise of these states.
Protestants ended up getting these types of policies first. Other parts of Europe, and
the rest of the world, would have to wait.
There are many other reasons that Protestantism has been associated with eco-
nomic prosperity in the past. García Portilla nicely describes many of these in this
book. Protestant missionaries were likely responsible for mitigating some of the
worst aspects of colonialism. Legal systems associated with Protestant states have
been shown to be more conducive to economic growth. Religious competition
among various Protestant sects was a likely cause of lower corruption. And the list
goes on. If anything, the Protestant economic advantage is now over-explained!
If the Protestant edge is indeed over-explained, this is simply a reflection of how
important the broader question is. The modern economy emerged in a Protestant
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state (Great Britain). The greatest twentieth-century economic and military power
(USA) was predominantly Protestant. The research on this issue is convincing that
this was not simply a coincidence. Economists, sociologists, and political scientists
have spent hundreds of thousands of pages trying to understand why this happened.
They have used a multitude of methods, focused on various parts of the world, and
have dug deep into history to help us better understand the role that religion can play
in economic growth (and stagnation). Jason García Portilla has followed very nicely
in this tradition. By bringing together multiple methods to shine light on one of the
“big questions” in the social sciences, García Portilla brings new insight to a much-
studied question. Here is hoping this is the beginning of much more to come
from him.
Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA Jared Rubin
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Preface
Why are historical Catholic countries and regions generally more corrupt and less
competitive than historical Protestant territories? How has the institutionalisation of
religion influenced the prosperity of countries in Europe and the Americas?
“Ye shall know them by their fruits” addresses these critical questions by
elucidating the hegemonic and emancipatory religious factors leading to these
dissimilarities between countries. The book features up-to-date mixed methods
interdisciplinary research contributing to existing studies in the sociology of religion
field by demonstrating the effect of the mutually reinforcing configuration of
multiple prosperity triggers (religion, politics, and environment) for the first time.
It demonstrates the differences in the institutionalisation of Roman Catholicism and
Protestantism by applying quantitative and qualitative methods and by performing a
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in 65 countries. This monograph provides
a comprehensive survey and empirical research of different theories of development,
focusing on the influence of religion.
High corruption and low competitiveness are common denominators in countries
with pervasive Roman Catholic traditions. In contrast, historically Protestant coun-
tries, both in the Americas and in Europe, tend to have higher levels of transparency,
education, social progress, and competitiveness. According to the Gospel of Mat-
thew, Jesus Christ declared that “Ye shall know them by their fruits”. He was
referring to the true and false prophets who would come on his behalf. This parable
inspires this book, which examines the relationship between religious systems
(“prophets”) and social prosperity (“fruits”). Its main question is: How does Prot-
estantism influence competitiveness and transparency compared to Roman Cathol-
icism in Europe and the Americas?
In this book, a comprehensive methodological framework has been developed,
consisting of different epistemological approaches (mixed methods). The correla-
tional (quantitative) part established the interrelations between the investigated
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variables (i.e., corruption, competitiveness, environment, and institutional religion),
while QCA further inferred causal relations for 65 countries in Europe and the
Americas. The qualitative part used critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine
four case studies (Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia).
Combining the following three main factors accounted for uneven socio-
economic and institutional performance in Europe and the Americas: (1) Religion:
(1.1) Historical Protestantism and its positive influence on law, institutions, and
language (highest performance); (1.2) anti-clericalism (medium-high performance);
(1.3) Roman Catholicism or Orthodoxy (medium-low performance); (1.4) Syncre-
tism (low performance). (2) Political non-religious influences: (2.1) Communism
(low performance). (3) Geography and environment, which modulate overall
performance.
This book contributes to existing research in the sociology of religion and
development studies fields by demonstrating the effect of the mutually reinforcing
configuration of multiple prosperity triggers (religion–political–environment). His-
torical Protestantism largely influenced prosperity by promoting education, by
secularising institutions, and by stabilising democracy. Protestantism has also
proven highly influential in the successive historical law revolutions that gradually
mitigated the power of pervasive feudal institutions and of papalist medieval canon
law. In contrast, traditionally Roman Catholic countries have generally upheld a
medieval model of extractivist institutions until anti-clerical (non-communist) move-
ments were able to weaken this influence in some countries.
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I wish to briefly acknowledge the generous support received from various
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are mentioned in the following pages.
I express my sincere thanks to my family (biological and spiritual) for their
tireless support. Having understood the importance of this study, many have even
sacrificed funds, their health, and even their marriages. My heartfelt gratitude to all
of you!
The most important acknowledgement and dedication are reserved for he who
inspired both this book and the following wisdom:
And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free
(John 8:32, King James Version).1
1 The Holy Bible, King James Version. Cambridge Edition: 1769. Scripture quotations from The
Authorized (King James) Version. Rights in the Authorized Version in the United Kingdom are
vested in the Crown. Reproduced by permission of the Crown’s patentee, Cambridge University
Press.
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This study would not have been possible without the commitment and support of
numerous individuals at different stages. The following list, although not exhaustive,
mentions various direct contributors. I am most grateful to all of them. The last
7 years have indeed been the best in my life, not least for making a long-awaited
dream come true.
My heartfelt thanks to:
Prof. Dr Yvette Sánchez, who graciously accepted to supervise my research when
I was still “fishing fishes” in the climate change “ocean”. Her goodwill enabled me to
benefit from an open window of opportunity, in the form of a Swiss Government
Excellence Scholarship (ESKAS). This funds three years of research in Switzerland
and part of my field trips. Hence, I am also grateful to Helen Obrist and the ESKAS
team at the Swiss Embassy in Bogota, to the Swiss Federal Government in Bern, and
to the University of St. Gallen (HSG).
In addition to patiently supporting my research, Prof. Sánchez, as co-head of the
Swiss-Latin American Center “Centro Latinoamericano Suizo” (CLS-HSG) and the
SSLAS (Swiss School of Latin American Studies), funded my field trips and my
participation in several international conferences and national workshops to present
preliminary versions of this study.
Prof. Dr. Christian Büschges, another co-head of the SSLAS, kindly accepted to
co-supervise my research and generously offered important guidance from the
outset. Prof. Dr. Karen Elliott, whom I also deeply esteem, provided expert guidance
on (yet not limited to) the QCA part of this study.
The following paragraphs acknowledge various scholars whose expertise
supported my research in particular areas:
Quantitative part
Karl Bailey generously helped me create the first database. Pavel Chlup and
Maria Kralova provided invaluable help with the quantitative and QCA models. Luc
Davie and Bianca van Dellen contributed to the quantitative model on corruption.
Tina Freyburg, Carsten Trenkler, and Roland Fuess offered valuable comments that
helped sharpen the correlational models and conclusions.
QCA part
Karen Elliott, Pavel Chlup, and Maria Kralova offered expert advice on QCA, as
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Patrick Emmenegger for his detailed and timely comments.
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Patrizia Hoyer provided substantial advice at an early stage. Thanks to her and
Chris Steyaert, this study was extended to an enriching CDA approach. Paul Mihas
graciously offered detailed feedback on and support with the qualitative design,
coding, and identity memo. Tabea Bereuther’s comments on a previous version of
the coding and qualitative design were immensely helpful.
Mixed Methods design and case studies
The mixed methods and dialectical pluralism meta-paradigm in the research owe
much to Burke Johnson’s brilliant advice. Andrew Bennett provided ongoing
invaluable support with optimal case selection and case studies configuration.
Andrei Gomez provided helpful critical feedback.
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This book is divided into seven main parts, which are subdivided into 25 chapters:
Part I: Introductory Considerations and Research Setting
Part I introduces this book and is organised into two chapters. The introduction
(Chap. 1) sets the historical context and describes this book’s outcome, contribu-
tions, and limitations. Chapter 2 presents the research setting, including the research
aims, research question and hypotheses, and the research model. The research model
synthesises understanding and serves as a rationale for the entire book. The model
exhibits the main exogenous theoretical determinants of corruption and prosperity,
which are tested empirically. The following chapters (Chap. 3–12) develop the
research model. Therefore, when numbers or capital letters appear in italics between
parentheses in headings and subheadings, please refer to the research model com-
ponents and relations (Fig. 2.1).
Part II: Conceptual Framework
Part II details the outcome and conditions of the research model (transparency/
prosperity) in three chapters. Chapter 3 (the outcome) defines corruption and com-
petitiveness from different perspectives, including moral and theological ones.
Transparency and prosperity are linked as part of the same outcome, prosperity
equals competitiveness, and competitiveness includes transparency.
Chapter 4 briefly surveys prosperity and transparency in Europe and the Americas
and shows, roughly, that historically Protestant countries perform higher than
Roman Catholic ones. Chapter 5 (conditions) touches on some influential theories
that have sought to explain prosperity differences between countries from diverse
disciplinary perspectives.
Part III: Theoretical Foundations (Amplifying the Conditions of the
Research Model)
Part III explains and interconnects the relevant factors (or variables and condi-
tions) used to determine corruption and prosperity in the research model. It consists
of six chapters: Chapter 6 explores relevant empirical studies and provides possible
explanations for the robust associations between corruption and religion. Chapter 7
discusses the prosperity–religion link and reviews some prominent empirical studies
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refuting and confirming Weber’s thesis and balancing the evidence gathered. It also
emphasises the importance of seriously considering the institutional (and hege-
monic) influence of religion in addition to the cultural influence (of religious adher-
ents). Chapter 8, the most comprehensive in Part III, characterises the relations
between religion, institutions, and the transparency–prosperity nexus. It explains
how economic prosperity, democracy, and transparency are part of a feedback loop
that constitutes a single phenomenon. More importantly, this chapter deepens the
institutional analysis by concentrating on the particular historical influence of reli-
gion on the different legal traditions in Europe and the Americas. It is the cornerstone
of Part III and, as such, of the entire study.
Chapter 9 demonstrates the influential association of Protestantism and prosperity
by explaining its historical focus on education and human capital building. On this
basis, Chap. 10 characterises the relations between culture, religion, and corruption/
prosperity. It advances the explanations of the prosperity–religion nexus from the
perspective of cultural attributes (e.g., trust, individualism, and familialism) by
comparing Roman Catholic and Protestant theologies. Chapter 11 briefly explores
the influence of religion and hegemony on language by concentrating on English,
German, and the Romance languages widely spoken in Europe and the Americas.
Chapter 12 discusses the influence of the environment and geography on prosperity
and corruption and reviews some leading empirical works.
Part IV: Research Paradigms, Methodology, and Research Design
Part IV has two chapters. The first (Chap. 13) discusses the research paradigms
underpinning this study. Chapter 14 introduces the methodology and research
design. It explains the mixed method approach of this study (quantitative, qualita-
tive, and QCA). Each of the chapters in Part V (empirical results) includes method-
ological protocols.
Part V: Empirical Results (Macro and Meso Components)
This part is divided into two components: macro and meso. Chapter 15 corre-
sponds to the macro-quantitative component. It discusses how competitiveness and
corruption were modelled, how the methods were applied in the correlation analysis
and which empirical results were achieved. Chapter 16 contains the meso component
(Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA). It discusses the QCA research model, the
QCA methodology, and the analysis of the QCA results.
Part VI: Component 3 (Micro): Case Studies
This part is organised into six chapters. Chapter 17 examines the criteria for
selecting the cases analysed in this study. It explains the application of critical
discourse analysis (CDA) as its principal empirical method. It discusses CDA
methods and data treatment as well as the empirical analysis of CDA results. Finally,
it compares and summarises the case selection criteria.
Chapters 18, 19, 20, and 21 offer in-depth discussions of the case studies
(Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia). Switzerland provides more informa-
tion than the other cases: It is an extremely positive case in the world and the only
European country discussed here. Chapter 22 presents a comparative overview of the
four case studies (Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia).
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Part VII: Discussion and Conclusions
Part VII has three chapters. Chapter 23 presents general conclusions based on
integrating the theory and the results obtained from all methods. It also offers seven
specific conclusions for each of the prosperity determinants considered. Chapter 24
examines further considerations derived from the research, while Chap. 25 provides
some brief concluding remarks.
Empirical Expectations
Some sections along the document contain empirical expectations since they
correspond to variables or conditions tested in the study. Further, sections
treating Latin America appear throughout the study. Historically, this region
has been an outlier in the Christian world (Europe and the Americas), with
high corruption and low prosperity levels. It provides rich material for
analysis and hence three of the four case studies deal explicitly with Latin
America. Generally, each chapter starts with a brief outline or a short
introduction. The various sections further structure the corresponding main
chapters and parts.
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This book seeks to understand the prosperity differences between countries in
Europe and the Americas by elucidating the hegemonic and emancipatory religious
factors leading to these dissimilarities. One key question in this respect is why
Roman Catholic societies are different from Protestant ones although both are
considered Christian.
This introduction is divided into two sections. Section 1.1 sets the historical
context and provides relevant background information. Section 1.2 outlines the
intended outcome of this study, its contributions to the literature, and its limitations.
1.1 A Historical Challenge Inspiring this Study
About two thousand years ago, Jesus Christ described the true and false prophets
coming on his behalf as follows: “Ye shall know them by their fruits” (King James
Bible, 1769, Matthew 7:16). He also directly challenged the moral authority of the
Jewish authorities, who were under Roman rule at that time. His teachings were
perceived as a threat to the conflicted Jewish and Roman establishments. These
convened to agree his crucifixion (one of the cruellest Roman death penalties) under
a legal deal.
The Roman Empire, together with the Jewish authorities, not only executed Jesus
and most of his disciples but also brutally persecuted their early followers (Bruce,
2007), who were considered a “sect” (e.g. King James Bible, 1769, Acts 24: 5).
Although many suffered cruel deaths, the “Christian sect” attracted an increasing
number of followers.
After combatting this “sect” for around four centuries, the Romans eventually
embraced Christianity as their official religion under Emperor Constantine. This
political move would, however, compromise Jesus’s original teachings, as preserved
in the Holy Scriptures. The new Roman syncretic religion thus rejected and at the
same time adopted biblical principles to purportedly uphold Christianity while in
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fact perpetuating pagan Roman rituals and traditions (i.e. veneration of icons instead
of the God from Israel; Sun-Day worshipping instead of the Sabbath) (Bacchiocchi,
1977). Yet Constantine soon witnessed the decline of the Roman Empire. Never-
theless, his “Christian universal religion-state” began to flourish, thus prolonging the
political, legal, and cultural heritage of the Roman Empire (Agnew, 2010, p. 41;
Hofstede, 2001, p. 109; Pirenne, 1936, p. 397). The Roman Church-State (Catholic)
succeeded and extended the Roman Empire’s heritage ironically speaking on behalf
of Jesus, the same crucified under the Roman law.
History has shown that forgery became a widespread method through which the
Roman imperial system accumulated considerable power to extend the supremacy of
the popery beyond the duchy of Rome. These fabrications included the Donation of
Pepin in 756 (Peter’s supposedly gold letter written in heaven, which enabled him to
claim that he was the first Pope); the false Donation of Constantine (for which the
Roman Catholic Church inherited the lands of the Roman Empire); and other
deceptive decretals (i.e. decrees) issued to grant canon law immunity against any
secular institution (Heussi, 1991; Merryman & Pérez, 2007). Moreover, the Catholic
Church imposed Roman traditions on Jesus’ teachings, banned the Holy Scriptures
and continued the cruel persecution of dissenters.
The Roman Church-State also enforced various forms of tyranny during the
subsequent Dark Ages to perpetuate its institutional hegemony. These violent
measures included crusades, inquisitions, and the maintenance of people’s igno-
rance. Only translations of the Scriptures into Latin were permitted, thus preserving
the monopoly of keeping and interpreting the Bible. Christian groups, like the
Waldensians, which sought to keep alive Jesus’ legacy were oppressed as “heretic
sects” to maintain the Roman monopoly over faith. Consequently, the Inquisition
murdered countless victims, making the Roman Church-State that institution that has
caused most human suffering in history. The Church-State had legal control over
monarchies and exerted political power across Europe and beyond.
In 1492, the Spanish Roman Catholic Monarchy “discovered” a new continent to
expand its dominion: the Americas. Vast territories were brutally conquered and
forced to adopt the Roman Catholic faith. Over time, a new syncretism—of Native
American, African, and Roman beliefs—was enforced in Latin America while the
medieval, extractive, and hierarchical model of society was perpetuated.
In Europe, various dissenters such as Jan Hus or William Tyndale dared to
challenge the supremacy of the Roman Church-State. Like many others, they were
convicted of heresy and cruelly executed. It was, however, not until the sixteenth
century that Martin Luther succeeded in translating the Scriptures into the German
vernacular from original Greek (Erasmus’ Textus Receptus) and Hebrew texts
(instead of Latin) (Burger, 2014). This advancement, along with Johannes
Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press made the Bible more accessible for
ordinary German-speaking people. These and other favourable developments initi-
ated the Protestant Reformation (after attempts to transform the Roman Church from
within had failed). The movement was based on returning to the original teachings of
Jesus Christ (under the Sola Scriptura principle). It gradually expanded its influence,
first in Northern Europe and later in North America.
4 1 Introduction
By keeping people ignorant of such and other historical facts, the Roman Catholic
Church-State has managed to control Western civilisation for over a thousand years.
Today, with more than a billion followers, the Roman Catholic Church-State is still
the most extensive centralised global organisation ever seen in the world. However,
popular belief now seems to accept the impression of a symbolic (that is, almost
non-existent) Roman Catholic State. Just as modern secular society seems to
embrace the idea of a weakened Roman Church, which seems to have renewed its
discourse and continues to exercise an influence comparable to that of any other
world religion.
Yet the discourse of Roman Catholicism shifted only recently. Over the past few
decades, the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) has promoted democracy and
human rights (Anderson, 2007; Levine, 1981). However, descending from Aristo-
telian and Aquinian principles, the Roman Church-State had always considered
democracy the least favourable social order. When having to decide between
communist (i.e. atheist) and democratic ideologies in the mid-twentieth century,
the Roman Church-State supported the latter as “the lesser of two evils” (Cook,
2012, pp. 24-25).
Currently, intransigent conservative ideologies still prevail (i.e. corporatism in
Latin America) after the inertia of long-standing Roman Catholic hegemony
(Beltrán, 2008; Figueroa, 2016). Also, Romanism still rejects personal interpreta-
tions of the Scriptures as only the clergy’s reading and understanding are deemed
legitimate.
The following chapters show that the effects of the Protestant Reformation in the
political, education and legal institutions and systems of those countries in which it
gained influence are far-reaching and well documented. Yet evidence exists that the
shift in Roman Catholic discourse reflects its attempt to perpetuate its hegemony
against Protestant “competition” (Anderson, 2007, p. 394; Cook, 2012; Gill, 1998,
pp. 7, 48). Moreover, Roman Catholicism still exercises an important institutional
dominion in countries under its influence, including most Latin American countries.
The Iberian conquerors first imposed Roman Catholicism in Latin America while
tradition and established institutions have since perpetuated its hegemony—to this
day. Protestantism, on the other hand, has more often emerged from voluntary
persuasion contrasting Roman Catholicism’s seemingly global corporate strategy.
This study emerged in the context of the five-hundred-year anniversary of Martin
Luther preparing and publishing his 95 theses in the German town of Wittenberg.
The theses exposed the rampant corruption and tyranny of the Roman Catholic
Church and initiated the Protestant Reformation.
Figure 1.1 summarises the historical rationale underlying this study.
1.2 Intended Outcome and Contributions
This subsection describes the relevance of this research. It explains the theoretical
and methodological gaps that it seeks to close.
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1.2.1 Theoretical Gaps: What Makes this Research Different?
This study may be justified as follows: good theory emerges from personal engage-
ment and contact with global problems rather than from literature gaps (Kilduff,
2006, p. 252). Beyond that, it addresses and seeks to close several theoretical and
methodological gaps.
First, it identifies a lack of a systemic (and complex) prosperity theory across
countries (Chap. 5). What becomes apparent is that even prominent authors explic-
itly neglect the influence of other factors and theories than those they have defined
themselves (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Diamond, 1997; Sachs, 2001).
However, several empirical studies have suggested that various factors common
to different countries (i.e. institutions, religion, geography) should work together, in
reality, to produce different possible prosperity outcomes (La Porta et al., 1999;
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Fig. 1.1 Historical timeline of religious-political trigger events in Christendom (Source: Author’s
collection). Based on the theoretical framework of this study. Among others, sources include
Woodberry (2012), Miller (2012), Acemoglu et al. (2011), Snyder (2011), Bruce (2007), Berman
(2003), Witte (2002), Heussi (1991), D’Aubigne (1862), and Eusebius of Caesarea (ca. 340 AD)
(n.d.)
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Paldam, 2001; Treisman, 2000). My model (Fig. 2.1) and research build upon these
previous results and expand understanding in five ways: (1) by adopting a QCA
causal approach; (2) by placing greater emphasis on the institutional influence of
religion; (3) by considering other proxy variables (e.g. GCI as a prosperity proxy
instead of GDP; concordats with the Roman See as a proxy of the institutional
influence of Romanism in a given country); (4) by providing more theological, legal
and historical information; and (5) by examining a comparative set of European and
Latin American cases.
This study adopts multiple causality approaches, in order to test variables from
different theoretical fields (e.g. culture, environment) instead of relying on
monocausal explanations. It investigates these variables (or conditions, factors,
and prosperity theories) from a systemic perspective and using different methods
(i.e. quantitative and QCA).
This systemic approach comprises several components: (a) Dialectic Pluralism
(DP) as a metaparadigm (Chap. 13); (b) a multi-theoretical perspective
(i.e. considering divergent theories one at a time); (c) multi-lingual analysis (Span-
ish, English, French, and German) of the literature or primary data (i.e. interviews),
which provides greater aggregated, comparative value than monolingual research;
(d) a multi-cultural perspective when analysing and comparing different cultures and
values in Europe and the Americas; (e) a transdisciplinary methodology, given the
researcher’s background and the different theories analysed (these stem from various
disciplines, including environmental studies, geography, sociology, cultural studies,
political science, law, economics, linguistics, and theology).
Therefore, this research rejects neither the mechanicist paradigm nor the systemic
one. On the contrary, it brings these paradigms into dialogue under the “complexity
paradigm” (Chap. 13).
The second theoretical and methodological gap that this study strives to close is
the hegemony gap in the sociology of religion. Typically, a large gap exists between
scientific knowledge and lived reality (Orlikowski, 2010). Moreover, an obvious
hiatus is evident in the sociology of religion, in particular regarding critical
approaches to religion, that is, the ones that take “issues of domination and inequal-
ity seriously” (Hjelm, 2014, p. 857). Much recent scholarship in the field “seems to
descend almost exclusively from Durkheim and Weber” (Hjelm, 2014, p. 855).
Consequently, existing approaches tend to confine themselves to the influence of
specific religious denominations and their followers rather than investigating the
institutional power of religion over society.
Max Weber (1905) made a significant contribution to understanding the work
ethic and its role in building trust and prosperity in Protestant societies. Hjelm
observes, however, that Weber’s contribution lay not in discerning the hegemony
and domination of a political-religious institution (such as the Roman Catholic
Church-State). In moving beyond Weber’s traditional, culture-only approach, this
study aims to fill the various theoretical gaps left by his work. It therefore seeks to
establish a historical understanding of the means and methods that were used to
perpetuate the hegemony of the Roman Church-State for over a thousand years
during the Dark Ages. This hegemony has been inherited and remains predominant
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in most Latin American countries to this day. Here, this study helps to understand not
only the decline of this hegemony in Europe and the Americas but also the potential
emancipatory influence of the Protestant Reformation.
The third theoretical and methodological gap that this study seeks to close
concerns the institutional and cultural dimensions of religion. At least two dimen-
sions of the influence of religion need to be taken seriously: institutional and cultural
(adherents) (Manow, 2004, p. 9). However, most empirical works considering
religion as a prosperity determinant pay little attention to the institutional effects
of religion. Instead, they concentrate mainly on religious affiliation (by using the
proportion of adherents as the only indicator of religion) (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2012; Hofstede, 2001; La Porta et al., 1999).
Such traditional research paradigms have focused on the cultural influence of
religion (à la Weber) and have neglected the institutional impact of religion.
Typically, cross-country empirical approaches have ignored the decisive power
relations or the historical agreements (concordats) between individual countries
and the Roman Catholic Church-State. More recently, however, Barro andMcCleary
(2005) and Barrett et al. (2001) have made essential contributions to establishing the
relation between the population affiliated to a given religion and the adoption of a
state religion. The association between state religion and the proportion of religious
adherents gives rise to an inertia that may persist for decades if not centuries (Barro
& McCleary, 2005).
Similarly, only very few studies in so-called new economic history have focused
on the institutional impact of religion on prosperity. This is not surprising as inter-
disciplinary approaches in this field are relatively young (a couple of decades)
(Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017).
Insights from disciplines such as political science (Manow & van Kersbergen,
2009), international relations (Snyder, 2011) or law (Berman, 2003; Witte, 2002)
have been crucial to understanding the institutional influence of religion on prosper-
ity/institutional patterns. Yet these findings have often not been integrated into the
array of explanations provided by empirical studies associating religion and pros-
perity. It is therefore necessary to build a comprehensive transdisciplinary theory
based on the findings of different disciplines. This in turn will enhance their
explanatory power.
This study pursues such “synthesised coherence” by connecting “together work
that previously had been considered unrelated” (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007,
p. 33). Thus, it considers cultural and institutional approaches to religion, both
theoretically and empirically, and argues that both are necessary and complemen-
tary. It empirically investigates the relation between corruption/competitiveness and
religious adherents (as a cultural proxy) in quantitative analysis. It subsequently adds




Most empirical studies lead from theory to data (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is partic-
ularly the case for the vast empirical information supporting the prosperity theories
explained briefly in Chap. 5.
Eisenhardt encourages researchers to complete the research cycle (see Fig. 1.2) by
conducting research via a less traditional route: from evidence to theory (Eisenhardt,
1989, p. 549). This study runs the entire research cycle from compiling information
in a general model of prosperity theories to further triangulating empirical data and
theorising (Chaps. 2 and 5; see also Part III).
The starting point of this study can be located anywhere on the cycle (Johnson,
2016). For instance, the prosperity theories in Chap. 5 lead to the hypothesis
(Chap. 1). The data collection methods (mixed) (see Part IV and methodology
sections in Part V) follow the hypothesis. Subsequently, data analysis leads to
describing the patterns needed to continue the theory building cycle.
I have not found any studies that combine a Mixed Methods Approach (MM),
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and
the sociology of religion. This study is the first of its type and possesses the inherent
strengths of typical mixed research, among others: (a) generating and tested a
grounded theory; (b) harnessing the strengths of additional methods to overcome
the weaknesses of other methods by applying both; (c) providing stronger evidence
for conclusions reached through converging and corroborating findings; (d) adding









(logic of context of justification)
Inductive
(logic of context of discovery)
Fig. 1.2 Theory generation cycle (adapted from Johnson, 2016)
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(e) increasing the generalisability of the results; f) combining qualitative and quan-
titative research to generate more comprehensive knowledge, an important condition
for informing theory and practice (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 21).
In sum, two arguments justify the theory building process in this study: (1) the
lack of a comprehensive model capable of synthesising, testing, and explaining
corruption and prosperity based on previously unrelated theories and (2) the need
for a critical theory of the role of religion, institutions, and social domination in
Europe and the Americas.
1.2.3 Limitations
On the theoretical level, I do not discuss each of its various topics in-depth. Vast
amounts of information have already been produced, in what is in effect an immea-
surable field of investigation: the origins of countries’ prosperity. Instead, this study
is systemic in that the relations and ramifications are more important than the depth
of each topic and case. Although the sociology of religion is central to this research,
the concepts and findings of other disciplines are also drawn upon. Consistent with
its systemic approach, this book emphasises the relations between fields. Thus, it
offers no detailed analysis of various influences—environment and geography,
language and ethnicities—on prosperity. This study explores neither Western evan-
gelical movements nor liberation theology or ecumenism in-depth even if these
topics are addressed. Finally, this research considers neither the recent rise of
Islam in Europe due to the migration crisis nor the Jewish influence in Europe and
the Americas.
Methodologically, this study exhibits the typical and inherent weaknesses of
mixed research (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 21). Among others, it is more
time consuming, is a greater drain on resources, and is more challenging as it
involves a single researcher learning about and carrying out both qualitative and
quantitative research concurrently.
Last but far from least, the research topic is highly sensitive and apt to generate
controversy. Its research design is ambitious, which required delicately balancing
surface and depth when analysing the results and writing these up. This study
favours comparing different sources and cases, which at times meant sacrificing
analytical depth. The biases inherent in this research are explained in Chap. 13.
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This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.1 details the research aims, and
Section 2.2 presents the main research question. Section 2.3 formulates the general
hypotheses. Section 2.4 presents the research model, which synthesises understand-
ing and serves as a rationale for the entire book. The model exhibits the main
exogenous theoretical determinants of corruption and prosperity, which are tested
empirically. Exogenous long-term factors include culture, religion, and environ-
ment. Given the aim of this research, particular emphasis is placed on religion
(Catholic and Protestant; institutional and adherents).
2.1 Research Aim and Focus
This study applies grounded theory to expand existing understanding of the relation
between two of the world’s main Christian religious systems—Roman Catholicism
and Protestantism—and two key prosperity indicators (corruption and competitive-
ness). It also explores the intrinsic factors potentially enabling this relation to be
established and perpetuated.
To achieve these aims, I adopt a hybrid (combined) approach involving Grounded
Theory (GT) and four case studies from a mixed-methods (MM) perspective. In fact,
“MM-GT works well in connecting theory generation with theory testing, linking
theory and practice” (Johnson et al., 2010). The resultant theory pursues an “eman-
cipatory ‘knowledge interest’” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 230; Habermas, 1972) and thus
challenges established approaches to prosperity problems (see prosperity theories,
Chap. 5).
© The Author(s) 2022




A direct relation between political power and the power of the Roman Catholic
Church-State has persisted throughout Latin America since the Conquest (Gill,
1998; Gill, 2013; Levine, 1981; Munevar, 2008). These institutional relations can
be traced back the European colonisers (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Engerman &
Sokoloff, 2002; Woodberry, 2012).
Consequently, this study explores the influence of Protestantism and Roman
Catholicism on corruption and competitiveness in present-day Europe and the
Americas. Previous scholarship has already highlighted the relevance of this topic.
For instance, Hjelm (2014) observed:
If ever there was a time for a critical, engaged sociology of religion, this would be it. Yet, the
paradigmatic discussions (as represented by textbook knowledge) still revolve around the
question of disappearance versus resurgence of religion, with little or no attention paid to
religions’ role in reproducing and transforming inequality (Hjelm, 2014, p. 856).
Corruption and competitiveness are the so-called prosperity indicators. Reviewing
these indicators in Europe and the Americas (Chap. 4 and Appendices 1–5) reveals
that historically Protestant countries generally perform better than predominantly
Roman Catholic ones. Based on this evidence, the main question of this study is:
How does Protestantism influence competitiveness and transparency compared to
Roman Catholicism in Europe and the Americas?
2.3 Hypotheses
This section presents the general hypotheses of this study. Specific configurational
empirical expectations are introduced in Part III.
Christianity has been central to Western civilisation. Yet the diverse historical
trajectories of the various Christian denominations have first established and subse-
quently determined different sets of societal norms and institutions. This book
explores the influence of Christianity on prosperity in present-day Europe and the
Americas.
It posits two main hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Roman Catholicism has negatively impacted prosperity (competi-
tiveness and transparency) in Europe and the Americas.
Hypothesis 2 The Protestant Reformation has positively impacted prosperity (com-
petitiveness and transparency) in Europe and the Americas.
The general assumption, however, is that religion might work in combination
with other long-term persistence factors triggering prosperity, i.e. the desired out-
come (see research model, Fig. 2.1). Other prominent theoretical triggers of pros-
perity are institutions and legal traditions, which are also implicitly linked to my
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hypotheses on religion (i.e. state religion, see Chap. 8). However, environmental
factors are exogenous (i.e. not directly related to the first two hypotheses) and
therefore require a separate hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Environmental performance positively impacts prosperity in Europe
and the Americas (i.e. moderating or moderated by the impact of religion).
This study investigates the influence of Christianity on prosperity within the
framework of the sociology of religion. It therefore focuses mainly on the first two
hypotheses.
2.4 Research Model1
The research model considers the variables and factors discussed in this study to be
interdependent. I take the model entirely and not residually and attach theoretical and
empirical importance to all the variables (theories). Generally, the same factors
(theories) that are associated with prosperity as a whole (i.e. GCI) are also associated
with corruption in the literature (see Chaps. 3, 6 and 7).
Parts II and III (conceptual and theoretical background) break down the research
model (Fig. 2.1) and explain its components and relations in different chapters.
These explain some of the complex relations theoretically and concentrate on my
principal variables of interest: religion and prosperity/corruption (see the subsections
concentrating on Latin America). Some relations are not covered since they are less
relevant to the purposes of this study (e.g. environmental influences on culture and
vice versa).
Figure 2.1 (see below) synthesises the logic underlying this study by interrelating
the variables of interest (i.e. conditions in QCA). It is general and thus does not
include all research variables. Some of the variables or conditions are embedded
within others and vice versa (see Appendices 1–5 for details). The figure also
represents the research model structuring this study:
1Originally published as “Research Model” in: Garcia Portilla, J. (2019). “Ye Shall Know Them by
Their Fruits”: Prosperity and Institutional Religion in Europe and the Americas. Religions, 10(6),
362. MDPI AG. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10060362
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
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Fig. 2.1 Research model (Source: Author’s figure). Note: Arrows and numbers indicate potential
causal relations, which are explored in the following chapters (see the corresponding capital letters
and the numbers between parenthesis in the headings and subheadings referring to the relations in
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The Outcome (Criterion Variables)
(A): Corruption and Prosperity
This chapter defines corruption and prosperity based on various underlying
perspectives.
3.1 Definitions of Corruption (A)
Corruption is a widely used term. Dozens of definitions exist in the literature
(Gingerich, 2013; Paldam, 2001; Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Treisman, 2000). How-
ever, one standard definition identifies corruption as illicit private benefit(s) (Paldam,
2001, p. 389). Another highlights the abuse of public authority or resources for the
purpose of pursuing political goals or financial advantages at the expense of others
(Gingerich, 2013, p. 10).
According to the Cambridge University Dictionary (2014), corruption is “illegal,
bad, or dishonest behaviour, especially by people in positions of power”. One
common antonym is “transparency”. In the world of business, this refers to activities
performed openly, i.e. “without secrets, so that people can trust that they are fair and
honest” (Cambridge University Dictionary, 2014).1
Moreover, corruption is a scourge associated with economic failure that nations
have long tried to remove, albeit with little success (Chase, 2010). Corruption is
symptomatic of state-society relations. It involves undermining the fairness and
legitimacy of the state and leads to wasting and poorly targeting public funds
(Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xvi). Corruption occurs when private wealth and public
power overlap (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xvii). Whereas corruption subverts human
1Definitions of ‘<corruption>’ and ‘<transparency>’ from Cambridge Dictionary, www.
dictionary.cambridge.org, © Cambridge University Press. Used with permission. Reproduced with
permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
© The Author(s) 2022
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rights, high transparency levels are also associated with guaranteeing human rights
(Gebeye, 2012; OHCHR, 2019).
Corruption may also be understood more broadly. As a moral category, it denotes
rot and putrefaction (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xiv). This is its common meaning
since the Old Testament. Leviticus 22:25 (King James Bible, 1769) identifies
corruption as a deficient inner state: “Neither from a stranger’s hand shall ye offer
the bread of your God of any of these; because their corruption is in them [. . .]”.
However, one of its most important uses in the Holy Scriptures is its reference to
Jesus Christ as the Holy One, as the one who did not corrupt (King James Bible,
1769, Psalms 16: 10; Psalms 49: 9; Acts 2: 27–32; Acts 13: 34–37).
In the Gospel of Matthew, the word “corrupt” refers to the warning that Jesus
gave about false prophets coming on his behalf (as the title of this study indicates).
Jesus compares the false prophets with the corrupt fruits of corrupt trees (King James
Bible, 1769, Matthew 7: 15–23). A similar reference occurs in Luke 6: 43–45 and in
Matthew 12: 33 (King James Bible, 1769): “Either make the tree good, and his fruit
good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by his
fruit”.
Among Protestants, Matthew 7 (King James Bible, 1769) is perhaps the most
common of several scriptural warnings as it provides a basis for demonising the
Roman Catholic clergy (Johnstone, 2006, p. 47). Roman Catholic clerics were
depicted as “deceitful workers [that] fashion themselves like unto the apostles of
Christ” and as Satan’s servants, who were instructed to use the scriptures in their
deceits (Becon, 1844, p. 405 as cited in Johnstone, 2006, p. 47). Therefore, reformers
like William Tyndale also employed the same scriptural reference (“false prophets”)
to denounce the Roman Catholic Church-State in the sixteenth-century (Tyndale,
1849, pp. 121–8; Johnstone, 2006, p. 47) (see also Sect. 10.4.2.1).
Yet, historical Protestants have broadly understood “corruption” as being a
phenomenon associated with a demonic influence which, therefore, permeates all
humankind, not just state churches or governments (see also Sect. 10.4.2.1). As
Johnstone (2006) observes:
Godly writings give evidence of an in-depth knowledge of the conventions of Protestant
demonism, particularly the defining nature of man’s corruption through the fall of Adam for
his constant persecution by the Devil, and his reliance on God for protection. ‘Sin and
corruption conceived in the heart of man is the spawn of the devil’. . .(p. 109)
The term corruption is central to this book. It is discussed in detail in Sect. 4.1 and
in Parts III and V. Those sections explore the different theoretical and empirical
outcomes of corruption and prosperity in those two religious systems claiming to
follow the teachings of Jesus Christ: Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. Apply-
ing Jesus’ parable of “false prophets” (King James Bible, 1769, Matthew 7: 15–23;
Luke 6: 43–45; Matthew 12: 33) extends beyond the clergy to a corrupt religious-
political system, one that uses the name of Jesus (like a false prophet’s) and thus
produces corruption and a lack of prosperity in the respective countries under its
influence (corrupt fruits).
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3.1.1 The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as an Outcome
(or Criterion Variable)
Corruption is difficult to study empirically (Treisman, 2000). Actual corruption is
hard to measure, and standardising perceptions may prove challenging. Thus, for
instance, if a society has high ethical standards, its citizens may perceive small
infractions as outright corrupt, whereas a society with different standards may be
perceived as less corrupt even if objectively measured as more corrupt. Therefore,
corruption is culture sensitive.
However, expertise and subjective perceptions are the only information on
corruption levels widely available for cross-country empirical research
(i.e. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI); World Bank; see Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 3;
Gingerich, 2013). The coverage of such aggregate indicators (i.e. CPI) makes them
the most empirically researched corruption measures, provided one assumes that
they correlate with real corruption levels (Lambsdorff, 1999, 2006; Mauro, 1995;
Habib and Zurawicki as cited in Gingerich, 2013). The different cross-national
corruption ratings established by diverse organisations using various techniques
are highly correlated, both with each other and across time (Treisman, 2000, p. 400).
Some studies at the individual (i.e. national) micro-level employ more objective
data (i.e. convictions for corruption) and higher conceptual precision than cross-
country research using aggregate indicators (Gingerich, 2013). Nevertheless, such
micro-level data is unavailable and not standardised across countries. Furthermore, it
suffers from validity issues (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 3).
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International
(TI) (2016) is a composite index. It draws on the corruption indices of 11 independent
institutions (including the World Economic Forum, the European Intelligence Unit,
and the World Bank). The index summarises perceptions of business people and
country experts around the world, both residents and expatriates. CPI values range
from 0 to 10. Lower values indicate a higher degree of corruption (i.e. a lesser degree
of transparency).
The empirical part of this study focuses on 65 countries in the Americas and
Europe. I selected the CPI-aggregated measure on account of its comprehensive
coverage and ideal availability to perform a cross-country analysis and to compare
the findings with previous studies.
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3.2 The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)
as a Prosperity Proxy (Outcome or Criterion Variable)
(A’)2
I define prosperity in its broader sense—of being successful—rather than restricted
to economic terms (i.e. GDP). On this basis, I link the concepts of “prosperity” and
“competitiveness” (GCI), which both result from related identical conditions. The
World Economic Forum developed the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) as a
comprehensive proxy of prosperity to track the performance of nearly 140 countries
in terms of twelve categories: institutions, technological readiness, innovation,
higher education and training, health and primary education, business sophistication,
infrastructure, macro-economic environment, labour market efficiency, market size,
financial market development, and goods market efficiency. Through empirical and
theoretical research, the World Economic Forum identified such categories as
determinants of productivity which in turn is the primary determinant of economic
growth and prosperity (World Economic Forum, 2016).
Thus, the World Economic Forum defines competitiveness as “the set of institu-
tions, policies and factors that determine a country’s level of productivity, which in
turn, sets the level of prosperity that the economy can achieve” (World Economic
Forum, 2016, p.11). Accordingly, I often use prosperity and competitiveness (GCI)
indiscriminately.
The GCI is a highly comprehensive measure and ranks countries on a prosperity
scale. The existence of institutions, education, transparency, and other factors
already included within the GCI (or prosperity) means a significant advantage for
the purposes of this study. First, these variables are closely related, theoretically and
empirically, and thus belong to the same “prosperity phenomenon” (GCI). Conse-
quently, their causality need not be discussed, as they are not isolated but aggregated
in the GCI. Second, such aggregated factors (GCI) allow focusing on other back-
ground (i.e. exogenous) causes determining the “competitiveness phenomenon”.
Therefore, I focus on potential (i.e. theoretically conceivable) exogenous variables
not included in the GCI. These, for example, include religion and culture, legal
origin and state religion (as background proxies for institutions), or environment and
geography.
The GCI (and its drivers) also correlate with indicators of equality (i.e. Inclusive
Growth Performance, Gini coefficient) and environmental sustainability, exhibiting
win-win synergies (rather than trade-offs) between these factors (World Economic
2Originally published as “Outcome: Prosperity and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)” in:
Garcia Portilla, J. (2019). “Ye Shall Know Them by Their Fruits”: Prosperity and Institutional
Religion in Europe and the Americas. Religions, 10(6), 362. MDPI AG. Retrieved from https://doi.
org/10.3390/rel10060362
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
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Forum, 2012; World Economic Forum, 2019; World Economic Forum & European
Investment Bank, 2017).
By way of illustration, throughout the Holy Scriptures, “prosperity” is often
associated with following the moral commandments of the law (see Table 8.4).
For instance, “Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may
prosper in all that ye do” (King James Bible, 1769, Deuteronomy 29:9). In turn, the
Bible links short- or long-term misfortunes as both being consequences of rebellion:
if thou wilt not hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe to do all his
commandments and his statutes which I command thee this day; that all these curses shall
come upon thee, and overtake thee (King James Bible, 1769, Deuteronomy 28:15).
This principle refers exclusively to the free-will moral observance of the law in
the Bible and is not to be confused with the blind obedience of hierarchical
structures and dogmas. Obedience of hierarchies often enforces coercion instead of
a rational internalisation of values, and has, in turn, a negative influence on pros-
perity (Guiso et al., 2006; Licht et al., 2007; Tabellini, 2005), (see Sects. 8.1.1 and
10.3). Protestant countries have applied the biblical moral principles of the Deca-
logue in their legal systems (Table 8.4). In contrast, Catholic countries have mostly
based their legal systems on the hierarchical Roman and Canon law, which mostly
derives from the Catholic Sacraments and Greek philosophy rather than from the
biblical commandments (Table 8.3).
Chapter 4 and Appendices 4 and 5 indicate clear distribution patterns for com-
petitiveness and corruption in the countries studied here: high competitiveness and
low corruption in traditionally Protestant countries; lower competitiveness and
higher corruption in traditional Roman Catholic or Orthodox countries.
3.3 Competitiveness and Transparency as Prosperity
Proxies
The lack of competitiveness, corruption, income inequality, and policy distortions
are strongly associated empirically (Rose-Ackerman, 2006); (Lambsdorff, 1999).
However, deriving clear causality arguments from these features is problematic.
While corruption, for instance, may cause the other variables, it is at the same time
also likely to result from these (Lambsdorff, 1999). Thus, the causes and the
consequences of prosperity (and corruption) are difficult to distinguish by consider-
ing these variables.
3.3.1 Economic Indicators and Corruption
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is the most robust variable related to
corruption across empirical studies as wealthier countries tend to exhibit less
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corruption (Paldam, 2001); (Treisman, 2000). Goldsmith’s (1999) sample of
66 countries found a negative correlation between corruption and different indicators
of economic freedom. Paldam’s (2002) study of 77 countries reached similar results,
including more explanatory variables.
No apparent doubt exists about a robust negative correlation between GDP per
capita and corruption. However, similar agreement exists that no clear causality can
be derived from that correlation (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 24). Causation may run from
low economic growth to corruption or from corruption to low growth or, and this is
more likely, in both directions, thus creating virtuous or vicious loops. However,
assuming economic growth as the primary cure for corruption amounts to simplistic
and misleading “wishful thinking” (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xvi).
Although various scholars have attempted to establish a causal link between
corruption and prosperity (or vice versa) (e.g. Treisman, 2000, p. 430), causal
associations suffer from pressing endogeneity issues (Lambsdorff, 2006). In prac-
tice, both variables should be interrelated in both directions (Lambsdorff, 1999);
(Morris, 2003); (Uildriks, 2009). Therefore, I consider the two variables compli-
mentarily (as a whole outcome), since their causal separation might be neither useful
nor desirable for the specific purposes of this study (see Fig. 2.1).
In fact, the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) as a prosperity proxy usefully
includes the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (World Economic Forum, 2016).
Consequently, I subsume both competitiveness and corruption under the prosperity
umbrella.
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Chapter 4
Diagnosing Corruption and Prosperity
in Europe and the Americas (A)
This chapter diagnoses prosperity in Europe and the Americas based on three
indicators: Corruption (CPI), Social Progress (SPI), and Competitiveness (GCI).
GCI and CPI have already been introduced and correspond to the outcome that is
modelled empirically (Parts V and VI). SPI will be introduced in Sect. 4.2.
4.1 Corruption in Europe and the Americas (CPI)
Figure 4.1 displays a clear distinction between two trends. On the one hand, the
USA, Canada, Australia, and Northern Europe tend to be perceived as the most
transparent regions in the world. In contrast, with few exceptions, Latin America and
the rest of the world are perceived as corrupt to highly corrupt.
Countries in Northern Europe, including the UK (which colonised North Amer-
ica), rank along the same values as the USA and Canada (see green circles in the
map). In contrast, southern Europe (Greece, Italy and especially Spain and Portugal,
the colonisers of Central and South America) exhibits higher corruption. Interest-
ingly, Uruguay and Chile (the least traditionally Catholic countries in South Amer-
ica) have unusually lower CPI levels than the rest of Latin America. Parts V and VI
further analyse this situation based on empirical observations and case studies.
Pervasive mistrust and corruption mar the social and public sphere in most Latin
American countries (Uildriks, 2009, p. 6). Corruption and mistrust profoundly
Some parts of this chapter were originally published as “Diagnosis: Prosperity in Europe and the
Americas” in: Garcia Portilla, J. (2019). “Ye Shall Know Them by Their Fruits”: Prosperity and
Institutional Religion in Europe and the Americas. Religions, 10(6), 362. MDPI AG. Retrieved
from https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10060362
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY)
license.
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hamper social prosperity in different regions (Fukuyama, 1995; North, 1998). Both
factors seriously affect coexistence and contribute to social fragmentation (Mockus
et al., 2012, p. 6).
Similarly, Luzzani (2002) observed that cultural acceptance of bribery in Latin
America makes public administration work more smoothly in this region, combined
with Latin America’s generalised “inadequate laws, irreverence for the law even
when it is adequate, and the impunity of those who are corrupt” (Luzzani, 2002,
p. 168). His conclusions coincide with Mockus (2001), who found that openly illegal
and frequently even morally reprehensible behaviour is culturally accepted or
tolerated in specific contexts in Latin America (p. 3).
Thus, rather than being a problem solely of political institutions, corruption is
deeply ingrained in the cultural background of societies. In Latin America, corrup-
tion is widespread not just within state agencies but also in broader society, and it is
an inextricable part of how most things are achieved. Indeed, within the continent as
a whole, most aspects of public life are notoriously corrupt (Uildriks, 2009, p. 8).
Equally, for Diament (1991) “corruption in Latin America is not merely a social
deviation, it is a way of life” (p. 20).
Within Europe and the Americas, Latin America ranks highest on the Corruption
Perception Index, followed by Southern Europe (Fig. 4.1). Historically, the Roman
Catholic and Orthodox Church-States have dominated the institutions and culture of
those areas of the world (Inglehart & Baker, 2000); (Gill, 1998). Is this a coincidence
or not?
Exploring the moral, cultural, and legal roots of the Latin American ethos calls for
reference to the continent’s religious origins. Political power and the hegemony of
the Roman Catholic Church have been directly related across Latin America since
the Conquest (Munevar, 2008). The closely intertwined connections between reli-
gion and politics since the Conquest and before have been historically fundamental
to the Latin American social and institutional ethos. Church and state have provided
Fig. 4.1 Corruption Perception Index (adapted from Transparency International [TI], 2016). Used
with permission
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each other with legitimation and institutional, material, and ideological support
(Levine, 1981, p. 3).
In Latin America, these institutional relations can be traced back to their
European (i.e. Iberian) colonial roots (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Engerman &
Sokoloff, 2002). Ever since the Middle Ages, the Spanish and Portuguese con-
querors implemented a hierarchical, elitist, and corporatist model of Christendom
that was sanctioned by the Church (Beltrán, 2008; Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981).
Although far from monolithic, historically the Roman Catholic Church-State has
gained a widespread controversial reputation, partly due to medieval institutions
such as the Inquisition or the indulgences. Systematic examples such as the abuse
perpetrated by the conquerors and legitimated by the Church in Latin America
(Navarro, 2016), or the current children abuse scandals, are well-known worldwide.
Although indulgences may no longer be valid as initially promulgated by Pope Leo
X in 1517 in the Taxa Camarae, the Jesuit Jorge Bergoglio, also known as “Pope
Francis”, employed this concept in his papal Bull Misericordiae Vultus (2015): “A
Jubilee also entails the granting of indulgences” (Bull of Indiction of the Extraordi-
nary Jubilee of Mercy, n. 22). Bergoglio has also used the concept of indulgences to
promote events like the Catholic World Youth Day in 2013 (Kington, 2013).
Similarly, the Vatican has recently issued a “Decree of the Apostolic Penitentiary
on the granting of special Indulgences to the faithful in the current pandemic,
20.03.2020” (COVID-19).
Religion is an essential underlying driver of corruption (or transparency) in the
state and society (Lambsdorff, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 2006). Exploring the influ-
ence of the Roman Catholic tradition on corruption and prosperity in Latin America
“remains an urgent priority for future research” (Treisman, 2000, p. 442). This study
follows this call by broadly comparing prosperity and corruption in Europe and the
Americas.
4.2 Social Progress in Europe and the Americas (SPI)
The Social Progress Index (SPI) is a comprehensive framework for measuring social
progress independently and complementarily to GDP. Economic performance alone
(GDP) does not fully explain social progress (variables have a correlation of 0,78)
(Porter et al., 2015). The SPI is a robust and holistic measurement framework for
national social and environmental performance. Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland
have the highest SPI scores in the world (around 88 each). Mediterranean countries
score around 80. All Latin American countries rank in the middle range of world
distribution (from Uruguay, 79, to Guyana, 60) (Porter et al., 2015).
Figure 4.2 shows the different SPI scores in the Americas. Following the histor-
ical trend, Canada and the USA have better prosperity conditions (i.e. SPI and GCI)
than all Latin American countries. Uruguay has the highest SPI value in Latin
America (and is therefore one of the cases studied in detail below).
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4.3 Competitiveness in Europe and the Americas (GCI)
Switzerland has the highest GCI score worldwide. The “advanced economies”
(USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Northern Europe) follow in the top
90–100% of the most competitive countries. The next group (70–80% of the most
competitive countries) includes Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Ireland. Latin
America and the Caribbean rank among the 40–80% most competitive regions
(World Economic Forum, 2016).
Except for some countries (e.g. Uruguay and Chile), the CPI, GCI, and SPI
confirm a long-established trend: Latin America is the only region in the world
that is both “third-world” and “Christian” (Levine, 1981, p. 35; Grier, 1997). The
next section briefly presents several approaches to explaining prosperity differences
across countries.
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Chapter 5
Conditions (Predictor Variables): Theories
Explaining Prosperity Differences (B), (C),
(D), (E)
Numerous theories attempt to explain cross-country prosperity and corruption dif-
ferences, which are empirically associated with a broad range of highly correlated
factors (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; La Porta et al., 1999; Michalopoulos &
Papaioannou, 2017; Rose-Ackerman, 2006). The main problem consists in isolating
the underlying triggers of prosperity and corruption, as causes are often also conse-
quences operating simultaneously in feedback loops (Lambsdorff, 2006). Essen-
tially, potential prosperity factors can be clustered into three groups: (1) cultural and
religious values; (2) institutions and economic growth; (3) environment and geog-
raphy (Fig. 2.1, Sect. 5.7, and Appendices 1–3 explain the theories, categories,
variables, and sources used here in greater detail). This chapter will be limited to
defining the conceptual scope of each of these groups of theories for this study
(i.e. predictor variables—see Fig. 2.1). Part III (Theoretical Foundations) will further
explain the relationships (arrows—see Fig. 2.1) between these groups of theories
(predictor variables or conditions) and prosperity (criterion variables or outcome).
Culture and institutions are comprehensive, interdependent concepts and religion
interacts as a subset within them both (see Fig. 2.1 and Chap. 10). Institutions and
culture have evolved and interacted with mutual feedback effects, thus determining
the prosperity of nations. Empirical evidence supports the claim that causality exists
in both directions. Culture may change in different ways depending on the type of
institutions, while institutions may work differently depending on the cultural
context (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 938).
5.1 Culture (C)
Abundant empirical research demonstrates that cultural variables determine several
economic choices (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Guiso et al., 2006; Volonté, 2015).
Cultural variables “play an important role in corporate governance practices around
the world” (Volonté, 2015, p. 78) and “they even affect the speed of development
© The Author(s) 2022
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and the wealth of nations” (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 898). However, culture is a
vague concept with no agreed-upon definition. Moreover, culture is a notoriously
difficult term to quantify (Paldam, 2001, p. 383), and “difficult to operationalize”
(Volonté, 2015, p. 80). Similarly, Alesina and Giuliano contend that defining
“culture is an arduous task” since theoretical and empirical definitions of culture
are often not easily related (p. 899).
Theoretically, culture has been characterised in a myriad of forms, frequently
being defined in relation to rituals, practices, customs, and ways of life (Droogers,
2004, p. 217). The author also observes the empirical challenges of culture as a
concept. Anthropologists have concentrated on culture as a fundamental capacity,
viewing people as “meaning-makers” (Crick as cited in Droogers, 2004, p.17). For
Droogers, the human capacity to create meaning defines culture. Yet, meaning
occurs in an intangible, supernatural reality, which is non-empirically verifiable
(p. 218).
Comparably, other definitions of culture exhibit similar empirical challenges. For
instance, Geertz (1973) defines culture as “a historically transmitted pattern of
meanings embodied in symbols” (p. 89), while Greif (1994) observes
Cultural beliefs are the ideas and thoughts common to several people that govern interac-
tion—between these people and among them, their gods, and other groups—and differ from
knowledge in that they are not empirically discovered or analytically proved (Greif as cited
in Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 900).
In turn, Alesina and Giuliano refer to “culture as values and beliefs”, but they
argue that the theoretical literature on culture has also been ambiguous in this regard.
On the empirical (quantitative) side that links culture to economic/institutional out-
comes, the authors observe that
. . .most papers (if not all) follow the definition adopted by Guiso et al. (2006), where culture
is defined as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation.” Empirical papers, therefore,
combine values and beliefs in the same definition. (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 900).
Nevertheless, there is no agreement on the empirical constitutive elements/vari-
ables of culture. For instance, Alesina and Giuliano explain the following “cultural
traits”: trust, family ties, individualism, generalised morality, work attitudes, while
Herskovits (1952, 1966) describes, among others, the following cultural elements:
technology, economic and social organisation, religion, magic, art, folklore, music,
and language. Meanwhile, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior
Effectiveness Research Programme (GLOBE) further develops the proposal of
Hofstede (2001), presenting the following “cultural dimensions”: power distance,
uncertainty avoidance, human orientation, collectivism, assertiveness, gender egal-
itarianism, future orientation, performance orientation (House et al., 2004). Yet,
measurements of cultural variables (e.g. GLOBE (House et al., 2004); Hofstede,
2001) often overlap with institutions (Volonté, 2015, p. 79) and lack data in many
countries in Europe and the Americas. Therefore, this study has excluded GLOBE
and Hofstede datasets from the empirical (quantitative and QCA) settings.
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For Volonté (2015), attempts to measure culture face two challenges: First, it is
problematic to isolate analytically cultural-specific effects given their identification
with other national formal institutional characteristics (e.g. law). Intra-country
cultural heterogeneity is thus often ignored. Second, no clearly observable variables
constituting culture exist.
However, several empirical studies have identified three proxies of culture as
appropriate: religion (the most prominent in the literature) (Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Alesina et al., 2003; Granato et al., 1996; Guiso et al., 2006; Mazar, 2008; Paldam,
2001; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; Volonté, 2015), language (Alesina et al., 2003;
Mazar, 2008; Volonté, 2015), and ethnic measures (Alesina et al., 2003; Guiso et al.,
2006). Of course, other extraneous elements can also be present, but these three are
the most operational. In fact, the combination of these three cultural proxies is
consistent with the historical “cultural project” promoted by the Roman Catholic
Church (i.e. Hispanicism in Latin America). This “cultural weapon” has specifically
consisted of the triad “religion, language, and race” (Figueroa, 2016); (see Chap. 21).
Thus, the integration of these three predominant proxies can empirically (quantita-
tively) define culture in this study. This empirical definition of culture is practical for
this research since it can be easily operationalised (e.g. data availability) and does
not directly overlap with institutions. Furthermore, this narrow approach has the
advantage of reducing the risks of reverse causality (thus focusing on the causal
arrow where culture affects prosperity, rather than the contrary) (Guiso et al., 2006,
p. 25). Therefore, two-thirds of the empirical setting (correlations and QCA) include
the proportion of the population that belongs to the main ethnicities, languages, and
religions in each country in Europe and the Americas. Qualitatively, however,
culture may be referred to in a broader sense in this study, to include other elements
such as values (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015) or power distance (Hofstede, 2001).
5.1.1 Cultural Determinism of Prosperity
Despite the abundant empirical research demonstrating that cultural variables deter-
mine economic outcomes (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Guiso et al., 2006; Volonté,
2015; Hofstede, 2001; GLOBE (House et al., 2004)), culture has been heavily
criticised as a theory that “does not work” as a determinant of prosperity (Acemoglu
& Robinson, 2012; McSweeney, 2015).
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) illustrate how cultural differences are not sig-
nificant factors. For instance, while North Korea is one of the world’s poorest
countries, South Korea is one of the most prosperous despite both countries sharing
the same language and cultural background (p. 43). Likewise, the authors exemplify
the vast prosperity differences between Nogales’s high quality of life (in Arizona,
USA) and its poor southern neighbour (Nogales, Sonora, Mexico). The inhabitants
of both Nogales––i.e. Arizona and Sonora––have the same cultural background.
Yet, the Mexican Nogales face high crime rates, corruption, poor education and an
inadequate health system (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 13). Nevertheless, the
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authors accept that cultural theory can be helpful as social and cultural standards
matter, are difficult to change, and may support institutional differences.
In his critique, McSweeney (2015) argued that cultural determinism makes it
impossible to define a “national culture” and that the quantitative approaches in
cultural theory underestimate the subnational levels. The author highlights several
inconsistencies in the main assumptions that ground the theoretical contributions in
cultural and management theory (GLOBE, Hofstede, Hall, among others).
McSweeney mentions the difficulties of defining “culture” and “national culture”
within a geographical domain. Another issue concerns the misleading acceptance of
an invariant or stable “culture”. Furthermore, citing numerous sources, McSweeney
criticises the statistical or numerical approach of cultural studies.
Firstly, McSweeney discredits any notion claiming that culture permanently and
predictably influences, affects, impacts, manifests, or has effects, consequences, or
outcomes on the social behaviour of defined populations (McSweeney, 2015, p. 16).
He maintains that such claims simply point to correlations, statistical associations, or
relationships that provide no evidence for causality (p. 18). McSweeney’s objection
is very valid. Generally, it has been wrongly and widely accepted in science that
correlations are necessarily associated with causality. Indeed, a statistical correlation
might be spurious, while causal inferencing is a more complicated process. This
study approaches this problem by adopting a mixed methods approach consisting of
qualitative and QCA methods to establish causal inference (see Methodology,
Chap. 14).
Secondly, McSweeney challenges the notion of geographical boundaries as being
appropriate for defining countries and culture (he cites various examples, including
India, Turkey, or the former Czechoslovakia). Although these examples are histor-
ically accurate, they do not serve to generalise a theory that accounts for reality. For
example, if we accept that no boundaries exist, how could we explain the institu-
tional and regulatory differences that exist in every country? Why do some countries
require a visa for citizens from other countries? Why can some countries provide
higher levels of freedom to their citizens than others? In this sense, institutional
theory and history provide better answers to these questions (Acemoglu & Robin-
son, 2012).
Thirdly, McSweeney claims that the link that GLOBE, Hofstede, Hall, and others
establish between culture and actions on a national level provides zero empirical
evidence and that their conclusions are biased. This strongly discredits the empirical
work undertaken by GLOBE, Hofstede, Hall, and others. Despite McSweeney’s
objections, Hofstede’s and GLOBE’s pioneering quantitative approaches have been
helpful in a myriad of empirical (quantitative) studies (Staeheli, 2003; Stulz &
Williamson, 2003; Volonté, 2015). No single theory or science can devise a per-
fectly rigorous empirical model, including all possible variables and all the desired
representativeness. It is essential to have at least one point of departure, which
explains why these works are considered here.
Fourthly, related to the previous criticism, the importance of subnational hetero-
geneity is also a valid point raised by McSweeney. However, in practical terms, it
would be virtually impossible to collect empirical information on a microlevel from
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every single town and even community in the whole world in order to generate a
satisfactory model in McSweeney’s terms. Moreover, from an institutional point of
view, (regulatory, political, and institutional) differences exist between countries as a
whole (as discussed) and therefore produce different prosperity outcomes. This
argument is discussed in the following sections and empirical findings of this
study (see Sect. 8.3.2; Fig. 8.3 and Table 8.2; Parts V–VII; Appendix 4.2).
Finally, although McSweeney (2015) raises crucial issues and heavily criticises
GLOBE, Hofstede, Hall, and other authors, he proposes neither a new model nor a
better empirical approach. Citing Wagner (1975), he limits himself to asserting that
speaking about national cultures is futile. However, it is better to have a point of
departure than none. Science is about generating information and insights that allow
us either to explain or to predict reality.
5.2 Institutions and Economic Growth (D)
Theoretically, institutions are “the rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990, p. 3).
Institutions can be either formal, i.e. official and openly codified (e.g. constitutional
laws), or informal, i.e. as an unwritten rule and socially shared values (Helmke &
Levitsky, 2004). Informal institutions are frequently more persistent than formal
ones (North, 1997) and pertain to how laws are enforced (Woodruff, 2006). Empir-
ically, North (1990); Alesina and Giuliano (2015); and Volonté (2015) have defined
informal institutions as a synonym of culture given the practical overlaps of these
concepts. Consequently, isolating institutions empirically “would be possible only if
one counts formal institutions (formal legal systems, formal regulation) as institu-
tions” (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, p. 902). In turn, Acemoglu et al. (2006) refer to
political and economic institutions in their definition, considering institutions as
mechanisms through which social choices are determined and implemented.
Institutional theory and other related approaches such as economic theory provide
the most robust empirical and theoretical explanations of why some countries are
more prosperous than others. For North, the radically different evolution of Anglo-
and Latin America reflects the imposition of distinct metropolitan institutions on
each colony (North, 1990). The main argument advanced by Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2012) is that institutions are decisive when explaining the differences and
inequality among nations. For the authors, geographical or cultural theories can be
influential, but they are useless in terms of clarifying why countries ultimately fail or
thrive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Other economists such as Preston (2012) have
also developed extensive theoretical approaches on this issue. Yet, different contro-
versies remain regarding which, where, and how institutions matter for economic
prosperity (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Glaeser et al., 2004; Woodruff, 2006), (for
details, see Chap. 8).
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5.2.1 Colonialism as an Overarching Explanation
and as the Overlapping of Cultural Proxies
The attributes of the colonising countries have greatly determined present-day
institutions in the former colonies, both informally (i.e. culture) and formally
(i.e. laws) (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 21; North, 1990; Volonté, 2015). Therefore,
the colonial legacy of such countries is associated with various factors (e.g. religion,
language, and legislation). Typically, Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries
are historically Catholic and apply French civil law, whereas English-speaking
countries are historically Protestant and apply common law (Volonté, 2015);
(Mazar, 2008) (see Chaps. 8, 9, and 10).
Furthermore, most countries in Europe and the Americas were colonies them-
selves. Most Latin American countries are former Spanish and Portuguese colonies,
while the USA and Canada are former British colonies. At the same time, European
colonisers (e.g. Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, or Holland) were
colonies of the Roman Empire. This colonial (rather than the indigenous) heritage
has substantially shaped institutions in most of the colonised countries. Colonisers
often transferred or imposed their solid institutions and status quo to their colonies.
Thus, when “the conquerors colonised much of the world, they brought with them
their culture (laws and institutions); they settled and shaped the present public
administration” (Mazar, 2008, p. 176). While many former colonies revised their
legislation after independence, only few have shifted far away from the original code
(Mazar, 2008; Merryman & Pérez, 2015; World Bank, International Finance Cor-
poration & Oxford University Press, 2004).
The Protestant Reformation led to an institutional deviation of the medieval status
quo in its countries of influence (see below). Such deviation was transposed to the
colonies. In turn, Spanish and Portuguese colonialism upheld the medieval status
quo by emphasising the authoritarian and feudal-hierarchical roles of the Roman
Church and the states (Andreski as cited in Grier, 1997, p.47; Acemoglu et al.,
2001).
Religion and the state were united for the majority of colonial history. The state
enforced religion, meaning that it was mostly not a matter of individual choice.
However, the modern sovereign state system emerged from the Thirty Year War
waged by Protestants against the imposition of Roman Catholicism by Ferdinand II
(leading to The Peace of Westphalia in 1648). The separation of church and state
occurred first and foremost in Protestant territories since the Reformation (Snyder,
2011; Wilson, 2009; Witte, 2002). This separation established itself as a driving
force of prosperity (Grier, 1997; Fanfani, 1936).
Nonetheless, colonialism has largely been treated separately from religion
(or even as a competing explanation). This conceptual error has led scholars to
empirically test endogenous variables. On the one hand, religion is typically reduced
to its proportion of adherents (which can normally result from the effect of historical
institutions and more recent trends, such as Pentecostalism or Agnosticism) (Sect.
10.4.3). On the other, colonial institutions include the historical and institutional
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influence of religion (which is more important than the number of adherents)
(e.g. Protestant British colonies as against Roman Catholic Spanish/Portuguese
colonies). Therefore, it is not surprising that empirical studies such as Grier (1997)
find that Protestantism (adherents) does not significantly lessen the gap between the
economic performance of former colonies notwithstanding an overwhelming corre-
lation between Protestantism and economic growth (GDP). Thus, the weight of
British colonial institutions (including Protestantism) in historically Protestant coun-
tries ought to be more decisive than the current Protestant (mostly Pentecostal)
adherents within historically Catholic countries, for instance.
Furthermore, Woodberry’s (2012) empirical findings also help better understand
that religion and colonialism have been intervening and complementary mechanisms
rather than competing explanations. Colonial institutions, including religion
transported from Europe, were highly influential in the New World (Woodberry,
2012, p. 244). Thus, North America, for instance, inherited the same institutional
outcomes that distinguished Great Britain from Spain or Portugal as far back as the
Protestant Reformation (Sects. 8.2.2 and 8.3.4).
5.3 Religion (Cultural and Institutional Influences) (B)1
5.3.1 The Institutional Influence of Religion Has Been More
Decisive to Prosperity than the Cultural Effect
of Religious Affiliation (Adherents)
At least two dimensions of the influence of religion need to be taken seriously:
institutional and cultural (adherents) (Manow, 2004, p. 9). Yet, religion is mostly
considered as an important expression of culture (Guiso et al., 2006; Mazar, 2008;
Volonté, 2015). For Anderson (2007), “culture was historically shaped in large part
by religion and because most religious traditions sat uneasily with democratic ideas
and practices, it was hard to see democracy thriving outside the Anglo-Protestant
world” (p.383).
Furthermore, religion is usually assumed to be central to economic development
(Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 533). Thus, many empirical studies associating
cultural variables with economic outcomes widely follow the Protestant ethics-based
theory proposed by Max Weber. The work ethics Weberian theory is considered
“. . .the most famous link between culture and economic development” (Acemoglu
et al., 2006, p. 401).
1Originally published as “Introduction” in: Garcia Portilla, J. (2019). “Ye Shall Know Them by
Their Fruits”: Prosperity and Institutional Religion in Europe and the Americas. Religions, 10(6),
362. MDPI AG. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10060362 © 2019 by the author.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under
the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
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Accordingly, most empirical studies linking religion and economics associate
variables of religious adherence and economic performance. The dominant research
paradigm has centred on the influence of the proportion of believers (so-called
market share or cultural influence of religion) on prosperity/corruption, but has
mostly disregarded the institutional influence of religion. Consequently, sociological
explanations of the prosperity–religion nexus are often either solely Weberian (work
ethic) or sheer hypothesis. This means that they have not further developed or been
related to other disciplines and historical sources (see Sect. 7.1).
Studies such as La Porta et al. (1999) and Barro (1997) have effectively isolated
the effects of religion adherence (yet, not of religiosity) on political, economic, and
legal outcomes (McCleary & Barro, 2006). However, the Weberian cultural argu-
ment that the beliefs of individual Protestants led to higher productivity has failed to
work in several other cases (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2006; Cantoni, 2015;
Delacroix & Nielsen, 2001). Quantitative studies analysing the influence of institu-
tions (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2006) or cultural determinants (Hofstede, 2001) on
prosperity have also reduced religion to its adherents’ influence on institutions,
culture, or prosperity. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) dedicate an
entire chapter to criticising Weberian Protestant ethics as a theory that is unable to
explain prosperity differences across countries. Likewise, Hofstede (2001) states that
industrialisation is what brings people to believe in more “inclusive” religious
systems such as Protestantism, rather than vice versa. Such assertions result from
empirically analysing the proportion of believers while disregarding the historical
and institutional influence of religion. Thus, considering religion only as a cultural
factor (i.e. adherents) results in trivialised or misunderstood relations between
religion, institutions, and prosperity/transparency. Moreover, the difficulty of sepa-
rating the effect of religious adherents from other possible (and varying) causes of
prosperity (e.g. institutions and geography) adds endogeneity to cross-country
studies (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 533).
Nevertheless, the relationship between religious institutions and the state is
identified as being the most important explanatory variable in the theory of Religious
Competition (based on Rational Choice Theory; see Sect. 7.2) (Chaves & Cann,
1992; Wilde et al., 2010). Yet, the effect of religious institutions has been largely
ignored, favouring religious pluralism as a means to measure competition (Olson,
1993; Wilde et al., 2010).
Undoubtedly, robust statistical data exists for nominal religion adherents in cross-
country studies. Hence, most of the literature on religion as a corruption/prosperity
determinant has only considered the proportion of adherents, even if religion cannot
be reduced to this sole indicator. The ample data available on religious adherents
may partly explain why most empirical literature utilises this variable as a proxy of
the cultural effects of religion on prosperity/corruption.
The objective of this section (and book) is not to critique the mostly studied
cultural influence of religion but to concentrate on the institutional path of religion,
which the author believes is more crucial to prosperity in the long term. Indeed, the
historical effect of religious institutions (i.e. state–church, law, education) is more
lasting and pervasive than current individual religious choices based on “freewill”
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(Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Merryman & Pérez, 2007;
Witte, 2002). Guiso et al. (2006) observed in this regard
. . .people choose neither their parents nor the religion of their parents [. . .], parents have a
natural tendency to teach their children what they have learned from their own parents,
without a full reassessment of the current optimality of those beliefs. . . (p. 32, 25)
In fact, the individual’s religious orientations are largely the resultant heritage of
the historical institutional interactions of state and church. According to Vallier
(1970), this is not necessarily connected to the influence of individual’s religious
beliefs. Rather, it is related to the institutional repercussions that religious corpo-
rations have on the operation of civil power structures, social groups, and on the
continuity of general ground rules that affect role processes and daily exchanges
(Vallier, 1970, pp. 157–58).
In the end, religion and politics were quite evidently integrated until the Protes-
tant Reformation. Thus, institutional religion preceded and gave rise to the state
(Snyder, 2011). Certainly, a key feature of various relevant studies (e.g. Becker
et al., 2016; Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Gill, 1998; Woodberry, 2012) has been
the identification of Protestantism as a destabilising element of institutional Roman
Catholic hegemony. Such an element has proven more important than the effects of
religious believers per se. The influence of institutional religion is pervasive to this
day, both in Europe and in the Americas (Figs. 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3; Table 8.2).
Furthermore, the crucial element that determines the dominant religion in a
country or region has been how the state has supported that religion. The fate of
the Reformations was ultimately dictated by rulers’ decisions on which religious
denomination to follow, which causes to endorse, and how harshly to suppress the
propagation of heterodox doctrines. These choices were so crucial that no Protestant
success has ever been achieved in Catholic-Protestant disputes without either state
or foreign assistance. The counter-reformation eventually regained territories with
large Protestant communities that persisted under Catholic jurisdictions, such as
Hungary, Bohemia, and parts of France (te Brake as cited in Nexon, 2011, p. 152).
However, it is not always easy to empirically differentiate between cultural and
institutional influences of religion as they are well connected (Barro & McCleary,
2005). Barro and McCleary (2005) developed a close empirical approach to institu-
tional religion in their classification of “State religion” (an independent indicator
considered in the QCA analysis in Chap. 16). “State religion” is, however, mostly
also related to population adherence and does not account, for instance, for the
international agreements (concordats) between the Roman See and individual coun-
tries. My study brackets those indicators and thus lends theoretical and empirical
weight both to the institutional (e.g. including concordats) and, to a lesser extent, the
cultural (mainly operationalised as adherents) influences of religion.
Therefore, in this study, religion contains “institutional variables” (e.g. state
religion, concordats) as a subset of institutions, and “cultural variables”
(e.g. nominal religion adherents) as a subset of culture.
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5.3.2 Definitions of Protestantism and Roman Catholicism
Engelhardt (2007) observes that Protestantism and Roman Catholicism have histor-
ically defined themselves as being set against each other in a “mutually defining
dialectic” (p.28). The Protestants first defined themselves “in their protest against the
heresies of Rome” (e.g. papal universal jurisdiction, purgatory, and indulgences)
(p. 37) (see Sect. 10.4.1.3). The author continues, “[b]y default, Protestants thought
themselves constrained to put the Bible in the place the church had traditionally
held” (p. 37). In turn, the “Roman Church then defined itself against the Protestants
in the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and through the Counter Reformation” (p. 29).
5.3.2.1 Definition of Protestantism
Protestants are defined as being members or followers “of several church denomi-
nations denying the universal authority of the Pope and affirming the Reformation
principles of justification by faith alone, the priesthood of all believers, and the
primacy of the Bible as the only source of revealed truth” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.-a).
Likewise, this study refers to Protestants as members of historical Protestant
churches (e.g. Lutherans, Methodists, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, or Presby-
terians) (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 7). The Protestant Reformation is defined as
a sixteenth century movement in Europe that rejected the Roman Church’s abuses,
initially attempted to modify and improve the Catholic Church, and ultimately
established the historical Protestant and Reformed Churches (Merriam-Webster, n.
d.-a; Cambridge University Dictionary, 2014; Oxford University Press, 2016).
For his part, Köhrsen (2017) distinguishes three streams of Protestantism: (1) His-
torical Protestantism; (2) Non-charismatic forms of evangelicalism; and (3) Charis-
matic forms of evangelicalism (Pentecostalism). For Köhrsen, many historical and
non-charismatic Protestant communities have undergone a charismatic turn, thus
moving them closer to the Pentecostal movement today (pp. 3–5).
Although this book refers to the Pentecostal movements, this research often
emphasises the historical streams of Protestantism, given their accumulated institu-
tional influence (see Sect. 8.3 and Chap. 9). Therefore, historically Protestant
countries are so defined according to their traditional religious heritage (Inglehart
& Baker, 2000), which does not necessarily reflect whether the majority of their
current population are Protestant adherents.
5.3.2.2 Definition of Roman Catholicism
The Roman Catholic Church-State (Roman Catholicism or Romanism) is defined
since the Reformation as “a Christian church having a hierarchy of priests and
bishops under the pope, a liturgy centered in the Mass, veneration of the Virgin
Mary and saints, clerical celibacy, and a body of dogma including transubstantiation
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and papal infallibility” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.-b). Evidently, the Roman Church-
State is not a monolithic entity, but differentiation exists within it (e.g. the Latin Rite
and the Eastern Rites; or contrasting ideologies such as the extreme right (Opus Dei)
and left (liberation theology) (Figueroa, 2016; Werz, 2008), (see Sect. 10.4.1.4). The
Roman Church-State is a complex and diverse organisation (Gill, 1998). As Agnew
(2010) observes
The Roman Catholic Church is perhaps an extreme case of a faith tradition with a highly
organised hierarchical structure that operates worldwide but must adjust itself to local and
world-regional contexts that can challenge and subvert its central doctrines, operational
principles, and political compromises with secular authorities (p. 43).
However, regardless of the internal differentiation, Canon Law has defined the
papacy as the “Supreme Authority of the Church” since the Middle Ages
(i.e. including post-Vatican II) (Canons 330–367; Molano, 1983). Molano observes
that according to Canon Law, the “Supreme Authority of the Church” is the head of
both individual Churches and their congregations, including the Universal Church,
structured as a communion of Churches or “Corpus Ecclesiarum” (Molano, 1983,
p. 20).
Furthermore, the “Vatican is a centralized bureaucracy that oversees the various
aspects of the international Church related to people, theology, education, law,
missions, and ecumenism” (O'Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 196). Since the Vatican
State was created through the Lateran Treaty with Mussolini’s National Fascist
Party, “the Church has, if anything expanded its presence as a unique ‘church-
state’” (Agnew, 2010, p. 46). For instance, the number of states entertaining
diplomatic relations with the Roman See almost quadrupled after Vatican II (from
46 to 177) (Ragazzi, 2009; The Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the
United Nations, 2020).
Therefore, this study considers the Roman Catholic Church not merely as a
religious organisation, but as the oldest state that “inherited the mantle of the
Roman Empire and its imperial territoriality” (Agnew, 2010, p. 41). As the author
explains, “. . .when the Roman Empire collapsed in Western Europe, only the
Church represented institutionally in perpetuity what little was left of the pax
romana” (Ibid).
Although this book highlights the existence of less intransigent sectors, the
research often emphasises the most conservative and intolerant wing of Roman
Catholicism (which has been historically dominant, institutionally) (Figueroa,
2016). Thus, by focusing primarily on an institutional level, there is a risk of
labelling the Roman Church-State a “black box”. However, as Gill (1998) argues,
there are many compelling reasons to study the Roman Catholic Church as a single
entity. Firstly, the Catholic Church’s hierarchical structure tends to limit internal
divisiveness. Although there may be continuing discussion within the Church over
policy direction, there is a general loyalty to authority with regard to taking action.
The author illustrates such Catholic deference to authority with some bishops who
may disagree with keeping the priesthood celibate, but they rarely ordain married
priests in their dioceses. Likewise, Catholic Church leaders have a deep desire to
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show and preserve a united front, especially regarding significant policy decisions. A
fractured Church loses bargaining power as well as spiritual legitimacy. Crucial
policy positions (such as openly rejecting a military regime) would almost certainly
be disputed within the hierarchy, but bishops usually disregard any disagreement and
defer to the final decision (pp. 9–10).
5.4 Dependency and World Systems Theories
According to dependency theory, local allies who control social, cultural, economic,
and political institutions in developing countries implement policies and
programmes designed by developed nations. Thus, in this view, the misery and
inequality abounding in Latin America are, for instance, not fortuitous but a conse-
quence of capitalist progress in the developed world (Levine, 1981). This depen-
dency theory strand has been very influential in Latin America and corresponds to
the Marxist version, one of whose leading advocates is Andre Gunder Frank
(Drexler-Dreis, 2017, p. 275).
Such ideas inspired the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) to explain Latin America’s role in the global economy as
being restricted to a primary product exporter (Prebisch, 1950). Later, the gradual
failure of ECLAC reformism led to a revision of these views (Preston, 2012, p. 6).
Indeed, traditional institutional approaches aiming to alleviate prosperity problems
such as inequality, poverty, or corruption include the highly technically based and
controversially discussed policy recipes of the ECLAC, the World Bank, or the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). While aiming to guide governments in Latin
America and the developing world, such policy recipes have often failed or even
worsened the social situation in certain developing countries (Stiglitz, 2002). This
observation suggests that the causes of structural prosperity have not been ade-
quately addressed.
And yet, dependency theory is widely accepted a priori. Dependency theorists,
liberation theologians, and leftist Latin American governments commonly accept US
“imperialism” as a predominant cause of poverty in Latin America (Castañeda,
2006; Galeano, 1971; Gutiérrez, 1973). However, there is little empirical evidence
to support this approach. For example, Venezuela and Bolivia are not wealthier since
opposing the USA; in fact, the opposite is true. Likewise, Colombia and Costa Rica
are not more impoverished for being US allies.
Dependency theories regard the core (prosperous) countries as so-called
hegemons. Semi-peripheral and peripheral countries are usually former colonies.
Such a division raises other crucial questions: Why does Spain, as the coloniser of
Latin America, still face economic problems to this day? Why does the USA appear
as a hegemon if it was once a British colony? Why did the USA achieve prosperity
levels that other colonies could not? Dependency theory does not properly answer
these questions and instead misleads analysis. For example, it mistakenly assumes
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that US “hegemonical exploitation” has caused the poverty problems of Latin
America, thereby disregarding other real structural problems.
However, dependency theory might be helpful in order to trace the hegemony of
colonial institutions and elites. Empirical and historical evidence shows that after the
former Spanish/Portuguese colonies gained independence, hegemony was handed to
local elites. Consequently, the relative socio-economic situation of Latin America
did not change much; instead, the extractivist tendency persisted (Acemoglu et al.,
2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Yet, “dependency” analyses typically exclude
or deny the historical ties and dependency on the Roman Church-State. Nonetheless,
this study reveals a clear tendency: the greater the Roman Catholic influence in a
country (e.g. the Church’s substantial control over education), the worse the
country’s conditions (see Sect. 8.3.2; Fig. 8.3 and Table 8.2; Parts III, V–VII;
Appendix 4.2).
5.4.1 World Systems Theory
Dependency theory has led to further developments, including World Systems
Theory, which divides the world into peripheral countries, semi-peripheral countries,
and core countries.
This theory is only applicable on a global level (Papademetriou & Martin, 1991,
p. 10). Therefore, world systems theory is criticised as:
a grand historical generalisation, a by-product of a univocal, reductionist and sense-loaded
interpretation of history in which all countries pass through similar processes, as if following
a grand script or some rigid laws of historical development (Arango, 2000, p. 291).
This theory suggests the existence of a global economic behaviour centred on
capitalist penetration from industrialised countries to peripheral areas. Furthermore,
peripheral countries provide a permanent flow of resources and migrant labour that
most prosperous countries require (Wallerstein, 2006). The global system’s exis-
tence depends on international flows of capital, supply resources, markets, and
labour.
5.5 Factor Endowments Theory (Institutions
and Geography)
Factor endowments theory extends institutional theory as it also considers various
political and institutional insights along with geographical factors. Among such
theorists, Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) explain differences in growth rates of per
capita income in the New World. They found that the initial differences between the
degree of inequality in the Americas can be mainly attributed to endowment factors:
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. . .that great equality or homogeneity among the population led [in the North], over time, to
more democratic political institutions, to more investment in public goods and infrastructure,
and to institutions that offered relatively broad access to economic opportunities. In contrast,
where there was extreme inequality, as in most of the societies of the Americas, political
institutions were less democratic, investments in public goods and infrastructure were more
limited, and the institutions that evolved tended to provide highly unbalanced access to
economic opportunities and thereby greatly advantaged the elite” (Engerman & Sokoloff,
2002, p. 4).2
Accordingly, initial inequality and soil and climatic conditions on the equator led
to the production of large quantities of high-value crops, such as sugar cane or
tobacco in Central and South America. Such crops were characterised by extensive
scale economies associated with the use of slaves and a self-ennriching elite that
perpetuated inequality over time. In contrast, the US and Canadian economies were
developed based on a “free land” model, which provided plots suitable for family
farms to all those who settled and worked the land for a specified period. This model
led to an equal distribution of land and wealth (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002).
Factor endowments theory is based on empirical research that correlates wealth
inequality, human capital, and political power to account for divergent economic
growth records. Consequently, this notion only partly explains countries’ failure or
success by solely concentrating on their economic growth. Furthermore, this theory
provides no comprehensive explanation that would in turn lead to a holistic under-
standing of countries’ prosperity, as the present study claims. It focuses exclusively
on the macro-economic achievements of countries and fails to explain other related
aspects such as corruption.
Like environmental and geographical theory, factor endowments theory does not
consider the historical differences between the European colonisers of the
Americas––i.e. the differing influence of the Iberian Peninsula and Great Britain
on their respective colonies. European colonisers had different cultural backgrounds
(e.g. Spanish or English). Thus, they did not merely “behave differently” in North
America because it was not densely populated compared with South and Central
America, where they found a densely concentrated population. This assumption
would not explain the cases of Brazil or Argentina, which were not densely popu-
lated before European colonisation and currently display extractive institutions like
the rest of Latin America.
Moreover, another related question is whether Canada and USA would be the
countries they are today if the Spaniards and Portuguese had colonised North
America. Huntington (2004) argues that they would most probably not; in turn,
they would look like other Latin American countries, sharing similar vices, institu-
tions, and cultural heritage. Great Britain built egalitarian societies in North Amer-
ica, whereas Spain and Portugal replicated their “extractive” and elitist models
throughout Latin America (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). In sum, in tándem with
2©2002 by Engerman & Sokoloff. This content is not under a CC-BY licence and has been
reproduced with permission.
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environment and geography theories, factor endowments theory can be considered
as another piece of the explanation puzzle.
5.6 Environment and Geography (E): The Environmental
Performance Index (EPI)
Vast empirical information supports a strong association between environment/
geography and prosperity. The theoretical explanations also make sense (see
Chap. 12).
The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is expressed in percentages and
aggregates more than 20 indicators reflecting national-level environmental data (Hsu
et al., 2016, p. 27). It comprises nine categories: health impacts, air quality, water
and sanitation, water resources, agriculture, forests, fisheries, biodiversity and hab-
itat, and climate and energy. The EPI is a comprehensive index and results from the
transformation of “raw datasets into comparable performance indicators, which
requires standardizing raw values according to population, land area, gross domestic
product, and other common units of measurement” (Hsu et al., 2016, p. 28).
Previous studies have already found robust correlations between environment
(EPI) and competitiveness (GCI), suggesting that the most competitive countries
also have the best environmental conditions and performance (dos Santos & Siqueira
Brandi, 2014; Kasimovskaya & Didenko, 2014). Moreover,
. . .there is no necessary trade-off between being competitive and being sustainable. On the
contrary, many countries at the top of the competitiveness rankings are also the best
performers in many areas of sustainability (World Economic Forum, 2012).
In Part V, the EPI is incorporated into regression analysis and QCA models on
account of its precise and comprehensive nature. Such incorporation reflects the
abundant empirical literature linking countries’ prosperity indicators to environmen-
tal and geographical variables (see Chap. 12).
5.7 Summary of Theories Explaining Differences
in Prosperity and Insights from New Economic History
Table 5.1 summarises the leading prosperity theories, which are based on empirical
(i.e. quantitative) research. The table shows postulates, issues, and authors in diverse
fields approaching the difference of prosperity across countries.
Table 5.1 presents a non-exhaustive list of perspectives that shows why some
countries are more prosperous than others. However, the listed theories do not
address the prosperity phenomenon from a holistic perspective (i.e. in all its com-
plexity). Likewise, this table mainly presents theories (and advocates) that base their
empirical research on quantitative data and methods.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.7 Summary of Theories Explaining Differences in Prosperity and Insights from. . . 51
In contrast to the above theories, I approach the prosperity/corruption phenome-
non holistically. This means that rather than excluding theoretical approaches
(cultural, institutional, environmental), I regard those approaches as intervening
triggers (not as competing explanations) from diverse disciplines. Therefore, all
the theories listed here are considered valid and complementary. The next sections
complement the identified prosperity triggers and interrelations with empirical and
theoretical evidence from different disciplines (see research model, Fig. 2.1).
5.7.1 Insights from New Economic History
New Economic History is an interdisciplinary approach dedicated to analysing the
causes of prosperity through integrating historical and other social sciences with
mathematical models and econometric techniques. Such integration reconciles pre-
viously exclusivist disciplinary approaches through combining factors, theories, and
disciplines, rather than offering mono-causal explanations. In contrast, the
neo-classic economic approach considered history, geography/ecology, and culture
(including religion and social norms) as “residuals”. The neo-classical approach left
little room to explicitly model “residuals”, which has long been the dominant
approach in the literature (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017).
Moreover, separate mono-causal prosperity theories tend to refute advances made
in other research fields. For instance, Sachs (2001, 2003) claimed that environment
and geography alone thoroughly explain prosperity variations among countries.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) made the same case for institutions.
However, each of these distinct theories may contain “a grain of truth” about
understanding prosperity imbalances between countries (Moran et al., 2007, p. 3).
Ideally, prosperity theories should be complementary instead of competing expla-
nations. For example, geography and environmental theories explain how seasonal
lands can provide a society and its economy better conditions to prosper (Diamond,
1997); (Sachs, 2001). Institutional theory helps explain how institutions model
social prosperity by perpetuating equality loops or by concentrating wealth
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; North, 1990). Cultural theory contributes to the
understanding of the influence of cultural variables, such as religious beliefs and
values, on prosperity (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Hofstede, 2001; Landes, 1999;
Volonté, 2015). Some scholars, among others La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman
(2000), andMichalopoulos and Papaioannou (2017), have therefore taken a systemic
approach to prosperity theories.
The relations among environment/geography, culture, institutions, and prosperity
are highly complex and involve massive historical dynamics which would normally
far exceed the scope of empirical research (Paldam, 2001, p. 384). Nonetheless, La
Porta et al.’s (1999) comprehensive study significantly advance research by exam-
ining potential determinants of government performance in up to 152 countries. The
authors concluded that countries exhibiting inferior government performance are
(1) poor, (2) close to the equator, (3) ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, (4) use
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French or socialist laws, or (5) have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims
(La Porta et al., 1999).
In a similarly ambitious empirical study, Treisman (2000) reached comparable
conclusions. Prosperous economies are less corrupt countries with Protestant tradi-
tions, histories of British rule, and with prolonged exposure to democracy (short,
present-day democracies are not statistically significant) (Treisman, 2000, p. 399).
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Corruption and Religion (A), (B), (1)
This chapter reviews some prominent empirical studies and possible explanations of
the corruption-religion nexus. It concentrates on the analysis of Roman Catholic and
Protestant adherents.
6.1 Religious Affiliation and Corruption
Numerous empirical (quantitative) studies exist on the relationships between cor-
ruption indicators and the proportion of religious adherents. These studies, under-
taken at different levels (cross-country, national, subnational), are rigorous and have
mostly reached comparable conclusions regardless of their publication dates,
methods, and variables:
Protestantism curbs corruption, in contrast to Roman Catholicism, which tends
to increase the perceived corruption: (Arruñada, 2010; Chase, 2010; Gerring &
Thacker, 2004; La Porta et al., 1997, 1999; Lipset & Lenz, 2000; Paldam, 2001;
Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Woodberry, 2012). Some of the key findings will be
examined.
La Porta et al. (1997) found a significant correlation between corruption and the
percentage of adherents to a hierarchical religion (Roman Catholicism, Eastern
Orthodox, Islam) in a sample of 33 countries. Hierarchical religions have adverse
effects on civic engagement, and therefore on corruption (La Porta et al., 1999);
(Lambsdorff, 2006). La Porta et al. (1999) found a robust predictor of transparency
(lower corruption) in the percentage of Protestants.
Chase’s (2010) study of 180 countries with 11 independent variables corrobo-
rated these findings. Thus, a country’s dominant religion explains its level of
corruption better than GDP and other economic indicators (Chase, 2010). Protes-
tantism tends to reduce the level of perceived corruption within a nation. In contrast,
Orthodoxy or Catholicism, when dominant, tend to increase the level of perceived
corruption. Treisman (2000) also observed a significant correlation between
© The Author(s) 2022
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transparency and the percentage of Protestants in a sample of 64 countries. Lipset
and Lenz (2000) and Gerring and Thacker (2005) corroborated that result. Paldam
(2001) analysed 11 groups of religions, finding lower corruption in countries with a
significant proportion of Protestants and tribal religions. Higher corruption appears
in countries where Roman Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism exert
considerable influence.
6.1.1 Possible Explanations of the Robust Associations
between Corruption and Religion
This phenomenon has attracted broad scholarly attention. Some of the many valid
explanations, supported empirically and theoretically, include:
On the Negative Influence of Roman Catholicism:
1. Hierarchical religions promote corruption (Lambsdorff, 2006); (La Porta et al.,
1997, 1999). This insight further develops arguments first presented by Olson
(1993) and Husted (1999). Societies with low accessibility to the higher echelons
must accept authoritarian rules and thus also high levels of corruption and
inequality (Husted, 1999).
2. Catholic and Muslim countries perform lower in education and learning than
Protestant ones (Becker & Woessmann, 2009); (Landes, 1999). Lower education
means that public officials are questioned less about their actions (Landes, 1999).
The majority of people are thus more prone to manipulation and to accepting
hierarchical relations. Therefore, “The maintenance of ignorance” has been one
of the most potent institutional strategies of the Catholic Church to influence
people’s behaviour (Head-König, 2017, pp. 46–47), (see Sect. 18.4). Other
denominations and sects also influence people’s behaviour by maintaining their
ignorance, but these groups do not reach secular levels of legal and political
influence on the scale of the Roman Church-State (Fumagalli, 2011; Helmsdorff,
1996; Martin, 1999; Schäfer, 2006).
On the Positive Influence of Protestantism:
3. Robust historical and statistical evidence demonstrates that Protestant missionar-
ies profoundly influenced the rise and spread of stable democracy worldwide
(Woodberry, 2012).
4. Historically and statistically, Protestantism led to better education and human
capital, and thus also to higher economic prosperity and a wide range of innova-
tions (Becker & Woessmann, 2009); (Becker et al., 2016). Such mechanisms
empirically support a more comprehensive explanation than traditional Weberian
theory and its postulate of a “Protestant work ethics” (Becker et al., 2016);
(Woodberry, 2012). For instance, Protestant institutions competing with
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state-sponsored religions are more likely to scrutinise abuses by public officials
(Svensson, 2005).
Empirical Expectation
1. I expect the overwhelming empirical evidence available to confirm higher
corruption rates in historically Roman Catholic countries than in histori-
cally Protestant countries (consistent with the title of this book, articulated
in Matthew 7: 15–23, King James Bible, 1769).
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Chapter 7
Prosperity and Religion (A), (B), (1)
The link between prosperity1 and religion is uncontestable. In the USA, for instance
(the second most competitive country worldwide; World Economic Forum, 2016),
religion contributes almost one-third of the national GDP per annum (USD 4.8
trillion). The revenues of US faith-based organisations (USD 378 billion annually)
exceed the global annual revenues of Apple and Microsoft combined (Grim & Grim,
2016).
Yet, the relations between prosperity and religion are reciprocal and highly
complex (Berger, 1990; McCleary & Barro, 2006). In the first causal arrow, religion
is a predictor (independent) variable that affects prosperity. This arrow represents a
school of thought (i.e. idealism) that descends fromWeber (1905), with the so-called
cultural argument that the beliefs of individual Protestants led to higher prosperity.
This study argues that the institutional influence of religion has been more decisive
than the “cultural path” of this causal relation (see Sects. 5.3.1, 24.1, and Chap. 8).
The second causal arrow moves in the opposite direction, with religion as a criterion
(dependent) variable (i.e. prosperity affects religion) and stems from Marx (1859
[1913]) (i.e. materialism). Conclusively, both arrows of causality do not compete,
but reinforce each other (dialecticism) (Berger, 1990; Guiso et al., 2006; Koch,
2009; McCleary & Barro, 2006) (see Fig. 2.1).
Originally published as “Prosperity and Religion” in: Garcia Portilla, J. (2019). “Ye Shall Know
Them by Their Fruits”: Prosperity and Institutional Religion in Europe and the Americas.
Religions, 10(6), 362. MDPI AG. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10060362
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY)
license.
1This section addresses the theoretical background of the relation prosperity–religion. Please refer
to Sect. 10.4.3.2 for a discussion on the “Prosperity Gospel” or “Theology of Prosperity” as a
typical Pentecostal phenomenon.
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This chapter offers no exhaustive review of the studies published on the
prosperity–religion nexus. There are three reasons for limiting the following account
to the most significant works. First, the research is too voluminous to be discussed
here in full. Second, such a discussion is not the primary purpose of this book. Third,
some studies have already performed this task most efficiently. For instance, Becker
et al. (2016) have provided the most comprehensive review of studies on the causes
and consequences of the Protestant Reformation (compared to business-as-usual
Roman Catholicism). The authors cover previous empirical studies, which have used
different variables at individual, city, regional, and cross-country levels. The
reviewed studies come from the fields of economics, sociology, and political
science.
The next sections synthesise the heated debate on prosperity and Christian
religion in Europe and the Americas. Section 7.1 analyses religion as a predictor
(independent) variable that affects prosperity (first causal arrow), whereas Sect. 7.2
examines the second causal arrow in the opposite direction (i.e. prosperity affects
religion).
7.1 Religion as a Predictor (Independent) Variable that
Affects Prosperity
Key issues in this interaction are how the institution of religion influences the
institutions of law and state, and therefore, prosperity (institutional influence of
religion) (see Sect. 5.3). On the cultural influence of religion (Weberian), central
questions are “how religiosity affects individual characteristics, such as work ethic,
honesty and thrift, and thereby influences economic performance” (McCleary &
Barro, 2006, p. 49).
7.1.1 The Weberian “Cultural” Argument on Christianity
and Prosperity (1)
Max Weber linked religion and economic performance arguing that the Protestant
Reformation initiated modern capitalism, with Protestant societies outpacing Cath-
olic ones economically (Weber, 1905). Weber’s classic thesis illustrated prosperity
differences between diverse religious affiliations using taxable capital available in
Baden in 1895. He found that tax returns from financial capital totalled over four
millions marks per 1000 Jews; 954,000 marks per 1000 Protestants and 589,000
marks per 1000 Catholics (Weber, 1905, p. 133). Based on this evidence, Weber
advanced a Protestant work ethic-based theory of prosperity. Accordingly, Protes-
tant beliefs (e.g. Calvinist, Puritans) would enhance the economy “by fostering traits
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such as work ethic, honesty (and hence trust), thrift, charity, hospitality to strangers
and so on” (McCleary & Barro, 2006, p. 51).
Following Weber (1905), numerous quantitative studies have analysed the empir-
ical relationships between prosperity indicators (mainly GDP) and religious affilia-
tion (mostly the proportion of adherents). Thousands of articles and hundreds of
books have discussed (and continue to discuss) Weber’s thesis. Some works widely
accept his claim as one of the most valid explanations of the rise of Western
Civilisation while others criticise particular points (Ferguson, 2011); (Berman,
2003, p. 24); (Becker et al., 2016).
However, empirical research on prosperity determinants typically—and
blindly—neglects the influence of religion (Barro & McCleary, 2003, p. 760).
Religion as a determinant suffers from similar mainstream disregards in other
disciplines such as law (Berman, 2003; Witte, 2002), international relations (Snyder,
2011), or political science (Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009).
7.1.2 Some Empirical Studies Refuting Weber’s Thesis
The results and conclusions of several empirical studies associating religion and
prosperity vary depending on the type of prosperity proxy variables chosen. Also,
the spatial (cross-country, national, or subnational) and temporal configurations of
these studies influence the different outcomes.
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2006) found no effect of religion (adherents) on economic
growth in cross-country settings. As shown, concentrating only on religious adher-
ents is problematic (Sect. 5.3.1), yet Delacroix and Nielsen (2001) reported mixed
results from comparing different historical periods and proxy variables. Other
empirical studies refuting Weber’s thesis have been performed at a subnational
level. Cantoni (2015), for instance, found no effects of Protestantism on population
figures used as proxies of economic growth. He used a dataset comprising 272 cities
in the period 1300–1900 in the German Lands of the so-called “Holy” Roman
Empire. The main problem of Cantoni’s approach lies in accepting city size as a
proxy of prosperity. Thus, the city-size argument might lead one to consider Sao
Paulo or Mexico DC as far more prosperous than Bern or Brussels today, for
instance. Moreover, while Cantoni’s finding might be accurate at a subnational
level, it cannot account for the historical performance of Germany as a whole
compared to other countries with a Catholic tradition (e.g. Portugal or Spain).
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7.1.3 Most Empirical Studies Confirm Weber’s Thesis
(Although for Different Reasons)
Based on their comparative examination and systematic, state-of-the-art synthesis,
Becker et al. (2016) concluded that historical Protestantism encouraged a wide range
of societal developments. Balancing the empirical evidence, most studies have
confirmed a positive impact of Protestantism on prosperity using different variables
as well as diverse spatial and temporal configurations. On the whole, most empirical
studies examining the consequences of the Reformation associate them with positive
developments of governance and the economy (Becker et al., 2016).
Economic prosperity has also been robustly linked with secularisation and
declining levels of religiosity (Barro & McCleary, 2003; Inglehart & Baker,
2000). Secularisation precedes economic growth, which means that prosperity did
not cause secularisation in the past (Ruck et al., 2018). Historically, Protestantism is
a well-established precursor of secularism (Snyder, 2011; Agnew, 2010; Shah &
Philpott, 2011; Woodberry, 2012; Berger, 1990; Gregory, 2012; Sect. 8.3.4.4).
Therefore, the causal arrows seem to run from historical Protestantism (anti-cleri-
calism) to secularisation, to economic prosperity and security, and to postmaterialist
values (Granato et al., 1996; Inglehart & Baker, 2000).
Hence, the effects of Protestantism may not be immediate (i.e. considering the
previously explained causal arrows). Capitalism emerged during the three centuries
after the Reformation, mainly in the Protestant regions of Europe and the New
World, and among Protestant minorities in Catholic countries. In contrast,
pre-industrial societies were “zero-sum systems” where little or no economic growth
took place (Granato et al., 1996). Consequently, Granato et al. (1996) argued that
Protestantism has been decisive as it “undermines a set of religious norms that inhibit
economic achievement and are common to most preindustrial societies”. Therefore,
the authors explain that “Weber is correct in arguing that the rise of Protestantism is a
crucial event in the modernization of Europe” (pp. 609–610).
Furthermore, historically Protestant countries still differ considerably in their
values and attitudes today compared with Roman Catholic, Orthodox, or Islamic
societies. Such enduring effects influence prosperity in the longue durée, although
few people are still religious in present-day Protestant Europe, for instance (Inglehart
& Baker, 2000, p. 49; see also Chap. 10). It is therefore hardly surprising that
influential works link empirically good economic outcomes to Protestantism in
different sets of countries. However, such studies recognise the effect of historical
Protestantism as a pivotal precursor of prosperity pillars rather than as a direct
prosperity trigger in a classical Weberian sense. Thus, for instance, the robust
empirical associations of Protestantism with prosperity relate to the development
of democratic institutions (Woodberry, 2012), the rise of education and printing
(Becker & Woessmann, 2009), and the weakening of hierarchical structures
(La Porta et al., 1999; Volonté, 2015).
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7.2 Religion as a Criterion (Dependent) Variable that Is
Affected by Prosperity
While previous subsections concentrated on the influence of religion on prosperity,
this section analyses the other direction of the arrow (i.e. the influence of prosperity
on religion). A crucial question in this interaction is how political institutions
and prosperity affect religious participation and beliefs (McCleary & Barro, 2006,
p. 49). Hence, theories of secularisation originate from the understanding of this
interaction. Two complementary perspectives are identifiable:
1. The supply-side or “top-down” factors of religion. This literature focuses on the
strategic role of religious organisations and leaders in the religious markets.
Accordingly, competition among providers of religion affects “the nature of the
religion product” (e.g. when governments impose state religions and limit entry).
This strand descends from Adam Smith (1791) and was developed by Finke and
Stark (1992) and Finke and Iannaccone (1993), among others (McCleary &
Barro, 2006, p. 50; Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 7). This approach has been
related to Rational Choice Theory, which contends that individuals and organi-
sations act based on the maximisation of utility (i.e. cost–benefit calculations)
(Wilde et al., 2010; Young, 1997). Accordingly, the Religious Competition
Theory argues that religious organisations that believe there is more competition
work harder to win and retain members and are usually more versatile and prone
to reform than organisations in monopolistic settings (Wilde et al., 2010, p. 589;
Finke & Stark, 1992, p. 19). In response to the models of rational choice, the Neo-
Institutional Theory contends that institutional contexts greatly define actors’
choices, decisions, and actions (Immergut, 1998; Ingram & Clay as cited in
Wilde et al., 2010, p. 590), (see Sects. 8.2, 8.3.4, 9.1, 10.4.1.2, and 10.4.1.3).
2. The demand-side or “bottom-up” model, which emphasises the mass public
preferences alongside industrialisation, “modernisation”, and prosperity. In this
model, prosperity gradually erodes religious habits, thereby also diminishing the
influence of organised religion on politics and governance. This perspective
stems from John Wesley (1760), the founder of Methodism; and was further
developed by Marx (1859 [1913]), Weber (1905), Hume (1757 [1993]), and
Freud (1927), among others. Berger (1990), Norris and Inglehart (2004),
among several others, have extended this idea (McCleary & Barro, 2006, p. 50;
Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 7). Although Weber (1905) dedicates most of his
attention to religion as an independent variable, he also recognises that religion
can be a dependent variable (Koch, 2009 pp. 12–13).
7.2.1 Influence of Prosperity on Religion: The Theory
of Existential Security
Norris and Inglehart (2004) theorised that a sense of existential security (i.e. the
feeling that survival and prosperity are secure enough that they can be taken for
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granted) usually weakens transcendent religion. Accordingly, the theory of existen-
tial security contends that secularisation mostly occurs in advanced industrial
nations, yet religious values prevail strongly in most developing countries with
rapidly growing populations (Norris & Inglehart, 2010, p. 2). The authors explain
that religiosity persists, especially among disadvantaged peoples, particularly vul-
nerable populations in poorer countries that face personal survival threats (Norris &
Inglehart, 2010, p. 5). In contrast, with rising levels of existential security (e.g. the
emergence of the welfare states and economic prosperity), citizens in nearly all
industrial developed nations are more oriented towards secularisation than people in
poorer developing countries (Norris & Inglehart, 2010, p. 15).
Furthermore, feelings of vulnerability drive religiosity, even in rich nations, when
comparing levels of economic inequality within their societies. For example, religi-
osity is strongest among the poorest and least secure sectors of US-American society
(Norris & Inglehart, 2010, p. 12).
Additionally, Norris and Inglehart (2004) theorise that, currently, “post-Christian
forms of spirituality” (e.g. yoga, astrology, or other “New Age” alternative beliefs
and practices) are widespread in Western societies. Apparently, these post-Christian
beliefs and practices may provide alleviation from the anxiety and stress that the
secular world poses in industrial societies (Houtman & Aupers, 2007; Norris &
Inglehart, 2010; Pike, 2006; Silver, 2006).
The theory of existential security constitutes a robust and revised version of the
secularisation theory with empirical (quantitative) data from the World Values
Survey (WVS) of 1981–2001. The WVS project conducted representative national
surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the publics in all six continents (in more
than 90 independent countries, containing more than 85% of the world’s popula-
tion). Norris and Inglehart (2004) provide significant correlations which consistently
link the prevalence of religious practices and values with multiple macro-level,
empirical measures of human development, and the social and economic progress
of all countries. Moreover, a large body of secondary empirical findings from diverse
methods, approaches, and disciplines such as welfare studies, health care, and social
psychology, is consistent with the existential security thesis (Norris & Inglehart,
2010, p. 6).
The sermon on “The Use of Money” by John Wesley (1760) constitutes an early
empirical example of the theories of secularisation and existential security. Wesley
preached, “gain all you can, save all you can, give all you can” but he regretted the
fact that, as his congregants became wealthier, they also became less religious
(McCleary & Barro, 2006, p. 49–50).
Yet, existential security as a “detrimental” principle of faith seems to have been
intuitively recognised, even in more ancient times. The book of Proverbs in the Bible
registers the following assertion:
. . .give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient for me: lest I be full, and
deny thee, and say, Who is the Lord? or lest I be poor, and steal, and take the name of my
God in vain (King James Bible, 1769, Proverbs 30: 8-9).
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The author of this proverb requests a sober measure of wealth. He recognises that too
much prosperity and existential security will lead him to lose his faith in God
(i.e. deteriorate his religiosity), but that too little will lead him to sin (i.e. steal).
Similarly, a Protestant stakeholder interviewed in this study referred to the book
of Judges in the Bible, which narrates several cycles of struggle and suffering during
which the Jews sought the God of Israel (see Sect. 21.7).
This principle comes down to us historically and repetitively, for example, from the book of
Judges [. . .] the more Israel obeyed God’s law in the Bible, the better [they] got, whereas
whenever they strayed far from God’s commandments, they faced the worst crises. [. . .] this
pattern is repeated cyclically over and over again in history, leading to social failure and
oppression whenever people disobeyed God (Independent Protestant believer).
The previous stakeholder’s statement would appear to contradict the theory of
existential security at first sight. However, according to the book of Judges (King
James Bible, 1769), Israel prospered during numerous generations after obeying
God’s commandments. Yet, after prospering (i.e. after gaining existential security),
the Jews turned away from the God of Israel (i.e. diminished their religiosity).
Afterwards, they started worshipping other gods and idols (i.e. post-Judaism), and
the entire nation fell into disgrace once more, as a consequence. In the new crises,
they repented and restored their obedience to the God of Israel, and subsequently, the
Jewish nation achieved prosperity again, only to then take it for granted once more
after a few generations and begin a new crisis. This cycle repeats several times;
therefore, the narration of the book of Judges relates a cyclical feature that demon-
strates consistency with the theory of existential security.
Chapters 18, 19, 20, and 21 (case studies) will show that the theory of existential
security is the most prominent principle identified after analysing the qualitative data
(case studies). This study applies Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a qualitative
method in the case studies (Sect. 17.6). Interestingly, CDA draws from Marxist
theory (Hjelm, 2014, p. 856), which this study also links empirically with the theory
of existential security.
7.3 Summarising the Core Messages of Chapter 7.
Prosperity and Religion
The relationships of prosperity vis-à-vis religion as a predictor (independent) vari-
able (e.g. Weber) or as a criterion (dependent) variable (e.g. Marx) reinforce each
other and produced a vast body of theories and empirical studies. In the first causal
arrow, Weber’s explanations and findings in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism has attracted much criticism over the last century. The debate remains
polarised. Thus, numerous quantitative studies link the relations between Christian
religions and prosperity indicators. The corresponding empirical conclusions either
support Weber’s central thesis (mainly at cross-country levels, e.g. La Porta et al.,
1999; Granato et al., 1996) or refute it (mainly selective regional examples or
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subnational levels; see, for instance, Cantoni, 2015; Delacroix & Nielsen, 2001;
Iannaccone, 1998).
In any event, the effects of Christianity on prosperity seem to vary depending on
the leading religious denomination influencing a given society. Recent research
largely confirms that the Reformation played a vital role in Europe’s economic
and political trajectory, although for different reasons than those advanced by
Weber (Woodberry, 2012; Becker et al., 2016, p. 11). Consequently, a Protestant
“work ethic”might oversimplify the intricate process that makes Protestant societies
more prosperous than Roman Catholic or Orthodox ones. A particular work ethic is
no more than one of many underlying mechanisms and contributing factors.
For instance, education and hierarchy are two decisive prosperity mechanisms
related to religious denominations. The historical Protestant focus on education has
positively influenced societal and prosperity outcomes (Becker & Woessmann,
2009). Likewise, the hierarchical power relations in Orthodoxy, Islam, or Roman
Catholicism have had unfavourable long-term effects on social progress and pros-
perity (La Porta et al., 1997). Chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11 will elaborate on these issues.
The historical institutional influence of religion has been the crucial factor with
regard to prosperity/transparency (more than the current proportion of adherents).
Thus, most empirical findings contradict the prevailing Roman Catholic ideology,
which has insisted (without, however, providing much empirical evidence) on
restoring what it considers a “prosperous and peaceful medieval society” (see, for
instance, Ratzinger & Pera, 2006; Restrepo, 1939). The Middle Ages allowed the
Roman Church-State to create a theocratical order in which the papacy established a
hierarchical society and in which spiritual power prevailed over temporal power.
This Roman Catholic ideal meant (and still means) that the ecclesiastical hierarchy
determines the legal principles and the basic norms of collective life (Figueroa, 2016,
p. 155).
The second causal arrow (religion as a dependent variable vis-à-vis prosperity)
resulted in, among others, secularisation theories focusing on either the supply or
demand-side of religion. The theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart,
2004) is an influential model that empirically focuses on the variations of the
demand-side and revises the secularisation theory.
While cultural and institutional proxies delineate the quantitative and QCA
empirical settings (2/3 of the results of this study), the theory of existential security
is particularly relevant in the application of grounded theory in the qualitative part of
the research (1/3 of the results). In other words, the empirical focus of the quanti-
tative and QCA parts is the relationship of religion, as a predictor (independent)
variable, to prosperity. Yet, after coding and applying grounded theory in the
qualitative part, the second arrow of relation (religion as a dependent variable)
appeared relevant.
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Empirical Expectation
2. I expect the empirical evidence to corroborate a trend towards higher
prosperity (competitiveness) in historically Protestant countries and
lower competitiveness in historically Catholic countries. This expectation
is based on abundant empirical studies linking higher prosperity outcomes
with Protestantism at a cross-country level.
The next chapters further explain the close corruption/prosperity–religion nexus
from an institutional-legal and from a theological perspective.
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This comprehensive chapter addresses the most crucial aspect of this study: institu-
tions and the institutional influence of religion.
It is divided into four sections. Section 8.1 discusses the importance of institu-
tions concerning transparency/prosperity and the difficulty of differentiating institu-
tions empirically. It also explores other critical issues related to prosperity such as
democracy versus hierarchy. Section 8.2 examines the religion-institution nexus and
considers the contributions of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. Section 8.3
analyses the law, the most formal and persistent institution that shapes societies.
Referring to the legal traditions in Europe and the Americas, it discusses the
pervasive influence of Roman civil and canon law and the role of subsequent
Protestant revolutions that sought to counteract that predominance.
8.1 Institutions as Triggers of Corruption/Prosperity (3)1
The quality of institutions has been theoretically and empirically linked to prosperity
(and thus also to transparency) outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu &
Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; La Porta et al., 1999; North, 1990;
Williamson, 2000). Such studies have credibly associated empirical evidence and
theory. Institutions are therefore widely accepted as playing a determinant (causal)
1Originally published as “Institutions as Triggers of Prosperity” in: Garcia Portilla, J. (2019). “Ye
Shall Know Them by Their Fruits”: Prosperity and Institutional Religion in Europe
and the Americas. Religions, 10(6), 362. MDPI AG. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3390/
rel10060362
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
© The Author(s) 2022
J. García Portilla, “Ye Shall Know Them by Their Fruits”, Contributions to
Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78498-0_8
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role in the prosperity of societies even if alternative interpretations may exist
(Woodruff, 2006).
However, several problems arise when considering institutions inter alia as
triggers of corruption (and prosperity):
1. Scant agreement exists on how to measure formal or informal institutions empir-
ically. Different studies measuring institutions with varied methods measure
different things. Sometimes even gauging the outcome in isolation from other
factors is challenging (Woodruff, 2006).
2. Endogeneity issues plague the causal approaches of institutions to prosperity,
although to a lesser extent the effect of political institutions on corruption.
Previous treatments of endogeneity, however, have not been convincing
(Kunicová, 2006; Persson & Tabellini, 2003; Woodruff, 2006).
3. It is not entirely clear which institutions are fundamental to prosperity/transpar-
ency processes (Woodruff, 2006, p. 106).
4. Formal institutions have little effect on broad prosperity outcomes. However,
informal institutions matter and have a more significant effect (Glaeser et al.,
2004; Treisman, 2000; Woodruff, 2006).
5. Although quite strong associations often exist, the causal arrow may point in both
directions (from corruption to institutional choice and from institutions to cor-
ruption) (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, p. xxv).
6. Informal institutions are the most difficult to measure (and change) since they are
largely determined by history (Woodruff, 2006, p. 121).
Thus, research on institutions and prosperity/corruption has so far not provided
conclusive evidence of causality. The strongest evidence relates to the impact of
underlying social structures (informal institutions), which is highly difficult to
address, both in prospective and in policy terms (Lambsdorff, 2006; Rose-
Ackerman, 2006; Woodruff, 2006).
In practical terms, institutions and transparency/trust may all have coincided with
prosperity, as empirical evidence exists for arguing causality in both directions
(Armony, 2004; Fukuyama, 1995; Morris, 2003; Uildriks, 2009). Therefore, pros-
perity, corruption (or its opposite transparency), trust, and institutions are insepara-
ble concepts. One causal cyclical logic that might be expected would be that ethical
transparency/trust values promote institutional stability and prosperity (Fukuyama,
1995).
History and culture have shaped current institutional structures (Acemoglu et al.,
2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 2006). At the same time,
empirical evidence also shows that institutional structures shape cultural values
(i.e. trust and civic norms) (Uildriks, 2009, p. 7); (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015). In
any event, religion has played a crucial role in corroborating both cultural values and
institutions (Arruñada, 2010; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Manow, 2004; Paldam,
2001; Treisman, 2000).
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have explained how inclusive institutions create
inclusive markets, incentives, and opportunities for prosperity. Inclusive institutions
create positive feedback loops, which prevent an elite’s efforts to undermine them.
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Throughout its history, Latin America has, however, experienced a negative insti-
tutional feedback loop, which has perpetuated corruption, mistrust, and elitist/
extractive institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Uildriks, 2009).
If political institutions are key (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), who creates them?
Lawyers and policy makers have moral and religious backgrounds (i.e. historically,
these are predominantly Protestant in North America and Roman Catholic in Latin
America). However, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) neglect the influence of
religious values on ruling elites. More importantly, the authors disregard the insti-
tutional influence of religion. Instead, they suggest that critical historical junctures
(e.g. the death of political leaders, weather conditions) may trigger institutional
shifts. However, citing Robert Michels’s “iron law of oligarchy”, Acemoglu and
Robinson (2008, 2012) list countless examples of radical movements and revolu-
tions that simply replaced one tyranny with another without producing positive
institutional shifts.
On this evidence, it is therefore essential to recognise which revolutions created
better institutions. We also need to ask which triggers changed an old regime into a
new status quo. Thus, countries that had not fully adopted the principles of such
revolutions preserved elements of the old regime. These notions are explored below
(see especially Sect. 8.3).
8.1.1 Institutions, Hierarchy, and Democracy Vis-à-Vis
Prosperity/Transparency
This subsection first considers the relation of democracy, hierarchy, and corruption/
prosperity and second their significant correlation with religion.
Weak institutions may cause mistrust and thus impair the quality of democratic
institutions (Putnam, 1993). At the same time, robust empirical evidence suggests
that stable democracies (democracies older than those that have emerged in the last
70 years) reduce corruption in the long term (Treisman, 2000). In other words, weak
and recent democracies with little electoral participation and little competition for
office tend to have little or no influence on reducing corruption (Rose-Ackerman,
2006); (Lambsdorff, 2006) (Treisman, 2000).
Other studies have also found significant linkages between democracy and
transparency (Goldsmith, 1999; Paldam, 2002; Persson & Tabellini, 2003;
Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000). However, they also report the waning significance of
democracy when GDP per capita is included in the models. Chapter 3 and Sect. 8.1
have already discussed the highly intertwined relationship between prosperity and
transparency and have suggested that both may be part of the prosperity
phenomenon.
Making the case for causal relations between corruption, prosperity, and democ-
racy has proven problematic, theoretically and empirically. The strong associations
among these factors, along with unclear directions of causality, suggest that they
form part of the same, reinforcing feedback loop. Overcoming such unproductive
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factor segregation, my research model considers transparency, prosperity, and stable
democracy as part of the same reinforcing feedback phenomenon (Fig. 2.1 and
Sect. 8.2.2.1).
Autocratic rulers (and leaders of highly hierarchical organisations) have incen-
tives to extract the maximum possible revenues to satisfy their self-interest as
abundant examples and historical evidence show (Olson, 1993). Hierarchical,
centralised bureaucracies corrode interpersonal trust, whereas horizontal, locally
led organisations induce interpersonal trust (Putnam, 1993). Historically, the
Roman Catholic Church-State has epitomised the hierarchical, centralised institu-
tion, whereas decentralisation and local control generally characterise Protestant
movements (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 35).
Using different methodologies and datasets, La Porta et al. (1999) and Husted
(1999) empirically confirmed that hierarchies contribute to corruption. Adserà et al.
(2003) estimated the impact of the level of democracy on corruption in a cross-
country study. They highlighted the importance of political instability as encourag-
ing actors to appropriate maximum rents in the short term, leading to increased
corruption.
In contrast, stable democratic societies usually reflect greater openness and
expanded freedom of choice. More competition for political positions should lead
societies to oust poorly performing leaders, at least in theory. Thus, politicians focusing
solely on increasing private rents would be voted out of power, and opposition
candidates would win elections by promising improvements (Rose-Ackerman, 1978).
However, ample evidence suggests that the Latin American experience is quite
the opposite. Notwithstanding advancing democratisation in the last century, the
relationships between government stakeholders and civil society have largely
remained clientelistic. Moreover, democratisation has generally gone hand in hand
with low public trust in state institutions and a generalised “irreverence to the rule of
law” by either state actors or civil society (Luzzani, 2002, p. 168). Furthermore, a
“democratisation of violence” has also accompanied the rise of democracy in Latin
America (Kruijt and Koonings as cited in Uildriks, 2009, p. 2).
In line with Olson (1993), La Porta et al. (1999), and Husted (1999), I argue that
one of the critical triggers of corruption (and inequality) in Latin America is the
continent’s strongly hierarchical (and elitist) societal structure. This structure is part
of the legacy of the Roman Catholic Church-State, which has exercised a pervasive
influence on formal and informal institutions throughout the region (Levine, 1981).
Empirical Expectation
3. Given that economic prosperity, democracy, and transparency are part of
the same phenomenon, I expect these factors to be highly correlated. My
quantitative model on corruption (Sect. 15.3.2) considers proxy variables
for all of these variables.
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8.2 Religion and Institutions (6)
8.2.1 The Roman Catholic Influence on Institutions,
Democracy, and Prosperity
The introductory considerations and the following sections show how the Roman
Empire and its inheritor, the Roman Catholic Church-State, have exerted a pervasive
historical influence in Europe and the Americas. However, the last five decades have
witnessed a reformed discourse in Roman Catholicism following the Second Vatican
Council. The following sections explore the relevant background and issues in
greater detail.
8.2.1.1 Roman Catholic Political Philosophy
Historically, Roman Catholicism has favoured a monarchical state order as an
absolute form of governance ideally suited to governing a large mass of people
with a single religion (Cook, 2012, p. 23). This political philosophy descends from
Aristotle, who considered the monarchy one of the desirable forms of government,
contrary to democracy, one of the worst in his eyes (see his Politics). Thomas
Aquinas, the single most important philosopher of Catholicism, adopted many
Aristotelian political principles and synthesised these with the medieval Catholic
ideal of society: “The best regime of a community is government by one person, [. . .]
unity is more congruently the effect of one than of many” (Thomas Aquinas, C. G.
iv. 76, (fn. 4) as cited in Cook, 2012 p. 23).
Therefore, the Roman Church-State and papal authority saw the monarchical
constitution as a model for the constitution of the secular state. Such an archaic
model of government is still evident in the Vatican’s monarchical structure
(i.e. Roman Catholic Church-State). Only recently has Catholicism begun to support
democracy abroad, strategically and discriminately. Democracy, for Romanism, is a
“lesser evil” since monarchical governments are no longer dominant worldwide and
also given the threats of secularism and Marxism (Cook, 2012, p. 83); (Anderson,
2007).
8.2.1.2 Change of Discourse Towards Democracy after Vatican II
The Roman Church-State, which avoids democratic forms for internal Church
governance, is best suited to either monarchical or a mixed form of secular govern-
ment. Thus, Romanism rejects democratic constitution and popular sovereignty
principles as ideals both for the Church-State and for ecclesiastical states (Rommen,
1945 p. 490); (Cook, 2012, p. 24). As Civiltà Cattolica, the Jesuit periodical in
Rome, stated in the late 1930s: “Fascism is the regime that corresponds most closely
to the concepts of the Church of Rome” (as cited in van Paassen, 1939, p. 465).
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However, Vatican II (1962–1965) brought about a myriad of transformations. As
Agnew (2010) observed:
The Second Vatican Council, while it may not have marked a huge disruption in the beliefs
and practices of the Church, did involve the adoption of a novel set of more latitudinarian
attitudes towards other religions (not least towards other Christians) and the reinvigoration
of an epideictic language emphasising reconciliation rather than the previously dominant
patristic form accentuating confrontation and judgement (p. 48).
Vatican II affirmed the religious freedom of the Church and cooperation between
Church and State as guiding principles (Ragazzi, 2009, p. 118). It ended the
requirement of a Latin mass, relaxed confessional obligations and restrictions, and
abandoned the Roman Church’s claims to power in secular states (Wilde et al.,
2010). There is also empirical evidence that “Catholics brought up after Vatican II
are indeed more trusting and tolerant” than before (Guiso et al., 2006, p. 33).
However, the Roman See has increased its political activity by signing more than
30 concordats with new states after Vatican II (Corral, 2014; Fumagalli, 2011).
Therefore, theological change alone falls short of explaining the post-1965 shift of
the Roman Church from its traditional hostile stance towards democracy (Anderson,
2007). Anderson (2007) explained this shift in terms of the Church’s efforts to
maintain its ideological, political, and social hegemony and to preserve its position
in ideological, political, religious, and social markets.
Cook (2012) analysed Catholic hegemony after 1965 (Vatican II) in Spain,
Croatia, Germany, the USA, Mexico, and the Philippines. He found that hegemony
involves maintaining the preeminent place of Roman Catholicism among other
religious denominations in pluralistic societies grounded in constitutional democra-
cies. He concluded that depending on the political and religious conditions existing
in a particular country, the Roman Church-State either maintains or establishes its
hegemony over time (Cook, 2012, p. 345).
Wilde et al. (2010) examined the bishops’ openness to reform and ecumenical
affairs in their votes (i.e. to vote progressively) while at Vatican II. Using data from
more than 100 countries obtained from the Vatican Secret Archive, the authors ran
logistic regression analyses and tested the Rational Choice (Religious Competition)
and Neo-Institutional theories. Wilde et al. found evidence substantiating both
theories. The authors have concluded that bishops from countries that enjoy religious
freedom were much more inclined to vote progressively than bishops from countries
in which the Roman Catholic Church was the state church (Wilde et al., 2010,
p. 599).
In countries where the Roman Catholic Church was the state religion, the
probability that a bishop voted progressively at Vatican II decreases drastically,
from.95 to.21, as the percentage of Catholic population increases from 75 to 100.
However, the effect of the proportion of Catholics varies substantially with different
state-church relations. In countries with formal religious freedom, the proportion of
Catholics has practically no impact on the way in which bishops typically vote. In
turn, in countries where the Roman Church or another religion has been established,
bishops display more conservative tendencies as the market share of the Church rises
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(Wilde et al., 2010, pp. 593–594). These findings confirm the higher importance of
the religious institutional settings vis-à-vis the proportion of adherents and, equally
importantly, the decisive influence of religious competition in the configuration of
the Vatican II outcomes.
Similarly, Gill (1998) studied the contribution of Roman Catholicism to political
change in Latin America. He explained why after Vatican II some Catholic hierar-
chies supported political reform, while others supported authoritarian regimes or
stood aside, in order to preserve the status quo. He proposed a market explanation
based on quantitative and qualitative data analysis (i.e. cross-country comparisons
and twelve case studies). After analysing historical and statistical evidence, Gill
concluded that to keep parishioners, Catholic Church leaders defended the interests
of the poor and opposed totalitarian governments in countries where evangelical
Protestants and spiritist movements had gained ground among poor Catholics. In
contrast, bishops maintained strong ties with military rulers in areas where the
religious competition was limited. Strong religious competition preceded the Cath-
olic hierarchies move to oppose the military in five of the six antiauthoritarian cases
analysed by Gill––Chile, Brazil, El Salvador, Panama, and Nicaragua. However, in
five of the proauthoritarian or neutral cases analysed by the author––Bolivia, Argen-
tina, Honduras, Uruguay, and Paraguay––the Catholic Church faced limited com-
petition and did not adopt progressive pastoral policies on a large scale. Indeed, the
Catholic hierarchy provided insufficient assistance to pastoral agents in these coun-
tries, even though some progressive sectors were being attacked (Gill, 1998,
pp. 106, 270).
Gill’s results are supported by other studies in cases such as Argentina, where the
Catholic Church (as a monopolistic player) was supportive of and cooperative with
military dictatorships. In turn, the Chilean Catholic hierarchy responded critically
and unsupportively towards the dictatorship in the presence of religious pluralism
(i.e. the significant presence of Protestantism) (Waldmann, 2012; Zilla, 2020).
Gill also argues that monopolistic churches are comparable to monopolistic
companies because both fail to fulfil their consumers’ expectations of both quality
and quantity (Gill, p. 85). He illustrates this market strategy in the Roman Church by
comparing the number of priests per 10,000 Catholics across countries after Vatican
II (in the 1970s). Whereas a typical Latin American country had only around two
priests per 10,000 Catholics, Protestant countries such as the USA, Great Britain,
Australia, or Sweden had nearly five times the number (around ten priests per 10,000
Catholics). Germany, the birthplace of the Reformation, had almost 46 priests per
10,000 Catholics (Barret cited in Gill, 1998). Gill found then a strong inverse
correlation between religious monopoly and Catholic clergy per 10,000 Catholics
(r ¼ 0.75) (Gill, 1998, pp. 85–87). Accordingly, in the presence of religious
competition, more clergy per Catholic population typically means a better provision
of religious and social services. Therefore, Woodberry observes:
. . .the Catholic Church provided far more education and created more organizational civil
society in countries where it competed with CPs [conversionary Protestants] (e.g. the United
States, Ireland, and India), than in places it historically could block competition
(e.g. Mexico, Spain, and Italy) (Woodberry, 2012, p. 269).
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Thus, Roman Catholic hierarchies have often defended the interests of the poor
(e.g. promoting democracy) when facing greater competition from Protestantism
(Anderson, 2007; Gill, 1998; Woodberry, 2012). Competition compels the Roman
Church-State to break traditional alliances with the ruling elites. Protestant missions
have often catalysed Roman Catholic mobilisation, thus expanding education and
political resources in Latin America (Smith, 1991; Trejo, 2009; Woodberry, 2012).
In Mexico, for instance, Woodberry observes:
in areas with successful Protestant missions, both conservative and liberal bishops expanded
education and organized indigenous communities politically; elsewhere they did not.
Because the Catholic Church has far more resources and personnel in Mexico than do
Protestants, Catholics provided more educational and political resources than Protestants
did—but Protestant missions were the catalyst (Trejo, 2009 as cited in Woodberry, 2012,
p. 269).
Conversely, in the absence of competition, Catholic hierarchy can easily ignore
people’s needs and continue its allegiance with abusive political elites (Gill, 1998,
7, 48); (Anderson, 2007, p. 394). Evidently, competition with Protestantism has not
been the only factor affecting bishops’ decisions to oppose dictatorships, but is,
nevertheless, a key component in explaining the variation in institutional responses
(Gill, 1998, p. 120).
Nevertheless, a tendency exists to disregard or consider past scholarship as
outdated or as non-applicable after the Second Vatican Council. The allegedly
altruistic change after millennia of Roman Catholic intransigence has even led the
dominant literature to explain modern welfare states as a manifestation of Catholic
social doctrine (Boswell, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Wilensky, 1981). Some
authors, however, have found this approach historically inadequate, since it distorts
the decisive causes of institutional variance (Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009). In
Europe, Manow (2004) notably observes:
. . .in some of the allegedly ‘Catholic’ regimes Christian [Catholic] Democracy never
emerged as a political party (Spain, Portugal, France), or early welfare state legislation
had an explicitly anti-clerical motivation (Italy, France, Belgium) (Manow, 2004, p. 4).
Political Catholicism has typically led to the formation of Catholic Democratic
parties in countries where it has faced competition with Protestant or anti-clerical
movements (e.g. Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy) (Ercolessi &
Hägg, 2012; Manow, 2004). Similarly, Gill (1998) observes that in Latin America,
Catholic Democracy was mostly a lay phenomenon with little to no official endorse-
ment from the Church hierarchy. Although the bishops sometimes openly supported
the Christian Democrats’ goals, Vatican bans on overt political participation in
partisan politics restricted their assistance (p. 206).
Such evidence presented by Manow (2004), Ercolessi and Hägg (2012), and Gill
(1998) also supports the Religious Competition and Neo-Institutional theories (Sect.
7.2). Having clarified the influence of Roman Catholic ideology on institutions,
below I briefly consider the influence of historical Protestantism on institutions.
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8.2.2 Protestant Influence on Institutions and Democracy
Protestantism not only broke the political (as well as institutional and economic)
hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church but also interrupted the growing influence
of this belief system in Europe. From these processes emerged the modern state and
secular institution (which later also influenced democracy, the American Constitu-
tion, and the French and Industrial Revolutions) (Becker et al., 2016; Snyder, 2011;
Witte, 2002; Woodberry, 2012) (Sect. 8.2.2.1 and Sect. 8.3.4).
Becker et al. (2016) have provided a comprehensive and conclusive synthesis of
the literature on the causes and consequences of the Reformation, including its
positive and “dark shadow” (negative) effects. The authors conclude that the Prot-
estant Reformation “ended the ancient hegemony of the Catholic Church in Western
Europe” (p.1). Also, they observed that the Reformation connects to positive
institutional and economic outcomes in a myriad of empirical studies in which
Protestantism encourages:
. . .a host of variables that are important for economic growth, including human capital,
governance, entrepreneurship, social ethic, social networks, and missionary work. [. . .]
Where the Reformation took hold, it fundamentally altered political, legal, and social
institutions. This ultimately resulted in the ascendancy of parliaments, the secularization
of law, increased emphasis on education, and the precursors of the welfare state (Becker
et al., 2016, p. 21).
Becker et al. (2016) found a mostly “positive picture” of “the effects of the
Reformation on education, work ethic, and economic development” (Becker et al.,
p. 20). However, the authors also found a “dark side” of Protestantism in their review
of empirical studies. They traced the negative effect of Protestantism back to Weber
(1905), who had already noted sinister consequences of the Reformation, as “an
‘iron cage’ of secularization, alienating materialism and narrowly instrumental
thinking” (Becker et al., 2016, p. 20). Also, Durkheim (1899) found a higher
propensity of Protestants to commit suicide than Roman Catholics and Jews across
regions and countries. Yet, Roman Catholics exhibit a higher tendency to commit
homicides than Protestants (Durkheim, 1899, pp. 353–354). The higher suicide
likelihood of Protestants in Germany and Switzerland has been corroborated empir-
ically by Becker and Woessmann (2015) and Torgler and Schaltegger (2014),
respectively.
Furthermore, the Protestant share of the population also correlates with the rise of
anti-Semitism and Nazism in Germany during the Weimar Republic. For instance,
Protestants were ultimately polarised, especially where they supported the right ends
of the political spectrum in Germany, since Catholics were rooted in the political
centre with their own party, the Zentrumspartei (Spenkuch as cited in Becker et al.,
2016, p. 21). However, other authors (Goldhagen, Browning, as cited in Becker
et al., 2016) state that German anti-Semitism might be traced back to “Luther’s
nationalism and obsession with the failed effort to convert the Jews to Protestantism”
(p. 20). Yet, these and other similar historical claims that link Luther’s ethics and
nationalism with Germany being predisposed toward intolerance and
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authoritarianism “suffer from being over-generalized, poorly construed and rarely
tested using systematic evidence” (Becker et al., 2016, pp. 20–21), (see Sect.
8.3.4.1).
8.2.2.1 Protestantism and Democracy
In historical Protestantism, neither a priest, bishop, or pope dictates morality but
every Protestant believer does so based on reading and interpreting the Bible. This,
in brief, is Luther’s democratising “universal priesthood of all believers’ principle”
(Witte, 2002).
Woodberry’s (2012) influential study demonstrated a consistent linkage between
Protestantism and democracy. The latter, as other authors have established, is also
firmly associated with prosperity (Morton et al., 2005; World Economic Forum,
2016). Woodberry (2012) provided robust historical and statistical evidence that
Protestant missionaries profoundly influenced the rise and spread of stable democ-
racy around the world:
1. Historically, Protestants have spread religious liberty, mass education, mass
printing, newspapers, voluntary organisations, and colonial reforms, and thus
helped to create the conditions for stable democracies.
2. Statistically, “Protestant missions are significantly and robustly associated with
higher levels of printing, education, economic development, organizational civil
society, protection of private property, and rule of law and with lower levels of
corruption” (Woodberry 2004a, 2004c, 2006c, 2011b, 2011c, as cited in
Woodberry, 2012, p. 268). The statistical evidence “demonstrates that the historic
prevalence of Protestant missionaries explains the variation in democracy better
than either the prevalence of the nonreligious or of generic Protestants. Moreover,
Protestant missions predict democracy, whereas Catholic missions do not”
(Woodberry p. 247).
Consequently, Protestantism is strongly associated with stable, representative
democracy in Western Europe. Also, statistically, “the historic prevalence of Prot-
estant missionaries strongly predicts democracy in 142 non-European societies”
(Woodberry, 2012, p. 245). Furthermore, Woodberry (2012) found such a consistent
association also among European-settler colonies:
“Protestant-based” United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have been more
democratic than “Catholic-based” Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. Both sets of
countries had similar precolonial conditions (i.e. temperate climates, communal landholding,
and small indigenous populations), which weakens theories that climate or pre-Protestant
class conditions caused the Protestantism–democracy association (p. 244).
Woodberry’s conclusions also weaken theories claiming that secularisation
causes democracy (e.g. the USA is far more religious than Uruguay). In this respect,
the historical prevalence of Protestant missionaries explains about half the statistical
variation in democracy in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania (Woodberry,
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2012, p. 244). The robust controls and consistent analyses performed by Woodberry
leave little room for an alternative explanation to Protestantism as a democracy
trigger.
On this historical and empirical evidence, Woodberry seriously challenges tradi-
tional modernisation theory. For instance, traditionally associated factors of democ-
racy and social developments are often endogenous (and not necessarily direct
determinants) (i.e. secular rationality, economic growth, urbanisation,
industrialisation, the expansion of the state, and the development of new class
structures) (Woodberry, 2012, p. 244). Anderson (2007) reached similar conclu-
sions, in particular that the greater the proportion of the Protestant population, the
higher the level of democracy (p. 385).
However, on the “dark side”, it is clear that “missionaries committed their own
abuses, and some were even racist”, or they often ignored abuses given their
concentration on conversion as a primary goal (Woodberry, 2012, p. 255). Also,
the typical Protestant translation of texts and education in the vernacular, “may have
accentuated ethnic heterogeneity and sometimes fostered violence” (Posner, Ranger
as cited in Woodberry, 2012, p. 245). However, as Bradbury (2014) concluded,
missionaries have been unfairly depicted as colonial forces, imperial agents, anni-
hilators of local societies, and ideologically motivated manipulators of marginalised
natives. Although there were a few missionaries to whom those descriptions could
be reasonably attributed, such generalisations wilt under the examination of a more
rigorous historical inquiry (Bradbury, 2014, p. 427).
Figure 8.1 shows the historical relations between the religious and institutional
factors giving rise to prosperity, transparency, and democracy; or instead to hege-
monic oppression and corruption.
8.2.3 Traditional Institutional Influence of Religion in Latin
America
The Roman Catholic Church-State legitimated Latin American territories as either
Spanish or Portuguese colonies from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century.
Equally, Spanish and Portuguese settlement guaranteed a Catholic monopoly from
1500 to the early 1900s, thus securing the Church’s hegemony and a feudalist-like
economy (Gill, 2013, p. 117). In essence, the conquest was a religious, political, and
military endeavour actively supported by the Church. It made Latin America a
unique cultural entity in the world, one largely possessing the same language
(Spanish or Portuguese) and the same religion (Roman Catholicism) as solid,
unifying elements (Navarro, 2016, p. 111).
By the onset of the colonial period, the Iberian Peninsula had established its
hegemony in Europe, which enabled it to bring under its rule the richest territories in
the Americas (South and Central). The British took what the Spaniards and Portu-
guese “left over” (North America). North American lands were desert-poor and
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inhabited by modest aborigines. Importantly, these territories lacked the abundance
of gold and jewels found in their South and Central American counterparts
(i.e. attested to by the Aztec, Maya and Inca civilisations) (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2012, p. 21).
A positive institutional loop inherited from Great Britain allowed a “reversal of
fortune,” in which the poorest lands of the Americas (North) became the most
powerful country in the world (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Prados de la Escosura,
2004). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) explain that inclusive institutions permit
goods and wealth to be shared more equally. This enabled the British to establish the
USA, from the “left-overs” of the Spaniards, and to build the British Empire.
By contrast, the Spaniards took advantage of the indigenous population and built
extractive institutions, such as la mita (“tax or common service paid by Indians”) or
la encomienda (“enslavement or Spanish labour system”). These were designed to
extract wealth from the people and to perpetuate a powerful elite during the colonial
period. This situation persisted after the independence of the Latin American states,
whose present-day institutions descend from la mita or la encomienda. Such social
inequality has bred corruption, violence, and political instability (ibid).
Even after independence, the Catholic Church-State has been instrumental to
securing a population loyal to government, thus perpetuating the status quo, i.e. the
hegemony of the Roman Church-State. Protestantism was officially banned, includ-
ing government prohibitions of Bible distributions and Protestant services in Span-
ish, among others (Gill, 2013, p. 119). In the mid-twentieth century, the Catholic
Church continued to secure for itself favourable positions in countries such as
Colombia or Argentina (Gill, 1998, 2013; Levine, 1981; Munevar, 2008).
The colonial legacy that Latin American institutions received from religion is
characterised by three facts: first, the religious monopoly of the Roman Catholic
Church, i.e. the banning of other religious expressions; second, the replacement of
indigenous beliefs for Roman Catholicism giving form to syncretic practices
persisting to this date; and third, royal patronage (Patronato Real), a quasi-perfect
fusion of church and state allowing the Spanish King to appoint bishops in the New
World, who would also hold government posts, and to preserve the hierarchy Pope-
King-Bishop (Navarro, 2016, p. 112).
Since colonisation, the material and symbolic influence of the Roman Catholic
Church has reinforced social arrangements in Latin America (Levine, 1981, p. 29).
For Levine, the pervasive fusion of Roman Catholicism and politics in Latin
America can assume several forms that may include, among others: (1) the content
and form of laws; (2) the approved processes for legitimising authority; (3) the
essence of accepted sanctions; (4) processes for resolving social conflicts; and
(5) educational structures. These and other expressions reflect a conviction that the
ideals that inform institutional structures and orient individuals are inextricably
linked to those which connect individuals to the spiritual realm (Levine, 1981, p. 20).
Notwithstanding the imposed restrictions, Protestant missionaries slowly intro-
duced Reformed forms of faith until Protestantism could no longer be ignored in the
twentieth-century Latin America (Gill, 2013). As Gill observed,
8.2 Religion and Institutions (6) 89
. . .Protestant missionaries were able to make their way slowly into various societies and
begin converting individuals, including indigenous folk who would then become pastors for
these new churches. Once Protestants began indigenizing their churches, it became difficult
for governments to prevent their growth. It was one thing to deport foreign missionaries; it
was just not possible to deport one's own citizens. Moreover most of these new churches
provided valuable social services to communities (e.g. literacy training, food banks for the
poor). . . (Gill, 2013, p. 119).
Protestant churches also provided the poor with access to medical assistance and
other services (Gill, 1998, 2013; Woodberry, 2012). Growing Protestant competition
forced many Catholic dignitaries to rethink their strategy with a new “preferential
option for the poor” (Gill, 1998, 2013). The Catholic Church promulgated a new
social strategy (i.e. Rerum Novarum of 1891); Catholic Action; Second Vatican
Council of 1965); Medellin Episcopal Conference of 1968). These developments
also gave rise to “Liberation Theology” (Büschges, 2018), (see Sect. 10.4.1.4).
Regardless of such advances, the Roman Catholic Church still exercises great
hegemony in most Latin American countries and traditional intransigent paradigms
continue to prevail (Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981; Martin, 1999; Munevar, 2008).
The inertia of such institutional legacies and the prevalence of corporatist ideol-
ogies (pre-Vatican II) have perpetuated an elitist model of society in Latin America,
which continues to be by far the most unequal continent in the world to date (World
Bank, 2014).
8.2.4 Summarising the Core Messages of Section 8.2.
Religion and Institutions
Regardless of the advances made by Roman Catholicism in the Second Vatican
Council (Vatican II: 1962–1965), corporatist ideologies remain prevalent, mostly in
Latin America (Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981; Martin, 1999; Munevar, 2008). But
while Roman Catholic discourse has shifted, the institutional inertia persists and
maintains the hierarchical status quo and longstanding feudal structures (e.g.
through signed concordats).
The Reformation brought forth a wide range of modern institutions. Among
these, education and democracy are the most crucial ones for ensuring prosperity/
transparency outcomes. Likewise, Protestantism has impacted the secularisation of
the state in Protestant countries (and also in Roman Catholics, albeit to a lesser, more
indirect extent). Protestantism fosters horizontal power relations and secular-rational
attitudes towards authority (Becker et al., 2016; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Manow &
van Kersbergen, 2009; Treisman, 2000; Witte, 2002; Woodberry, 2012). Thus, such
egalitarian and secular attitudes are linked to greater transparency and prosperity
(Lambsdorff, 2006).
State institutions in Latin America have been closely linked with Roman Cathol-
icism in that they continue feudal-medieval structures. The Protestant Reformation
has not been allowed to directly influence institutions in Latin America as it did in
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North America or in northern Europe. The following sections expand on these
historical relations and concentrate on religion and formal institutions (law) in
Europe and the Americas.
Note: The GCI index includes an institutional indicator. Therefore, no results of
institutions are analysed in the empirical setting, in order to exclude endogeneity
(i.e. institutions explaining institutions). However, the next section considers the
legal tradition, which may serve as an exogenous proxy of the historical institutional
influence of religion (or non-religion).
8.3 Law, Religion, Revolutions, and State Models (B), (D),
(6)
8.3.1 Legal Traditions in Europe and the Americas2
Countries in Europe and the Americas have either transplanted or developed their
legal systems based on some few legal traditions rather than writing new systems of
their own (Watson, 1974; La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1115). Thus, the different legal
rules, procedures, and institutions at the national and subnational levels share
traditional characteristics that allow classification into groups or families. Along
these lines, Merryman and Pérez (2007) defined legal tradition as a collection of
profoundly ingrained, socially formed views about the essence of law, its place in
society and institutions, the proper organisation and function of a legal system, and
how the law is or should be made, enforced, interpreted, refined, studied, and taught.
The legal tradition is a connection between the legal system and the society of which
it is a part (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 2).
Consequently, the most widespread legal traditions worldwide are: first, Roman
civil law, which includes French and other European and Latin American systems;
second, common law, which includes most Anglo-Saxon systems; and third, social-
ist law, which comes from former and current socialist countries (including China
and Cuba). The historical dominance of Roman law resulted from Roman imperial-
ism and conquest. Likewise, the current dominance of Roman civil law and of the
common law traditions in the modern world is a direct product of earlier centuries of
European imperialism (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 5) (Fig. 8.2). Additionally, such
traditions have also spread across the world through borrowing or imitation
(e.g. Japan voluntarily adopted the German legal tradition) (La Porta et al., 1998,
p. 1115). Within the first group of legal traditions (Roman civil law), only three
2Originally published as “Legal Traditions and Prosperity in Europe and the Americas” in: Garcia
Portilla, J. (2019). “Ye Shall Know Them by Their Fruits”: Prosperity and Institutional Religion
in Europe and the Americas. Religions, 10(6), 362. MDPI AG. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.
3390/rel10060362
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
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significant families currently exist as its heirs: French, German, and Scandinavian
(ibid) (Fig. 8.2 and Sect. 8.3.2).
Typically, Southern (Mediterranean) Europe, and Latin America have French
law. Northern Europe has mostly German, Scandinavian, or English common law.
North America inherited English common law. Post-Soviet states have a socialist
legal tradition, but most of them returned to French civil law after the fall of the
Berlin Wall (La Porta et al., 2008, p. 289).
Figure 8.2 presents the most important legal traditions in Europe and the
Americas from the Middle Ages to the present. From left to right, Roman and
canonical legal traditions chronologically progressed through the centuries. They
did not abruptly end after the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, but percolated down
after the various revolutions. All legal traditions incorporate Roman law in some
form. From bottom to top, a colour gradient represents the closeness to Roman and
canon law traditions (ranging to purple). Those legal traditions that are more distant
from Roman and canon law (ranging to green) are shown towards the bottom of the
table.
Roman and Roman Catholic canon law traditions have defined the institutional
status quo or the ancien régime in Europe and the Americas. Violent national
revolutions directed against the existing legal system gradually interrupted this
hegemony in favour of more transcendental views of justice (above all in the last
five centuries). Successive national revolutions have reformed and renewed the legal
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Fig. 8.2 Legal traditions in Europe and the Americas (Amended from Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003;
Merryman & Pérez, 2007; La Porta et al., 2008)
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traditions (in some countries more than in others) of the still pervasive and surviving
Roman and the Catholic canon law regime. Every country in Europe and the
Americas traces its legal system back to a revolution (Berman, 2003, pp. 16–17).
The following sections explain each of these traditions chronologically.
8.3.2 Legal Traditions and Current Institutional
Performance (3)
The long-term persistence of legal traditions affects institutional performance and
therefore also prosperity (Volonté, 2015). Figure 8.3 summarises some performance
indicators of otherwise distinct legal traditions. French, German, and Scandinavian
legal systems belong to the tradition of Roman Civil law (Merryman & Pérez, 2007).
And yet they are all different. Germanic, and in particular the Scandinavian, legal
systems descend less from Roman law than the French one (Zweigert and Kotz as
cited in La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1119). German and especially Scandinavian legal
systems were influenced by the Lutheran Reformation, which, to a certain extent,
modified the foundational principles of Roman (and particularly of canon) law.
French civil law comes from the French Revolution, which also intended to
transform the influence of Roman and canon law. This transformation, however,
was not always possible due to the inertia of the tradition of Roman law for French
Revolution jurists. Moreover, the transformation of canon law, for example, was not
automatically transplanted to most Latin American countries, which adopted French
legal principles after gaining independence (Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez,
2007). Several Latin American countries signed concordats with the Roman Church-
State after their independence, thus subordinating their civil law to canon law and
granting explicit privileges to the Church-State (Salinas, 2013).
As explained in further detail below, countries with French legal origins also have
Roman Catholicism as their dominant religion, historically. Likewise, countries with
a socialist legal origin are more likely to exhibit a significant historical presence of
Orthodox religions. French and socialist legal origins are consistently associated
with burdensome regulations and lower incomes. In contrast, countries of English,
German, or Scandinavian legal origin have been historically linked to Protestantism,
regulate less, and are the most prosperous (La Porta et al., 1999, p. 244; World Bank,
International Finance Corporation & Oxford University Press, 2004) (See Fig. 8.3).
The countries that regulate the most (i.e. those of socialist or French legal origins)
typically exhibit more corruption, more poverty, greater inefficiency of public
institutions, and lower quality of private or public goods. Heavier regulation is
associated with inequality, fewer checks and balances, and less enforcement capac-
ity. A large amount of heavy regulation descends from the Roman legal tradition
(La Porta et al., 1999; World Bank, International Finance Corporation, & Oxford
University Press, 2004).
8.3 Law, Religion, Revolutions, and State Models (B), (D), (6) 93
8.3.3 The Roman Civil Law Tradition
The civil law tradition can be traced as far back as the Twelve Tables in ancient
Rome (450 B.C). Figures 8.2 and 8.3 show that mostly modern French law and, to a
lesser extent, German and Scandinavian law currently represent the tradition of
Roman civil law. Today, French civil law is both the most influential and also the
most widely distributed system across the world (i.e. it is predominant in Latin
America, Southern Europe, and across Asia and Africa). It precedes international
law (i.e. the legal developments of the European Union and UN) and even prevails in
a few enclaves of the “common law world” (Louisiana, Quebec, and Puerto Rico)
(Merryman & Pérez, 2007, pp. 2–3; La Porta et al., 2008, p. 289). La Porta et al.
(2008) characterise French civil law as follows:
[. . .] originates in Roman law, uses statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of
ordering legal material [. . .]. Dispute resolution tends to be inquisitorial rather than adver-
sarial. Roman law was rediscovered in the Middle Ages in Italy, adopted by the Catholic
Church for its purposes, and from there formed the basis of secular laws in many European
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Fig. 8.3 Comparison of institutional performance between different legal traditions (Amended
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Different historical successive subtraditions constitute modern civil law:
(1) Roman civil law (from the Roman Empire); (2) Canon law (from the Roman
Catholic Church-State); (3) Commercial law (where pragmatic Italian merchants
serve as judges); (4) the influence of revolutions (i.e. German, French, American);
and (5) legal science (descending from the various revolutions) (Merryman & Pérez,
2007); (Berman, 2003).
The first three subtraditions (Roman, canon, and commercial law) are the funda-
mental historical sources of institutions, concepts, and procedures in “civil law
countries”. In such countries, these three subtraditions embody the essential modern
codes (typically: civil, commercial, and penal; civil and criminal procedure)
(Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 14).
Roman and canon law have the highest historical relevance and are directly
related to religion, institutions, and prosperity. Below I explain these two crucial
subtraditions.
8.3.3.1 Roman Civil Law
Merryman and Pérez (2007) consider Roman law as being Rome’s most significant
contribution to Western society. There is no doubt that Roman forms of thought
invaded the Western legal system. For the authors, all Western lawyers can be
considered Roman lawyers in this respect. Yet, in civil law countries, the prevalence
of Roman civil law is much more widespread, prominent, and explicit than in
common law countries (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 11).
Roman law was compiled and codified in the sixth century A.D under Justinian in
the Corpus Juris Civilis. It is the most fundamental part both of the European legal
tradition (especially in the Mediterranean Region) and of Latin America’s. Today the
civil codes of these countries demonstrate the domination of Roman law, as well as
its medieval and contemporary revivals (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, pp. 10–11).
Weber (1905) also observed that Roman law “has always retained its supremacy
in the Catholic countries of Southern Europe”, while countries such as England were
able to overcome it (p. 37–38).
8.3.3.2 Roman Catholic Jurisprudence (Canon Law) (6)
The pan-European Roman Church-State became the first modern state. It established
a body of law that was systematised and compiled in Gratian’s Decretum (1140),
entitled “A Concordance of Discordant Canons” (Berman, 2003, p. 4).
The canonical law of the Roman Catholic Church-State has strongly influenced
civil law. For instance, canon law influenced the jus commune that the European
states received (it was the law generally applicable in Europe). Notably, Roman
Catholic canon law includes various forged documents that were regarded as
authentic for centuries (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, pp. 11–12). O’Reilly and Chal-
mers (2014) notably explain that canon law is a legal system that has always
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governed the Catholic Church and “had once been used to govern nations”. How-
ever, canon law “is often unfamiliar to those from common law jurisdictions”
(p. 316). The authors further observe:
The Catholic Church has its own code of laws worldwide. Those laws are found in the Code
of Canon Law as well as in the particular laws created by internal, local, and national Church
legislation. While church entities are bound to follow the laws of the civil jurisdiction, where
these exist, all members of the Catholic Church, including laity and clergy, are also bound to
follow the laws of the Church, or face internal penalties. [. . .] To understand the Church’s
process, one must always keep in mind that the institution does not view itself as some sort of
religious corporation; its self-understanding and judicial model is akin to being a state. Thus
its disciplinary processes are more akin to the law of a government or state rather than a
corporate disciplinary model (O’Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, pp. 7–8; 316–317).
Roman Catholic sacraments inspired medieval Catholic canonists and moralists
to devise entire legal systems. The sacraments provided the framework for
organising some of the legal institutions of the Church and society in the Middle
Ages (Table 8.1). However, not all canon law can be subsumed under the sacraments
(Witte, 2002, pp. 169–170).
Moreover, the development of natural law is central to Roman Catholic theology.
It was influenced in particular by Greek philosophy and Roman law rather than by
the Scriptures (Gula, 2002, pp. 120–121; Selling, 2018, p. 9). Importantly, it is
through natural law that the Catholic Church-State claims the rightness or wrongness
of human conduct. The Catholic Church-State bases such claims on its trust in the
human capacity to discern and to choose between right or wrong regardless of
religious affiliation (Gula, 2002, pp. 120–121). Natural law is, for Roman Catholi-
cism, a reflection of divine law and immediately accessible to human reason through
the traditions of the Church and sacred texts (Berman, 2003, p. 73). The Roman
Church-State has resorted to natural law as the foundation of its teachings on sexual
behaviour, freedom of religion, justice, fair societies, human life, medical practice,
and the connection between societal morals and civil law (Gula, 2002, pp. 120–121).
Contrary to Gula’s (2002) idealistic appreciation, the application of natural law
and the Code of Canon Law have led, among others, to “the very public failures of
the Church to listen to victims and to get rid of abusive priests” (O’Reilly &
Chalmers, 2014, p. 397). The authors observe, “the canonical penal process is
clunky, vague, and inefficient” (p. 269). Among the several reasons that explain
the inadequacy of the Canon Law system of justice, O’Reilly and Chalmers mention:
Table 8.1 Examples of medieval canon laws supported by Catholic Sacraments (Amended from
Witte, 2002, pp. 169–170)
Catholic sacrament Associated laws
Baptism and the Eucharist Liturgy, religious doctrine, catechesis, and discipline
Ordination Law of the clergy and Church life
Marriage Law of sex, marriage, and family life
Extreme unction Law of wills, inheritance, and trusts
Penance Law of crime, tort, and moral obligation
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1. The canon law trial processes are slow, hierarchical, and inquisitional. While
traditional criminal procedures in common law countries (e.g. the USA) may take
a matter of days, the canonical process can take several years. For instance, a
canonical tribunal hears a case then “sends it up to an appeal panel, and Vatican
review is likely” (p. 353).
2. “‘Due process’ is not a standard term with a recognized content in canon law”
(Orsy as cited in O’Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 354). Therefore, canonical
procedures do not recognise rights such as the presumption of innocence, trial
by an independent court, or the right to confront witnesses (p. 354).
3. No separation of powers (i.e. checks and balances) exists in canon law (canon
331). While the Code of Canon Law distinguishes between executive, legislative,
and judicial powers, the authority resides internationally in the pope, who is the
supreme executive and primary legislator for the Roman Church-State. Locally,
the authority resides with the bishop, who is subordinate to the pope
(pp. 208–209).
4. Vatican officials and the pope enjoy sovereign immunity as the Vatican is
recognised as a sovereign nation. Sovereign immunity defeats any effort of
domestic plaintiff lawyers unless they appeal to specific international law instru-
ments (pp. 163–164).
5. No cross-examination exists in canon law, for which only auditors or judges are
allowed to ask questions. Also, “only having clerics judging clerics is patently
biased because clearly the notion of solidarity among the brotherhood of priests
trumped finding a fellow priest guilty” (pp. 264, 268).
6. Secrecy and the avoidance of scandal are mentioned in 24 different canons of the
Code (p. 224). The principle of avoiding scandal to the Church explains, among
others, the unwillingness of bishops and clerics to interact and cooperate with
secular enforcement authorities. Consequently, “turning the accusations over to
the civil authorities was never considered a viable option” (p.277). Numerous
examples exist in which the Vatican curia encourages bishops not to cooperate
with civil investigations over clergy sexual abuse scandals. For instance, “the
Vatican blocked the Irish bishops from adopting a policy of ‘mandatory
reporting’ of suspect abusers to the police” (p. 79). Likewise, the Colombian
Cardinal Darío Castrillón issued several letters congratulating bishops for not
releasing information about the sexual abuse of minors to civil authorities
(p. 199).
Therefore, the application of the Code of Canon Law has resulted in a cover-up,
whereby the Roman Church-State has left most of the sexual abuse committed by
Catholic priests unpunished and uncompensated (Grand Jury of Pennsylvania,
2018). In the USA, O’Reilly and Chalmers (2014) document the quite cumbersome
bureaucratic procedure under Catholic Canon Law to suing known or suspected
clerics for having committed child abuse:
Offentimes this process literally took years to complete––particularly if the case was
appealed to Rome. [. . .] When an appeal was filed, it went to one of the Vatican courts.
The National Review Board [for the Protection of Children and Young People] reports that
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bishops knew that “the Vatican courts tended to err on the side of protecting a priest because
of a concern that bishops could seek to use canon law to rid themselves of a priest whom they
did not like or with whom they disagreed.” [. . .] American Bishops were very concerned that
even if there was a “conviction” in an internal diocesan penal trial that the judgment would
eventually get overturned by a Vatican appeals court on a technicality. Then the case would
either be sent back to be done correctly, or dismissed completely. Bishops had heard of cases
that were overturned by Rome on technicalities, with the appeal being sent back with an
order to reinstate the priest––even after a criminal conviction in the local civil jurisdiction
(O’Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 262).
Furthermore, some priests and bishops who are abusers, have also invoked the
“seal of confessional” under the claim of religious freedom “to refuse to report sex
abuse and to rebut the prosecutors’ demand for disclosures” (O’Reilly & Chalmers,
2014, p. 122). In Pennsylvania (USA), thousands of sexual abuse complaints have
been kept in “secret archives” that only the responsible bishop could access under
the Code of Canon Law. The FBI analysed Diocesan files and found that the Roman
Catholic hierarchy followed the same script-like method to “conceal the truth”:
(1) uses euphemisms rather than concrete language to describe sexual assaults;
(2) does not conduct genuine investigations with properly trained staff; (3) sends
priests for “evaluation” at church-run psychiatric treatment centres to create a
semblance of integrity; (4) fails to disclose why a priest needs to be removed, or
tells his parishioners that he is on “sick leave” or suffering from “nervous exhaus-
tion”; (5) keeps covering the priest’s housing and living expenses even if he
continues to abuse children; (6) transfers the priest “to a new location where no
one will know he is a child abuser”; and finally and most significantly (7) fails to
notify the police (Grand Jury of Pennsylvania, 2018, pp. 2–3).
Evidently, the canonical and civil procedures are entirely separate processes that
do not naturally interrelate, although there can be some overlaps. However, the
Canon Law system has interfered with civil prosecution processes, so that most cases
of abusive clergy remain in impunity (Grand Jury of Pennsylvania, 2018). The
Canon Law system has proven to use cumbersome, archaic processes with excessive
formalities that make “the removal and punishment process exceedingly difficult to
manage” (O’Reilly & Chalmers, 2014, p. 253). Even in prosperous countries such as
the USA, the canonical penal system is “unwieldy, inefficient, and almost impossible
for many dioceses to maintain the personnel and processes as they are required in the
Code”. O’Reilly and Chalmers appropriately ask the question of where the canonical
system can possibly run properly, if not in the USA (p. 401). As the Report of the
Grand Jury of Pennsylvania (2011) states:
The canonical process does not make the internal investigations any less biased in favor of
protecting the institution, or the people who conduct them any more competent at arriving at
the truth, or the victims feel any less re-victimized (supra, 86–87).
O’Reilly and Chalmers (2014) also emphasise the pervasiveness of the clergy’s
sexual abuse problem, with varied outcomes among virtually all religious organisa-
tions, including Protestant faiths. Yet, these denominations do not cover-up their
cases with a historical state legal shield such as the Code of Canon Law. Several
denominations (e.g. Methodist, Nazarene, Protestant Episcopal Church) have
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concurred that religious doctrines need not be considered in criminal cases such as
clergy abuse. However, denominations such as the Presbyterians claim that the
presbytery functions as an ecclesiastical court alternate, which is not analogous to
civil law (i.e. a similar claim as in the Catholic Canon Law). Mormons and The
Jehovah’s Witnesses “are noted for their secrecy and intra-faith methods”, which
“makes it difficult to accurately assess the scope of sexual abuse” (O’Reilly &
Chalmers, 2014, p. 406). In any case, secular authorities investigate and prosecute
ordinary citizens, including Protestant ministers, who commit sexual abuse or any
other crimes, in regular legal processes.
Finally, in common law countries, (which are also historically Protestant, such as
the USA) the conflict between Catholic Canon Law and the law of the state is more
visible because the latter has pre-eminence. In turn, that conflict is less visible in
most Catholic countries, in which Canon Law has often prevailed over civil norms.
Furthermore, legal instruments such as concordats have been typically enforced to
accept the force of Canon Law in several Catholic countries.
8.3.4 Protestantism, Revolutions, and Law (60)
Despite the critical impact of Protestant reformations on the law and on institutions,
the influence of religion has been largely neglected or obscured in the mainstream
literature3 (Doe & Sandberg, 2010, p. 9; Berman, 2003, p. 71; Witte, 2002, p. 28;
Anderson, 2009, p. 210). The significant contribution that sixteenth-century
Lutheran legal theorists made to Western legal thought has been ignored in conven-
tional historical accounts (Berman, 2003, p. 71). As Witte observed, “. . .some social
historians today have dismissed the “Reformation” altogether as a historian’s fiction
and a historical failure” (pp. 28–29). Thus, a conventional interpretation of the
influence of the early Reformers is that:
. . .they inspired no real reformation. Their ideas had little impact on the beliefs and
behaviors of common people. Their policies perpetuated elitism and chauvinism more
than they cultivated equality and liberty. Their reforms tended to obstruct nascent move-
ments for democracy and market economy and to inspire new excesses in the patriarchies of
family, Church, and state. As the editors of the Handbook of European History 1400–1600
put it, “the Reformation” must now be viewed as an ideological category of “nineteenth
century Protestant historical belief,”which served more to defend the self-identity of modern
mainline Protestants than to define a cardinal turning point in Western history. Recent
historiography, the editors continue, has brought “changes of sensibility” that have now
“robbed” the term “Reformation” of any utility and veracity (Witte, 2002, p. 29).
3It does not refer to the Weberian (cultural) influence of Protestantism on the development of
capitalism, about which thousands of articles and hundreds of books have been written (see Sect.
7.1). Rather, it refers particularly to the influence of religion on law and institutions as an established
research paradigm. Doe and Sandberg (2010) have observed, regarding the latter, that in Law
Schools, the relationship between religion and law has been an overlooked topic of study (p. 9).
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However, Witte runs “counter to traditional lines of historical analysis” by
demonstrating that the theology and law of the Reformation are “sources of ideas
and institutions that were much more than simply the totems of the elite of the
bludgeons of the powerful”. When viewed through the binocular of law and theol-
ogy, the author continues, “the Lutheran Reformation is hardly the ideological
concept or idle category that some recent historiography suggests” (pp. 29–30).
This section reviews the historical influence of Protestantism, and of the various
revolutions that followed in its wake, on the different legal traditions.
8.3.4.1 The Sixteenth-Century German-European Revolution
In 1517, Martin Luther and other Reformers initiated a process that culminated in the
abolition of Roman Catholic ecclesiastical jurisdiction in future Protestant countries
(i.e. England, Scandinavian countries) (Berman, 2003, p. 6). Luther, a canon law
expert, condemned Aquinas’s Aristotelian theology and most of the Catholic sacra-
ments due to their lack of biblical foundations (Berman, 2003); (Witte, 2002).
Berman portrayed Martin Luther as someone who honestly reflected his preachings
and teachings in both his career and life. For the author, the German people of
Luther’s time considered him a new Elijah, John the Baptist, Daniel, Moses, or other
prophet sent by the Lord. For Berman, Luther was the brightest and undoubtedly one
of the most influential, innovative, and famous theologians of his day. He was
intensely passionate, almost as if he was being spurred on by extraneous forces.
Yet, the same passion prompted him to denounce vitriolically those who profoundly
disagreed with him. He used scatological words in his condemnations without
hesitation. In his later years, he engaged in bigoted verbal attacks on Jews who
resisted converting to Christianity, paralleled with assaults on Anabaptists, Turks,
papists, and others (Berman, 2003, p. 47).
In Luther’s Ninety-five Theses of 1517, and in subsequent debates, he exposed a
long list of injustices inherent in canon laws. He also unmasked the “fallacious legal
foundation” of papal authority and the “myriad inconsistencies” between the
“human laws and traditions” of the Roman Church-State versus the Scriptures
(Berman, 2003, p. 74). Luther said that the Roman Church should not be a lawmak-
ing institution and emphasised:
In the entire canon law of the pope there are not even two lines which could instruct a devout
Christian, (. . .) it would be a good thing if canon law were completely blotted out, from the
first letter to the last, especially the [papal] decretals. More than enough is written in the
Bible about how we should behave in all circumstances. Unless they abolish their laws and
ordinances and restore to Christ’s churches their liberty and have it taught among them, they
are to blame for all the souls that perish under this miserable captivity, and the papacy is truly
the kingdom of Babylon and of the very Antichrist (LW 44:179, 202–3 as cited in Witte,
2002, p. 55) (author’s italics).
Moreover, Luther directly attacked the moral authority of the Roman law (and its
lawyers) as part of the same Babylonian system:
100 8 Institutions, Corruption/Prosperity, and Religion (A), (B), (D), (1), (3), (6)
Jurists are bad Christians (WA TR 3, No. 2809b). Every jurist is an enemy of Christ (WA TR
3, Nos. 2837, 3027). I shit on the law of the pope and of the emperor, and on the law of the
jurists as well (WA 49:302 as cited in Witte, 2002, p. 2).
Therefore, what began as a reformation of the Church and theology rapidly
expanded into a reformation of the law and the state, in Germany and beyond
(i.e. in Northern Europe, and later in North America). The key was to deconstruct
canon law for the sake of the Gospel and, on this basis, to reconstruct “civil law on
the strength of the Gospel” (Witte, 2002, p. 3).
Accordingly, the Lutheran Reformation initially removed medieval Roman and
canon laws in the sixteenth-century Germany. Luther considered this process imper-
ative for various reasons: Roman and canon laws fostered papal tyranny and thus
enjoyed unbridled powers of legislation, adjudication, and administration. Second, it
was abusive and self-serving, and thereby granted the clergy special benefits,
privileges, exemptions, and immunities that elevated it above the laity. Third, it
served as an instrument of greed and exploitation to support the luxury and bureau-
cracy of the Roman Church (LW 31:3414 as cited in Witte, 2002, pp. 55–56).
Moreover, since Roman Catholic natural law is founded on the human ability to
discern good and evil (Selling, 2018); (Gula, 2002), its refutation by Protestantism
also had a biblical foundation:
The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: Who can know it? (King
James Bible, 1769, Jeremiah 17:9);
Why should ye be stricken any more? ye will revolt more and more: the whole head is sick,
and the whole heart faint (King James Bible, 1769, Isaiah 1:5);
For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with
me; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would, I do not: but
the evil which I would not, that I do (King James Bible, 1769, Romans 7:18–19).
Given the explicit scriptural claims of the human inability to discern good from
evil, Protestant jurists, therefore, considered the Gospel the best source of natural
knowledge (Witte, 2002, p. 169). Luther, but most especially his followers,
Melanchthon, Eisermann, and Oldendorp considered the Bible the supreme source
of law for earthly life. Accordingly, they produced a new jurisprudence, one
theologically based on biblical moral principles, upon which they interpreted sub-
ordinate species of legal rules (Berman, 2003, p. 8). Consequently, Lutheran jurists
laid particular emphasis on the biblical Ten Commandments to ground their juris-
prudence, which thus contrasted with the Catholic canonists’ focus on the seven
sacraments (Berman, 2003); (Witte, 2002) (compare Tables 8.1 and Fig. 8.4).
However, Lutheran jurists also had to adapt traditional canon laws, which
subsequently fell under the control of civil authorities (Witte, 2002, pp. 83–84).
Therefore, not all Protestant, positive law can be subsumed under the Ten Com-
mandments, but can also have other biblical, as well as Roman or canonical origins
(Witte, 2002, p. 170). However, “self-serving papalist accretions” were eradicated,
4D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 78 vols. (Weimar, 1883–1987).
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and canon law in Germany now returned “to its core interpretations and applications
of biblical and natural norms” (ibid). In this way, German law was transformed and
still largely influences modern Western laws of education, social welfare, and
marriage, for instance (Witte, 2002, p. 295). Moreover, “the Ten Commandments
provided the Evangelical jurists with a useful framework for organising some of the
legal institutions of the state” (Witte, 2002, p. 170) (Fig. 8.4).
Successively, all Europe (and later also other regions) felt the repercussions of the
Protestant revolt against the canon-law-based and hierarchical Roman Church-State.
The sixteenth-century German Lutheran Revolution of theology, law, and institu-
tions took diverse forms in several European countries. It facilitated the creation of
national legal systems that encompassed the complete continuum of jurisdictions
(Berman, 2003, p. 8) and generally exalted monarchies over the Roman Church-
State (Berman, 2003, pp. 72, 208). In fact, after the Lutheran Reformation,
the idea of the Pope and Emperor as parallel and universal powers disappears, and the
independent jurisdictions of the sacerdotium are handed over to the secular authorities’
(Skinner, 1978, p. 353).5
Consequently, the Lutheran Reformation extended across Europe. Even in the
remaining Roman Catholic countries, such as Spain, France, or Austria, royal
powers significantly increased over the Roman Church-State within the kingdoms
(Berman, 2003, p. 8).
However, as with any revolution, the German Reformation also had a “dark side”.
Witte notes the acute crisis that reigned in Germany following the rapid deconstruc-
tion of law, politics, and society immediately after the Reformation. The bloody
peasants’ revolt in Germany in 1525, and the widespread confusion over sacraments,
preaching, funerals, prayers, holidays, and pastoral duties, exemplifies the chaos at
the time. Also, the excesses that occurred at the dawn of the Reformation are well
known, as Witte observes:
They [the Reformers] simply took over hundreds of Church properties, endowments,
foundations, charities, almshouses, schools, cathedrals, cemeteries, Church courts, and
other properties and institutions that were part of the canon law administration–often
ostracizing and occasionally killing former occupants in the process (although Luther
repeatedly counselled against violent ejection of monks and nuns, preferring instead to
prohibit the enrolment of any new monks. . .) (Witte, 2002, p. 84)
8.3.4.1.1 Lutheran Influence on Scandinavian Countries
The Lutheran Reformation influenced in particular the Scandinavian pattern of
church-state relations (Anderson, 2009, p. 211). The Lutheran influence was more
intense and took hold faster in Scandinavian countries than in Germany, which
remained partly Roman Catholic. The monarchies of Denmark (and countries under
its influence, i.e. Norway and Iceland) and Sweden (and thus also Finland) firmly
5©1978 by Skinner. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
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embraced Lutheranism already in the 1520s. These countries also imposed severe
criminal penalties on openly non-Lutheran adherents (Berman, 2003, p. 58).
Swedish and Danish monarchs seized the influence and wealth of the Catholic
Church-State and assumed the welfare functions previously performed by the
Church (e.g. hospital care and relief of the poor) (Anderson, 2009, p. 211). As
such, Lutheran state churches “positively contributed to the early introduction of
social protection programs and to subsequent welfare state development” (Manow &
van Kersbergen, 2009, p. 4).
8.3.4.2 The Seventeenth-Century English-European Revolution
Under the influence of the German sixteenth-century revolution, England also
instituted a Protestant state-church to which all citizens had to belong and fell
under the authority of the monarch. Later, dissenting Calvinists and other oppressed
classes initiated the English or Glorious Revolution (1640–1689), which curbed the
influence of the state-church, and established the supremacy of Parliament over the
Crown. Subsequently, the English Revolution resulted in a body of legislation based
on Calvinist beliefs (Berman, 2003, p. 10). This “reformation of the Reformation”
fundamentally and lastingly transformed the English legal system, including checks
and balances of political power. Likewise, the English Revolution also became a
European revolution, succeeding the previous one in Germany (Berman, 2003,
p. 201).
Akin to the German Lutheran Reformation, the Ten Commandments are the
foundation for a plural system of law in England (Doe & Sandberg, 2010). Notably,
the general principle “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself” (second part of the
Decalogue that Jesus summarised in Matthew 22:37–39, King James Bible, 1769) is
a touchstone of civil behaviour (p.163) (See Fig. 8.4).
Likewise, the Protestant Reformation in England and Wales banned the teaching
of canon law at universities (Doe & Sandberg, 2010, p. 9). Equally, in the courts of
Westminster Hall, invoking canon law was increasingly deplored (Helmoz, 1987);
(Pearce, 2010). As Wilcox and Field wrote in their Admonition to Parliament in
1572: “the Canon law is Antichristian and devilishe, and contrarye to the scriptures”
(p. 30). However, similarly to Germany, not all canon law was eliminated as an
authoritative source. In fact, some ordinances were adapted to ongoing develop-
ments in English common law.
The expansion of the British Empire resulted in a wide distribution of common
law in the British colonies. This law is therefore still in force in Great Britain,
Ireland, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Merryman & Pérez, 2007,
p. 4).
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8.3.4.3 The Eighteenth-Century United States Revolution
The successive Protestant Reformations brought along progressive legal steps
towards democracy and thus increasingly distanced societies from the power of
the Roman Church. Each dissenting Protestant revolution built on the developments
and achievements of the previous one. The sixteenth-century German-European
Reformation had generally increased the royal powers as a means of overthrowing
the Roman Church-State. The seventeenth-century English-European Revolution
then made further advances by introducing checks and balances for monarchical
powers and by limiting the power of the Church-States. Such developments paved
the way for the world’s first-ever democratic constitution: the eighteenth century
American Bill of Rights. In the USA, once again, a dissenting Protestant view based
on the previous reformatory advances became dominant and denied the establish-
ment of a State-Church.
Furthermore, the American constitution expanded the democratic rights and
liberties of citizens (thus advancing English legislation, which had already
guaranteed rights to the aristocracy over the monarchy) (Miller, 2012); (Berman,
2003); (Witte, 2002).
The eighteenth-century French-European revolution also helped to nurture its
counterpart in the USA. However, the latter implemented a different system of
checks and balances in government powers than those proposed by the French
Revolution, for instance (Merryman & Pérez, 2007); (Berman, 2003).
8.3.4.4 The Influence of Protestant Revolutions on Secularism
The Protestant reformations initiated a rapid secularisation process, which decreased
the public role of the Roman Church-State and broke down the imperial hierarchy
(Philpott, 2001; Snyder, 2011). Moreover, the Protestant reformations and their
associated progressive weakening of the Roman Church-State ultimately resulted
in the modern sovereign state system in the seventeenth-century (i.e. the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648) (Agnew, 2010; Gregory, 2012; Philpott, 2001; Shah & Philpott,
2011; Snyder, 2011).
Much liberal Enlightenment thought was grounded in Protestant secularism
(Snyder, 2011, p. 17). Therefore, the laic rejection of Roman Catholicism in
revolutionary France resulted from the influence of Protestantism, in particular
Calvinism. Most Enlightenment democratic theorists came from a Calvinist back-
ground, even if they were not religious (e.g. Locke, Rousseau, Grotius, Franklin,
Adams, Henry, Madison, and Hamilton) (Woodberry, 2012, p. 248). Enlightenment
theorists secularised ideas previously expressed by Calvinist jurists and theologians
(e.g. Nonconformist and Puritan covenants formed the basis of the secular Hobbes’s
and Locke’s social contracts) (Hutson, 1998; Nelson, 2010; Witte, 2007; Lutz, 1980,
1988 as cited in Woodberry, 2012, p. 248).
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Furthermore, Locke’s principle of equality for all people descends explicitly from
Protestant ideals (Waldron; Woodberry and Shah; as cited in Woodberry, 2012,
p. 248). Moreover, Protestant dissenters in Protestant liberal democracies
spearheaded egalitarian movements such as the abolition of slavery, free trade, and
peace (Kaufmann & Pape, 1999; Snyder, 2011; Woodberry, 2012). In this sense,
without the Reformation, no liberal peace would exist (Hurd, 2011; Snyder, 2011,
p. 17; Gregory, 2012).
Consequently, Protestantism was a vital historical precursor to secularisation
(Berger, 1990, p. 113; Gregory, 2012). In its wake, religion has since lost much of
its past influence (Norris & Inglehart, 2004) in specific contexts (e.g. Europe, the
academia). However, the rest of the world is as religious as ever, and some regions
(e.g. the Middle East) are even more religious than before (Berger, 1999).
8.3.4.5 The Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century French-European
Revolution
The successive Protestant reformations inspired or initiated transformations from
which arose secular, anti-clerical revolutions, which further decreased the power of
the Roman Church-State and expanded civil power. The most notable revolution, the
French Revolution, utterly suppressed the monarchy in France and extended to most
papal states (e.g. Pope Pius VI was taken prisoner until his eventual death). Some of
these states were, however, later restored. The Italian nationalism and anti-clerical-
ism remaining after the French Revolution resulted in the nineteenth-century annex-
ation of Rome and the papal states to the former Italian Kingdom. It was not until
1929 that the current Vatican State was created through the Lateran Treaty with
Mussolini’s National Fascist Party (Gross, 2004; Hanlon, 2008; Roessler & Miklos,
2003).
Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762) and the French Revolution (1789) openly
identified Roman Catholicism (and Christianity in general) as opposed to any free
republic. In such a Manichean conflict between the Church and the Republican state,
the Republic ended up radically subordinating the Church. Consequently, the French
Republic eliminated the Church’s control over education, its ownership of large
estates and its right to perform marriage ceremonies (Shah & Philpott, 2011, p. 38).
The new French legal philosophy of rationalism, individualism, utilitarianism, as
well as the rejection of orthodox Christian doctrines, were also linked to deism (the
belief in a Creator’s gift of reason and freewill in exercising that gift (Berman, 2003,
p. 10).
French rationalist natural secular jurists considered it possible to abolish the old
(i.e. Roman-canonical) legal system altogether and to create an entirely new one.
However, the jurists drafting the new system were trained in the old one, of which a
significant part was preserved as a result (Merryman & Pérez, 2015).
Eighteenth and nineteenth-century revolutions (i.e. the French and American
revolutions, the Italian Risorgimento and Latin American independence wars) gave
rise to administrative and constitutional law under civil law. Equally important was
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that the French Revolution also brought forth “secular natural law” (based on deism).
Montesquieu and Rousseau promoted the importance of separating government
powers (judicial, executive, and legislative), as initiated by the French Revolution.
After the nineteenth century, the authority of Roman (and canonical) laws gradually
declined. The Revolution meant that nationalist ideologies replaced religious ideol-
ogies. Feudal institutions were incompatible with such developments (Merryman &
Pérez, 2015).
The French imposed civil codes, abolished guilds and feudal remnants, and
undermined aristocratic privileges, thus boosting prosperity in the territories they
conquered in Europe (Acemoglu et al., 2011). Consequently, the principal states of
Western Europe adopted civil codes, whose archetype is the French Code Napoléon
of 1804 (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 10).
An especially explosive revolutionary development occurred in education.
French republicans and liberals repeatedly pushed for a state-supervised, compul-
sory, educational system. In Belgium, the Liberal Party implemented a programme
in the 1870s to significantly restrict the role of the Roman Catholic Church in
education (Shah & Philpott, 2011, pp. 39–40).
However, even after an age determined by reason and revolution, feudalism
survived in Latin America and certain parts of Europe (especially in the South).
Feudalism has kept alive the social injustices inherent in its origins. This is under-
standable because when it came to exporting their methods, the French did not
introduce a roadmap for how their model truly worked and left out any guidelines for
how it did (Merryman, 1996, p. 116).
For example, the laïcité or separation of church and state rooted in the French
Revolution was not automatically transplanted to Latin America. In contrast, feudal
legal institutions in the British colonies of North America were deprived of their
pernicious socio-economic influence already early on (Merryman & Pérez, 2015).
8.3.4.6 Maintaining the Roman Catholic Status Quo after Independence
8.3.4.6.1 The Adoption of French Civil Law in Latin American Countries
Most Latin American countries bypassed the (Protestant) European revolutionary
processes and directly adopted the French Revolution’s legal tradition (La Porta
et al., 2008; Merryman & Pérez, 2015). Therefore, the French legal tradition
profoundly influenced all former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America.
Exceptionally, Cuba adopted a socialist legal tradition later in the 1960s. In turn,
some former British colonies in the Caribbean have correspondingly English com-
mon law (La Porta et al., 2008).
The influence of the Protestant Reformation on the law and on institutions in
Latin America has been minimal or indirect, and has resulted from US-American
influence, for instance (i.e. constitutionalism) (Merryman & Pérez, 2015). More
importantly, the pervasive influence of the Roman Catholic Church-State meant that
Latin American countries adopted the legal tradition of the French Revolution
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without, however, embracing anti-clerical movements (or with fragile anti-clerical
components) (La Porta et al., 2008; Salinas, 2013). Exceptions include Uruguay,
Chile, and Cuba, as these countries have had successful anti-clerical or laic move-
ments and because their legal systems have long reflected a clear separation of
Church and State. Moreover, these three countries have never signed a concordat
with the Roman Church-State (Da Costa, 2009; Ramírez, 2009; Salinas, 2013).
8.3.4.6.2 Concordats with the Roman Catholic Church-State
Concordats are international treaties between the Roman See (the so-called “Holy”
See) and the states. In the past, concordats have been criticised as mutual conces-
sions of privileges between Church and State. The three most important and contro-
versial concordats signed by the Catholic Church in the twentieth century were with
the Nazi Reich in Germany, with Franco in Spain, and with Fascist Italy (Fumagalli,
2011, pp. 438–439).
The term “concordat” refers to the more comprehensive agreements between the
states and the Roman See but also identifies a wide variety of instruments (e.g. treaty,
convention, accord, protocol, exchange of notes, modus vivendi) (Ragazzi, 2009,
114). A historical treaty-making power allows the Roman Church to sign concordats
and ensures its accession to major multilateral treaties (Ryngaert, 2011, 844).
Eleven Latin American countries have in force a concordat with the Roman
Catholic Church-State (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela). Such states are called
“concordatarian” and the extent to which those agreements grant privileges to the
Roman Church varies from country to country (Corral, 2014). The scope of these
rights and privileges depends on the negotiating power of the Roman See vis-à-vis
the contracting state (Ryngaert, 2011, 845). The other Latin American countries
maintain fewer diplomatic relations with the Vatican (some less, some more), for
instance, through formal agreements or the exchange of letters (Corral, 2014).
Concordats may cover diverse affairs, ranging from tax exemptions for the Roman
Church to permitting its intervention in military, educational, and real estate issues
(Brownlie, 1979; Corral & Petschen, 2004; Figueroa, 2016; Forrest et al., 2006;
Levine, 1981).
The template used by the Vatican in most concordats with Latin American
countries was introduced by Pope Pio IX (1846–1878) (Salinas, 2013). It accords
extraordinarily extensive rights to the Catholic Church-State, for instance, in educa-
tional affairs:
Education in universities, public and private schools and further educational establishments
should be under the doctrine of the Catholic Religion. [. . .] the bishops and other local
ordinaries would have the free direction of the theology chairs, of canon law, [and] of all the
branches of ecclesiastical teaching. [. . .] in addition to the influence they will exert through
the strength of their ministry over the religious education of youth, they will ensure that in
the teaching of any other branch there is nothing contrary to [the Roman Catholic] religion
and morality (article 2). Besides, the bishops retain their right of censure over all books and
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writings related to dogma and discipline of the Church and public morals (Bolivian concor-
dat model, cited in Salinas, 2013, p. 217).6
These concordats are all similar (or in many cases identical) in Latin America. As
such, they attest to the Vatican’s influence on their wording rather than to the
interests of the various diverse states (Salinas, 2013).
As a rule, the concordats ensure religious education in public schools. The
conference of bishops, in agreement with the responsible government authorities,
approves the curriculum for the teaching of Roman Catholic religion in schools
(Schanda, 2004).
The concordats also imply state recognition of the sovereignty of the Roman
Catholic Church-State. Consequently, Roman Catholicism is the only religion to
possess legal personality under international public law. The other religious denom-
inations are only entitled to have agreements under domestic public law as they have
no international legal personality. This privilege of the Roman Catholic Church-
State has sometimes been used to the detriment of other religious denominations
(Fumagalli, 2011, p. 444).
Therefore, EU institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights, have
indirectly challenged Roman Catholic concordats for introducing legislation not
aligned with international standards into domestic law (Fumagalli, 2011,
pp. 445–446). In Europe, at least two objections have been levelled at concordats
(or treaties and bilateral relations with the Roman Church-State): first, they limit the
sovereignty of the state; and second, they promote the denominational inequality due
to the privileges of the Roman Catholic Church-State (Cook, 2012; Schanda, 2004).
8.3.4.7 The Twentieth-Century Russian Revolution
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Eastern Orthodox Russia opposed the papal
Roman Church-State and canon law and established its own hierarchy and canon
law. However, Russia maintained its tsarish autocracy and its supreme secular and
spiritual authority until 1917. The successive Lutheran, Calvinist, dissenting Prot-
estant and deist revolutions all bypassed Russia. Thus, Russia never experienced an
evolutive process from an autocracy to a monarchical high magistracy, to an
aristocratic Parliament, and then to a democratic separation of powers. Instead,
Russia underwent abrupt transformation through the Bolshevik revolution, inspired
in part by the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment, and later proclaimed athe-
ism. Moreover, the Russian Revolution ended up in a totalitarian state that distorted
the ideals of social democracy (Berman, 2003, p. 18); (Miller, 2012).
One of the ideal postulates of the atheistic foundations of Soviet law is the
“goodness of humankind.” This involves the acceptance of an inherent human
nature, which is itself capable of establishing a fair and just society (Berman,
2003, p. 18). Such a postulate is opposed to the biblical principle that “nothing
6Author’s translation of the original Spanish text.
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good can be found in humankind,” which forms the basis of the Protestant Revolu-
tions (see Sect. 8.3.4 and Fig. 8.4). The atheistic, Soviet legal principle of the
“goodness of humankind” resembles Roman Catholic natural law in that it trusts
the human capacity to discern good from evil (Selling, 2018, p. 9; Gula, 2002,
pp. 120–121). In fact, socialist legal traditions only ever became apparent in
countries with an Orthodox or Roman Catholic background but never in countries
under Protestant influence. As Andreski (as cited in Grier, 1997) argued, by fostering
prosperity, freedom, and equality, Protestantism inhibits the formation of a social
environment conducive to the propagation of militant subversion ideologies (p. 49).
Significant differences exist between Soviet, Western European, and American
legal systems. Features differentiating Soviet law from other systems include the
dictatorship of the Communist Party and the absence of a law higher than that of the
state; the repression of basic civil liberties such as the freedom of religion, speech,
and press; and the absence of private land ownership (Berman, 2003, p. 19).
However, the Russian Revolution’s elevation of the parental role of the law, and
of the social and economic role of the state, have had repercussions throughout the
world (ibid). Interestingly, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, most
former Soviet countries reinstated the legal tradition of the French Revolution
(Merryman & Pérez, 2015); (La Porta et al., 2008).
8.3.5 Religion, Law, and State Models
Significant differences exist between the legal systems (and thus, the state models) of
countries in Europe and in the Americas. National legal systems have persisted for
decades or even centuries while legal traditions have prevailed for centuries or even
millennia. In contrast, political discourses may last for merely a few years or
decades. Therefore, the influence of the different legal traditions tends to cluster
countries into groups exhibiting affinities between their legal origins and institu-
tional performance. Table 8.2 summarises the various legal revolutions and tradi-
tions along with their models of state–church–citizen relations.
The church–state–citizen relationships in Table 8.2 delineate the historical pro-
gression from the original medieval model of the Corpus Christianum, which was
based entirely on Roman and Catholic canon law traditions (Model 1), to modern
legal systems.
1. The Corpus Christianum is the model of the medieval Pan-European Roman
Catholic Church-State. In it, the Roman Church-State is the highest power. As
such, it alone may access and interpret the divine and guide its small secular arm:
the state. In this conception, both Church and State control and coerce the
individual. The individual may access the divine exclusively through the Church
and never directly. The entire system of moral and legal codes emanates from the
Roman Catholic Church-State in the figure of the pope. Legally speaking, the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8.3 Law, Religion, Revolutions, and State Models (B), (D), (6) 113
model is currently valid for the Roman Church-State; minor changes were made
after the Second Vatican Council (Agnew, 2010; Cook, 2012).
2. The second model (German Revolution) enhances the power of the secular
authorities (monarchical states), and thereby substantially reduces the influence
of the Church. The State provides universal education. The individual has direct
access to the Scriptures and enjoys direct communion with God (Becker &
Woessmann, 2009; Berman, 2003; Witte, 2002).
3. In the third model (English Revolution), oppressed groups and other dissenting
forms of Protestantism (e.g. Calvinism, Puritanism) decreased the power of the
state-church and thus of the monarchy. Such a process pushed towards the
separation of Church and State and sought to empower the individual, in a
large-scale development towards modern democracy based on the advances of
the Lutheran Reformation in Germany and northern Europe (Berman, 2003; Doe
& Sandberg, 2010).
4. The fourth model (United States Revolution) further progressed the clear sepa-
ration of Church and State through a Protestant, dissenting process initiated
earlier in England (and even before). The resulting democratisation process
progressively and continuously further empowered the individual (Berman,
2003; Miller, 2012).
5. The French Revolution (fifth model) almost coincided with that in the USA and
both informed each other. However, unlike the previous revolutions, Protestant-
ism played no direct (and merely an indirect) role in France. Liberal anti-cleri-
calism fiercely opposed Roman Catholicism but was also hostile to Protestantism
(e.g. ironically, it destroyed bibles just as Roman Catholicism did). Therefore, the
French Revolution encouraged individual, relative truths (instead of Catholic
dogmas or Protestant, biblical moral foundations) by promoting deism and
reason. In this conception, the individual and the democratic state are also
strengthened, like in the model of the United States Revolution. Here, however,
the state coerces and controls the churches (Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez,
2007; Miller, 2012).
6. The sixth model (the Russian Revolution) goes beyond the principles learned of
the French Revolution. The state becomes the most powerful entity and hopes to
liberate individuals from religious, “opiate-like” beliefs and from economic,
class-based exploitation. Consequently, the state significantly coerces religion
and enhances both the parental role of the law and the social and economic role of
the state (Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez, 2007).
8.3.6 Summarising the Core Messages of Section 8.3. Law,
Religion, Revolutions, and State Models
Even if most revolutions were defeated, the influence of the various legal traditions
has long persisted. For instance, Eastern schism and in particular the German,
English, American and French Revolutions ended the monopoly of Roman canon
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law. The Thirty Year War ended the German Revolution, the English Revolution
suffered defeat in the early 1800s, the French Revolution in 1870, and the Russian
Revolution in the 1990s (Berman, 2003).
And yet, all these revolutions influenced the different legal traditions. Several
elements of those revolutions still coexist in some countries more than others.
Roman and canon law percolated into the legal systems of those countries that
underwent revolutions to a greater or lesser degree. For instance, the French and
German revolutions made the jurists re-adopt and adapt principles of the old regime
in order to build on the respective basis (Berman, 2003; Merryman & Pérez, 2007;
Witte, 2002). However, Roman and canon law exercised less influence in common
law countries (e.g. after the English and United States revolutions) (Berman, 2003;
Doe & Sandberg, 2010; Merryman & Pérez, 2007).
The Lutheran German Revolution formed the basis of the various later Protestant,
dissenting revolutions, and legal traditions (i.e. British and American). Some of its
concepts (e.g. separation of state functions from the church; state-sponsored educa-
tion) permeate all modern legal systems to this day (Berman, 2003; Witte, 2002).
The English Revolution marked a crucial step towards modern democracy and
limited the power of the monarchies in Europe. Moreover, the British Empire spread
common law throughout its colonies across the world (Berman, 2003; La Porta et al.,
2008; Merryman & Pérez, 2007).
The revolution in the USA inspired modern constitutionalism and democratic
rights all over the world. The French Revolution also transferred its legal model to its
colonies and countries under its influence. For example, the USA exerted constitu-
tional influence on Latin American countries while the French Revolution inspired
the independence and the creation of the modern Latin American republics. How-
ever, the anti-clericalism of those revolutions was not always assimilated. Instead,
along with the French code, Roman and Catholic (i.e. canonical) law has been the
predominant legal tradition in most Latin American countries to this day. This attests
to the pervasive presence (and power) of Roman Catholicism (i.e. concordats,
corporatist states, Catholicism as a state religion) (Barro & McCleary, 2005;
Berman, 2003; La Porta et al., 2008; Merryman & Pérez, 2007; Salinas, 2013).
Thus, the basic model of church–state–citizen relations in most Latin American
countries more closely resembles the medieval Corpus Christianum, i.e. a model
based on Roman and Catholic canon law traditions (Model 1). This happened
although Latin American countries adopted several elements from the French legal
tradition. Examples of corporatist states in which concordats are effective include
Colombia, Venezuela, and Honduras.
On the other hand, Chile and Uruguay are liberal democracies with explicit anti-
clerical movements that never allowed concordats to be signed with the Roman
Church-State. Consequently, their basic model of church–state–citizen relations is
closer to that of the French Revolution (Model 5). After its revolution, Cuba adopted
the Russian model (Model 6).
In Europe, Switzerland (following the 1848 Constitution) was influenced by
dissenting Protestantism and by US federalism and constitutionalism, along with
French liberalism (Obinger, 2009). The Swiss Confederation has never signed a
8.3 Law, Religion, Revolutions, and State Models (B), (D), (6) 115
concordat with the Roman Church-State, even if agreements exist at the cantonal
level.
The anti-clerical, anti-Roman, and anti-canon law sentiments that influenced
sixteenth-century Lutheran Germany resembled those of the eighteenth and
nineteenth-century post-revolutionary France. In both cases, jurists sought to elim-
inate the references to Roman and canonical law. Therefore, Germany and France
represent the most atypical legal systems in the “civil law world”. Their models have
assumed intellectual leadership and have been implemented in several other coun-
tries (Merryman & Pérez, 2015).
Nonetheless, in both cases, jurists ended up readapting and reincorporating
Roman and canon law to suit their new purposes (e.g. the adoption of biblical
principles in Lutheranism and of rationalist deism in the French Revolution)
(Merryman & Pérez, 2015; Witte, 2002). Consequently, the Roman influence is
still highly significant in both cases notwithstanding the substantial legal contribu-
tions of the respective revolutions (Merryman & Pérez, 2007, p. 13).
Common law is a different case because British jurists managed to adapt a legal
system after the Reformation with precious little influence of Roman and canon law
(Doe & Sandberg, 2010). Thus, common law has no hierarchical source of law and is
less rigid, less rigorous, and less systematic than civil law. Likewise, common law
jurisprudence is less influenced by the rationalist dogmas of the French Revolution
(Merryman & Pérez, 2015).
Legal origins associated with Protestant influence (e.g. English common law,
German and Scandinavian legal systems) have proven more sustainable. They also
exhibit higher institutional performance and prosperity than legal origins associated
with a laic rejection of religion (La Porta et al., 2008). Dissenting Protestant religions
paved the way for the Enlightenment and for social emancipation (Miller, 2012;
Snyder, 2011; Woodberry, 2012).
In contrast, legal origins associated with a laic rejection of religion (e.g. Soviet)
have not proven sustainable over time or the elements crucial to their functioning
could not be transferred (e.g. French Revolution). For instance, while French legal
origins transmitted anti-clerical sentiments to Southern European countries, they
were not automatically transferred to most Latin American countries (Merryman &
Pérez, 2007). As a result, Southern European countries materialised the sovereignty
of their states over the Roman Church-State and thereby attained certain levels of
prosperity and institutional performance (higher than in most Latin American coun-
tries, but lower than in historically Protestant countries).
For these reasons, Latin American countries with successful anti-clerical move-
ments (e.g. Uruguay, Chile) reached similar prosperity levels as Southern European
countries (e.g. Italy, Spain). However, most Latin American countries have been
unable to implement anti-clerical laws and to overcome feudal structures, among
other reasons, due to concordats and other political and legal commitments towards
the Roman Church-State. As a result, their prosperity and institutional performance
are lower.
Therefore, when comparing prosperity and institutional performance (“fruits”), it
can be argued: 1) the “people’s opium” described by Marx in the Russian Revolution
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applies more to specific types of hierarchical state religions (i.e. Orthodox, Roman
Catholicism, Muslim). 2) However, the Marxists’ total rejection of any religious
expression eventually replaced one type of tyranny (and opium) for another. 3) In
contrast, historically dissenting Protestant religions and anti-clerical movements
have proven to be the precursors of social emancipation and the “antidote against
the opiate” (Berman, 2003; La Porta et al., 2008; Merryman & Pérez, 2007).
The next section explores the relationship between religion, education, and
prosperity. Before that, however, I introduce various associated empirical
expectations:
Empirical Expectations
4. I expect higher transparency/prosperity levels in countries with Protestant-
influenced legal origins (i.e. German, English, or Scandinavian) than in
non-Protestant countries. The Protestant Reformation introduced the Sola
Scriptura principle reflected in Protestant-influenced legal origins.
5. I expect lower prosperity/transparency levels in countries that have been
influenced by the French legal system, in particular when they have strong
clerical ties, and thus have been significantly influenced by Roman and
canon law (as in Latin America).
6. Given the tradition of controversial and restrictive concordats, I expect a
negative influence on transparency and prosperity in the respective
concordatarian countries.
7. I expect a negative influence on prosperity/transparency in countries
rooted in Socialist legal origins, in particular on account of the Soviet
legal principle of the “goodness of humankind” (similar to Roman Cath-
olic and Orthodox natural law).
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Education, Religion, and Corruption/
Prosperity (A), (B), (C), (1), (2)
This chapter discusses the longue durée effect of religion on education and analyses
the uneven contributions of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in this respect.
9.1 The Influence of Religion on Education and Human
Capital (Prosperity Pillar Mechanism) (A), (B), (C), (D),
(1), (2), (3), (5), (6)
Historically, acquiring education and accumulating human capital have been persis-
tent human endeavours for centuries. They have also constituted a more primary
source of prosperity than economic institutions (Glaeser et al., 2004; Easterlin, 1981;
Goldin, 2001; Lindert, 2003; Galor, 2005; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008; Becker
& Woessmann, 2009).
Religious factors have both driven and determined unequal education outcomes
in Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Becker andWoessmann have found a high
correlation coefficient (0.78) between Protestantism and literacy across countries.
The authors observe that Protestantism resulted in a significant increase in literacy,
which contributed to economic development (p. 582). They further explain that
religion was vital for economic progress because it inadvertently caused an imbal-
anced accumulation of human capital. Thus, after centuries, the denominational
disparities that arose after the Reformation had an effect on uneven economic results
(p. 534). In their empirical study, the authors found that in 1900, all Protestant-
majority countries had achieved almost universal literacy, while no Catholic country
had done so. Indeed, many of them were well behind. Existing evidence from inside
the countries themselves reveals a similar trend (Becker & Woessmann, 2009,
p. 544).
Before the Reformation, roughly only 1% of the population (i.e. a small elite)
were literate in Germany (Engelsing as cited in Becker & Woessmann, 2009). In the
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passage of time, the Reformation has turned out to be a primary driver of schooling.
Thus, even today, Protestants are still more educated (0.8 years more), and more
prosperous (5.4% higher income) than Catholics in Germany. Standard regressions
confirm these correlations (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, pp. 578). The perpetuation
of this educational gap between Protestants and Catholics over time allows the
authors to conclude that Luther’s educational ideals may have had far-reaching
consequences. Protestants in Germany are still better educated, even after more
than a century in a public school system that offers fair access to education regardless
of religious belief (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, pp. 578–581).
The authors cite several sources showing that similar trends or even wider
schooling differences between Protestants and Catholics have existed in other
countries such as the USA, Ireland, or Finland. For instance, in Finland in 1880,
illiteracy among Catholics was 54.4%, compared with only 1.3% among Lutherans
(Markussen as cited in Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 544). The following sections
explain the differences between Roman Catholic education and Protestant education
that can lead to markedly different outcomes.
9.1.1 Roman Catholic Education
Greek philosophy and various other cultural traditions have influenced Roman
Catholic theology more strongly than the Holy Scriptures (Selling, 2018, p. 9;
Gula, 2002, pp. 120–121; Gruner, 1977, p. 117). For example, Aristotle had a
greater influence on Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica than the entire Old
Testament. Moreover, Catholicism’s extended allegorical interpretation of the Scrip-
tures stems from Origen, and ultimately from Plato. The Roman Catholic Church,
therefore, places its traditions and hierarchical authority over the Scriptures. This
explains the significant disparity between Roman Catholicism and essential biblical
foundations (Sect. 10.4.1). Furthermore, the Roman system has long suppressed the
Scriptures, thus preventing believers from engaging directly with them. Up until the
last century, prohibition or persecution were the norm for those who owned,
translated, read, or taught the Scriptures without the sanction of the Church (Cook,
2012; Heussi, 1991).
In turn, the most widespread Roman Catholic teaching practices have been the
repetition and memorising of dogmatic texts so as to recite them without much
understanding (Plata Quezada, 2008; Heussi, 1991; D’Aubigne, 1862). Therefore,
such texts, as well as selected parts of the Gospel, were taught in Latin scholarly
language to mostly illiterate peasants even after the Middle Ages in Europe
(Androne, 2014; Becker & Woessmann, 2009). Such teaching practices suppressed
any critical thinking and demanded absolute obedience to unilateral dogmatic
discourses, thus enhancing and perpetuating the hegemony of the Church-State. In
fact, “The maintenance of ignorance” has been one of the most effective strategies
deployed by the Catholic Church-State to influence people’s behaviour (Head-
König, 2017, pp. 46–47). Similar practices have been in force until recently,
especially in rural areas in some Latin American countries. Similarly, regarding
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Catholic education in Latin America, Gill (1998) observes that the Catholic Church
allocated the vast majority of educational services to the upper classes. Furthermore,
the Roman Church underplayed the link between Bible reading and literacy, fearful
that it would cause another Protestant Reformation. Thus, for much of Latin
America’s existence, the importation of the Bible was prohibited (p. 89).
Moreover, the Roman Church-State has provided far more education in countries
where it has had to compete with Protestantism (e.g. USA, India, Ireland) than in
countries where it has managed to prevent competition (e.g. Mexico, Spain, Italy).
(Woodberry, 2012, p. 269).
9.1.1.1 Jesuitical Education
As with Protestantism, Roman Catholicism cannot be reduced to black and white
generalisations. The Catholic Church initiated the Counter-Reformation process in
the Council of Trent (1534–1549) and thus contested the advancement of Protes-
tantism. Consequently, the Roman Church-State created new religious orders,
among which the Jesuits were the most prominent (Heussi, 1991). Seemingly
contradictorily, yet importantly, the Jesuits, despite their loyalty to the pope, were
secular before the word was coined (Roy, 2010). One of the novelties introduced by
the Jesuits is the focus on analytical skills and higher education through applying the
Ratio Studiorum (Pavur, 2005). Competing with Protestant education, which
enhanced methodical skills by studying the Scriptures (Becker & Woessmann,
2009), the Jesuits’ Ratio Studiorum advanced Aquinian and Aristotelian teachings.
Therefore, Jesuit education had always focused, among others, on the liberal arts,
medieval scholasticism, Renaissance humanism, and ethics, thus attaching less
importance to any exegetical understanding of the Scriptures (Lukàcs, 1986).
The term Jesuit has two definitions: “a member of the Roman Catholic Society of
Jesus founded by St. Ignatius Loyola in 1534” and “one given to intrigue or
equivocation” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.) (author’s italics). Similarly, the Oxford
Dictionary (2016) defines the term Jesuitical as (1) of or regarding the Jesuits; and
(2) dissemble, deception, or equivocation in the way identified with the Jesuits
(Oxford University Press, 2016). Similar definitions can be found in Spanish
(RAE), German (Duden), or other English dictionaries.
In the nineteenth-century Switzerland, “Liberals considered the Jesuit order ‘an
anathema, as the apotheosis of Catholic obscurantism, intrigue, and subversion’”
(Gould, 1999 as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 181). Therefore, the Swiss “constitution
of 1874 banned the pope-loyal Jesuit order. . .” (Obinger, 2009, p. 181). Beyond
Switzerland, Schwarz-Herion (2015) observes the following, regarding the historical
influence of the Jesuits:
the activities of the Jesuits as personal educators of young people from influential families
and as confessors at courts (Goerlitz et al. 1982; Fülöp-Miller 1929) gave them the
opportunity to manipulate influential persons and potential blackmailing leverage other
monarchs and Princes. [. . .] After some Sovereigns started to get suspicious towards the
Jesuits, the Jesuits started to hide behind 1000 masks, pretending to be Brahmans among
Brahmans, protestants among protestants, scholars among scholars, etc., always adapting to
the circles they were infiltrating (Fülöp-Miller 1929). [. . .] Since the Jesuits were perceived
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as a threat, the Order of the Jesuits got prohibited in 1773 by Pope Clemens XIV due to
pressure from several monarchs (Paris and Fülöp-Miller as cited in Schwarz-Herion, 2015,
p. 77).1
Notwithstanding the bad reputation formerly acquired by the Jesuits, Schwarz-
Herion (2015) further observes that their global influence has increased, and the
author states her concern in this regard:
the influence of the Jesuits (SJ) on politics seems to remain unbroken until today. [. . .]
Modern Jesuits do not only play an essential role in the Vatican, but are also firmly rooted in
international politics: the EU council president Hermann Rompuy said in public: ‘We are all
Jesuits’, pointing out that he was “developing the architecture for the future Europe” (Eppink
2012). [. . .] The political networks of these hierarchically structured religious orders,
organized in a military way and boasting with their medieval legacy of the cursaders,
might pose a serious obstacle to the Great Transition to sustainable global democracy and
thus should not be taken lightly by a vigilant enlightened civil society consisting of many
humans who have grown up in modern democratic and laical states (Schwarz-Herion, 2015,
p. 112).2
In South America, some Jesuit missions have had a lasting, positive impact on
modern-day human capital and incomes (10–15% higher compared to the surround-
ing Roman Catholic population in Southern Paraguay and Northern Argentina)
(Valencia, 2017). These missions also advanced education among the Catholic
population in different places at a subnational level even if they were largely elitist
(Woodberry, 2012) and far less encompassing than the traditional Protestant urge for
education (Becker & Woessmann, 2009).
9.1.2 Protestant Education
Faith rests not on ignorance, but on knowledge.
(John Calvin, 1559, Institutio Christianae religionis)
Historically, and empirically, education is the most crucial feature that Protes-
tantism influenced and through which it promoted economic prosperity. Statistically,
the Protestant lead in literacy accounts for nearly all of the Protestant advantage in
economic outcomes (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 532).
Several Reformers, including Martin Luther, were university professors and
writers who promoted the Sola Scriptura principle. For this purpose, Luther and
other Reformers translated the Scriptures into vernacular languages and taught
illiterate people to read (Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Berman, 2003; Witte,
2002). They believed that proper education enables the individual to distinguish
1Copyright note. This content is not under a CC-BY licence and has been reproduced with
permission. This licence is granted under the STM Permission Guidelines https://www.stm-assoc.
org/intellectual-property/permissions/permissions-guidelines/
2Copyright note. This content is not under a CC-BY licence and has been reproduced with
permission. This licence is granted under the STM Permission Guidelines https://www.stm-assoc.
org/intellectual-property/permissions/permissions-guidelines/
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right from wrong, truth from falsehood, and to accurately understand “the essentials
of the Christian faith” (Green, 2009; Hillerbrand, 1968, as cited in Androne, 2014,
p. 81). This explains the Reformatory emphasis on teaching and studying the
Scriptures, and thus on establishing elementary schools for ordinary people (Becker
& Woessmann, 2009). As the Bible itself states:
All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for
correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly
furnished unto all good works (King James Bible, 1769, 2 Timothy 3:16).
Similarly, the Scriptures also assert that “Blessed is he that readeth [. . .]” (King
James Bible, 1769, Revelation 1:3). Therefore, the Reformers (as well as other early
Christians) focused on developing literacy, to enable the reading and teaching of the
Gospel (i.e. exegesis). Over time, this enabled Protestants to further utilise these
skills in other, non-religious domains (e.g. trade and commerce). As a result,
Protestant societies thrived when people were taught to read the Bible, which
provided the intellectual resources required for economic development (Becker &
Woessmann, 2009, p. 531).
Furthermore, in Protestant countries, education became accessible to (and often
mandatory for) all. It combined the study of the Scriptures (instead of Latin scho-
lastic texts) with vocational training. Consequently, the Lutheran Reformation
transformed the elitist monopoly of Roman Church-based education into state-
based education (initially, locally and nationally in Germany, and later also in
other countries). The Reformers’ introduction of a public, “secular” education
system with public officials, civic concerns, and laicisation opposed Rome’s
one-sided, distorted religious and humanistic learning (Witte, 2002, pp. 290–291).
With the Reformation, education remained inherently religious, but over time it
became progressively secularised by being harnessed to civic purposes and broader
political control (Ibid). Consequently, the study of the Gospel has been of funda-
mental importance in Protestant countries (e.g. at universities such as Harvard, Yale,
Cambridge, Oxford, Geneva, and Zürich).
The Protestant nurturing of the educated middle classes was the precursor of the
politics of popular accountability in government (Snyder, 2011; Spruyt, 1994).
However, while Protestants have perhaps not always provided the majority of
resources (e.g. education, book printing), Protestantism has nevertheless compelled
governments to establish schools (Woodberry, 2012, p. 246). Likewise, when facing
greater competition with Protestantism, Roman Catholic hierarchies have also
defended the interests of the poor (e.g. education for non-elites, democracy) (Gill,
1998; Anderson, 2007; Woodberry, 2012).
Historical Protestantism has also favoured mobilisation “from below”. It has
pursued this goal through the early development of literacy at all social levels, and
has thus encouraged wider participation in politics. Conversely, the supra-national
influence of Roman Catholicism has favoured mobilisation “from above”, leading to
a late development of literacy and thus limiting the political participation of the
lower social strata (Flora & Heidenheimer, 1981).
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In Latin America, in order to spread the Gospel, Protestants also introduced
literacy campaigns long before Roman Catholicism (Gill, 1998, p. 89). As the Jesuit
Jeffrey Klaiber noted, in Latin America, Protestant missionaries introduced the Bible
and have since provided the most readable and best versions of the New Testament
in Spanish. Therefore, ironically, Catholic missionaries have had to explain carefully
to their Latin American flock that Protestants did not write the Bible and that reading
it is not heresy (Klaiber, 1970, p. 99).
9.1.2.1 Summarising the Core Messages of Sect. 9.1.2. Protestant
Education
Historically (and statistically), one key mechanism driving prosperity/transparency
has been the Protestant emphasis on literacy so as to promote reading and under-
standing the Bible among wider circles (Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Woodberry,
2012). This contrasted starkly with the Roman Catholic practice of reciting parts of
the Gospel in Latin scholarly language to mostly illiterate peasants (Androne, 2014;
Becker & Woessmann, 2009). The teaching of God’s Word in vernacular languages
created linguistic and methodical skills (i.e. exegetical understanding) that proved
valuable beyond the religious realm (Becker & Woessmann, 2009, p. 542). This
practice also led to the accumulation of human capital, and thereby opened and
perpetuated an important educational (and hence prosperity) gap between Protes-
tants and Roman Catholics over time.
As part of the Catholic Counter-Reformation, the Jesuits have competed with
Protestant education but attaching less importance to the Scriptures in their school-
ing. Some South American areas influenced by Jesuit missions exhibit 10–15%
higher human capital and income than the surrounding Catholic populations. Yet,
Jesuit instruction has been largely elitist and far less encompassing than Protestant
educational coverage and accomplishment.
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Chapter 10
Culture, Religion, and Corruption/
Prosperity (A), (B), (C), (1), (2)
Several empirical studies have considered three proxies of culture: religion (Volonté,
2015; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Paldam, 2001; Granato et al., 1996); language (Volonté,
2015); and ethnic measures (Alesina et al., 2003). However, cultural proxies often
overlap with cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001) as well as with countries and their
institutions (Volonté, 2015). The triad “Protestantism, English, and common law” is a
typical example of interrelated overlapping characteristics associated with similar
governance regimes (Volonté, 2015) and lower corruption (La Porta et al., 1999). The
first three sections below elucidate some of these relationships. The fourth identifies
those elements of Roman Catholic and Protestant theologies that may help clarify
cultural differences. Section 10.5 explores the concept of syncretism as a process
associated with cultural amalgamation, which, in Christianity, has predominantly
occurred in Roman Catholicism when blended with ethnoreligious traditions.
10.1 Culture and Corruption (2)
Cultural determinants may drive corruption and its associated variables (i.e. GDP,
institutions, democracy) at the same time (Lambsdorff, 1999, p. 14). Now, however,
the causality arrow runs theoretically and empirically from culture to corruption,
rather than vice versa (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 17).
The most important cultural characteristics defining the level of corruption in a
country are generalised trust, religion, and acceptance of hierarchy (Lambsdorff,
2006, p. 17). These factors are interrelated (La Porta et al., 1999). Hence, high levels
of generalised trust, a large share of Protestants, and low acceptance of hierarchy
mean less perceived corruption in a country (Lambsdorff, 2006).
Supplementary Information The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
030-78498-0_10) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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Several studies have shown that corruption is more frequent in countries with a
high degree of ethnic fragmentation (see, among others, Mauro, 1995; La Porta et al.,
1999; Treisman, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003). However, neither Serra (2006) nor
Elbahnasawy and Revier (2012) found any significant effect of fractionalisation on
corruption. One possible explanation for these dissimilar conclusions might be
related to the embedding of all ethnicities in a single indicator of fragmentation
across different samples.
My empirical models (Part V) also include linguistically and ethnically aggre-
gated and disaggregated measures as cultural proxies. Thus:
Empirical Expectation
8). I expect no conclusive results for ethnic fractionalisation given the possi-
ble overlapping of cultural proxies (Volonté, 2015) with other variables
and given the varied conclusions of previous empirical results with aggre-
gated measures.
10.2 Culture and Institutions/Prosperity (2), (3), (5)
Various cultural aspects have direct empirical relations with institutional/prosperity/
transparency outcomes: (1) trust (e.g. a higher level of trust implies less litigation).
Education also favours trust; (2) family ties. Familialism (a significant reliance on
family ties) is linked with lower civic sense and less trust. Thus, medieval corpora-
tions that were established based on such nuclear families underperformed; (3) indi-
vidualism encourages personal accomplishments and innovation, contrary to
collectivism; (4) generalised morality, which is limited to small circles in hierarchi-
cal societies; and (5) work attitudes, in the classical Weberian sense of the Protestant
work ethic (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015, pp. 902–910).
10.3 Culture and Religion (B), (C)
The relationship between culture and religion is complex and subject to ongoing
debate. Globalisation has “de-cultured” and “de-territorialised” world religions from
their cultural and geographical origins (Roy, 2010). Likewise, secularisation, most of
all in Europe or in specific political contexts (e.g. Communism) has partially driven
religion out of the cultural sphere (Berger, 1999; Roy, 2010). Conversely, religion
may represent most cultural values depending on context (e.g. for Orthodox Jews,
Christian Pentecostalists, or Muslim Salafists) or a minor part of such values (e.g. for
Jewish atheists, secular Protestants, or Catholic non-believers).
Alesina and Giuliano (2015) leave unmentioned the relation between religion and
the cultural traits mentioned above (Sect. 10.2, with the exception of the fifth aspect).
However, religion is a decisive institutional and cultural expression, and as such
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governs social relationships (Volonté, 2015; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; La Porta
et al., 1997). Consequently, the cultural and institutional influence of religion
underlies the phenomenon that prosperity, transparency, and institutions reinforce
each other (Lambsdorff, 2006; Treisman, 2000).
Trust
Regarding trust, sufficient empirical evidence links values, attitudes, and beliefs
(including trust) with religion and prosperity outcomes (Arruñada, 2010; Barro &
McCleary, 2003; Guiso et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1997). Arruñada (2010)
compared the values and personal outcomes of Protestants and Catholics in a
32-country sample, based on data form the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP) Survey. The author analysed differences in the theology, church organisation,
and social practice of Protestantism and Catholicism. Different indices and indica-
tors of social ethic (e.g. social control, the rule of law, and homogeneous values) and
work ethic (e.g. positive working hours) were examined. Some significant findings
of Arruñada can be summarised as follows:
• Compared with Roman Catholics, Protestant principles influence individuals to
be less attached to close networks of friends and family, possess more homoge-
neous standards, be more involved in collective social control, and support
institutions more (Arruñada, 2010, p. 891).
• Arruñada (2010) and Guiso et al. (2003) found statistical evidence for the fact that
Roman Catholics are significantly more tolerant of tax fraud than Protestants.
Roman Catholics are statistically less supportive of political and legal institutions
and are more willing to cover for their delinquent friends when dealing with the
police (Arruñada, 2010, p. 907).
• Protestants hold more homogeneous values than Catholics. Greater homogeneity
reduces exchange and transaction costs and promotes impersonal trading and
markets (e.g. those in commerce, finance, and industry) (p. 907–908). In turn,
Roman Catholicism tends to promote personalised exchange and is less
favourable to impersonal commerce (p. 890, 908) (e.g. in medieval times or in
most rural areas in Latin America).
• Better-educated Protestants trust churches and religious organisations more,
whereas better-educated Catholics trust them less. Thus, the Roman Catholic
Church has greater conflict with its educated laity. Education tends to substitute
for religion in Roman Catholicism, whereas it complements religion in Protes-
tantism (p. 906).
Similarly, after surveying prominent empirical works linking trust and religion,
Volonté (2015) observed:
Protestants exhibit a higher level of trust in contrast to Catholics, which promotes trade and
thereby economic development (La Porta et al., 1997; Glaeser & Glendon, 1998; Guiso
et al., 2006). [. . .] Religion and trust are therefore also related to organizational issues. Stulz
and Williamson (2003) contend that the Calvinist Reformation promoted decentralization
and the creation of multiple churches, and aimed to guard against concentrations of power.
In contrast, Roman Catholicism, which is recognized as a religion whose congregations
place their trust in people “who know more”, has a centralized hierarchical structure with the
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Pope as its authoritative head (Levine 1979; La Porta et al., 1999; Stulz &Williamson, 2003,
p. 319 as cited in Volonté, 2015, p. 84).
The veneration of the pope as the authoritative head of a hierarchical, centralised
structure is the archetypical example of vertical trust (Volonté, 2015, p. 84). In turn,
Protestants tend to be sceptical of hierarchies. The reformations historically pro-
moted decentralisation (i.e. multiple churches) and democratisation (i.e. priesthood
of all believers), and thus protected ordinary people against concentrations of power
(horizontal trust) (Woodberry, 2012; Witte, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Stulz &
Williamson, 2003; Levine 1979 as cited in Volonté, 2015, p. 84).
A typical example of horizontal trust refers to common goods (e.g. milk or fruit)
left on display for customers to buy using open cash bowls (without supervising
cashiers). For Mangalwadi (2011), such traditions exist mostly in historically Prot-
estant countries and derive from applying the moral principles of the Biblical
Decalogue. Consequently, regardless of a higher authority (e.g. a priest or a gov-
ernment) overseeing farm produce, God always watches (over) humans (producers
and customers). Such a simple principle of accountability has profound reinforcing
implications for the value-creating and value-adding chain (Mangalwadi, 2011,
pp. 251–254). In non-Protestant societies, following Mangalwadi’s example, low
trust (or vertical trust) implies hiring an overseeing cashier, adulterated milk, inspec-
tors accepting bribes, and a higher price for a lower quality item. Accordingly, such
economies are much less competitive than Protestant economies. But the distinct
values persisting through the present owe more to the historical and institutional
weight of religion (than to its contemporary influence), even regardless of the
secularisation of societies (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). As Glaeser and Glendon
(1998) observed, “current social norms may still be the legacy of prior religious
beliefs” (p. 431). Likewise, Inglehart and Baker (2000) assert:
While the majority of individuals have little or no contact with the church today, the impact
of living in a society that was historically shaped by once-powerful Catholic or Protestant
institutions persists today, shaping everyone––Protestant, Catholic, or other. . . (p. 36).
Familialism
Familialism and low generalised morality characterise Roman Catholicism as
discussed (Sect. 10.4.1) (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Van Kersbergen, 1995; Arruñada,
2010; La Porta et al., 1999). In turn, individualism stems from the French Revolution
and secularism was indirectly influenced by the Protestant Revolutions (Sect. 8.3.
4.4). Arruñada (2010) found statistically, and consistent with the argument of
Putnam (1993) that Catholics give more importance than Protestants to family ties.
This more significant role of the family, according to Arruñada, corresponds to
Catholics’ proclivity for occupational options that promote production within fam-
ilies, which can lead to nepotism and obstruction of institutional functioning
(Arruñada, 2010, p. 908).
Investigating these cultural features, various empirical studies (e.g. Granato et al.,
1996) have found robust practical interrelations between GDP growth and Protes-
tantism based on cultural measurements (World Values Survey of a 25 cross-country
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sample). Likewise, Hayward and Kemmelmeier (2011), combining individual and
national levels using cross-national panel data, reported that Protestantism persis-
tently fosters capitalism but independently of active religiosity (cultural
Protestantism).
Religion has shaped culture to a significant extent in Europe and the Americas
(Anderson, 2007; Paldam, 2001; Huntington, 1991). Therefore, my research model
places religion inside the “culture box” and maintains that it has manifold relations
with variables beyond culture (e.g. institutions; Fig. 2.1). The next sections further
analyse the implications of cultural factors, religion, and corruption in Latin
America.
10.3.1 The Cultural Influence of Religion in Latin America
10.3.1.1 Corruption in Latin America
Some Latin American cultural characteristics prone to corruption are corporatism,
authoritarianism, centralism, formalism (double standards), particularism (allegiance
within an inner circle), and the dispensing of favours expected of certain roles (Nef,
2001, pp. 159–174). Therefore, corruption and culture are associated in Latin
America as an ethical problem arising from society’s moral deficiency where
traditional values persist (Uildriks, 2009, p. 9).
Hofstede (2001) reached similar conclusions after making a first empirical,
quantitative approach to exploring the differences in thinking and social behaviours
across 72 countries (using 116,000 questionnaires distributed across IBM, the
multinational enterprise). Notwithstanding fierce criticism of the representativeness
of the samples and of the categories utilised for analysis, Hofstede’s pioneering work
provides a numerical glimpse of cultural variables in relation to institutions and
prosperity. The author’s results were extrapolated, then generalised in six “cultural
dimensions” (Hofstede, 2001).
One of the six dimensions used by Hofstede is the “Power Distance Index” (PDI).
PDI is the extent to which the least influential individuals in a society expect and
accept an unequal distribution of power (Hofstede, 2014). According to the PDI
index, most Latin American countries present high scores, contrary to the low PDI
scores in North American and North European countries. Table 10.1 summarises the
consequences of different PDI scores for political systems, religious life, and
organisations, among others (Hofstede, 2001).
As shown, institutionalised religion and the state have established hierarchical
power relations in Latin America, thus a high-power distance may be expected on
this continent. In contrast, after the Reformation, the institutional disbanding of
Roman Catholicism in Northern Europe and the non-institutionalisation of religion
in North America led to more social equality.
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10.3.1.2 The Divorce Between Law, Social Norms, and Morals in Latin
America
Various factors—corruption, crime, violence, and institutions’ loss of prestige—
account for the systematic divorce between law, social norms, and morals in most
Latin American countries (Mockus et al., 2012).
Table 10.2 shows the respective regulatory systems (divorced in most Latin
American countries). The three columns frame the three regulatory systems (law,
social norms, and personal morals). The behavioural motivation mechanisms are
deployed in the two rows, depending on whether they are positive (incentives above)
or associated with negative reasons or punishments (penalties below). Mockus’
(2012) conceptual proposal shows that rather than abiding by a single regulatory
system, humans are subject to three interacting systems. Such interplay can be
harmonic (e.g. in northern Europe) or may generate multiple shocks (as in Latin
America) (Mockus et al., 2012, p. 7).
Arruñada (2010) coincides with a similar distinction of these three regulatory
systems, which he refers to as “enforcement mechanisms” (parties) (Table 10.2). The
author describes that under “third-party” enforcement, specialised authorities such as
government rulers, prosecutors, and public forces check community members’
behaviour and discipline those who break the laws. In turn, enforcement by a
“second party” depends on sanctions and verifications by the party who bears the
brunt of the violation’s repercussions. Thus, peers in groups are second parties in
economic exchanges, and they may also sanction non-compliant partners by various
means, such as humiliation, bullying, ostracising, or even deprivation. Finally,
through the “first party” enforcement mechanism, human beings sanction
Table 10.1 Different Power Distance Index (PDI) and its consequences for social and political








Autocratic or oligarchic Pluralist governments based on the
outcome of majority votes
Government
stability
Sudden changes (instability) Stable governments stressing equality
Political
spectrum
Polarisation between left and right
with a weak centre
Political parties tend to occupy the
centre
Tax system Tax system protects the wealthy Tax system aims to redistribute wealth
Religion Success of religions stresses stratifi-
cation (hierarchical)
Success of religions stresses equality
Theories about
society
Elitist (Machiavelli, Mosca, Pareto) Pluralist (More, Marx, Weber)
aNote: PDI provided information for only less than 20 observations for the 65 countries analysed
here. Furthermore, PDI overlaps with other proxies of culture and institutions (Volonté, 2015).
Therefore, I excluded the PDI index from analysis due to lack of data and risk of endogeneity, and
no results were obtained from this variable
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themselves with psychological compensations. Accordingly, individuals determine
their actions in response to their understanding of a moral code, which also contains
many essential economic preferences, such as thriftiness and hard work. In Chris-
tianity, concepts such as “salvation” and “everlasting life” fall into this “first party”
category of regulatory mechanisms (Arruñada, 2010, p. 892).
For Arruñada, religion directly influences personal moral standards, as well as less
clearly influencing social norms and law. ForMockus, law, culture, andmorality tend
to be congruent in ideal democratic societies. Culture is more demanding than law,
and morality is more demanding than culture. The behaviours valid in light of
individual morality usually enjoy social approval, although the opposite is not always
true. In turn, what is culturally approved is usually legally allowed, although some
acceptable legal behaviour is rejected for cultural reasons (Mockus, 2001, p. 3).
In contrast, the divorce from these normative systems occurs in most Latin
American countries and applies to corruption and all forms of illegal behaviour
(at times even extending to violence). A typical and extreme example is that the right
to life is a fundamental right upheld in all Latin American constitutions. However,
social organisations (or cultural groups) intent on eradicating the fundamental
respect for another person’s life have proliferated in Latin America. For such groups,
it often becomes even necessary to demonstrate that “you are capable” or “brave
enough” to take another person’s life so as to gain greater respect or stronger group
affiliation. This thinking needs to be understood in terms of the divorce of law and
culture. It can, however, also be analysed in terms of a divorce between morality and
culture. It is also possible that due to fear, recognition, or shame an individual ends
up accepting certain group rules even if these go against one’s conscience (e.g. “I
prefer not to be considered a ‘snitch’ even though I know I am doing something with
which I morally disagree”) (Mockus et al., 2012, p. 6).
In sum, individuals not only respond to the coercive power of the law but, much
more stalwartly, they also obey their cultural and moral principles (Mockus et al.,
2012, p. 7). Historically, the Roman Catholic Church has influenced the three
regulatory systems in Latin America. Thus, a negative influence on the coherence
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law (or recognising the










Fear of legal sanction Fear of shame or
social rejection
Fear of damnation or
guilt
(Adapted from Mockus et al., 2012, p. 7; Arruñada, 2010, p. 892)
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of these systems may be expected when considering Catholic “relativist morals”
(Sect. 10.4.1) and restrictive concordats and corporatist legal instruments (Sect. 8.3.
4.6).1 In contrast, the application of the Biblical Decalogue principles in the legal
systems of historically Protestant countries (Sect. 8.3.4) introduced coherent moral,
social, and legal accountability standards towards God and the neighbour (Fig. 8.4).
The previous discussion justifies reviewing the distinct theologies of historical
Protestantism and Roman Catholicism as the root-cause of their differences (see
below).
10.4 Roman Catholic and Protestant Theologies,
and Corruption/Prosperity (1), (3), (6)
The following sections examine the influence of religion in terms of theological
approaches within Roman Catholicism, then explore the same within Protestantism.
10.4.1 Roman Catholic Theology and Political Culture
10.4.1.1 Roman Catholic Theology
Selling (2018) explains Roman Catholic theological ethics in terms of personal
intention, that is, good (“virtues”) versus evil (“vices”). This Roman Catholic notion
derives from its traditional recognition of four “cardinal virtues” established by
Greek philosophy and by the three “theological virtues” of Paul’s Epistles. Thus,
Greek philosophy (especially Aristotelian) once again carries more weight than
Scriptural “virtues”, of which there are only three (as formulated in the New
Testament), (see Sects. 8.2.1.1, 8.3.4.1, 8.3.5, and 9.1.1). Therefore, Roman Cathol-
icism acknowledges as “virtue” the Aristotelian “non-absolute” and “mean” relative
point between two extremes (Selling, 2018, p. 9). As such, “good and evil” depend
on analysing specific acts, circumstances, and intentions as harmful or beneficial for
each person. Accordingly, no “ruling” moral standard would be adequate (not even
the Scriptures):
Even clear commandments, such as “thou shalt not kill” admit of exceptions that have been
enshrined in [Catholic] church teaching for centuries (Selling, 2018, p. 8).2
Selling (2018) acknowledges that Roman Catholicism “does not subscribe to the
vast majority” of the laws of Judaism (p. 10). In other words, Roman Catholicism
1Note: I do not define specific variables for this divorce of mechanisms, neither in regression
analysis nor in QCA models. However, legal origin, concordats, and population adherents may
serve as proxies, and are therefore included in the empirical setting (Chap. 16 and Part VI).
2Joseph Selling is Emeritus Professor of Moral Theology at Catholic University Leuven. He is also
the author of the book “Reframing Catholic Theological Ethics” (Oxford University Press, 2016).
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does not endorse most Old Testament laws that Jesus and the Apostles, as Jews,
followed (Bruce, 2007). Moreover, the moral law that Catholicism explicitly teaches
from the Old Testament’s Decalogue is elaborated with the help of supplementary
meanings through a “natural law reasoning” (Selling, 2018, p. 10). Consequently,
the Catholic Decalogue diverges from the original books (King James Bible, 1769,
Exodus 20; Deuteronomy 5), which were “written with the finger of God” (King
James Bible, 1769, Exodus 31: 18; Deuteronomy 9: 10). The wording of the Ten
Commandments, moreover, even varies in Catholic Catechisms of different lan-
guages beyond their translation (Fig. 10.1).
A B C




Roman Catholic Catechism in 
Spanish (author’s translation)
1
And God spake all these words, saying, I am the Lord thy God, 
which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the 
house of bondage.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
1. I am the LORD your 
God: you shall not have 
strange Gods before me.
1. You shall love God above all 
things.
(Amarás a Dios sobre todas las 
cosas).
2
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any 
likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the 
earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: thou shalt 
not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy 
God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon 
the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that 
hate me; and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love 
me, and keep my commandments.
…?
(Commandment eliminated 
from the Roman Catholic 
Catechism)
…?
(Commandment eliminated from 
the Roman Catholic Catechism)
3
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain:
for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in 
vain.
2. You shall not take the 
name of the LORD your 
God in vain.
2. You shall not take God’s 
name in vain.
(No tomarás el nombre de Dios 
en vano).
4
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work: but the seventh 
day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do 
any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, 
nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is 
within thy gates: for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, 
the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: 
wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it.
3. Remember to keep holy 
the LORD'S Day.




Honor thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long 
upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
4. Honor your father and 
your mother.
4. Honor your father and your 
mother.
(Honrarás a tu padre y a tu 
madre).
6
Thou shalt not kill.
5. You shall not kill. 5. You shall not kill.
(No matarás).
7
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
6. You shall not commit 
adultery.
6. You shall not commit impure 
acts.
(No cometerás actos impuros).
8 Thou shalt not steal.
7. You shall not steal. 7. You shall not steal.
(No hurtarás)
9
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
8. You shall not bear false 
witness against your 
neighbor.
8. You shall not say false 
testimony or lie.
(No dirás falso testimonio ni 
mentirás).
10
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house, thou shalt not covet 
thy neighbor’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, 
nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor’s.
9. You shall not covet your 
neighbor's wife.
9. You shall not consent impure 
thoughts or desires.




10. You shall not covet your 
neighbor's goods.
10. You shall not covet the 
property of others.
(No codiciarás los bienes 
ajenos).
Note: Author’s highlighting and emphases 
Fig. 10.1 The Bible’s Decalogue compared with the Decalogue of Roman Catechism (English and
Spanish) (adapted from A) The Holy Bible. The Authorised (King James) Version. Cambridge
Edition: (1769); (B) Catechism of the Catholic Church—The Ten Commandments (Vatican, 2018);
(C) Catecismo de la Doctrina Cristiana (Comisión Episcopal de Enseñanza de Madrid, 1962,
pp. 6–7)). Note: Author’s highlighting and emphases
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Figure 10.1 shows the pronounced differences between the Decalogue of the
Holy Scriptures (A) and the Roman Catholic Catechism in Spanish (C). The
Decalogue of the Roman Catholic Catechism in English (B) stands between the
Scriptures and the Spanish Catechism. The Roman Catholic Catechism contains
fundamental alterations in the First Table of the Commandments (the first four
Commandments relative to loving God; see and compare with Fig. 8.4). The Second
Table (concerning loving one’s neighbour) remains relatively similar with some
minor changes.
While the First Commandment concerns monotheism (A and B), in (C) the
wording is completely different, bringing into play other related Biblical ordinance
but not the original (Figs. 8.4 and 10.1). Similarly, the Second Commandment of the
Decalogue (to make no graven image) is arbitrarily removed from the Roman
Catechism (B and C). This makes sense when considering the core practice of
venerating images and icons in Roman Catholicism. Such reverence is common to
different religious systems (e.g. Babylon, Egypt, Rome); in contrast, however, the
Holy Bible condemns it as idolatry (Fig. 8.4).
While the Third Commandment remains relatively similar, the Fourth Command-
ment varies significantly in A, B, and C. In A, it mentions keeping the Sabbath
(Saturday). In B, it refers to the LORD’s Day (which is open to interpretation,
i.e. Sunday Mass), and in C to “sanctifying the festivals”. The three variants differ
noticeably, as a result of the interplay between Jewish (Sabbath) and pagan factors
(sun worshipping: Sunday) in early Christianity (Bacchiocchi, 1977).
The wording of the other commandments has remained similar, some minor
changes aside. Nonetheless, the Roman Catechism contains several articles that
further relativise the application of the Commandments, for instance:
Regarding the Ninth Commandment:
The gravity of a lie is measured against the nature of the truth it deforms, the circumstances,
the intentions of the one who lies, and the harm suffered by its victims. If a lie in itself only
constitutes a venial sin, it becomes mortal when it does grave injury to the virtues of justice
and charity (2484, Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican, 2018).
However, the Holy Bible does not mention the existence of “venial sins” such as
“soft lies”. On the contrary, Jesus said:
But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these
cometh of evil (King James Bible, 1769, Matthew 5:37).
Here is another example of the relativisation of the Sixth Commandment in the
Roman Catechism:
The prohibition of murder does not abrogate the right to render an unjust aggressor unable to
inflict harm. Legitimate defense is a grave duty for whoever is responsible for the lives of
others or the common good (2321, Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican, 2018).
Here, too, the Scriptures state that Jesus commanded the opposite:
but I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek,
turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let
him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain.
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Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away. Ye
have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I
say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you,
and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you (King James Bible, 1769,
Matthew 5:39–44; my italics).
Furthermore, meaningful variations on content and wording are also evident in
the English and Spanish versions of the Roman Catechism. The Roman Church-
State is Catholic. Although this means it is “universal”, its Commandments are
taught differently in English-speaking (predominantly Protestant) contexts than in
Spanish-speaking (predominantly Roman Catholic) ones. Similar differences in
wording can also be found in the Catechism’s version of the Decalogue in other
languages (e.g. compare German with Portuguese or French versions). Since the
Catechism eliminated the Second Commandment, the Ninth Commandment was
divided in two (thus creating two new Commandments).
10.4.1.1.1 Roman Catholic Theology in Practice
According to Arruñada (2010), Roman Catholicism favours varied moral values,
given the content of its moral code and primarily due to its methods of enforcement
(p. 895). The double or “diverse moral standards” in Roman Catholicism encourage
a “selective charity”, thus favouring friends and relatives ( familialism) over
strangers. Regarding enforcement, the “salvation by works” and “purgatory-based”
theologies, along with the private confession of sins to a priest, imply heterogeneous
subjective moral standards for judging individuals according to the clergy’s subjec-
tivity and individual circumstances. In other words, moral norms are adapted
according to individual circumstances, and descend from medieval “casuistry”
(Arruñada, 2010, p. 895). Moreover, this concurs entirely with the Aristotelian
“non-absolute” and “mean” relative point defining “good” or “bad”. Therefore, the
various predicted statistical results could be expected (see Sect. 10.3).
Another widespread moral tradition refers to the duality between official Catholic
discourse and de facto practice. Examples include the constant scandalous abuse of
children by priests. For instance, the recent exhaustive Pennsylvania report found
that the Roman Catholic hierarchy covered-up for more than 300 priests who had
abused over 1000 children in Pennsylvania alone. Although the leaders of the
Catholic Church publicly condemn child abuse, in practice the Church hierarchy
systematically covers up such scandals (Grand Jury of Pennsylvania, 2018) (see
Sect. 8.3.3.2).
10.4.1.2 Roman Catholic Political Culture
Political culture is a system of principles, values, expressive representations, and
empirical views that describe the context within which political activity occurs
(Verba, 1965, p. 513). Familialism and the predominance of the male breadwinner
model are two values propagated by Catholic political parties (Esping-Andersen,
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1996; Van Kersbergen, 1995). Catholic political culture “[. . .] is transmitted mainly
through nationwide institutions, to the population of a society as a whole—even to
those who have little or no contact to religious institutions” (Inglehart & Baker,
2000, p. 36; Emmenegger, 2011, p. 339). Therefore, the social effect of Roman
Catholicism does not depend on religiosity (Esping-Andersen, 1996, p. 66; Figue-
roa, 2016).
Various scholars, including Arruñada (2010), Lambsdorff (2006), and Treisman
(2000), have analysed the adverse consequences of familialism on corruption.
Societies are perceived as less corrupt when impersonal values are more important
than particularistic or family values (Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 19). Thus, the adverse
impact of Roman Catholicism on corruption stems mainly from the institution. The
Roman Church-State transmits values such as the acceptance of hierarchy,
familialism, double standards, and relativism to the population via education, for
instance. Moreover, the pressure to compete with Protestantism has often forced the
Catholic Church to strategically adopt more pro-social and more democratic postures
in several countries (Gill 1998, 2013; Anderson, 2007; Woodberry, 2012; Wilde
et al., 2010) (see Sect. 8.2.1.2). The next two sections briefly consider two current
aspects of Roman Catholic theology: ecumenism and liberation theology.
10.4.1.3 Ecumenism: All Roads Lead to Rome
Ecumenism and its adjective, ecumenical, are defined as “promoting or tending
toward worldwide Christian unity or cooperation”; “of, relating to, or representing
the whole of a body of churches”; and “worldwide or general in extent, influence, or
application” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Etymologically, the term derives from Greek
Oikos, “home”. This root is the same for concepts such as Oikos-logos: ecology (the
study of home) or Oikos-nomos: economy (the administration of home). Sixteenth-
century late Latin understood “oecumenical or ecumenical” as “belonging to the
universal [Catholic] Church”. One Roman Catholic deacon and university professor
interviewed for this study termed ecumenism as “a process of bringing the separated
brethren from the Catholic Church (Protestants, among others) back ‘home’”.
However, as Engelhardt (2007) has noted:
Contemporary Christians are separated by foundationally disparate understandings of Chris-
tianity itself. Christians do not share one theology, much less a common understanding of the
significance of sin, suffering, disease, and death. These foundational disagreements not only
stand as impediments to an intellectually defensible ecumenism, but they also form the
underpinnings of major disputes in the culture wars. . . (p. 25).
Yet, the “ecumenical movement” fosters unity among Christians according to
opportune occasions and the needs of the Roman Church-State. These include efforts
to eliminate words that complicate mutual relations between denominations and to
promote dialogue between competent experts from different churches and commu-
nities (Abbott, 1989). According to the Jesuit Walter Abbott, as the challenges of
honing ecclesiastical communion are progressively resolved, the Catholic Church
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expects all Christians to be reunited in a single “Eucharistic” celebration, into a unity
which, for him, rests solely within the Roman Church (Abbott, 1989, pp. 347–348).
The Christian desire for unity is indeed founded on the Scriptures (King James
Bible, 1769, John 17:11). However, the downscaling to a Christendom centred
exclusively on the Roman Catholic Church-State reflects a nostalgia for a monop-
olistic medieval Church (Agnew, 2010). This notion was expressed by Joseph
Ratzinger (the former Pope Benedict XVI) when he referred to the medieval
continuum from the Roman Empire to the “Holy” Roman Empire as “European
identity” (Ratzinger & Pera, 2006; Agnew, 2010). For Ratzinger, the Christendom
“crisis” began with what he calls “Germanic Protestantism”. Hence, the Protestant
Reformation forcefully broke the continuity of the (Catholic) European identity and
subordinated the power of the Church to the state, thus creating what he calls
“unholy”/Catholic nation-states (Ibid). The Roman Church-State, longing to return
to the monopolistic medieval Church, has therefore incessantly sought to bring back
“home” the “separated brethren”.
The efforts of Roman Catholicism to initiate and maintain such an ecumenical
enterprise have been undeniably successful worldwide. The Encyclical Dignitatis
Humanae has fostered ecumenical relations after Vatican II (Cook, 2012, p. 33).
Although Vatican II has promoted reconciliation attitudes towards other religions, it
has not “marked a huge disruption in the beliefs and practices of the [Catholic]
Church” (Agnew, 2010, p. 48). In turn, historical principles (i.e. Sola Scriptura, Sola
Gratia and Sola Fide) that initially gave rise to Protestantism––meaning literally to
Protest against Rome’s tyranny and demagogy––have evidently capitulated today in
many Protestant denominations. The following cases exemplify this phenomenon
that has facilitated ecumenical relations.
Lutheranism
Roman Catholicism and the Lutheran Church have publicly and progressively
agreed on several critical issues in numerous documents (i.e. Joint Declarations)
with statements such as:
This Declaration on the Way (In Via) to unity seeks to make more visible the unity we share
by gathering together agreements reached on issues of church, ministry, and eucharist. This
Declaration, [. . .] is neither at the beginning nor the end of the journey toward unity
(Committee on Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, 2015, p. 1).
Particularly remarkable is the Report of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Commis-
sion on Unity—“From Conflict to Communion”—on the occasion of the Lutheran-
Catholic Common Commemoration of 500 years of the Reformation in 2017.
Through this joint official report, the Lutheran Church has relinquished various
fundamental principles that originated five centuries ago with Martin Luther,
among others the Sola Scriptura. Lutherans now accept statements previously
inconceivable such as “The Bishop of Rome by virtue of his office is ‘pastor of
the whole Church’” (LG 22 as cited in LWF & PCPCU, 2013, p. 69). Likewise, in
the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (June 1998), Roman Catholic
and Lutheran scholars reached a consensus on the question: How is one saved? This
formerly dissenting view was crucial to the Protestant Reformation––i.e. salvation
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by grace alone through faith in Jesus Christ alone (Sola Gratia and Sola Fide),
instead of “salvation by the works” of Catholicism (Cook, 2012, p. 34; Arruñada,
2010). Furthermore, Bergoglio’s (aka “Pope Francis”) visit to Sweden in 2016, to
commemorate the 499th anniversary of the Lutheran Reformation (Sweden, once a
strongly Lutheran country and now secularised), was far more than simply a
milestone in Catholicism’s efforts to regain its “separated brethren”.
Anglicanism
The Anglican Church’s frequent reference to “the middle way between Protestant-
ism and Catholicism” is another important example of the Protestant “homecoming”.
Anglican theology and practices have moved ever closer to Roman Catholicism
(Abram, 2018; Doe, 2010, p. 243; Doe & Sandberg, 2010). In 2011, for instance, the
Roman Catholic Church-State received seven Anglican priests and 300 members
from six congregations. Several others are rapidly progressing towards full commu-
nion with Rome (Cook, 2012, p. 33).
Pentecostalism
The ecumenical contacts between the Neo-Pentecostal movement and the charis-
matic Catholic movement are surprisingly close. In Latin America and beyond, the
classical topics of controversial theology between Catholicism and Protestantism,
and between liberalism and fundamentalism, are no longer obstacles for theological
re-annexation. In fact, confessional boundaries are no longer obeyed (especially in
Protestantism) in practising its faith (Schäfer, 1997).
Mainline Protestantism
Mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics now share common denominators and
jointly oppose secularism. Issues such “as homosexual marriages, abortion, and
religion in the public square have proved to be common ground for both groups”
(Cook, 2012 p. 34; Miller, 2012, 2017; Colson & Neuhaus, 1995).
Mainline Protestantism (and in general, secular societies) are “amnesiac socie-
ties” (Hervieu-Léger, 1993) since “they are less and less capable of maintaining the
memory that lies at the heart of their religious existence” (Hervieu-Léger, 1999,
p. 80). These features are such neither because societies are increasingly rational nor
because they have “found satisfactory alternatives to the traditional forms of religion
so crucial in their historical formation” (Hervieu-Léger, 1999, p. 80).
Engelhardt (2007) explains the capitulation of principles in Protestantism as a
result of the secularising forces of surrounding societies. For the author,
secularisation has debilitated “the historic, zealous commitment of the particular
faiths to their particular founding doctrines, thus undermining the theological bar-
riers to intercommunion” (p. 26). Popovich, an Orthodox author, has described this
blend of secular thought and religious authority in the following terms:
Ecumenism is the common name for the pseudo-Christianity of the pseudo-Churches of
Western Europe. Within it is the heart of European humanism, with Papism as its head
(Popovich, 1994, p. 169).
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Ecumenism and Religious Freedom
The name “Protestants” derives from the protestation against the papal proposition
that its hierarchy and status quo should be reestablished in areas where the Edict of
Speyer (1526) had already enforced religious freedom. The papacy at the Diet of
Speyer II (1529) postulated, among others, the majority rule in matters of faith, the
banishment of the Zwinglians, and death-punishment to Anabaptists. The opposition
of the reformed princes to the papal proposals was crucial to the success of the
Reformation, the liberties of Germany, and the rights of conscience (Wolgast, 1996;
Cook, 2012; D’Aubigne, 1862). As Wolgast (1996) noted,
The protestation received legal status through the appeal that the Protestant princes and
imperial cities lodged before two notaries in Speyer on 25 April, 1529. [. . .] in 1529 the
individual conscience was established for the first time as a norm of decisions not to be
outvoted in political negotiations. Against the positive law was set the conformity of the
evangelical teachings to the scriptures; the legal act of protestation presupposed a religious
decision (Wolgast, 1996, 4: p. 104).
Figure 10.2 presents parallels between Roman Catholic concepts of religious
freedom at Diet of Speyer II (1529) and Dignitatis Humanae of Vatican II (1965), as
well as the Protestant definition at the protestation of Speyer.
After analysing several case studies and comparing Catholic concepts of religious
freedom of Diet of Speyer II (1529) and Dignitatis Humanae of Vatican II (1965)
(See Fig. 10.2), Cook concluded:
. . . the Catholic Church has not changed its hegemonic nature, only its method of achieving
hegemony. Additionally, it strongly suggests that the [Catholic] Church’s efforts to arrest
and counteract the Protestant Reformation (and any other religion) are far from buried in the
past (Cook, 2012, p. 159).
The Protestant definition at the protestation of Speyer concurs with Martin
Luther’s assertion: “I will preach it, teach it, write it, but I will constrain no man
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Fig. 10.2 Differences between Protestant and Catholic concepts of religious freedom (adapted
from Cook, 2012, pp. 158–159)
3Martin Luther, “The First Sermon, March 9, 1522, Incovait Sunday,” (as cited in Tappert, 2017,
p. 234).
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of Protestantism had equally advocated this principle of religious freedom, espe-
cially when they acted as state religions and became dominant, magisterial, and
conformist. Thus, Protestant dissenters (e.g. Anabaptists) have historically suffered
persecution from both Roman Catholic and magisterial Protestant churches (Miller,
2012). As a nineteenth-century Protestant wrote:
Whenever the church has obtained secular power, she has employed it to punish dissent from
her doctrines. Protestant churches that have followed in the steps of Rome by forming
alliance with worldly powers have manifested a similar desire to restrict liberty of con-
science. An example of this is given in the long-continued persecution of dissenters by the
Church of England. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thousands of noncon-
formist ministers were forced to flee from their churches, and many, both of pastors and
people, were subjected to fine, imprisonment, torture, and martyrdom (White, 1888, p. 443).
Yet, “the dissenting Protestant view of a separated church and state, always a
minority position in England and the rest of Europe, and even in early colonial
America, became the dominant position in the early [American] republic” (Miller,
2012, p. xviii). Nevertheless, barriers once erected by Protestantism against ecume-
nism have fallen in light of Roman Catholicism advocating religious freedom for all
groups in pluralistic (Protestant) societies (Cook, 2012, p. 50). However, the same
religious freedom is denied to “non-Catholics in political communities where Cath-
olics are in the majority” (Pavan, 1989, pp. 4,51). Regarding these variations in the
Roman Church’s pastoral strategy worldwide, Gill (1998) observes that the Catholic
clergy lobby hard for religious freedom where Catholics are a minority and
unhindered by existing Church bureaucracies, such as in Russia, certain countries
in Asia, and Africa. In contrast, bishops actively advocate for legislation that limits
religious freedom in Latin America and Poland, where the Catholic Church is the
predominant religious actor. This phenomenon concurs with the assumption of
parishioner maximisation, which dictates that if a church is on the defensive, its
leaders will try to limit religious liberty. In turn, when a church is increasingly
expanding, it will pursue legislation that promotes religious freedom (Gill, 2013,
pp. 59, 227).
Similarly, Dowling, referring to such a Machiavelism, observed nearly two
centuries ago:
There is one kind of Romanism to be exhibited in Protestant lands, and another and a widely
different in Italy, Spain and other popish lands, where it reigns in its glory (Dowling, 1853,
p. 626).
Consequently, it is not surprising that despite ecumenical discussions, tension still
exists between Protestants and Catholics (Cook, 2012). On the one side, the Roman
Catholic claim to absoluteness has always been regarded as a scandal and an offence
(Pauwels, 1963, p. 585). On the other, some small dissenting Protestant denomina-
tions (so-called sects) are reluctant to accept Roman Catholic hegemony (see the
biblical reasons discussed in Sect. 10.4.2.1) (Miller, 2012, 2017; Cook, 2012;
Taggart, 1998). After all, scepticism towards Rome is evident, as:
Historically, the [Catholic] Church has sought to expand its resources and power in many
countries. It has sought to maximize its wealth and resources and to enact laws and policies
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that protect it against competitors such as Protestant Christianity and other faiths (Manuel
et al., 2006, p. 4).
Peace among religious denominations is something which is undeniably desir-
able. However, there is a need for caution when considering that Protestant denom-
inations have mostly relinquished their founding principles, while “Rome never
changes” as per the Italian saying. Despite the progress after Vatican II (see Sect.
8.2.1.2), Roman Catholicism has not markedly altered its beliefs and practices
(Agnew, 2010, p. 48) or its institutional founding principles (i.e. Canon Law)
since medieval times (O’Reilly & Chalmers, 2014). The political repercussions of
an ecumenism in “Rome terms” are beyond its theological or religious implications.
History warns of the long medieval tyranny of a fused state and Church under the
Aristotelian “government by one person” and its relativistic morals, keeping the
masses ignorant. Breaking such a status quo carried a cost of countless wars and
human lives (e.g. the Thirty Years’ War that led to Westphalian order) (Snyder,
2011; Agnew, 2010; Cook, 2012; Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003). Evidently, since
Vatican II Roman Catholicism has become more tolerant, and thus “Europe has
become ever more pluralistic religiously and thus ever less likely to be squeezed
back into a singular Catholic mold” (Agnew, 2010, p. 52). Yet, the author warns:
Surely the trend towards a medieval Church redux is something about which we all should
be concerned, not least because states and other agencies will undoubtedly find themselves
recruited into one side or another in new “religious wars,” both rhetorical and actual (Agnew,
2010, p. 56).
10.4.1.4 Liberation Theology: A Top-Down Movement
Among others, Protestantism, modernity, secular unions, and left-wing political
groups increasingly began to threaten the hegemony of the Roman Church-State in
Latin America and beyond. These developments made the Roman Church-State
realise (at the beginning of the twentieth century) that it had overestimated its strong
popular influence. Accordingly, it has endeavoured to build a “New Christendom” in
Latin America since the early 1930s (Dussel, 1976; Vekemans 1976 as cited in
Smith, 1991). Throughout, the “New Christendom” has served as a strategy to
reassure the establishment of Roman Catholicism as the major cultural and institu-
tional influence in modernising Latin America (Smith, 1991). As part of this
strategy, the Roman Church-State took the side of “modernity”, ‘science”, and
“progress” for the first time in history (Richard 1987 as cited in Smith, 1991).
Accordingly, “Catholic social teachings” and the innovations of Vatican II in the
1960s have concurred with this strategy. Other insurgent developments, including
the rise of Marxism, the experience of Camilo Torres, and the Cuban revolution,
brought forth a “progressive wing” of Roman Catholicism (Levine, 1981). Catholic
theologians, such as Gutiérrez (1973), identified dependency theory, which emerged
in the second half of the twentieth century in Latin America (see Sect. 5.4), as key to
understanding the region’s socio-economic situation (Drexler-Dreis, 2017).
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Accordingly, Catholic liberation theologians came to believe that the Latin
America’s main problem was its dependency on dominant capitalistic oppressors,
which would be solved through “liberation” rather than more “development” (Smith,
1991, p. 237). The foundational episode of liberation theology took place during the
Second General Conference of the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM),
held in Medellín, Colombia in 1968. This theology is an “elite-initiated”
revitalisation movement aiming to force “redirections in the strategies and
resources” within established institutions (Smith, 1991, p. 234).
Gutiérrez is considered the “father of the Liberation Theology”. According to
Gutiérrez, the aim of liberation theology goes beyond improving living conditions: it
consists of a drastic structural shift, a lasting cultural revolution, and a social
transformation; an ongoing, never-ending development of a new man, a new way
to be an individual (Gutiérrez, 1973, p. 880). Gutiérrez tried to reconcile the Marxist
ideal of an earthly, egalitarian society through revolution or insurgence with the
heavenly salvation of the soul in Christian terms. These two notions are exegetically
incompatible when comparing the use of violence as a means to achieve social ends
with the application of biblical principles, such as those contained in the Ten
Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount (see Sects. 8.3.4 and 10.4.1). Further-
more, a hypothetical communist synthesis has proven not to produce desirable social
results (see Sect. 8.3.2; Fig. 8.3 and Table 8.2; Fig. 16.4; Truth Table 11 in
Appendix 4.2).
Scheper-Hughes and Scheper (2015) observe that liberation theology was a
significant and noticeable social movement in the 1970s and 1980s, which realigned
several Catholic clergy members and nuns who had favoured the oppressed during
several South American military dictatorships and Central American civil wars.
Liberation theologians expanded on their message at the 1968 Medellín Conference
of Latin American Bishops, during which the bishops committed to a new social/
spiritual compact known as a “preferential option for the poor”. This message urged
the Latin American Roman Church to break away from its imperialist origins and
favouritism for landlords, industrialists, and power elites. However, as the authors
stress, liberation theology never became the mainstream or hegemonic Catholic
theology in Latin America (Scheper-Hughes & Scheper, 2015, pp. 13–14). Regard-
ing its political implications, liberation theology did not draw out what a new society
would be like, except for a few examples of socialism. Furthermore, Vatican
loyalists have successively replaced progressive bishops in Latin America since
the 1990s (Berryman, 2020).
As liberation theology has not been dominant in the Latin American Roman
Church, its institutional impact is even less pronounced in the global Catholic
Church-State. It is of particular importance that liberation theology has not produced
changes in the principles of canon law (although it could have influenced its
interpretation) (C. Salinas, personal communication, April 27, 2020; J. Müller,
personal communication, March 27, 2020). Gill (1998) notes that the emergence
of Catholic scholars proclaiming a new liberation theology shocked the Church’s
higher echelons (p. 177). Likewise, Scheper-Hughes & Scheper’s observation on the
pledges of the Catholic hierarchy is subtly different from Gill (1998)‘s
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mixed-methods empirical analysis based on several Latin American cases. For Gill,
more than four centuries of monopolistic hegemony of the Catholic Church in Latin
America resulted in a lack of commitment to pastoral issues and a profound tendency
to appease the political establishment in exchange for patronage and legislative
approval for Church teachings. Yet, Catholic hierarchs had to rethink their political
and pastoral strategies when religious rivals started gaining dramatic spiritual terrain
in the weakest segments of several Latin American countries, starting in the 1930s.
Thus, the Catholic hierarchy introduced a pastoral policy of a “preferential option for
the poor”, during which competition for the souls of the disadvantaged became
intense. This new pastoral strategy of the Roman Church clashed with military and
authoritarian regimes that followed detrimental policies to the needy. Thus, when
facing increasing religious competition, Church hierarchs abandoned their conven-
tional coalition with the political establishment and rejected authoritarianism to
sustain a credible commitment to helping the vulnerable. Human rights groups
also contributed funds to this opposition, reducing the episcopacy’s dependence
on the state. However, when there was little competition, bishops tended to disregard
the “preferential option for the poor” to retain cordial ties with military rulers and
maintain established privileges (Gill, 1998, p.71).
10.4.1.4.1 Marxism and Hegelian Dialectics in Liberation Theology
Catholic-Marxist alliances developed within the liberation theology movement
quickly expanded across Latin America and beyond (Levine, 1981). Partly, due to
such associations, the recalcitrant ultramontane Catholic wing (Rome, conservative
bishops, and right-wing Latin American governments) have opposed liberation
theology (Smith, 1991, p. 236).
To a large extent, liberation theology emerges from “Marxism’s influence”
(Gutiérrez, 1973, p. 9). Fierro (1977) corroborated Gutiérrez’s views by arguing
that this political theology results from the embodiment of historical materialism and
dialectical logic into Western philosophy (Fierro, 1977, p. 2). Such Marxist dialec-
tical materialism derives from Hegelian dialectics and idealism, which are based on
the synthesis of opposites or contradictions (thesis–antithesis–synthesis) (Johnson,
2017, p. 157). Unconventionally applying Hegelian logic to understand the emer-
gence of an “elite-initiated” movement like liberation theology might work as
follows:
(1) Thesis. Status quo. The corporatist, conservative hierarchies of the Roman
Church-State join forces with right-wing governments to keep society oppressed
(e.g. Opus Dei).
(2) Antithesis. Liberation theologists use dependency theories to explain Latin
America’s problems in terms of external causes (e.g. by blaming industrialised,
Protestant countries). The “Option for the poor” is associated with left-wing
stakeholders (e.g. some Jesuit priests—consistently loyal to the pope—or
Dominicans involved in the insurgency).
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(3) Synthesis. The polarisation of society and escalating cycles of armed conflict
(wars) are followed by peace negotiations in which the Roman Catholic Church-
State serves as a mediator. Final outcome: Maintenance of the status quo in any
case (Roman Church-State hegemony).
This example applies quite well to countries (e.g. Colombia) whose institutions are
characterised by strong corporatist ideologies. In Colombia, the government has
traditionally been associated with right-wing conservative forces and intransigent
Roman Catholic ideologies (i.e. Vice-President Marta Ramírez and former President
Álvaro Uribe among other high-ranking government officers have ties with Opus
Dei). On the other hand, some Catholic priests were involved in the insurgency, for
example, Camilo Torres and Manuel Pérez Martínez (in liberation theology-guerrilla
groups like ELN). However, the Roman Catholic Church has also been directly
involved as a mediator or conciliator in the Colombian armed conflict (i.e. priests
like Dario Echeverri and Gabriel Izquierdo and bishops like Augusto Castro and Nel
Beltrán). In the end, the Roman Catholic Church has been directly and indirectly
involved on both sides of the conflict. As a result, the status quo has been maintained.
This example helps to understand that liberation theology is one strand of Roman
Catholicism albeit not the principal one. In Latin America, mostly orthodox old
pre-Vatican II views still prevail (Martin, 1999; Figueroa, 2016). Moreover, both
wings of Roman Catholicism (right-wing corporatist and left-wing liberation theo-
logians) conform to the Roman Church-State hierarchy (i.e. the papacy). For exam-
ple, Gutiérrez was invited to the Vatican in 2015, despite Ratzinger’s threat to
excommunicate him in 1984 (Lamola, 2018).
The dialectic illustrated above suggests that it is doubtful whether liberation
theology could lastingly affect Roman Catholic Canon law, for instance. At a practical
level, the analyses proposed by liberation theologians (e.g. Gutiérrez, 1973; Boff,
1989) do not apply to everyday Catholic practice. Instead, the primary triggers of
Catholic practice are mostly personal and local concerns (Martin, 1999, p. 41).
10.4.1.4.2 Liberation Theology and Protestantism
Religions evolve and, typically, the creation of different denominations is considered
to be the product of doctrinal differences (Webster, 2019, p. 1125). Contrasting
Scriptural interpretations, diverse paradigms, meanings, and other discrepancies
have been the common denominator (Engelhardt, 2007) of Protestant
schismogenesis as an ethnographic fact (Webster, 2019, p. 1125). Furthermore,
Christian traditions have changed over time and vary among denominations, while
the Scriptural texts have remained largely unaffected by time for centuries (i.e. King
James or Martin Luther versions). Engelhardt (2007) observed a decisive influence
of philosophy and secularism in this respect:
The mainline Christian churches of the West through importing philosophical rationality
into their doing of theology over time transformed their theologies in terms of the demands
of the secular culture. After all, if one borrows the logic or rationality of one’s theology from
philosophy, one will incrementally transform theology into the image and likeness of the
surrounding secular culture, since philosophy always carries the mark of a particular age and
culture (Engelhardt, 2007, p. 29).
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Consequently, liberation theology has influenced Protestant theologians
(e.g. Bonino, 1976) and especially some Pentecostal movements (Sepúlveda,
2009). Moreover, the religious experiences of Pentecostals and Catholic Charis-
matics are very similar (Self, 2009). Figure 10.3 presents the similarities and
differences between some features of reading the Bible in historical and present-
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Fig. 10.3 Ways of reading the Bible in traditional Roman Catholicism, Liberation Theology (post-
Vatican II), historical Protestantism, and Pentecostalism (adapted from Sepúlveda, 2009; Becker &
Woessmann, 2009; Becker et al., 2016; McCleary, 2013; Witte, 2002; Woodberry, 2012)
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The religious currents shown in Fig. 10.3 coexist today. However, each has
prevailed more than others in different historical periods. For example, currents
1 and 3 (traditional Roman Catholicism and historical Protestantism) have been
antagonists and dominant since the sixteenth century (even earlier in the case of
Roman Catholicism). Currents 2 and 4 (Catholic Liberation theologians and Pente-
costals) appeared in the second half of the twentieth century and share various
features of understanding the Bible.
For many Catholic ecclesial and Pentecostal communities in Latin America, the
Bible has long been the first contact with the printed word. Many people have even
learned to read with the Bible, which has a deep meaning for those trapped in social
and cultural exclusion (Sepúlveda, 2009).
However, vast differences exist when comparing Catholic ecclesial and Pente-
costal communities with historical Protestantism (Köhrsen, 2017). First, what Cath-
olic authors call “critical” Bible reading (Gutiérrez, 1973, p. 13) follows the same
interpretative principles of traditional Roman Catholicism (i.e. the allegorical inter-
pretation passed on by Origenes, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas). Thus, the Old
Catholic dogmas are maintained based on superficial reading without either exegesis
or proper consideration of intertextual factors.
The so-called critical reading of the Bible, advocated by liberation theologians,
favours direct social and political revolution (including insurgence) (Gutiérrez,
1973, p. 69; Levine, 1981, p. 35). Saying that, revolution or insurgence illustrates
the rejection of Christian Scriptural principles, such as the “love of one’s enemies”
proclaimed by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount (King James Bible, 1769, Matthew
5: 38–48). In turn, the Scriptural principles rejected by liberation theologians formed
the basis of Protestant legal revolutions in the past (e.g. German, Scandinavian,
American; see Sect. 8.3.4 and Fig. 8.4). Therefore, the principles that Liberation
theology seeks to implement in society concur more with the communist law
tradition (in societies like Cuba) than with the Protestant revolutions (i.e. common
law, German law, Scandinavian law) (see Sect. 8.3.2 and Fig. 8.3 and Table 8.2).
Another critical issue of comparison is the “liberation of what” proposed by the
different currents. Liberation theologians advocate freeing societies from “sinful”
“oppressive social, economic, and political structures” (Levine, 1981, p. 39). In light
of dependency theory, this would mean, among others, liberation from colonial
exploitation in Latin America (formerly from the Spanish crown and later from the
foreign capital of Protestant countries (e.g. England, USA; see Gutiérrez, 1973;
Galeano, 1971). However, dependency analysis disregards the hegemonic relations
between the Roman Catholic Church-State and the states, or upholds these, or even
praises them as positive (Galeano, 1971, p. 247) (see Sect. 5.4).
On balance, liberation theology is ahistorical (Lamola, 2018). It began as a
top-down approach within the Roman Catholic hierarchy rather than a bottom-up
initiative from the communities. It applies dependency theory to direct attention
away from two millennia of Roman (and Catholic) hegemony towards Iberian
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imperialism, and especially of Protestant countries (e.g. USA, UK). Moreover, it
inspires the use of violence or rebellion as a means of resolving social inequality
based on dubious and relativistic moral principles consistent with Number 2321 of
the Roman Catholic Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican, 2018; see also Sect.
10.4.1).
In contrast, the ideology of historical Protestantism allowed the Reformers to
identify the papacy as “the Man of Sin” (see Sect. 10.4.2.1 and 2 Thessalonians,
King James Bible, 1769). Such identification was based on in-depth exegesis by
historic Protestants, who applied the Sola Scriptura principle. Thus, only Jesus sets
humankind free from bondage (King James Bible, 1769, John 8: 31–38). Rebellious
means against governments should be avoided (King James Bible, 1769, 1 Timothy
2:1–2; 1 Peter 2:17; Romans 13:1). Therefore, the successive Protestant revolutions
sought to eliminate the pervasive influence of the Roman Church-State in favour of
power independent from Rome (at first by empowering the monarchies and then
gradually also citizens; Sect. 8.3.4).
10.4.2 Protestant Theology
When acknowledging the robust systematic evidence on the underlying effect of
religion on corruption, authors refer to this as “unfortunate” from a policy perspec-
tive (Woodruff, 2006, p. 121) or that it provides “little inspiration to reform”
(Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 17). However, when Martin Luther formulated his 95 theses,
he was protesting against the rampant corruption and tyranny of the Roman Catholic
Church five centuries ago. The resultant movement resumed and advanced the
discontent for which the Waldensians, Wycliffe, Tyndale, Hus, and many others
had previously been condemned, often sacrificing their lives. The Protestant Refor-
mation sought to return and democratise the original teachings of the Bible, which
rested on the Sola Scriptura principle, throughout Europe and beyond (Witte, 2002;
Doe & Sandberg, 2010; Becker et al., 2016). As shown (Sects. 8.2.2 and 8.3.4), the
Protestant reformations had various spillover effects, including the spread of democ-
racy, liberalism, secularisation, and the formation of the modern sovereign state
(Woodberry, 2012; Snyder, 2011; Agnew, 2010; Shah & Philpott, 2011; Philpott,
2001; Hurd, 2011; Berger, 1990; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Treisman, 2000).
Sola Scriptura implies that the Bible alone is a sufficient and infallible rule of life.
Consequently, Protestants generally place a greater emphasis on one’s own relation-
ship with God, while the Roman Catholic Church places a greater emphasis on
priestly mediation (Gill, 1998, p. 90). Sola Scriptura means that the Holy Scriptures
are the only and absolute standardising moral source of Christian principles (histor-
ical Protestantism), in contrast to Roman Catholic relativism (see Sect. 10.4.1).
Therefore, Arruñada (2010) found that Protestants statistically exhibit a greater
social ethos, which leads them to closely scrutinise one another’s actions, support
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legal and political systems, and hold more consistent values (p. 890). Specifically,
the Sola Scriptura principle enabled historical Protestants to hold more homogenous
values, including a universal charity descending from the Gospel (instead of a
selective one) (Arruñada, 2010). As Elisha Williams, the eighteenth-century Amer-
ican theologian and founder of Yale University, observed:
That the sacred scriptures are the alone rule of faith and practice to a Christian, all Protestants
are agreed in, and must therefore inviolably maintain, that every Christian has a right of
judging for himself what he is to believe and practice in religion according to that rule
(Williams, 1998, p. 55).
The very Protestant characteristic of the freedom of conscience initiated several
reformations in different countries (Berman, 2003), thus creating a broad range of
successive diverse denominations (Sects. 8.3.4, 10.4.1.4.2, 10.4.2, and 10.4.3).
10.4.2.1 Theological Reasons for Traditional Protestant
Anti-Clericalism
My dear brothers never forget, when you hear the progress of the Enlightenment praised, that
the Devil’s cleverest ploy is to persuade you that he does not exist.
(Charles Baudelaire, 1862, Le Spleen de Paris)
Historical Protestants sincerely believed that the Roman Church-State is the
“synagogue of Satan”4 based on an intertextual historicist interpretation of the
Bible (see Table 10.3). Some Protestant denominations still adhere to intertextual
historicist biblical interpretation and hold the belief that the papacy continues to be
“Satan’s synagogue” today (see Sect. 10.4.2.2).
Their historicist study of the Book of Revelation provided the Reformers with an
influential picture of the history of the Church. This interpretation had consistently
allowed Reformers from different epochs and countries to discern “the hidden
diabolism of the Roman faith” (Johnstone, 2006, p. 50).
Protestants have long interpreted the Book of Revelation (especially Chap. 13)
along with the Book of Daniel in the Old Testament (especially Chaps. 7–8, King
James Bible, 1769) (Boxall & Tresley, 2016, p. 4). Such a historicist study has
allowed Protestant eschatologists to identify the pope as the Antichrist. This view
arises from symbolically associating a persecutory political-religious power (the
Roman Church-State) with the beast whom the dragon (Satan) gives his power,
seat, and great authority in Revelation 13 (Boxall & Tresley, 2016, p. 4; Johnstone,
2006, p. 55).
4Derived from the Book of Revelation (King James Bible, 1769). “It expressed the insidious
subversion Protestants believed to lie behind Catholic false doctrine and empty piety—a church
that appeared Christian was in fact its opposite” (Johnstone, 2006, p. 4).
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Table 10.3 shows the examples of prominent Protestant thinkers who shared
similar theological conclusions. The interpretation of the popery (Roman Church-
State) as the deceiving power from Satan on earth (Babylon-Beast-Harlot) was
Table 10.3 Typical association of the papacy with the “Man of Sin”, the Antichrist, beast and
harlot according to biblical interpretations of notable Protestant intellectuals (1500–1800)
Biblical text (King James Bible, 1769)
“Man of Sin” or “Antichrist”
(2 Thessalonians 2); or
“Let no man deceive you by any means: for that day shall not
come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of
sin be revealed, the son of perdition; who opposeth and
exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is
worshipped; so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God,
showing himself that he is God” (2 Thessalonians 2: 3-4).
“the beast” (Revelation 13) “And the beast which I saw was like unto a leopard, and his
feet were as the feet of a bear, and his mouth as the mouth of a
lion: and the dragon gave him his power, and his seat, and
great authority. And I saw one of his heads as it were
wounded to death; and his deadly wound was healed: and all
the world wondered after the beast” (Revelation 13: 2-3).
or “The great harlot” (Revelation
17)
“[. . .] and I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet-colored beast, full
of names of blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns.
And the woman was arrayed in purple and scarlet color, and
decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having a
golden cup in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of
her fornication: and upon her forehead was a name written,
MYSTERY, BABYLON THE GREAT, THE MOTHER OF
HARLOTS AND ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH. And
I saw the woman drunken with the blood of the saints, and
with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus” (Revelation 17: 3-5).
“And the woman which thou sawest is that great city, which
reigneth over the kings of the earth” (Revelation 17: 18).
Eschatological Interpretation Papacy/Roman Catholic Church
Interpreted by Martin Luther (1517
onwards)
German Reformer and theologian
Huldrych Zwingli
(1519 onwards)
Swiss Reformer and theologian
John Calvin (1536
onwards)




American promoter of the separa-
tion of church and state
John Wesley (1728
onwards)








American theologian and founder of
Yale University
Note: Author’s italics
(Adapted from Boxall & Tresley, 2016; Hoffmann, 2015; Hartman et al., 2002; Stefanovic, 2009;
Taggart, 1998; Williams, 1998; Newton, 1733; Luther, 1532)
10.4 Roman Catholic and Protestant Theologies, and Corruption/Prosperity. . . 157
practically universal among Protestants. This interpretation was prevalent regardless
of the historical and political contexts in which Protestants lived until the nineteenth
century (Gregg, 1997).
The identification of the Roman Church-State as the Antichrist (or the papacy, in
the interpretation of the two beasts in Revelation 13) was widespread among
Protestants of different denominations (Table 10.3). The Geneva Bible attests to
the interpretation of the Revelation in the early Calvinist tradition and offers a typical
example of historicist interpretation. Furthermore, the extensive use of this particular
interpretation of the books of Revelation and Daniel (King James Bible, 1769) is
evident in Protestant writings, especially until the nineteenth century (Boxall &
Tresley, 2016, p. 9).
The first generation of Reformers (and other Protestants) were disillusioned
Roman Catholics who converted and admitted “that Catholicism was a very con-
vincing fake” (Johnstone, 2006, p. 41). The Protestant understanding of the diabol-
ical character of Roman Catholicism thus also resulted from the notion that the
popery embodies a direct (but hidden) inversion of Christianity (p.41). For example,
Roman Catholic worship involves disguising pagan rituals and hence, covering
“them with the ‘manners’ of Christianity” (Calfhill as cited in Johnstone, 2006,
p. 48). The veneration of icons explicitly forbidden in the Decalogue (Figs. 8.4 and
10.1) illustrates this point, as it ultimately constitutes idolatry. However, Roman
Catholicism still promotes this practice, thus suppressing this Commandment in the
Catechism (Fig. 10.1). Johnstone described “Protestant attempts to comprehend the
corruption of traditional Catholicism” (p. 27) during the English Reformation in
these terms:
[Protestants] adopted a long-established heretical association of the Pope with Antichrist,
and behind Antichrist lay the Devil, the guiding hand of apocalyptic subversion. [. . .] In
effect Catholicism might be a parody, a contradiction of everything sacred to the true faith.
But this was hidden behind a pious gloss which had hoodwinked millions into their own
eternal destruction. Nor were its victims naive or ignorant; many learned and zealous
Christians continued to believe in the veracity of the Roman church (Johnstone, 2006, p. 27).
Furthermore, dissenting and nonconformist Protestants “took reformist argu-
ments a stage further by claiming that de facto Satanism was inherent in any national
church” and “at the heart of government” (Johnstone, 2006, pp. 254, 188). As an
eighteenth-century Protestant wrote:
There is no reason to consider the antichristian spirit and practices to be confined to that
which is now called the Church of Rome. The Protestant churches have much of antichrist in
them, and are far from being wholly reformed from [. . .] corruptions and wickedness
(Hopkins, 1972 [1794], p. 328).
The Reformers’ belief that Roman Catholicism was the Church of Satan also
relied on recognising “the Devil’s power to disguise himself within Christian piety”
(Johnstone, 2006, p. 41). This is evident in the following Bible verses:
And the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which
deceiveth the whole world: he was cast out into the earth, and his angels were cast out with
him (King James Bible, 1769, Revelation 12: 9);
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And no marvel; for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light (King James Bible,
1769, 2 Corinthians 11: 14).
The Old Testament Book of Isaiah contains a complementary reference to the
intertextual references to the successive kingdoms (beasts) and Satan (Lucifer) in the
books of Revelation (NT) and Daniel (OT):
that thou shalt take up this proverb against the king of Babylon, and say, How hath the
oppressor ceased! the golden city ceased! (King James Bible, 1769, Isaiah 14: 4);
How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! how art thou cut down
to the ground, which didst weaken the nations! (King James Bible, 1769, Isaiah 14: 12).
The Prophet Isaiah associates the king of Babylon with an oppressive power and a
golden city. Later, Isaiah links this system to Lucifer, who weakens the nations
(a statement that touches on the core of this study). The Book of Daniel (in parallel to
the Book Revelation) (King James Bible, 1769) also interrelates (symbolically as
beasts or as a statue) the successive, Satanic powers of Babylon, Medo-Persia,
Greece, and finally Rome. Rome inherited parts of the preceding civilisations
(e.g. Greek philosophy, Babylonian rituals) (Radmacher et al., 1999; Taggart,
1998). The power of Rome persists to this day through its influence on all legal
systems worldwide (Sect. 8.3) and through the Roman Church-State (i.e. the weak-
ening of nations).
For William Tyndale, the papacy had accepted Satan’s temptation: “The king-
doms of the earth and the glory of them, which Christ refused” in the desert
(Tyndale, The Practice of Prelates, pp. 274–5 as cited in Johnstone, 2006, p. 54).
As a result of this arrangement, the papacy shall worship the devil by adopting his
role as “Satan’s vicar”, who corrupts religion. Therefore, the papacy “took up in the
like manner all Christendom on high, and brought them from the meekness of the
Christ unto the high hill of the pride of Lucifer” (p. 54).
10.4.2.2 Current Protestant Views on the Papacy
The Roman Catholic counter-reformation had attempted to shift attention away from
intertextual historicist biblical prophecy since the sixteenth century. Spaniard Jesuits
developed a Futurist School (e.g. Francisco de Ribera) and a Preterist School
(e.g. Luisz de Alcasar) as alternatives to historicist eschatology. Both schools
removed any reference to Rome from prophecy and contradicted the Reformers’
linking of the Antichrist with the papacy and with Babylon as the Roman Church-
State. The Futurist view stands for a biblical prophecy to be fulfiled in the future,
while the Preterists advocate a prophecy already fulfiled in the first century (Johnson,
1981).
Consequently, since the sixteenth century, neither a monolithic nor a unified
explanation for biblical prophecy has existed in Roman Catholicism but contrasting
opposites (Futurism versus Preterism). However, neither view makes any reference
whatsoever to the papacy in biblical prophecy, as opposed to historical
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Protestantism. This constitutes a Hegelian dialectical strategy common among
Jesuits (similar to the one described in Sect. 10.4.1.4).
Preterist views have gained much scholarly attention even among modern Prot-
estant writers. The suppression of the Papal states in the nineteenth century and
Roman Catholicism’s loss of power (Sect. 8.3.4.5) have ushered in Preterist views
even more vehemently (Johnson, 1981; Taggart, 1998). Thus, the Reformers’
intertextual historicist interpretation has only few followers today. However, for
some remaining Protestant intertextual historicist interpreters, the apparent weaken-
ing of Roman Catholicism after the French Revolution (i.e. as a deadly wound) has
partially fulfiled the Revelation (Cook, 2012); (Taggart, 1998):
And I saw one of his heads as it were wounded to death; and his deadly wound was healed:
and all the world wondered after the beast (King James Bible, 1769, Revelation 13: 3).
Therefore, even after the successful introduction of the counter-reformation
dialectic (Futurism and Preterism), some Protestant denominations still adhere to
intertextual historicist interpretation today. Examples of this small group include
conservative Lutherans (Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 2018), historical
and Restorationist denominations, and the Seventh-day Adventists (SDA) (Taggart,
1998; Bacchiocchi, 2002).
10.4.3 Pentecostalism
The broad diversity of Protestant denominations and sects today makes it difficult to
generalise their separate contributions, let alone capture these in a single study.
However, distinct Protestant theologies and organisational forms have led to distinct
outcomes (Manow, 2004; Woodberry, 2012). For example, while Lutherans
pioneered the development of the welfare state, some other currents of Protestantism
(e.g. Calvinists, Baptists) slowed this down (Manow, 2004). Another clear example
is the asymmetrical emphases on higher education: Calvinists typically make greater
educational efforts than other Protestant missionaries, and Pentecostals even less
than other Protestant missionaries. Therefore, new forms of Protestantism
(i.e. Pentecostalism) placing less emphasis on education are less likely to have a
positive social impact than previous Protestant versions (Woodberry, 2012,
pp. 251–269).
Pentecostalism has been a singular African variation of Christianity, transmitted
via African American culture (MacRobert, cited in Sharpe, 2014, p. 173). Likewise,
Pentecostalism partly originated “as one of the ways that Africans responded to the
missionary structures and appropriated the message” (Kalu, 2008, p. viii).
Pentecostalism has been the fast-growing and most influential “movement” in
recent decades and now includes the majority of Protestants. Figure 10.4 shows the
growth trends of Protestantism worldwide.
Africa, Asia, and Latin America have the largest Protestant populations today.
However, Protestantism is a relatively young phenomenon in those continents,
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where the influence of Pentecostal and Neo-Pentecostal denominations dominates.
The Edinburgh World Missionary Conference of 1910 marked a milestone in the
spreading of Protestantism through missionary work on those continents (Fig. 10.4)
(Todd & Zurlo, 2016).
Today, Pentecostal movements focus their efforts on the eschatological urgency
of conversion and invest little in developing human capital (McCleary, 2013; Becker
et al., 2016, p. 11). Moreover, Pentecostal theologies are often removed from the
historical tradition of the Bible, unlike historical Protestantism. However, Pentecos-
tal movements are extremely varied, making generalisation difficult (Spittler, 2009,
p. 66). Nonetheless, the positive social impact of Pentecostalism compared to
historical Protestantism is small. For example, Pentecostalism invests little in
human development and thus achieves merely low institutional impact (e.g. low
development of educational and medical facilities) (McCleary, 2013; Woodberry,
2012; Becker et al., 2016).
Fig. 10.4 Protestants by continent and the share of the largest Protestant movements in the world
today (Todd & Zurlo, 2016). Used with permission of the authors
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10.4.3.1 The Influence of Pentecostalism in Latin America
The increasing number of Protestant denominations from a wide range of currents
affects every country differently. Schäfer (2006) devised a comprehensive model
and various typologies to classify large Christian groups and their ideologies in Latin
America (pp. 58–60). Until 1970, more than 90% of the total population in Latin
America were still Roman Catholics. By 2014, this share had decreased to nearly
70% (Protestants: 19%; unaffiliated: 8% in 2014) (Pew Research Center, 2014).
Currently, almost one out of five Latin Americans is Protestant (Pew Research
Center, 2014, p. 62). As stated, the presence of Protestantism has been crucial in
creating competition with the Roman Catholic Church-State and has thus initiated
democratic and human capital processes (see Sects. 7.b, 8.2.1.2, and Chap. 9) (Gill,
1998, 2013; Woodberry, 2012; Becker et al., 2016). In his mixed-methods empirical
analysis, Gill (1998) observed that the market competition from Protestantism
induced Catholic bishops to reconsider their conventional disregard of the needy.
The influence of Protestantism has, in many ways, contributed to shaping the
Catholic Church’s “preferential option for the poor”. Considering the Roman
Church’s strong involvement in the Latin American political sphere, this change in
Catholicism’s pastoral approach has had significant political repercussions, in par-
ticular an increasing aversion to regimes and policies that harm the rights of the poor
(p. 80).
However, nearly two-thirds of Protestants in Latin America are now Pentecostal
(Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 62). The Pentecostal and Evangelical experience has
not been as favourable in Latin America compared to the influence of historical
Protestantism after the Reformation (e.g. in Germany, England, and the rest of
Northern Europe and North America) (Witte, 2002; Woodberry, 2012; Becker
et al., 2016; Berman, 2003; Snyder, 2011; Martin, 1999).
In Latin America, no body of legal norms exists “to promote as the basis for an
Evangelical society” (Martin, 1999, p. 41). In contrast with Roman Catholicism,
Evangelicals are not very influential politically and “are highly unlikely to acquire
serious influence in Latin America” (Martin, 1999, p. 40). Most Evangelical parties
could not achieve visible political relevance, although more recently, the civic
engagement of Evangelicals has increased in Latin America (Zilla, 2020). Recent
examples of heads of state who have either been Evangelicals or supported by
Evangelical movements include Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Jimmy Morales in Guate-
mala, and Manuel López Obrador in Mexico (Zilla, 2020).
Yet, Latin American Protestants have no recourse to historical norms that have
been worked out over centuries of experience in politics and law and that may thus
serve them as guides (unless they consider German, English, Scandinavian, or North
American Protestant experiences). Instead, what Protestants have followed in Latin
America “are the established practices of corporatism and clientage” (p. 40). As a
result, they have often fallen into the same corrupt behaviour as traditional politi-
cians (Helmsdorff, 1996; Schäfer, 2006). Moreover, in Latin America “. . .the
contrast between Evangelicals and Catholics is really not so great” (Martin, 1999,
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p. 41). Due to the absence of high-status ecclesiastics and religious intellectuals, who
might, moreover, deploy sophisticated norms, Latin American Protestants are
“equipped with little more than native good sense and the limited inferences they
can draw from the Bible” (Martin, 1999, p. 40).
10.4.3.2 The Prosperity Gospel (PG) as a Mainly Pentecostal
Contemporary Phenomenon
While previous sections have analysed the influence of historical Christian denom-
inations on prosperity, this subsection considers a more contemporary phenomenon
that is widespread: the Prosperity Gospel (PG).
The Theology of Prosperity or Prosperity Gospel (PG) is a trans-denominational,
transnational doctrine, which is closely linked to the Charismatic Movement and
Pentecostal Christianity. PG teachings spread the idea that “wealth is a sign of God’s
blessing and is compensation for prayer and for giving beyond the minimum tithe to
one’s church, televangelists, or other religious causes” (Koch, 2009, p. 1).
Likewise, Harrison (2005) defines PG as “a relational community of believers,
voluntary organisations, fellowships, conferences, and ministries loosely defined by
a shared doctrine, a network without definite leader or governing body” (p. 14).5 Key
features of PG are its alignment with growing numbers of churches and
megachurches in urban centres and the embracement of mass media and postmod-
ern, consumerist capitalist values. The founding moment of the PG movement has
been identified in the “healing revivals” of the post-World War II period in the USA.
Subsequently, PG expanded as a doctrine to multiple denominations in different
countries, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Sharpe, 2014; Bowler,
2010, 2013).
10.4.3.2.1 PG Origins: Syncretism with African Rituals and New Thought
Movement
Syncretic Origins of PG in the USA
PG is a mainly Protestant movement comprising three distinct though intersecting
streams: Pentecostalism, New Thought, and African American religion (Bowler,
2010). The following paragraphs describe each of these three streams of the PG
amalgamation.
Strand 1: Pentecostalism and preceding forms of Protestantism.
PG has been the fastest-growing strand of Pentecostalism since the 1980s.
However, it also has deeper roots in the longer history of Protestant promotion of
capitalistic ideas stemming from the nineteenth century (e.g. Wesleyan Methodism)
5©2005 by M. Harrison. This content is not under a CC-BY licence and has been reproduced with
permission. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
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(Towns, 2008; Sharpe, 2014; Bowler, 2010, 2013). Yet, unlike previous Protestant
forms that elevated capitalist accumulation and asceticism (e.g. Calvinism), PG more
strongly emphasises the consumption and immodest achievement of economic
goods (Lingenthal, 2012, p. 55; Sharpe, 2014, p. 166; Miller, 2007).
Strand 2: New Thought and white Protestantism.
PG has also been significantly influenced by a blend of magical-religious rituals
of white Protestants (Bowler, 2010, p. 46), which include a miasma of mental magic,
bursting with Transcendentalism, Spiritualism, Free Masonry, and New Thought
(Bowler, 2010, p. 28). Concurrently, Butler (2009) asserts that PG is a “hybrid” of
religious capitalism “that has its roots in 19th century thinkers like E.W. Kenyon and
20th century purveyors like Norman Vincent Peale, and Oral Roberts” (p. 2).
McConnell (1988) also claims that Kenneth Hagin (one of the recognised
founding fathers of the PG in the USA) is directly indebted to the ideas of Essek
William Kenyon. Likewise, other leading PG preachers and televangelists, such as
Kenneth Copeland, Frederick Price, Don Gassett, and others have been linked with
Kenyon’s teachings. Kenyon is, in turn, closely associated with the nineteenth-
century American New Thought movement, which leans heavily on parapsychology
(Sharpe, 2014, p. 169). Therefore, McConnell presents PG as a cult-like sect, with
deeply non-Christian roots (Sharpe, 2014, pp. 168–169). Equally, Koch (2009)
argues that PG proponents “universally admit that the principles they set forth
work for Christians and non-Christians alike” (p. 8). For Koch, PG teachings are
more closely connected with the secular self-help movement than with those of
traditional orthodox Christianity.
The metaphysical New Thought movement emphasises the power of the individ-
ual’s mind to transform thought and speech into tangible blessings (i.e. wealth,
health, happiness). This positive thinking stream found a welcoming environment
within mainline Protestantism, thus engendering the recognisable Gospels of wealth
(PG) and health (Bowler, 2010, pp. 27, 52).
Strand 3: African American Protestantism.
PG also found a comfortable home within black Protestantism (especially in
congregations of Methodists and Baptists) in the first half of the twentieth century
in the USA. This amalgamation can also be seen as a historical recapitulation of
pervasive and persistent Pentecostal and New Thought combinations in African
American Protestantism (Bowler, 2010, p. 46).
This time, however, early PG combined with African-derived traditions
(e.g. hoodoo, voodoo) that resulted in cross-pollination and black adoption and
adaptation of mainly white metaphysical rituals. Black theologies, thus, further
spread Spiritualism, focusing on the importance of material blessings (Bowler,
2010, p. 50).
The previous paragraphs have shown the syncretic origins of PG, especially with
African American roots and New Thought in the USA. Yet, when PG globalised, the
movement continued its syncretism with indigenous traditions of other regions, such
as Latin America (Miller, 2007, pp. 24–5). However, it is also important to highlight
that Pentecostalism tends to preserve but also demonise the beliefs in indigenous
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traditions and “spirits” as “the devil’s representatives” (Robbins, 2004, pp. 128–9;
Sharpe, 2014, p. 173).
10.4.3.2.2 General Criticisms of PG
Nearly all aspects of PG’s teachings and practices have been intensely criticised. The
most obvious concern that critical social scientists express is that PG preys on the
world’s most needy people, collecting tithes from the poorest and promising only
false hope and exaggerated promises of miraculous healings and unimaginable
economic wealth in return (Sharpe, 2014, p. 174). Other criticisms depict PG as an
“evangelical-neoliberal machine” (Connolly, 2009), where PG is the spiritual artic-
ulation that promotes and reinforces neoliberalism (Wrenn, 2019). This neoliberal
portray of PG describes the invisible forces of the market as “evidence” of God’s
hand (Wrenn, 2019, p. 430). Others describe PG as a US American-led conspiracy to
propagate capitalism and consumerism and ruin traditional forms of life in the global
South (Robbins, 2004; Coleman, 2002; Kyle, 2006; Sharpe, 2014). However, all
these criticisms need to be balanced against the empirical evidence.
The following sections will analyse some of the most contentious issues that
increase criticism of PG.
Corruption
Leading figures of the PG movement have been repeatedly questioned or charged
with financial misconduct and mismanagement. Thus, PG is also known through a
series of scandals in different countries, including the USA, Brazil, and other Latin
American and African nations (Zilla, 2020, p. 19–20; Lingenthal, 2012, p. 22;
Sharpe, 2014, p. 168; Jenkins, 2006, p. 106).
Political Engagement
PG, and Pentecostal churches in particular, have been notably linked with having
supported right-wing political forces (e.g. Bolsonaro in Brazil, Uribe in Colombia,
Trump in the USA) or even oppressive political regimes, such as Pinochet in Chile
(Zilla, 2020; Sharpe, 2014; Bastian, 1993; Martin, 1990). However, several empir-
ical studies do not show a necessary association between far-right conservative
parties and Pentecostals in different contexts. Instead, the empirical findings point
to church adherents tending to vote in parallel with other members of their social
classes (Koch, 2009; Sharpe, 2014; Martin, 1990; Robbins, 2004).
10.4.3.2.3 Theological Criticisms of PG
No theological consensus exists regarding the genealogy of PG. However, theolo-
gians and other critics, often from within Pentecostalism and other Christian groups,
describe PG as an idolatry of money with heretical teachings that deviate from the
central sense of the Gospel (i.e. salvation and love) (Harrison, 2005; Sharpe, 2014).
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Yet, PG preachers often contend that “Jesus’ death and resurrection abolished not
only sin and disease but also poverty” (Bowler, 2013, p. 95).
Indeed, several reasons permit critics to consider PG as “a betrayal of the cross”.
The most obvious question is how Christians can openly pursue economic wealth if
the Bible depicts Christ as a “. . .despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and
acquainted with grief. . .” (King James Bible, 1769, Isaiah 53:3), who announced
that “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to
enter into the kingdom of God” (King James Bible, 1769, Matthew 19:24).
Yet, PG preachers provide several arguments in defence of wealth, often relying
on “proof-texting” biblical passages removed from their textual and historical
context (i.e. superficial exegesis) (Barron, 1987; Koch, 2009; Sharpe, 2014). For
instance, PG believers often portray Jesus as a rich––rather than an ascetic––figure
by using as arguments passages such as the following:
• The visit of the wise men would imply that Jesus attracted prosperity from the day
he was born (Dollar, cited in Bowler, 2010, p. 105): “. . .they saw the young child
with Mary his mother, and fell down, and worshipped him: and when they had
opened their treasures, they presented unto him gifts; gold, and frankincense, and
myrrh” (King James Bible, 1769, Matthew 2:11).
• The dividing of Jesus’ garments among the soldiers at his crucifixion could
suggest that they were valuable (Dollar, cited in Bowler, 2010, p. 105): “Then
the soldiers, when they had crucified Jesus, took his garments, and made four
parts, to every soldier a part; and also his coat: now the coat was without seam,
woven from the top throughout” (King James Bible, 1769, John 19:23).
• The ability to travel and feed the multitudes on several occasions (e.g. King James
Bible, 1769, John 6), and even having Judas as treasurer (e.g. King James Bible,
1769, John 13:29), would attest to Jesus’ wealth (Blake, cited in Sharpe, 2014,
p. 165; Koch, 2009 p. 1).
PG believers often claim that the traditional austere portrayals of the suffering
Christ are incorrect or outdated. However, Christian theologians of differing denom-
inations have criticised PG literalist interpretations as over-simplistic and inadequate
readings of the Holy Scriptures (Sharpe, 2014, p. 168), or as “twisting Bible verses
out of context to suit their own self-help philosophy” (Horton, 2009, p. 4). A lack of
a deep exegesis often excludes or minimises the importance of other conflicting
passages for the PG beliefs that clearly indicate Christ’s ascetic life, inter alia:
And Jesus said unto him, Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the Son of
man hath not where to lay his head (King James Bible, 1769, Luke 9:58; original emphases);
Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary. . .? (King James Bible, 1769, Mark 6:3);
Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world. . . (King James Bible, 1769, John 18:36).
As critic theologians have observed,
“There is much in the Bible that connects the right relation with God to prosperity” (Cobb,
2009). “Yet there is little equivocation in its [the Bible’s] core message that the good life is
not one dened by material acquisition and ostentatious consumption but by purposeful acts
motivated by generosity and concern for others” (Dillon, 2009).
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In this sense, one of the most contentious theological issues that raise controversy
is related to the tithes and offerings that the faithful contribute to their congregations:
Tithes
Tithing is a practice that involves giving at least 10% of one’s gross income to the
believer’s Church, or related charities. The promise is that believers will get a
hundredfold return from unexpected sources (Butler, 2009; Sharpe, 2014). Thus,
the faithful see a cost-effective investment in tithing (Zilla, 2020, p. 18).
PG believers base tithing in a myriad of biblical passages that certainly support
giving in diverse contexts. However, the practice has been associated with PG
preachers’misuse and corruption scandals (Sharpe, 2014). In the USA, PG churches,
such as Creflo Dollar’s World Changers, for instance, even verify that members have
paid their full tithes by asking them to submit tax records and keep detailed financial
reports (Bowler, 2010, p. 115). In Brazil, surveys show that 52% of PG adherents
(Evangelicals) tithe to their congregations vis-à-vis 34% of Catholics that contribute
in some way to their Church (Corrêa, 2013). However, the Roman Catholic Church
still receives subsidies or financial benefits from the Brazilian state (“institutional
tithes”) although the Brazilian Constitution explicitly forbids public institutions to
subsidise any church or religion (Art. 19) and enshrines religious freedom and
equality principles (Zilla, 2020, p. 21).
Nevertheless, tithing is not new or exclusive of the PG movement, but this
principle has been applied in diverse ways, in virtually all Judeo-Christian traditions,
since ancient times (e.g. Plumptre, 1818). Surprisingly, the systematic study of
tithing has received little scholarly attention. According to Murray (2011), a detailed
historical review of the tithing system is entirely absent, as well as analysis of the
recurrent criticisms about exploiting tithing practices, and a critical engagement to
understand the biblical and theological principles that comprise tithing (p. 5).
The role of giving and tithing in the Scriptures is too voluminous to be considered
in its full extent in this study. However, Budiselić (2015) has advanced in the
systematic understanding of biblical and theological foundations of the tithing
system. PG and other Christians claim a biblical obligation to tithe to their
churches/pastors. Budiselić’s contribution is crucial in order to understand
and criticise such an assertion and practice. He examines Old Testament examples
and all the references to tithing in the New Testament to present arguments for and
against claims that Christians should tithe.
Budiselić concludes that Christians have a responsibility to give (e.g. to support
those in need and to proclaim the Gospel). However, church tithing can in no way be
considered a literal commandment for Christians today. Yet, it was a commandment
with specific content and form for the Jews. For instance, the Israelites contributed
up to 20% of their goods or more in support of the Levites and the temple, for
helping the poor and foreigners, and for the festivals. Nonetheless, the New Testa-
ment raises the standard of voluntary giving with abundant principles that include
offering to up to 100% of one’s capital, with rewarding promises (Budiselić, 2015,
p. 44). The following biblical passages illustrate this principle:
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Then Peter began to say unto him, Lo, we have left all, and have followed thee. And Jesus
answered and said, Verily I say unto you, There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or
sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake, and the gospel’s, but
he shall receive a hundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and
mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life
(King James Bible, 1769, Mark 10:28–30).
give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together,
and running over, shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that ye mete
withal it shall be measured to you again (King James Bible, 1769, Luke 6:38).
Sell that ye have, and give alms; provide yourselves bags which wax not old, a treasure in
the heavens that faileth not, where no thief approacheth, neither moth corrupteth (King
James Bible, 1769, Luke 12:33).
I have showed you all things, how that so laboring ye ought to support the weak, and to
remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive
(King James Bible, 1769, Acts 20:35).
Consequently, Christians are encouraged in the Scriptures to give to the weak, to
all in need, and to support the proclamation of the Gospel. However, following
Budiselić’s reasoning, PG believers would tithe to their churches/pastors based on
two faulty assumptions: 1) Christians must not give at least 10% of the income to
their church/pastor (but they should instead give as much as they can to voluntarily
support those in need and to proclaim the Gospel); 2) not all Jews were giving 10%
(and their contributions were not only addressed to the priesthood) (Budiselić, p. 44).
Certainly, the New Testament does encourage giving to support the preachers, but it
does not require a defined percentage:
Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel
(King James Bible, 1769, 1 Corinthians 9:14).
. . .for the laborer is worthy of his hire (King James Bible, 1769, Luke 10:7).
Accordingly, tithing/offering to one’s church/pastor is just one of the ways of
practising giving. However, the Scriptures do not exhort giving in order to make a
single church/pastor millionaire. Furthermore, church tithing cannot be considered
as an imperative way of giving because, among others, the conditions defined in the
Old Testament are not entirely applicable today (e.g. the Levites and the temple are
physically absent6) (Budiselić, 2015). Therefore, the imperative urge of PG and
other preachers’ requesting tithes seems biblically inconsistent in light of these
considerations, and has led in many cases to its misuse and corruption. Equally
inconsistent would be the subsidies or “institutional tithes” some governments pay to
the official established churches as they are not “voluntary” contributions anymore;
rather, they act like taxes (sometimes paid by believers and non-believers alike).
6Yet, the New Testament refers to the temple as a type of the coming Messiah (Jesus Christ): “Jesus
answered and said unto them, Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up. Then said the
Jews, Forty and six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it up in three days? But he
spake of the temple of his body. When therefore he was risen from the dead, his disciples
remembered that he had said this unto them; and they believed the Scripture, and the word which
Jesus had said” (King James Bible, 1769, John 2:19–22).
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10.4.3.2.4 Is PG a Poor people’s Movement? Empirical Results from Studies
There is anything but consensus regarding PG and class. Scholars of religion often
consider PG a typical “poor people’s movement” that offers the needy the “opiate”
of upward mobility (Bowler, 2010, 2013; Koch, 2009; Cox, 2001; Gifford, 1990;
Hollinger, 1991). However, studies show that the PG movement attracts converts
from all social classes, including well-educated, middle-class Latin Americans and
Africans (Miller, 2007, p. 21; Sharpe, 2014, p. 173).
Others contend that the PG justifies the affluence of those who have been
upwardly mobile by arguing that this is spiritually deserved and derived (Koch,
2009; Gifford, 1990; Bruce, 1990). However, a theological test of PG’s supernatural
claims does not exist nor does it appear feasible. Furthermore, measuring the income
levels of PG believers has proven challenging, and few studies are available (mostly
performed in the USA). Among other challenges, PG constituents often resist to
disclose members’ income, church budgets, and pastors’ salaries (Bowler, 2010,
2013).
Nonetheless, Koch studied PG in the USA by analysing more than a thousand
telephone surveys. He determined that income does not affect adherence to
PG. However, “blacks, the ‘born-again’ or ‘evangelical’, and those who are less
educated are more likely to seek out Prosperity messages” (Koch, 2009, p. v).
Surprisingly, PG adherence does not affect the believers’ generosity to religious
and non-religious causes. The author concludes that members of PG are not over-
represented among those with higher or lower incomes. Instead, PG adherents are
“between blessings”, which neither allows for the inference of the evident success
nor the sheer failure of the overt PG claims (Koch, 2009, p.81). Comparably,
Bowler’s (2010) study indicates that American PG adherents enjoyed a comfortable
lifestyle (p. 229).
Finally, PG critics document several cases of economic exploitation and disap-
pointed hopes. However, studies also confirm that large numbers of PG converts
have decisively improved their lives by joining the movement (e.g. by learning
financial management and entrepreneurship) (Robbins, 2004, p. 136; Sharpe, 2014,
p. 176; Miller, 2007, p. 176). Therefore, empirical studies on PG and class render
mixed evidence.
10.4.3.2.5 Summarising the Core Messages of Sect. 10.4.3.2 The Prosperity
Gospel (PG)
The world-expanding PG contemporary movement that claims believers will prosper
by tithing and declaring affirmations has syncretic roots in Pentecostalism, New
Thought, and African American religion. Critics have disproven virtually all PG’s
teachings and practices, and raised criticisms on the corruption of ministers, exploi-
tation of the poor, support of far-right parties, and controversial theological claims.
This section balances and analyses such criticisms, finding mixed evidence for those
claims:
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• Corruption scandals related to PG mismanagement have occurred in virtually all
countries where the movement has reached (Sharpe, 2014).
• No necessary association exists between PG and far-right political parties,
although notable examples exist.
• Although PG approaches the Scriptures literalistically, it does not apply an
interlinear exegesis. A lack of interlinear exegesis renders out-of-context inter-
pretations of the Bible.
• Tithing is an ancient biblical practice that the PG movement has misconstrued to
make it imperative. According to the Bible, Christians should give as much as
they can to support the needy and to proclaim the Gospel, but not to maintain the
wealth of a preacher or a church.
• Critics often depict PG as a movement of unscrupulous preachers who econom-
ically exploit the poor. The empirical evidence shows that PG is composed
mainly of middle classes and blacks, but faithful from all social classes belong
to PG. Likewise, although PG cases of exploitation exist, studies also document
positive experiences of PG conversions.
Empirical Expectations
9). I expect prosperity/transparency levels to be directly (positively) related
to the proportion of Protestants and inversely (negatively) related to the
proportion of Roman Catholics. This expectation is valid for the cross-
country sample of Europe and the Americas, as confirmed by empirical
studies (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997; Chase, 2010).
10). However, I do not expect a significant positive influence of the Protestant
population on prosperity/transparency in Latin America. Firstly, Prot-
estantism in Latin America has been relatively recent compared to its
five-hundred-year history of asserting the Reformation in Europe. In
Latin America, Protestantism is a recent phenomenon. It dates back no
more than fifty years, and its proportion has not surpassed 20 per cent
(Todd & Zurlo, 2016). Secondly, most of the Protestant growth in Latin
America comes from Pentecostal currents, whose positive impact has
been far weaker than historical Protestant denominations (McCleary,
2013; Woodberry, 2012; Becker et al., 2016).
10.5 Syncretism
The concept of syncretism is related to the concept of culture and thus, has no-agreed
upon definition. The inconsistent etymology and complex history of the term make it
problematic to define (Leopold & Jensen, 2004, p. 14). According to Droogers
(2004), determining what syncretism is constitutes a difficult challenge as several
definitional debates exist around the term. Controversies abound over the
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phenomenon’s commonality and intricacy, which stems from a refusal to consider
the phenomenon’s normalcy––i.e. that all religions are syncretic configurations
(p. 376).
Pakkanen (1996) even claims that syncretism is an impractical “theoretical
invention” as it refers to explaining “syncretism with syncretism” (Pakkanen,
1996, pp. 86–87). Yet, for Stewart and Shaw (1994), syncretism “refers to the
synthesis of different religious forms. It is a contentious and contested term which
has undergone many historical transformations in meaning. Some see it as a dispar-
aging, ethnocentric label for religious traditions. . .” (p. i).7 Leopold and Jensen
(2004) explain that the traditional definition of syncretism wrongly assumes that
culture, religion, and ethnicity are, in essence, pure (p. 2). However, most syncre-
tistic formations are “unconscious” as a natural result of social interactions, while
others are consequences of cultural domination (Leopold & Jensen, 2004, p. 4).
Kraemer (1962) argued that non-Christian religions are intrinsically syncretistic
and thus, syncretism is predominantly non-Christian. For the author, syncretism is
also inevitable in Christianity, but it has occurred here as an illegitimate fusion rather
than doing so innately. Therefore, the principal criticism against syncretism as a
concept is that it implies pejorative references to non-Christian religions. Likewise,
the term has historically been tied to Christian theological disagreements (Leopold &
Jensen, 2004, p. 8).
10.5.1 Syncretism and Christianity
The Gospels and the Book of the Acts of the Apostles (King James Bible, 1769)
relate that the first Christians were almost entirely converted Jews. Kippenberg
(2004) observes that Jews refused pagan rituals, considering them idolatry (p. 35).
Judaism has been naturally anti-syncretic as the Scriptures forbid mingling with
foreign religious elements (Fig. 8.4). The New Testament relates, however, that the
Gospel was also spread to the Gentiles soon afterwards. Examples of this are the
conversion and baptism of Cornelius, the Italian centurion (Acts 10); the Ethiopian
Eunuch (Acts 8); and the mission of the Apostle Paul to the heathens in Greece and
Asia. Consequently, Rudolph (2004) notes that the mission and propagation of a
faith inevitably leads to syncretism (for the author, this is exemplified by Paul’s
preaching to the Greeks in Acts 17) (p. 71). Likewise, the Book of Acts of the
Apostles records that tension occurred among “Christian Jews” and “Christian
Gentiles” on issues such as circumcision (e.g. Acts 11). Therefore, for Kippenberg
(2004), Christianity has been a syncretistic religion, especially in its early days
(p. 29). However, the syncretic process of Christianity skyrocketed when it became
the official religion of the Roman Empire.
7©1994 by Stewart & Shaw. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
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Benavides (2004) observes that under Constantine, the Christian divinity began
functioning as a traditional Roman god of victory––i.e. a divinity whose adoration
was ritualised before the war and praised after victory (Wardman as cited in
Benavides, 2004, p. 202). Although there was a contradictory bond between the
Christian divinity and the Sol Invictus, the new divinity already incorporated some of
the revered attributes by Heliogabalus and the Emessan priests when the Roman
state adopted Christianity as the official religion (Benavides, 2004, p. 202). Conse-
quently, the Roman (Catholic) Christianity adopted pantheistic components coming,
among others, from the Roman Empire and Greece. Leopold & Jensen contend that
as a result of its long mission history, the Roman Church-State has established a
more comprehensive frame for integrating new or external components into Catholic
doctrine and policy (p. 18). Therefore, according to the authors, for Jesuits, Fran-
ciscans, and Dominicans, among other Catholic orders, syncretism has been a way of
broadening their mission in different parts of the world, including the east and Latin
America (p. 16). Hence, among others, the effects of Catholic mission have pro-
duced amalgams between indigenous gods and Catholic saints, for instance (p.18).
However, the Protestant Reformation has been a typical anti-syncretistic move-
ment (Spica, 2018; Leopold & Jensen, 2004). Spica observes: “The Reformers
criticized the fact that the Christian message had been lost from its original purity,
and this was the reason for reforming the church” (p. 241). The “original purity”
refers to the Sola Scriptura principle defended by the Reformers (see Sect. 10.4.1.3).
Therefore, the failed ecumenical attempts of Erasmus and Calixt in the sixteenth
century are partly explained, in that they saw logical evidence of the truth within
Christianity’s in pagan writings, particularly in Aristotelian philosophy (Engel, 1976
as cited in Leopold & Jensen, 2004, p. 15). However, the initial anti-syncretistic
attitude of Protestantism partly succumbed with the advent of Pentecostalism (see
following subsection and Sect. 10.4.3).
10.5.1.1 Syncretism and Christianity in Latin America
In Latin America, another “syncretism with syncretism” instance has occurred in
Pakkanen (1996)‘s terms. In this process, Catholics of the Roman rite blend popular
Catholic religiosity (e.g. idols, images, incense, shamans, nomenclature) with
pre-Columbian ethnoreligious traditions. Johnson and Zurlo (2016) have defined
these typical Latin American believers as “Christopagans”. As Spica observes:
Even when we say that Latin America is mostly Christian or Catholic, the notions of this
Christianity or Catholicity are very different from typical European Catholicity. Here,
popular Catholicity assumes the diverse beliefs and practices of African and native peoples,
modifying and adapting the original beliefs of European Catholicism to the ways of life,
challenges and worldviews of the Latin American people. [. . .] This differentiated religios-
ity, though, still calls itself Catholic despite evidence of mergers with prehispanic religiosity.
[. . .] In addition to Catholicity, we are now seeing many neo-Pentecostal religions emerging
in Latin America. Although they often try to deny syncretism and defend a certain purity of
faith, they are extremely syncretic, especially in ritual matters. This is clear, for example, in
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their use of popular music in worship, in their dances of praise and in their way of
understanding Christian belief (Spica, 2018, pp. 236–237).
Benavides (2004) documents the syncretic processes that occurred during the
expansion of Roman Catholicism among Andean, Aztec, and Mayan populations.
Herskovits (1966) also noted that native and African gods are identified with saints
of the Catholic Church in the NewWorld. However, according to the author, African
cultural remembrances (such as shouting and mourning) are more moderate and
religious relations are more discreet in Protestant regions than in Catholic areas
(Herskovits as cited in Apter, 2004. p. 165). Nevertheless, most of the current
Protestant denominations worldwide have a strong Pentecostal influence, which
highly syncretises African and native rituals (see Sect. 10.4.3). Furthermore, the
Pentecostal influence has also been pervasive in Roman Catholicism. As an inter-
viewee noted in this research:
It’s very difficult to distinguish among Catholic Charismatics, Renewed Pentecostals, and
Neo-Pentecostals as their rituals are almost the same. You have to get deep background
information to distinguish them. Hermeneutically, it’s difficult to differentiate them; all of
them clap hands and rite and preach the same, but they want to be differentiated: Catholics as
Catholics and Pentecostals as Pentecostals, as such, as they don’t congregate together
(Ecumenical academic theologian).
However, the process of syncretism with indigenous or African rituals varies
within different Latin American countries and subregions, depending on the histor-
ical presence of these ethnicities. The following cases, coupled with primary infor-
mation from this study (interviews), show this pattern.
10.5.1.1.1 Colombia
Uribe (2003) refers to Colombia as a territory that has been full of magic and
witchcraft for centuries. The arrival of the Spaniards, with the rigid bastion of
Catholicism, not only provoked a displacement of the indigenous people but an
uprooting of the black slaves from their places of origin. This uprooting was the first
cause of the magical-religious conformation in Colombia. The colonial society
gradually became a space in which African fetishisms, indigenous gods, and the
exaggerated belief in saints and miraculous medals found their convergence point in
relationships of domination. The social organisation was mediated by race, where
the Catholic Spaniards occupied the hegemonic tip of the pyramid, and the Blacks
and Indians were at the base. Thus, the beliefs and traditions of the Indians and
Blacks were presented as barbaric and diabolic in the face of Catholic superiority.
However, these traditions continued to be practised, mingled with Catholicism, and
survived the Colony and the Enlightenment, remaining intact when Protestantism
emerged in Colombia. The association of indigenous and black beliefs with the
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demonic was prolonged and intensified with the advent of the Evangelicals and
Pentecostals,8 thus creating a new syncretic platform (Lozano, 2009).
A Colombian Roman Catholic Theologian partly coincides with Lozano’s
account:
When the Spaniards arrived, they came to catechise instead to evangelise. They [natives]
were taught to cross themselves, to recite the creed and some prayers by memory. And then it
was assumed that “Christians”, sons of God were made, and then they proceeded to baptise
them. But there was never an Evangelisation process; the term Jesus or the Word never
came; the Word was not taught directly, and this is another reason why the Bible is almost
not read. . .(Roman Catholic Theologian).
A Colombian Protestant interviewee in this study also concurs with the assertion
about syncretism in Protestantism:
The problem is that there is a syncretism between Protestant Christianity and necromancy.
[. . .] Many of the rites of this African culture and ceremonies have been passed on to the
Protestant Church. The clapping and the dancing in the churches have its roots in Africa
where people worship in that manner. Claps, drums, and dance. You can see it in the
Protestant world, and it is even being practised today in the United States. “I clap and
dance because I feel good,” they say. I call them Epicurean Christians (Independent, free
Protestant believer–academic).
10.5.1.1.2 Cuba
In Cuba, the syncretic connection is even more evident (see Sect. 20.3). The massive
influx of African slaves as cheap labour to cultivate sugar since colonial times
contributed to the emergence of spiritism, voodooism, and syncretised forms with
Roman Catholicism (e.g. Santería) (Contreras, 2013, p. 177; Ramírez, 2009, p. 167;
Sánchez, 1992, pp. 90–91). In practice, an amalgamation of rituals is evident. A
priest of the Afro-Cuban religion (a spiritistic religion) expressed the singular
importance of Roman Catholicism in their rituals:
We have respect and veneration for the Catholic Church as a mother and centre. Our saints
[icons] must receive light in Catholic rituals, for example with holy water. It is an essential
requirement for our ordination as Babalawo or “Santo” [a spiritistic saint] to be baptised in
the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church knows and is aware of this requirement for
sanctification, but never acknowledges this publicly. [. . .] Francis [pope Jorge Bergoglio]
met with Yoruba and Protestants when he came to Cuba. He is simple, but he has a higher
rank than any country or president, as Rome is the centre of the world (Cuban Babalawo
priest).
8For Robbins (2004), the process of demonisation in Pentecostalism transforms ancestral spirits into
agents of the Devil, prompting people to dedicate their energies to combatting it. This practice
serves to further establish the Devil’s presence and its significance in post-conversion life
(pp. 128–9).
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Complementing the words of the Babalawo priest, a Cuban Roman Catholic
Theologian explains the relationship of Afro-Cuban rituals with Roman
Catholicism:
The Afro-Cuban religion did not have its own rite, so they adopted the Roman Catholic
rituals. The Roman Catholic Church did not commit to this, but as for the priests, it is a
convenient way to fill the Church with adherents. The Priests are happy with that, although
they know they are making a theological mistake. This means that the Roman Catholic
Church has accepted syncretism for convenience (Cuban Roman Catholic Theologian).
A representative of the Cuban National Council of Churches partly confirmed the
claim of the previous two interviewees: “. . .one can count more Roman Catholics as
many Babalawos are baptised as Roman Catholics”.
10.5.1.1.3 Uruguay
In Uruguay, at least two aspects mediate the relative low prominence of syncretism
compared with the previous cases: the low Afro-descendant and indigenous
populations, and the high secularisation of the society (see Chap. 19). Here, the
interviewees have only referred to the introduced Brazilian influence of syncretic
rituals:
In Uruguay, syncretic rituals come by transfer from Brazil, especially Umbanda and spiritist
rites. But they come by contact with Brazil since the Afro-descendant presence in Uruguay is
low (Uruguayan Roman Catholic Priest).
An ecumenical academic theologian shares a similar perception:
Here the cult of Yemanjá has increased a lot. That is santería, and it comes from people of
African ancestry from Brazil. We have the Candomblé, music with which black slaves were
pressured in Montevideo; that music has been declared cultural heritage of humanity and is
what identifies Uruguay. However, as an Uruguayan, I do not feel identified with the
Candomblé. It’s because of the cultural difference we have. [. . .] And I do not know what
the Catholic Church thinks. I haven’t heard any comments in favour or against it.
10.5.2 Summarising the Core Messages of Sect. 10.5
Syncretism
Syncretism as a concept suffers from many problems with its definition, which is
historically linked to theological disagreements in Christianity. While syncretism
has been a natural process in all religions, Jews and historical Protestants have
tended to be more anti-syncretic given their Scriptural base of beliefs. In turn, the
importance of traditions, in Roman Catholicism for instance, has led to include more
non-orthodox rituals in its practice. In Pentecostalism, the syncretic practices are
apparent, partly due to its marked African influence. In Latin America, “syncretism
with syncretism” has occurred with the expansion of Roman Catholicism and
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contemporary Protestantism (mostly Pentecostalism) and blend with indigenous and
African practices. Latin American syncretism with indigenous or African rituals
varies depending on the presence of these ethnicities. Therefore, the empirical
(quantitative and QCA) part of this study includes measurements of ethnicities as
cultural proxies of syncretism.
Finally, the syncretic process in Latin America has blended religions, music,
languages, and cuisine, among other cultural expressions (Wilson, 2004).
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In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,
and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with
God. All things were made by him; and without him was not
any thing made that was made (King James Bible, 1769,
John, 1:1–3).
The importance of studying language in order to understand social phenomena is not
new. The last decades have witnessed a growing academic interest in the study of
language and of discourse analysis in the social sciences (Heracleous, 2006).
Consequently, “. . .language (and language use) is increasingly being understood
as the most important phenomenon, accessible for empirical investigation, in social
and organizational research” (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000, p. 1126).
In this sense, studying language in practice has played an important role since
ancient times. The biblical citation at the beginning of this section, first written
thousands of years ago, directly links language to the Creation and the divine. This
notion is currently recognised in systemic approaches to language, where “language
is action” and “creates realities” (Foucault, 1972; Echavarria, 2006, pp. 34–36).
Austin (1962) also challenged the traditional notion of “to say something is just to
state something” and instead posited that “to say something. . .is to do something”
(p. 12). Likewise, “language is not a medium for representing the world, but for
intervening in it” (Argyris et al. as cited in Romme, 2003, p. 563). These notions
have led to recognising the prominent role of language as a means of shaping
institutions and society. Furthermore, ample theoretical and empirical evidence
points to language as a suitable proxy for culture (Stulz & Williamson, 2003;
Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985; Hofstede, 1980 as cited in
Volonté, 2015, p. 83). Language, religion, and legal origins are all highly correlated
and associated with particular institutional performances (Chakrabarti et al., 2008;
Volonté, 2015; Mazar, 2008).
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11.1 The Role of the Bible in Shaping Language
and Societies
The Bible has been translated into numerous vernacular languages:
11.1.1 German
Several studies have discussed the profound influence of the Reformation on the
spread and standardisation of the German language through Luther’s translation of
the Bible (Volz & Greenslide, 1963; Besch, 1999; Greenslade, 1963). It was mainly
through the vernacular translation of the Bible that people learned to read and that
human capital was enhanced. This process has resulted in higher literacy rates
among Protestants to this day (Becker & Woessmann, 2009). Consequently, the
language of Luther’s translation became more than part of German national heritage,
first for Protestants, and later penetrating every German-speaking home (Ritter,
1963).
11.1.2 English
Similarly to German, the English language had almost no prestige before the
Protestant Reformation. Later, different dialects and different Bible translations
challenging the unity of the English kingdom motivated King James to commission
a scholarly and reputable translation of the Scriptures. The Authorised (King James)
Version (KJV) has served ever since as a unifier and dominant cultural conditioner in
English-speaking thought, language, and literature (Lewis, 1969; McGrath, 2001;
Daniell, 2003).
11.1.3 Other Native Languages
Bible translations have helped to keep alive native languages otherwise threatened
with extinction across the world (Moor & Voinov, 2015).
11.1.4 Latin, Roman Empire, and Roman Catholicism
The Roman Empire spread Latin. Celtic speakers, for example, adopted the Latin
imperial language and thus gave birth to French (Moor & Voinov, 2015). Moreover,
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Latin never died but evolved into Roman languages descending from Vulgar Latin
(e.g. Spanish, French, Italian, Portuguese, Rumanian, Catalan, Romansh) (Wright,
1988). Furthermore, the Roman Church-State inherited Latin as its official language.
However, the Vulgate Latin translation of the Bible only became official for Roman
Catholicism at the Council of Trent (1545–1563), which was prompted by the
Protestant Reformation. The Latin translation was intended only for the clergy and
theologians (Lampe, 1969).
Consequently, the Roman Church-State condemned—and sought to impede—
any effort to bring the Holy Scriptures within reach of common people, in order to
prevent what happened in Germany and England. The fate suffered by those
Reformers who translated the Bible into Spanish (Reina and Valera) was a common
one: They were persecuted and exiled from Spain (Hauben, 1967).
To uphold the Catholic Church-State, the governments of several Latin American
countries banned Protestant services and the printing of the Bible in Spanish until the
last century (Gill, 1998). Thus, the influence of the Bible on Latin languages has
been limited. Figure 10.1 illustrates one example: The content of the Roman
Catholic Catechism Decalogue in “Catholic” languages (e.g. Spanish and Portu-
guese) differs from that in “Protestant” languages (e.g. English and German). In
“Protestant languages” the Ten Commandments in the Catholic Catechism resemble
more the Bible’s wording (King James Bible, 1769, Exodus 20, 1–17) than in
“Catholic languages” (Sect. 10.4.1.1).
Empirical Expectation
11). I expect German and English-speaking countries to be more competitive/
transparent than those speaking Roman languages. German and English
are associated with the Reformation, whereas Roman languages are
associated with the status quo of the Roman Empire, i.e. Roman
Church-State.
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Chapter 12
Environment/Geography and Prosperity/
Transparency (E), (4), (7)
This section analyses the prosperity-environment/geography nexus and the
corruption-environment/geography nexus. It concludes the theoretical review of
this study.
12.1 Prosperity and Environment/Geography (4), (7)
A direct empirical relationship exists between the environment/geography and the
prosperity of nations (Diamond, 1997; Sachs, 2001). Diamond (1997) found that
several environmental factors enabled European states to prosper and conquer other
continents. Such aspects include the availability of docile animals for domestication,
access to a storable vegetal protein, or a favourable climate and environment
(Diamond, 1997). Similarly, Sachs (2001) observes:
Perhaps the strongest empirical relationship in the wealth and poverty of nations is the one
between ecological zones and per capita income. Economies in tropical ecozones are nearly
everywhere poor, while those in temperate ecozones are generally rich. And when temperate
economies are not rich there is tipically a straightforward explanation, such as decades under
communism or extreme geographical isolation (Sachs, 2001, p. 1).1
After controlling for the quality of institutions, Sachs (2003) empirically explains
cross-country patterns of national income. The author claims that geography and
environment affect per capita income even more directly than institutions. He found
“a systematic gradation of average per capita income, with high latitudes both North
and South showing higher per capita income than low, tropical latitudes” (Sachs,
2001, p. 4). Furthermore, Sachs (2003) observes that empirical studies:
1©2001 by Jeffrey D. Sachs. This content is not under a CC-BY licence and has been reproduced
with permission.
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have demonstrated that levels of per capita income, economic growth, and other economic
and demographic dimensions are strongly correlated with geographical and ecological vari-
ables such as climate zone, disease ecology, and distance from the coast (Gallup et al., 1998;
Mellinger et al., 2000; Gallup & Sachs, 2001; Sachs & Malaney, 2002, as cited in Sachs,
2003, pp. 1–2).2
Latitude “impacts economic activity through insolation, precipitation, and other
climatic factors” (Sachs, 2001, p. 4). Consequently, countries located in the inter-
tropical or equatorial zone tend to be poorer than those located in temperate zones.
Sachs argued that lower agricultural yields and greater mortality due to tropical
diseases, for example, explain lower prosperity levels near the equator. For instance,
lower food productivity in the equatorial zone is well documented due to factors
such as: (1) the fragility and poverty of the inter-tropical soils, which lose their
fertility rapidly; (2) a high prevalence of parasites and pests associated with the high
biodiversity of the equatorial zone; (3) high costs on net photosynthesis due to high
respiration and metabolic processes; and (4) enormous fluctuations in water avail-
ability (Gallup & Sachs, 2001; Sachs, 2003; Garcia, 2003, 2012).
Therefore, Brown and Lall (2006) explained 60% of per capita GDP variance
across countries in terms of rainfall statistics and a binary variable accounting for
war. Their analysis of global datasets shows a statistically significant relationship
between greater rainfall variability and lower GDP per capita. The authors demon-
strated that climate variability, notably rainfall variability, is a significant determi-
nant of economic growth. The amount and variability of rainfall were significant
factors in the prosperity “of early agricultural economies and contributed to the
differences in the wealth of nations since the early 19th century” (Brown & Lall,
2006, p. 315). Furthermore, the authors claim that climate variability impacts can
often be mitigated.
The relationship between latitude and savings provides another example of this
association between environment/geography and prosperity. Ecosystem dynamics in
the equatorial zone include high biodiversity and rapid nutrient cycling due to high
temperatures, with low nutrient accumulation in soil (e.g. the Amazon forest). In
contrast, seasonal dynamics and lower temperatures in temperate zones account for
slow nutrient cycling and biomass accumulation. Temperate seasonal ecosystems,
therefore, tend to accumulate more biomass in less biodiversity. Examples of this
phenomenon include big sequoias in forests, the proliferation of large algae in the
oceans, and big fat mammals. In comparison, equatorial ecosystems are highly
biodiverse, but their individuals are much smaller than their temperate counterparts.
Temperature and speed differences in nutrient cycles greatly determine the ethology
of organisms. For example, temperate species must “save” fat and energy for winter
(in order to prevent death). In contrast, equatorial species tend to consume the
available resources immediately due to high competition (MacArthur, 1972; Garcia,
2003).
2©2003 by Jeffrey D. Sachs. This content is not under a CC-BY licence and has been reproduced
with permission.
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A similar dynamics may have encouraged human beings in temperate zones to
store goods (e.g. grains, cheese, jam) for winter, and later to accumulate and reinvest
the excess capital. In contrast, the permanent availability of natural resources (in the
absence of seasons) means that humans in the equatorial zone tend to consume rather
than store and invest.
This example might lead one to the assumption that the temperate countries
located in the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn and beyond would exhibit better
prosperity indicators on the whole. Thus, countries in the northern and southern
hemispheres should be all prosperous and less corrupt than those on the equator.
However, Russia and other former Soviet Union countries, located in the northern
hemisphere, would be exceptions to this rule. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
criticise the environment/geography approach to prosperity for its narrow scope.
While explaining the prosperity differences between continents broadly, geograph-
ical determinism cannot account for variations within continents themselves
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
Yet, in the Americas, this assumption would suffice to understand the prosperity
of the USA and Canada and, to a lesser extent, of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and
Argentina—in contrast with the poorer countries located on the equator
(e.g. Venezuela). However, environmental and geographical determinism theory
would not explain why South American countries (beyond the equator––e.g. Argen-
tina) have lower prosperity and higher corruption rates or inequality than those of
North America. Thus, although important, geography and the environment are
merely two pieces of a giant puzzle. This is exactly where institutions (including
religion) and other historical factors contribute to formulating feasible explanations
(see Sect. 8.2.3).
12.2 Corruption and Environment/Geography (4), (7)
The trajectories by which geographical and environmental factors might affect
corruption are mainly indirect and occur via economic development (Treisman,
2000, p. 430). In this respect, an abundance of natural resources (i.e. fuels and
minerals) tends to generate conditions for rent-seeking and corruption (Leite &
Weidemann, 1999; Ades & Di Tella, 1999). Specifically, an abundance of oil is
found to increase the level of corruption in a country (Montinola and Jackman as
cited in Lambsdorff, 2006, pp. 21–22). Venezuela, Nigeria, or Arab countries are
examples of countries located on the equator characterised by an abundance of
natural resources and by high levels of corruption.
Moreover, more natural resources (e.g. fuel) do not necessarily mean better
environment quality (e.g. climate). Environment quality indicators are what Brown
and Lall (2006), Sachs (2001), Diamond (1997), and others have associated with
prosperity, and thus with transparency (Treisman, 2000). The Environmental Per-
formance Index (EPI) aggregates some of those indicators besides others (see Sect.
5.6).
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Empirical Expectation
12). I expect a robust positive relationship between the EPI and prosperity/
transparency. However, I do not expect the EPI to explain the entire
variability of GCI/CPI.
This chapter closes the theoretical description of the most prominent corruption/
prosperity determinants referred to in Fig. 2.1. The next chapters explain the research
paradigms, design, and methodology of this study.
References
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity and
poverty. Crown Business.
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption. American Economic Review,
89, 982–994.
Brown, C., & Lall, U. (2006). Water and economic development: The role of variability and a
framework for resilience. Natural Resources Forum, 30, 306–317.
Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, germs, and steel. The fates of human societies. W. W. Norton.
Gallup, J. L., Sachs, J. D., & Mellinger, A. D. (1998) Geography and economic development. In
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (April), The World Bank.
Gallup, J. L., & Sachs, J. D. (2001). The economic burden of malaria. The Supplement to The
American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, 64(1,2).
Garcia, J. (2003). Carbon fixation in soils and climate change in peatlands and high mountain
“paramo” ecosystems. Original in Spanish: Análisis del potencial de emisión de dióxido de
carbono del páramo de Chingaza y lineamientos para su conservación en el contexto del
Mecanismo de Desarrollo Limpio. (Trabajo de Grado Carrera de Ecología. Facultad de Estudios
Ambientales y Rurales. Universidad Javeriana.
Garcia, J. (2012). Climate change in mountain ecosystems. An Andean perspective at IPROMO
2012. Mountain Research Initiative Newsletter, 7, 48–49.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2006). Causes and consequences of corruption: What do we know from a cross-
section of countries? In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), International handbook on the economics of
corruption (pp. 3–51). Edward Elgar.
Leite, C., & Weidemann, J. (1999). Does mother nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption,
and economic growth. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 99/85.
MacArthur, R. (1972). Patterns in the distribution of species. Princeton University Press.
Mellinger, A. D., Sachs, J. D., & Gallup, J. L. (2000). Climate, coastal proximity, and development.
In G. L. Clark, M. P. Feldman, & M. S. Gertler (Eds.), Oxford handbook of economic
geography. Oxford University Press.
Sachs, J. (2001). Tropical underdevelopment. National Bureau of Economic Research., Working
Paper, 8119, NBER, 1–37.
Sachs, J. (2003). Institutions don’t rule: direct effects of geography on per capita income. Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper, 9490 (NBER), 1–13.
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Econom-
ics, 76(3), 399–457.
192 12 Environment/Geography and Prosperity/Transparency (E), (4), (7)
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by




Research Paradigms, Methodology, and
Research Design
This part provides a general methodological overview of the study. However,
specific protocols for each research component are included at the beginning of
each chapter. Before describing the various methods, what follows introduces the
paradigms underpinning this study.
Chapter 13
Applied Research Paradigms
The paradigms and biases underlying this study reflect its dialectical pluralism
(DP) (mixed methods research) and a complex thinking perspective.
13.1 Research Paradigms
13.1.1 Research Paradigm 1 (Dialectical Pluralism)
Dialectical Pluralism (DP) is a broad paradigm with manifold benefits for develop-
ing the meta-paradigm required in this research. The DP is an approach to research
and policy that considers multiple paradigms carefully, thoroughly, and respectfully
(Johnson, 2017). The basic idea behind the meta-paradigmatic perspective of this
study is.
to empathetically and thoughtfully work with more than one paradigm (or perspective or
theory) to produce a new, more complex ‘whole.’ The whole might be mostly divergent,
mostly convergent, or, most often, a combination of divergent and convergent perspectives,
practices, values, and assumptions (J. C. Greene as cited in Johnson, 2017, p. 159).
This mixed methods study applies DP as its primary paradigm. Hence, it inves-
tigates the possible influence of religion on prosperity from multiple paradigmatic,
theoretical, and methodological perspectives.
Chapter 5 reveals that the main weakness of mainstream theories attempting to
explain prosperity is that they tend to reject approaches from other disciplines.
However, each of the explanatory theories employed in this study to understand
prosperity imbalances between the investigated countries may contain a grain of
truth (Moran et al., 2007, p. 3). Therefore, gaining a comprehensive and systemic
understanding of the situation is vital and requires the explanatory theories of
prosperity to be synthesised in a general model.
© The Author(s) 2022
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The traditional approach of mutual rejection of separate disciplines demonstrates
the need for a transdisciplinary paradigm to the causes of the historical prosperity
imbalance in Europe and the Americas. A model encompassing different theories in
a holistic and transdisciplinary manner is necessary in order to understand the whole
picture. Likewise, this also allows the inclusion of more variables that potentially
influence prosperity. In fact, “the most productive conceptual frameworks are often
those that integrate different approaches, lines of investigation, or theories that no
one had previously connected” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 35).
Consequently, DP is an ideal paradigm for the aims and concerns of this study.
This approach not only respects “different perspectives, but it is also designed to
strategically enable adherents to carefully consider differences and possible ‘syn-
theses’ of their knowledge, abilities, and values”. This kind of synthesis is dynamic
(Johnson, 2017, p. 161).
13.1.2 Research Paradigm 2 (Complex Thinking)
This study adopts the paradigm of complexity, since this opposes, yet contains
mechanicist and systemic paradigms (Morin, 2001). Historically, the complex think-
ing paradigm emerged as an evolutive result of systemic thinking, which arose from
mechanicism (Zuñiga & Tarride, 2010). These three approaches are reviewed
separately below in light of this study.
Mechanicist Paradigm
One of the principles characterising the mechanicist paradigm is the concept of linear
causality. This principle is a standard paradigm, which also guides traditional
positivist science, including economics. Many prosperity theories (especially within
the neoclassical economic approach) fall into this traditional paradigm (Chap. 5).
Systemic Paradigm
The systemic paradigm rejects the dominant reductionism of the mechanisist para-
digm. It focuses on the interrelations between a system’s constituents and those
between that system and its environment. It favours a holistic view and thus
maintains the principle of generality that also characterises the mechanicist para-
digm. However, it also recognises the systems’ particularities (Zuñiga & Tarride,
2010, pp. 1115–1116).
Theories revised in this study such as environment/geography (Sachs, 2003;
Diamond, 1997) or institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) (Chap. 4) have
incorporated elements of the systemic paradigm. By including historical components
and following unconventional approaches, these theories lay the foundations for
systemic explanations of the origins of prosperity. However, by denying other
disciplines’ approaches, they remain “trapped” in the mechanicist paradigm, thus
accepting monocausal, linear explanations.
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Complexity Paradigm
The complexity paradigm overcomes the adoption of either the mechanicist or the
systemic approach in favour of a dialogic, complementary perspective (Zuñiga &
Tarride, 2010). Accordingly, this study applies a linear, mechanicist approach
(e.g. regressions) combined with systemic models (see QCA and CDA). Yet, the
various theories (Chap. 5) are revised and the results analysed from a dialogic
perspective. Likewise, complex logic leads the synthesis, analysis, and conclusions
which are drawn. Therefore, this research rejects neither the mechanicist nor the
systemic paradigm. On the contrary, it brings these paradigms into dialogue under
the “complexity paradigm”.
Below I briefly describe the researcher’s scientific and personal paradigm biases.
13.2 Paradigm Biases
13.2.1 Scientific
In order of importance, according to the Philosophy of Social Sciences Inventory
(PSSI) scoring test, the scientific paradigms guiding this study are: Mixed research
methods: 6.0; Idealism: 5.3; Quantitative research methods: 4.5; Nomothetic
methods: 4.5; Rationalism: 4.0; Empiricism: 4.0; Fallibilism: 3.6; Ethical realism:
3.5; Qualitative research methods: 3.5; Humanism: 3.5; Ontological relativism: 3.5.
13.2.1.1 Biases
Several types of bias can threaten the validity of any meta-study (e.g. language,
location, time, outcome, funding) (Hussain et al., 2019). Publication bias can be a
salient issue that occurs when the researcher is favourably oriented towards studies
with statistically significant results, while rejecting those that are contrary to expec-
tations. Publication bias could also lead to an overestimation of effects in meta-
analysis. Likewise, confirmatory bias “is the tendency to emphasize and believe
experiences which support one’s views and to ignore or discredit those which do
not” (Mahoney, 1977, p. 161). To counter these threats and limitations, this study
applied some of the strategies recommended by Brown et al. (2017) and Hussain
et al. (2019):
• A systematic review of empirical studies in journals of multiple electronic
databases (Hussain et al., 2019).
• Triangulation for crosschecking information through multiple sources and pro-
cedures (see Sect. 17.6.3.3).
• Peer review processes as a source through which quality checks can be improved
(Brown et al., 2017). This research was submitted to peer reviewers and critical
friends (see Appendix 5).
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• Publication in Open Access Journals. Online, “open access journals improve the
readability and reduce publication bias” (Hussain et al., 2019, p. 59; Brown et al.,
2017). Some sections of this study were published in an open access peer-
reviewed journal (Published: 1 June 2019; Garcia Portilla, 2019).
• Sharing the data and making it publically available would reduce the probability
of publication bias (Brown et al., 2017; Hussain et al., 2019). Some sections and
appendices of this study have been publically available on the website of the open
access peer-reviewed journal since June 2019 (Garcia Portilla, 2019).
• Multi-lingual analysis (Spanish, English, French, and German) of the literature
and primary data (i.e. interviews) instead of ignoring studies that are not
published in the researcher’s mother tongue (Egger et al., 1997; Hussain et al.,
2019).
13.2.2 Personal
Maxwell’s textbook “Qualitative Research Design” states:
Traditionally, what you bring to the research from your own background and identity has
been treated as “bias,” something whose influence needs to be eliminated from the design,
rather than a valuable component of it. This has been true to some extent even in qualitative
research, despite the fact that qualitative researchers have long recognized that in this field,
the researcher is the instrument of the research. In opposition to the traditional view, . . .[s]
eparating your research from other aspects of your life cuts you off from a major source of
insights, hypotheses, and validity checks (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 37–38).
Therefore, the explicit incorporation of the researcher’s personal identity and
experience has gained extensive theoretical and philosophical support (e.g. Berg &
Smith, 1988; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Jansen & Peshkin, 1992 as cited in Maxwell,
2013, p. 38). In fact,
. . .the most admirable scholars within the scholarly community . . . do not split their work
from their lives. They seem to take both too seriously to allow such dissociation, and they
want to use each for the enrichment of the other (Wright Mills as cited in Maxwell, 2013,
p. 38).
Studies identifying their author’s personal positions are praised, among others, as
follows: “Seen as virtuous, subjectivity is something to capitalize on rather than to
exorcise” (Glesne & Peshkin as cited in Maxwell, 2013, p. 38). Or “mine your
experience, there is potential gold there!” (Strauss as cited in Maxwell, 2013, p. 38).
Maxwell (2013) therefore proposes a particular technique for incorporating the
researcher’s subjectivity and experience in a study: “researcher identity memo”.
This acknowledges the researcher’s personal perspective and stance. Taking Max-
well’s cue, I have included a positionality memo in Appendix 5 to ensure that my
perspective does not unduly influence the analysis and coding, in particular in the
qualitative part. Among others, Appendix 5 includes the strategies for objective data
treatment, and amplifies the following personal information about the researcher:
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13.2.2.1 Personal Experiences from Each Belief System
Roman Catholicism
• I grew up in a Roman Catholic family in Colombia (a strongly Roman Catholic
country);
• I was educated for 12 years in Roman Catholic schools and received Catholic
religious instruction;
• I studied for five years at a Pontifical Jesuit university.
Atheism (after being a firm Catholic believer)
• I spent ten years living as a self-confessed atheist who embraced atheistic values;
• I socialised in and applied the paradigm of scientific materialism (positivism).
Dissenting Protestantism (after being a convinced atheist)
• I spent 12 years living as converted, free Christian and I have studied the Bible on
my own;
• I have lived and studied in the United Kingdom and Switzerland (two historically
Protestant countries) (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).
13.2.2.2 Strategies for Objective Data Treatment
The following strategies were employed to ensure objective data treatment: (1) Two
independent quantitative researchers were engaged to select the variables using
solely quantitative criteria (e.g. cross-validation) in regressions and QCA. (2) Two
independent qualitative researchers were engaged to impartially validate the quali-
tative coding (a total of four independent researchers) (see Appendix 5). (3) The
selected variables (chosen from a pool of more than 70 indicators) were associated
with qualitative codes to prioritise them from a mixed methods perspective. (4) The
quantitative and qualitative (QCA) databases and the twelve codes applied compar-
atively to the four case studies’ qualitative data are available for inspection (see
Supplementary Materials). However, the names and original interviews conducted
as part of this study will not be made publicly available to protect the interviewees’
identities.
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Chapter 14
Methodology
This study applies a “mixed methods approach to grounded theory” (MM-GT) and
combines qualitative and quantitative elements in several phases of the research
process (i.e. data collection, analysis, inference). Such an approach serves to achieve
“broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration” (Johnson,
Onwuegbuzie, & Turner as cited in Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017, p. 108).
Equally, MM-GT works well for research questions focusing on why and how the
investigated phenomena function (including their qualitative and quantitative
aspects). Consequently, MM-GT is appropriate here, since it concerns “meanings
and processes or explanatory relationships” (and thus also causation) (Johnson et al.,
2010, p. 72).
Mixed methods, such as those applied here, have proven useful for studying
religious and secular milieus. One of their main advantages is that they ensure an
increased validity of descriptions and explanations (Stolz, 2017).
This study is driven by an equal-status mixed methods research approach (John-
son, 2016). Thus, qualitative and quantitative components have equal value and
weight. Figure 14.1 presents the research design:













Qualitative:       






Fig. 14.1 Research design (Source: Author’s)
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This flowchart also shows the integrated sequential methods used in this research:
each method informs the application of the other methods.
As will be explained, different research components, each corresponding to
different yet complementary epistemological approaches, provide complementary
results at different levels of analysis. In other words:
– The “macro” approach is that quantitative component that exhibits general trends
for countries and variables at a continental scale with minimum inferencing of
causal relations. Correlations are used to test whether variables are related at a
cross-country level (i.e. whether a population’s religious affiliation is linked to
corruption).
– QCA is the “meso” approach used to analyse both quantitative and qualitative
data, and thus enabling inferences about causality. QCA clusters countries into
groups of affinity and is used here to trace causal mechanisms (i.e. whether the
adoption of Protestantism as a state religion is a necessary and sufficient condition
for high levels of prosperity and transparency). QCA also allows briefly
explaining each country situation in the dataset (around 60 countries). QCA
analysis includes four case studies (the same cases are analysed in the “micro
approach”—i.e. the next method).
– The most detailed approach (“micro”) used in this study corresponds to the
qualitative case studies on four selected countries for the purpose of specific
analysis aimed at substantiating causal explanations. Case studies facilitate
understanding differences and similarities, as well as causal mechanisms, from
a qualitative perspective. This book includes four case studies on countries with
(1) diverse geographical backgrounds, (2) different composition and dominance
of Christian denominations, and (3) legal systems rooted in different origins.
In sum, the regression analysis of this study quantitatively explores the relations
among factors/variables. QCA adds causality considerations and bridges quantita-
tive relations and qualitative analysis. The four case studies are purely qualitative.
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Empirical Results (Macro & Meso
Components)
Part V consists of two main chapters: 1
1. The quantitative part of this study (Chap. 15) corresponds to regression analysis,
where the relationship between variables is used to test some prominent prosper-
ity/corruption theories. This part does not seek to prove causation, but instead
empirically explores whether a population’s religious affiliation is related to
competitiveness/transparency. Its empirical investigation also extends to studying
the traditional paradigm of some common determinants of corruption that are
related to religious adherents. Among others, the corruption model applied here
tests the interrelations between GDP, political liberties (democracy proxy), and
language and ethnic fractionalisation.
2. The second part (Chap. 16) advances the understanding of corruption and com-
petitiveness with a more complex causal approach (QCA). Compared to the
regression analysis, this approach expands on three aspects: first, qualitative
proxy conditions for the institutional influence of religion (i.e. concordats);
second, split measures of language and ethnic variables (instead of packed indices
of fractionalised measurements); and third, the analysis of four short cases.
Recapitulation of Hypotheses and Empirical Expectations
Chapters 15 and 16 will empirically test the hypotheses and expectations advanced
in Parts I and III. To facilitate the analysis, the hypotheses and empirical expec-
tations are briefly restated here.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Roman Catholicism has negatively impacted prosperity (competitive-
ness and transparency) in Europe and the Americas.
1Note: In the following sections, italics are used to identify variables or parameters.
Hypothesis 2: The Protestant Reformation has positively impacted prosperity (com-
petitiveness and transparency) in Europe and the Americas.
Hypothesis 3: Environmental performance positively impacts prosperity in Europe
and the Americas (i.e. moderating or moderated by the impact of religion).
Empirical Expectations
1. I expect the overwhelming empirical evidence available to confirm higher
corruption rates in historically Roman Catholic countries than in historically
Protestant countries (consistent with the title of this book articulated in Matthew
7: 15–23, King James Bible, 1769).
2. I expect the empirical evidence to corroborate a trend towards higher prosperity
(competitiveness) in historically Protestant countries and lower competitiveness
in historically Catholic countries. This expectation is based on abundant empir-
ical studies linking higher prosperity outcomes with Protestantism at a cross-
country level.
3. Given that economic prosperity, democracy, and transparency are part of the
same phenomenon, I expect these factors to be highly correlated. My quantita-
tive model on corruption (Sect. 15.3.4) considers proxy variables for all of these
variables.
4. I expect higher transparency/prosperity levels in countries with Protestant-
influenced legal origins (i.e. German, English, or Scandinavian) than in
non-Protestant countries. The Protestant Reformation introduced the Sola
Scriptura principle reflected in Protestant-influenced legal origins.
5. I expect lower prosperity/transparency levels in countries that have been
influenced by the French legal system, in particular when they have strong
clerical ties, and thus have been markedly influenced by Roman and canon
law (as in Latin America).
6. Given the tradition of controversial and restrictive concordats, I expect a
negative influence on transparency and prosperity in the respective
concordatarian countries.
7. I expect a negative influence on prosperity/transparency in countries rooted in
Socialist legal origins, in particular on account of the Soviet legal principle of
the “goodness of humankind” (similar to Roman Catholic and Orthodox natural
law).
8. I expect no conclusive results for ethnic fractionalisation given the possible
overlapping of cultural proxies (Volonté, 2015) with other variables and given
the varied conclusions of previous empirical results with aggregated measures.
9. I expect prosperity/transparency levels to be directly (positively) related to the
proportion of Protestants and inversely (negatively) related to the proportion of
Roman Catholics. This expectation is valid for the cross-country sample of
Europe and the Americas, as confirmed by empirical studies (e.g. Chase,
2010; La Porta et al., 1997).
10. However, I do not expect a significant positive influence of the Protestant
population on prosperity/transparency in Latin America. Firstly, Protestantism
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in Latin America has been relatively recent compared to its five-hundred-year
history of asserting the Reformation in Europe. In Latin America, Protestantism
is a recent phenomenon. It dates back no more than 50 years, and its proportion
has not surpassed 20% (Todd & Zurlo, 2016). Secondly, most of the Protestant
growth in Latin America comes from Pentecostal currents, whose positive
impact has been far weaker than historical Protestant denominations (Becker
et al., 2016; McCleary, 2013; Woodberry, 2012).
11. I expect German and English-speaking countries to be more competitive/trans-
parent than those speaking Roman languages. German and English are associ-
ated with the Reformation, whereas Roman languages are associated with the
status quo of the Roman Empire, i.e. Roman Church-State.
12. I expect a robust positive relationship between the EPI and prosperity/transpar-
ency. However, I do not expect the EPI to explain the entire variability of
GCI/CPI.
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Chapter 15
Component 1 (Macro): Quantitative
(Regression) Analysis
Several analyses were conducted to reach different explanatory models and thereby
to determine the most critical variables in the datasets. This quantitative part is
correlational, not experimental (causal). Therefore, the importance of a variable is
based on its explanatory power, not on causal relations.
The competitiveness GCI index contains numerous sub-indices, which are aggre-
gated into 12 different categories (World Economic Forum, 2016). Among the
sub-indices, GCI comprises corruption (CPI) (or its opposite, transparency percep-
tion), as well as some of its determinants. However, the interactions between the
variables of interest and corruption, on the one hand, and between the variables of
interest and competitiveness, on the other, were analysed and modelled separately.1
This chapter has three sections. The first overviews the process of modelling
competitiveness (GCI) and corruption (CPI). The second corresponds to the meth-
odological protocols and limitations. The third presents the empirical results of the
regression analysis for GCI and CPI.
Originally published as “Materials and Methods” in: Garcia Portilla, J. (2019). “Ye Shall Know
Them by Their Fruits”: Prosperity and Institutional Religion in Europe and the Americas.
Religions, 10(6), 362. MDPI AG. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10060362
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY)
license.
Supplementary Information The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
030-78498-0_15) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
1Please refer to Appendices 1–2 and Supplementary Materials for a detailed description of the
variables and their interactions in the general research model. Also included in these appendices is a
summary of the theories, indicators, and sources utilised in the models.
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15.1 Modelling Competitiveness and Corruption
15.1.1 Modelling Competitiveness (GCI) (Stages 1 and 2)
I modelled several variables associated with theories of prosperity (see Chap. 5 and
Appendices 1–2, and Supplementary Materials) as possible exogenous determinants
of competitiveness in most countries worldwide. For example, the Environment
Performance Index (EPI) is linked to geographical and environmental determinants,
while religion (adherents) is related to cultural and Weberian theory. State religion
and legal origins are proxies of the institutional influence of religion. I tested the
possible different contributions of those variables to explain the variation in com-
petitiveness (GCI).
The next generation of models focused on countries in Europe and the Americas,
i.e. those two continents under study here. Finally, the subsequent generation of
models isolated the influence of variables such as state religion and share of
population adherents on different religious affiliations. Such isolation ought to
benefit the model fitness as these variables are related (Barro & McCleary, 2005)
and might overfit the model.
15.1.2 Modelling Corruption (CPI Stage 3)
Analysing corruption as a criterion variable (stage 3) associates several common
predictor variables frequently used in the literature to explain corruption: GDP per
capita, religion, or political liberties (Rose-Ackerman, 2006) (see Part III, Chap. 6,
and Appendix 2). The modelling of corruption focused on Europe and the Americas.
However, unlike the modelling of competitiveness, it bypassed the first generation of
models (worldwide).
15.2 Methods of Regression Analysis
15.2.1 Methodological Limitations
15.2.1.1 Latest Available Data Measured at Different Time Periods
To draw the most accurate picture of existing reality, this study is based on the latest
data available for all the investigated variables (most data come from 2016 reports).
However, 2016 data were not available for all variables (care was taken to ensure
that data were not older than 20 years). Saying this, slightly older data would not
amount to a significant limitation. The prosperity performance of most Western
countries exhibits comparatively long-term persistence (of a century or more) and
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thus indicates historical inertia (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017; Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). The same applies to some environ-
mental variables such as geography, latitude (Diamond, 1997), or state religion
(Barro & McCleary, 2005).
15.2.1.2 Regression Analysis Is Not a Causal Approach
A significant correlation does not always indicate causation (Arruñada, 2010,
p. 908). Moreover, causal approaches to the present dataset and research design
(i.e. based on the latest available data) might not be desirable for two reasons: First,
this would lead to endogeneity problems. Testing plain variables as evident in the
model would render regression results inconsistent due to the likely presence of
endogeneity (i.e. because of simultaneous causality). Reverse causality is a wide-
spread issue in regression models. Likewise, testing variable causality blindly
(i.e. merely statistically, without any historical or theoretical consideration) would
not be appropriate either. Thus, the historical approach to the variables under
investigation is explained and addressed in detail (Figs. 1.1 and 8.1; Chaps. 6–12).
Second, adopting a causal approach would require Instrumental Variable
(IV) estimation, a complex experimental design, and a definition of independent,
dependent, and control variables. It would also need instrumental variables, which
might not exist in reality (or might be highly challenging to identify and define).
While a time series approach would partially resolve the issues arising from a causal
quantitative approach, it is not addressed in this study (see below). However, one
other method in this research (QCA) uses a causality approach.
15.2.1.3 This Regression Analysis Excludes a Time Series Approach
A time series would be an ideal approach to test whether variables are related over
short or rather over long periods. This approach would allow identifying whether
relationship patterns between variables exist over time. Conceptually, it would make
sense to relate performance in a period t with explanatory factors measured in period
t-1. One example would be if increasing or decreasing religiosity or the influence of a
Christian denomination coincided with a prosperity variable (i.e. whether changes in
a population’s religious affiliation relate to changes in corruption).
The relationship between prosperity and religion in Protestant versus Catholic
societies could be tested in time and space. Regarding time, for example, countries
that were Roman Catholic before the Protestant Reformation (e.g. England, Ger-
many or Switzerland) were pre-industrial (mainly primary sector economies) in the
Middle Ages. In geographical space, for instance, countries currently under perva-
sive Roman Catholic influence (e.g. Spain or Latin America) tend to exhibit lower
performance than Protestant ones.
Analysing Christian religion reveals that the Reformation initiated gradual
changes, including its slow institutionalisation and influence on democracy, literacy,
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and the state (Becker et al., 2016; Woodberry, 2012; Witte, 2002). Consequently, a
time series approach ought to cover longer periods (at least several centuries) based
on the assumption that the prosperity of most Western countries maintains almost the
same relative position over long-term time periods (a century or more)
(Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2017; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).
A time series approach might also alleviate endogeneity issues, as current per-
formance cannot (directly) influence past conditions. Still, relevant reverse causality
might exist via indirect correlation. Nevertheless, a time series approach also has the
disadvantage that the same available data does not exist for all variables. Some
variables are measured yearly, some every 5 years, and some every 50 years (most
have only been measured during the last 50 years or less). For some essential
variables, no information and proxies exist, thus making it necessary to create new
databases to cover particular periods (e.g. Pre-Reformation and Reformation).
Undoubtedly, the time series approach is promising, yet requires considerable time
and resources (which, however, exceed the scope of the present book). Notwith-
standing this reservation, future research might consider applying this approach.
The current approach uses “legal origin” (La Porta et al., 1999) and “state
religion” (Barro & McCleary, 2005) to capture some variable relationships over
long periods. Barro and McCleary (2005) proved that a growing fraction of adher-
ents to a country’s main religion increases the probability of a “state religion”. This
gradual process means that few Western countries changed their status of having a
“state religion” in the twentieth century.
15.2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
Population
The countries studied here were selected based on data availability (the same
consideration applies to QCA, see Chap. 16). Data stem from constructed and
from secondary (existing) data available in public databases. Further, the data consist
of censuses of currently available indicators for the following cross-country
analyses:
Stage 1. Worldwide (107 countries): The database comprises data series available
on competitiveness, corruption, social inequality, as well as other social, environ-
mental, and economic indicators. It also includes indicators of denominational
tradition and religious background for most of the surveyed countries.
Stages 2 and 3. Europe and the Americas (66 countries—competitiveness;
61 countries—corruption): Cases with straightforward data access for most variables
in Europe and the Americas.2 Unlike in other regions, Christianity has been the
2Due to data availability issues, some countries were excluded (e.g. most of the small island states in
the Caribbean). However, most countries in Europe and the Americas provide rich data. See
Supplementary Materials for detailed information on countries, sources and main variables.
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dominant religion for at least the past two centuries in Europe and the Americas. The
populations of these continents currently adhere largely to Roman Catholic, Ortho-
dox, or Protestant churches of various denominations (Johnson & Zurlo, 2016).
15.2.3 Protocol
I followed an 11-step protocol (summarised below):




information (> 70 variables 
for 107 countries)
Deletion of variables with 
more than 25% missing 
values
Use of mice function 




Use of step and regsubsets 
functions in all directions
Use of cross validation and “regression trees” for 









Deletion of overly inluential 




Based on r squared, adjusted r squared, cross validation (in particular, mean squares of 
prediction error based on three groups) and relationships among variables signiicance.
5. Model 
interpretation
Based on estimates, signiicance, and Beta standardisation of a model of 10 variables for 107 
countries (Results Model 1). 
6. Further 
modelling 
Variable isolation models (Results Model 2: Religion distribution in population and Model 
3: State Religion)
Step 1 aimed to include as many countries as possible in the database. However,
not all the variables had the same data available for all the observations. Variables
such as the GLOBE cultural index (House et al., 2004) were excluded from the
analysis as the corresponding data were only available for a sample of three dozen
countries. If less than 25% of values were still missing in the remaining dataset, they
were imputed using Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations in R (mice).
Step 2 involved using automated functions to help select from a high number of
variables (see diagram above) from different theoretical backgrounds (see Appendix
1). Although the results of one automated model search may be arbitrary, about 40 of
these models were created using different approaches to eliminate path-dependence
and bias.
Step 3 concentrated on meeting linear regression assumptions in all the models.
Assumptions were tested in a continuous process whenever a new model was
created. Among other assumptions, I tested for multicollinearity by checking the
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Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the correlation value. VIF results refused
multicollinearity and, along with low correlation value, suggest that these variables
are orthogonal. Likewise, all significant correlations among the predictor and crite-
rion variables were controlled for.
Step 4 involved using cross-validation based on the prediction quality of shuffled
groups of observations. Those model and variables exhibiting the best prediction
ability were selected. “Step” is an automatic method based on the R function step (),
which is also used to perform variable selection. These methods are useful when the
number of explanatory variables is large, and when fitting all possible models proves
unfeasible (University of Columbia, 2017).
Step 5 used Beta standardisation, which is necessary for comparing influence
among variables. This indicates the significance of each variable in the context of
others (and thus facilitates comparison). The goal, however, is not to test signifi-
cance. Nor can Beta standardisation be computed for interaction variables (see
second column “Standardised” in the Results).
In Step 4, Model 1 (see Results), two selected variables that might potentially
outshine each other were analysed: religious denomination (proportion in popula-
tion) and state religion. Consequently, I isolated these variables and ran separate
models (see Step 6).
Stage 2: Modelling for Europe and the Americas (competitiveness).
7. Dataset modi ication Selection of 66 countries in Europe and the Americas with complete data (from Step 1 data) No data imputation
8. Variables and model selection Use of Step, Cross validation and “regression trees.”
9. Model Based on estimates, signi icance, and Beta standardisation of two models of 4 variables for 66 countries (Model 4 and Model 5 on interpretation competitiveness). 
Europe and the Americas exhibited higher data quality and availability. Conse-
quently, there was no need to impute data as in the world models (Stage 1: Models
1, 2, and 3). Therefore, stable regional models with higher reliability (i.e. avoiding
data imputation and thus reducing bias) were created (Stage 2: Models 4 and 5).
Step 7. Due to data availability issues, some countries were excluded (e.g. most of
the small island states in the Caribbean). Step 8 was similar to steps 2, 3, and 4, while
step 9 was similar to step 5.
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Stage 3: Modelling for Europe and the Americas (corruption).
10. Dataset modi ication Selection of 61 countries in Europe and the Americas with complete data No data imputation11. Variables selection Use of a regression tree, estimates, and signi icance (Model 6 on corruption ) and model 
The competitiveness index (GCI) includes corruption (or its opposite, transpar-
ency) perception (CPI). However, to analyse whether transparency has the same
direction as competitiveness, I ran a model that considers corruption as a criterion
variable applicable to both Europe and the Americas.
Step 10. The corruption index (CPI) lacks data in several observations; therefore,
fewer countrieswere selected from the dataset than in stage 2 (Step 7:Competitiveness).
Step 11. Regression trees are used for classification purposes or to predict out-
comes when the response variable is numerical or continuous as in this situation
(Morgan, 2014).
15.3 Empirical Results of Regression Analysis3
Appendices 1–2 provide a detailed description of the variables, theories, categories,
and sources used here, as well as of the interactions between the variables in the
general research model. Presented below are the results for competitiveness (Models
1–5 and conclusions) and for corruption (Model 6 and conclusions).
15.3.1 Competitiveness
15.3.1.1 Stage 1: Competitiveness in the World
The analysis of competitiveness as a criterion variable associates different predictor
variables usually corresponding to theories of prosperity. Model 1 was chosen from
more than 30 other models as it has the highest cross-validations and satisfactorily
explains GCI variability.
3Some parts of this section were originally published as “Empirical Results (Correlational Analy-
sis)” in: Garcia Portilla, J. (2019). “Ye Shall Know Them by Their Fruits”: Prosperity
and Institutional Religion in Europe and the Americas. Religions, 10(6), 362. MDPI
AG. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10060362
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
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15.3.1.1.1 Model 1
GCIi ¼ β0 þ β1EPIi þ β2Mulattoi þ β3Asiani þ β4Protestant St:Reli
þ β5Catholic popi þ β6Orthodox popi þ β7Protestant popi
þ β8Muslim popi þ β9German LOi þ εi
Positive Correlations
The most significant variable is the Environment Performance Index (EPI), which is
highly positively correlated with competitiveness GCI (0.72). If EPI was removed
from the model, R-squared would drop by 17%. However, the same model without
EPI exhibits similar results to Model 1 (Table 15.1) for the remaining variables.
Here, an increase of EPI by one point is associated with a GCI growth of 0.026
points. EPI occupies larger units (mean value 70) than GCI (mean value 4) (The
scale is standardised, meaning that these values refer to the non-standardised ranges;
see Appendix 1 and Supplementary Materials).
A second important variable positively related to competitiveness (GCI) is the
German legal origin: “GERMAN (LO)”. Such countries have on average a higher
GCI by 0.229.
Third, if Protestantism was the state religion “PROTESTANT (S.R)” (e.g. UK,
Sweden, Denmark), then the overall effect would be positive on GCI. Establishing
Protestantism as a state religion leads to a GCI increase of 0.223, which is far greater
(almost double) than for a highly Protestant population. This confirms the higher
Table 15.1 Model 1. Competitiveness in the world
Coefficients: Estimate Standardised Std. error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.74106 0 0.274644 9.98 2.25  1016 ***
EPI 0.026048 0.586 0.002671 9.752 6.86  1016 ***
Mulatto (ethn) 0.443397 0.117 0.172934 2.564 0.011951 *
Asian (ethn) 1.880652 0.194 0.434192 4.331 3.74  105 ***
PROTESTANT (S.
R)
0.577261 0.223 0.168104 3.434 0.00089 ***
Catholics (%) 0.574504 0.273 0.220611 2.604 0.010722 *
Orthodox (%) 0.78216 0.27 0.23189 3.373 0.001085 **
Protestants (%) 0.541959 0.146 0.310636 1.745 0.084344 .
Muslims (%) 0.472164 0.203 0.234843 2.011 0.047269 *
GERMAN (L.O.) 0.942412 0.229 0.1817 5.187 1.25  106 ***
–
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘’ 1. Residual standard error: 0.2961 on
97 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.8355, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8142. F-statistic: 39.35
on 12 and 93 DF, p-value: <2.2  1016
Source: Author’s collection
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importance of the institutional influence of religion compared with that of the
proportion of adherents (in line with Sect. 7.1.)4
Negative Correlations
All variables related to religion distribution in a population—Catholics (%), Ortho-
dox (%), Protestants (%), Muslims (%))—are negatively correlated with GCI
although these correlations are only marginally significant. Nonetheless, the Ortho-
dox population causes the most substantial negative effect. An increase by one
percentage point of the Orthodox population leads to a decrease of 0.0078 units in
GCI. The same goes for changes in the Roman Catholic population, where an
increase in one percentage point of their population would mean a GCI decrease
by 0.0057. Likewise, if the share of the Protestant population increased by one
percentage point, GCI would decrease by 0.0054 units. Finally, if the share of the
Muslim population increased by one percentage point, GCI would decrease by
0.0047 units.
On the other hand,Mulatto and Asian ethnical values both have a negative effect.
A growth of one percentage point in the mulatto/Asian population means a 0.00117/
0.00194 decrease in GCI, respectively.
Models Analysing Major Religious Population Groups or State Religions
Separately
Model 1 (Table 15.1) has shown a differential influence of the religion distribution
in a population and of state religion on GCI. Models 2 (Table 15.2) and 3 (Table
15.3) were run to separate any potential differential influence. Separate analysis of
the two variables eliminates the possibility that a religious population distribution
and a state religion would “overfit” the model.
15.3.1.1.2 Model 2 with Population Percentage
Model 2 shows the relation between the percentage of religious adherents and
competitiveness while excluding state religion variables.
GCIi ¼ β0 þ β1EPIi þ β2Caucasiani þ β3Mulattoi þ β4Asiani þ β5Dogmasi
þ β6Socialisti þ β7Germani þ β8Catholic popi þ β9Muslim popi
þ β10Orthodox popi þ εi
Model 2 (Table 15.2) confirms the findings of Model 1 (Table 15.1) in the same
order:
4Exceptionally, while “Agnostic” and “Independent” variables of religion distribution in a popula-
tion positively affected GCI, they were not significant enough to be included in the model.
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1. EPI is the most significant variable.
2. Increasing Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim populations negatively influence
GCI. However, the Protestant population and other Christian adherents are not
significant in Model 2.
3. Model 2 confirms the direction and influence of most other variables in Model
1. However, in Model 2, Caucasian ethnic values positively influence GCI.
Likewise, Dogmas and Socialist legal origin negatively impact GCI.
15.3.1.1.3 Model 3 (Including State Religion)
Model 3 (Table 15.3) excludes the percentage of religion adherents variables. State
religion variables alone explain most of the variability otherwise explained by
religious population.
GCIi ¼ β0 þ β1EPIi þ β2Caucasiani þ β3Mulattoi þ β4Asiani þ β5Catholici
þ β6Protestanti þ β7Socialisti þ β8Germani þ εi
The results of Model 3 (Table 15.3) ratify those of the previous models. The most
significant positive influence on GCI comes from EPI, Protestant state religion,
Caucasian ethnicity, and German legal origin. In contrast, Asian and Mulatto
ethnicities, Roman Catholic state religion, and Socialist legal origin would nega-
tively affect GCI.
Table 15.2 Model 2: Competitiveness in the world including the percentage of religious adherents
and excluding State religion variables
Coefficients: Estimate Standardised Std. error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.68713 0 0.411929 6.523 3.22  109 ***
EPI 0.031948 0.718076 0.003588 8.904 3.35  1014 ***
Caucasian (ethn) 0.3062 0.182286 0.137576 2.226 2.84  102 *
Mulatto (ethn) 0.49164 0.129827 0.212469 2.314 0.022804 *
Asian (ethn) 2.262534 0.233818 0.607969 3.721 0.000334 ***
Dogmas 0.06555 0.161069 0.033539 1.954 5.36  102 .
SOCIALIST (L.O.) 0.223811 0.125531 0.111884 2 0.048283 *
GERMAN (L.O.) 0.608521 0.147437 0.221393 2.749 0.007151 **
Catholics (%) 0.435477 0.217661 0.131934 3.301 0.001355 **
Muslims (%) 0.349915 0.155187 0.191688 1.825 0.071044 .
Orthodox (%) 0.742669 0.235604 0.192192 3.864 0.000203 ***
–
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘’ 1. Residual standard error: 0.3554 on
96 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.7559, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7304. F-statistic: 29.72
on 10 and 96 DF, p-value: <2.2  1016
Source: Author’s collection
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15.3.1.2 Stage 2: Modelling Competitiveness (Europe and the Americas)
The following models were produced explicitly for Europe and the Americas,
excluding the noise existing in the world database. Likewise, Models 4 and
5 serve to compare whether the same variables chosen in the previous “world”
models are still significant in Europe and the Americas.
15.3.1.2.1 Model 4: Results of Cross-Validation
GCIi ¼ β0 þ β1Hostilitiesi þ β2German lani þ β3Catholic popi
þ β4Orthodox popi þ β5EPIi þ εi
This result shows the high robustness of this model (Table 15.4), in that it
explains almost 66% of GCI variability with four significant variables at a 99%
confidence level:
1. EPI is the most important variable because it accounts for most of the GCI
variability. The increase in EPI by one percentage point is related to a “GCI”
growth of approximately 0.038 percentage points.
2. The second most important variable is the Orthodox population, which exerts the
most substantial negative effect in the model. If the Orthodox population
increased by one percentage point, GCI would decrease by approximately
0.010 percentage points.
Table 15.3 Model 3: Competitiveness in the world including state religion and excluding the
percentage of religion adherents
Coefficients: Estimate Standardised Std. error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.94889 0 0.205025 9.506 1.57  1015 ***
EPI 0.032097 0.721417 0.003403 9.433 2.25  1015 ***
Caucasian (ethn) 0.233095 0.138765 0.137925 1.69 9.42  102 .
Mulatto (ethn) 0.432751 0.114276 0.197873 2.187 0.03115 *
Asian (ethn) 1.41671 0.146408 0.503625 2.813 0.00594 **
CATHOLIC (S.R) 0.245126 0.156268 0.091698 2.673 8.82  103 **
PROTESTANT (S.
R)
0.307335 0.118639 0.147376 2.085 0.03966 *
SOCIALIST (L.O.) 0.232813 0.130581 0.113454 2.052 0.04286 *
GERMAN (L.O.) 0.60705 0.147081 0.231532 2.622 0.01015 *
–
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘’ 1. Residual standard error: 0.3552 on
98 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.7536, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7307. F-statistic: 32.96
on 9 and 97 DF, p-value: <2.2  1016
Source: Author’s collection
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3. Similarly, the effect of the Roman Catholic population also negatively influences
competitiveness. If the Roman Catholic population increased by one percentage
point, GCI would drop by approximately 0.005 percentage points. This finding,
along with the previous one (2), is consistent with La Porta et al.’s (1999)
conclusions about the negative influence of hierarchical religions on prosperity.
4. Finally, the proportion of the German-speaking population positively affects
GCI. An increase of 1 percentage point in the German-speaking population
would mean a GCI increase by approximately 0.008 percentage points. This
finding would confirm a positive relationship (as outlined in Sect. 11.1).
15.3.1.2.2 Model 5: Results with Step
GCIi ¼ β0 þ β1Hostilitiesi þ β2GERMAN LEGALi þ β3Catholic popi
þ β4Orthodox popi þ β5EPIi þ εi
“Step” is a fundamentally different method, yet mostly exhibits the same results
(Table 15.5) as those of cross-validation (Table 15.4). Step analysis further confirms
the choice of the right variables (based on reality, not on random data effects). Here,
the only difference is that Step analysis chose GERMAN (legal origin) instead of
German language (percentage of German-speaking population) with 99% confi-
dence. The chapters that discuss the theoretical framework and conclusions further
discuss these variables and findings.
GERMAN (legal origin) is a binomial variable, meaning that if a country is of
German legal origin, then its GCI is 0.759 higher. If it is not of German legal origin,
then the variable does not affect GCI. Only these two extremes exist.
On the other hand, the variable Social Hostilities due to religion also appears in
Models 4 (Table 15.4) and 5 (Table 15.5). It exhibits the lowest value of standardised
Table 15.4 Model 4: Competitiveness in Europe and the Americas (cross-validation method)
Coefficients: Estimate Standardised Std. error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.583 0 0.48642 3.254 0.00188 **
Hostilities 0.07461 0.18955 0.03368 2.215 0.03063 *
German (lang) 0.82223 0.24086 0.26625 3.088 0.00307 **
Catholics (%) 0.49853 0.29507 0.15608 3.194 0.00225 **
Orthodox (%) 1.04274 0.44616 0.21537 4.842 9.66  106 ***
EPI 0.03829 0.52268 0.00596 6.424 2.53  108 ***
–
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘’ 1. Residual standard error: 0.3771 on
59 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.6556, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6264. F-statistic: 22.46
on 5 and 59 DF, p-value: 1.54  1012
Source: Author’s collection
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beta and also low values. More importantly, this variable appeared only at 90%
confidence value (all other results had a 99% confidence value). Therefore, this
variable is not sufficiently significant.
Finally, standard deviation confirmed the results of both cross-validation (Table
15.4) and Step (Table 15.5) and found the same, most robust coefficients. Conse-
quently, only four variables in the models had statistical significance.
15.3.1.3 Conclusions for Competitiveness
15.3.1.3.1 Conclusions for Competitiveness in the World (All Models)
The consistent results of the five previous models are:
1. A positive influence of EPI on GCI;
2. A positive influence of a German legal origin (or German language) on GCI;
3. A negative influence of an Orthodox population on GCI;
4. A negative influence of a Roman Catholic population (or Roman Catholic State
Religion) on GCI.
These results are valid for the world—Models 1 (Table 15.1), 2 (Table 15.2), and
3 (Table 15.3)—, as well as for Europe and the Americas—Models 4 (Table 15.4)
and 5 (Table 15.5)—.
Partially conclusive findings:
Ethnic influence appeared with some degree of importance in the world models
but disappeared in Europe and the Americas.
Socialist legal origin negatively influenced GCI—Models 2 (Table 15.2), and 3
(Table 15.3)—.
The influence of the share of Protestants in the population is not conclusive. In
Model 1 (Table 15.1), Protestants negatively affected GCI, after Orthodox and
Roman Catholics. However, in Model 2 (Table 15.2), which analyses religious
population, the influence of Protestants disappeared.
Table 15.5 Model 5: Competitiveness in Europe and the Americas (Step method)
Coefficients: Estimate Standardised Std. error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.606434 0 0.479997 3.347 0.00143 **
Hostilities 0.075303 0.191317 0.033201 2.268 0.027 *
GERMAN (L.O.) 0.759773 0.260367 0.224315 3.387 0.00126 **
Catholic_pop 0.499403 0.295584 0.153919 3.245 0.00194 **
Orthodox_pop 1.04258 0.446087 0.212236 4.912 7.49  106 ***
EPI 0.037974 0.518342 0.005882 6.456 2.24  108 ***
–
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘’ 1. Residual standard error: 0.3719 on
59 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.6651, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6367. F-statistic: 23.43
on 5 and 59 DF, p-value: 6.91  1013
Source: Author’s collection
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Neither Protestant population (1) nor Protestant State Religion (2) are significant
variables for competitiveness in Europe and the Americas—Models 4 (Table 15.4)
and 5 (Table 15.5)—. Hypothetical reasons for such findings include, respectively,
(1) the high influence of Pentecostalism in the Protestant population today might
neutralise the possible positive effect of historical Protestantism. Pentecostalism
impacts little on human capital and institutions (Becker et al., 2016; McCleary,
2013; Woodberry, 2012) and has often fallen into established practices “of corpo-
ratism and clientage” (Martin, 1999, p. 40; Schäfer, 1997) (Sect. 10.4.3). (2) While
Switzerland and the USA are the most competitive (GCI) countries, they do not have
Protestantism as their state religion, despite being historically Protestant (Barro &
McCleary, 2005; Inglehart & Baker, 2000).
Nonetheless, Protestant State Religion exhibited a positive significance on Model
3 (State Religion). This suggests that Protestant State Religion is more important for
GCI than the proportion of Protestants in the population. The effect of Protestant
State Religion on higher GCImight also be related to its influence in diminishing the
institutional power of the Roman Church (Sect. 8.3.4). The latter conclusions both
confirm Fanfani’s claim as early as 1936 (as cited in Grier, 1997) that the separation
of state and church is the critical prosperity trigger. Such a separation occurred
mainly in Protestant countries for anti-clerical reasons. Fanfani argued that religion
per se harms prosperity unless it leads to the separation of ecclesiastical and political/
economic powers in a country (as historical Protestantism did).
15.3.1.3.2 Conclusions for Competitiveness in Europe and the Americas
In Europe and the Americas, Models 4 and 5 discover a combination of variables that
largely explains GCI variability in the following order of importance:
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
I found a high correlation of EPI with competitiveness (GCI), as suggested by the
environment-and-geography theory of prosperity (Diamond, 1997; Sachs, 2001;
Brown & Lall, 2006). This index has by far the highest positive influence on GCI
of all the variables considered and explains most of the GCI diversity. Higher EPI
strongly implies higher GCI.
Legal Origin
As predicted in the variables description sections (Chap. 3–12), I found a highly
positive relation of German legal origin and German language with GCI. The
influence of the Reformation on the German legal system has been widely discussed
(Witte, 2002; Berman, 2003) (Sect. 8.3.4). Likewise, several studies (Besch, 1999;
Greenslade, 1963) have discussed the influence of the Reformation on the dissem-
ination and standardisation of the German language (Sect. 11.1).
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15.3.2 Corruption
15.3.2.1 Proxy Predictor Variables for the Regression Model
of Corruption
The quantitative model used here tested some proxy variables of selected main
determinants of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Alesina et al., 2003). Such
predictor variables are:
1. Proxies of economic prosperity: the log GDP per capita (GDPPC) and the Index
of Economic Freedom (IEF);
2. Proxies of democracy: the Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index (PRCL) and
the Political Stability Index (STABIL).
3. Proxies of culture: the percentage of Roman Catholics (CATH), and Protestants
(PROT) in the population. This also includes ethnic, linguistic, and religious
fractionalisation measures (ETHF, LING and RELF, respectively).
For each variable, the latest available data were used (one observation per
country). Please refer to Annex 1 for details on the variables and sources.5
CPIi ¼ β0 þ β1GDPPCi þ β2IEFi þ β3PRCLi þ β4STABILi þ β5PROTi
þ β6CATHi þ β7ETHFi þ β8LINGFi þ β9RELFi þ εi
15.3.2.2 Regression Results for Corruption in Europe and the Americas
Data analysis includes a regression tree (see Fig. 15.1). The Political Rights and
Civil Liberties Index (PRCL) is the most critical factor in determining the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI). Lower corruption levels (CPI ¼ 81.5) are evident in
countries with a (PRCL) 44 and that also have a higher log GDP per capita
(GDPPC > 10.6). Such results are entirely consistent with the respective theoretical
predictions (Sects. 3.1, 3.3 and 8.1 indicate that these variables are part of the same
phenomenon). In line with theory (Sect. 6.1), transparency increases even more if the
country in question also has a high proportion of Protestants (PROT > 0.24) in its
population (CPI ¼ 84.75).
This regression tree confirms that PRCL; GDPPC, and PROT are all positively
related to transparency (or vice versa, negatively related to corruption). GDPPC and
5Note: I have previously explained the essential theoretical variables and clarified that prosperity,
democracy, and transparency are all part of the same outcome in terms of my research aims.
Therefore, the variables researched in this regression model do not show causal effects. Finding
causality between corruption and GDP, PRCL, IEF, or STABIL is problematic due to endogeneity
issues (Lambsdorff, 2006) (i.e. in reality, they might all form part of the same phenomenon or
syndrome and all belong to the GCI index) (World Economic Forum, 2016). Further, correlations
only exhibit relations but no causalities (Sect. 15.2.1).
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PROT do not seem to play an essential role in countries with low PRCL (democ-
racy). This result is also in line with theory. For instance, Treisman (2000) found that
only stable democracy (before 1950) reduces corruption. Most of the Protestant
upsurge in the developing world has stemmed from Pentecostalism after 1950
(Johnson & Zurlo, 2016), which only marginally impacts human capital and insti-
tutions (Becker et al., 2016; McCleary, 2013; Woodberry, 2012).
The estimates in Table 15.6 corroborate the relation between lower corruption
(or higher transparency) and a high proportion of Protestants in the population.
Similarly, other predictor variables, above all GDPPC, PRCL, LING correlate with
lower corruption levels (i.e. higher CPI). The negative impact of the share of
Catholics in the population is less visible, with a lower coefficient in magnitude.
These results are entirely compatible with theory, in particular with Treisman (2000).
As indicated by the positive coefficients for LING, linguistic fractionalisation
tends to imply lower corruption. This trend is illustrated by countries
(e.g. Luxembourg, Canada, or Switzerland) facing low corruption and featuring in
the top ten countries of the present sample regarding language fractionalisation.
Conversely, a higher level of ethnic fractionalisation (ETHF) tends to be associated
with higher levels of corruption, as established by other empirical studies (Sect.
10.1). This observation confirms that linguistic heterogeneity does not necessarily
coincide with ethnic heterogeneity. For instance, most Latin American countries are
relatively homogenous concerning language but less so regarding “ethnicity” or
“race”.
xPRCL <> 44
52.9180328 ; 61 obs; 74.7%
xPRCL <> 37.25
36.28125 ; 32 obs; 3.8%
xGDPPC <> 10.63066518
71.2758621 ; 29 obs; 13.1%
xPROT <> 0.240287219













Fig. 15.1 Regression tree, with the mean value of CPI, the number of observations, and percentage
deviance. The minimum number of observations per node for a split to be attempted is set to 15.
Any split not decreasing the overall lack of fit by a factor of 0.005 is not attempted. (Source:
Author’s collection)
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The regressions do not display any significant relation between religion
fractionalisation RELF and corruption. Consequently, low corruption is present in
both multicultural, free societies with high measured religious fractionalisation
(e.g. USA, United Kingdom, Canada), and countries with low religious
fractionalisation (e.g. Luxembourg or Belgium). A “packed” index of
fractionalisation measures works like a “black box” as analysing interactions
between the components (i.e. each language or ethnicity) is impossible.
15.3.2.3 Conclusions for Corruption in Europe and the Americas
Generally speaking, the conclusions reached here about the selected variables
resemble those of previous research (Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2001; Arruñada,
2010; Chase, 2010; and to a less extent La Porta et al., 1999). Results were validated
using different databases and methods.
15.3.2.3.1 Proportion of Protestants
The findings confirm my hypothesis that corruption levels are directly
(i.e. negatively) related to the proportion of Protestants in countries in Europe and
the Americas. Thus, the share of the Protestant population might play an essential
role in reducing corruption. This result is consistent throughout the regressions and
the regression tree and confirms previous empirical studies (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997;
Treisman, 2000; and Chase, 2010). The influence of Protestantism is further
explored using the QCA method, which enables one to consider other variables
also playing an essential role besides population share.
Table 15.6 Model 6: Corruption in Europe and the Americas
Coefficients: Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 95.7267 22.615 4.233 0.0000962 ***
GDPPC 10.5639 2.1555 4.901 0.0000101 ***
IEF 0.2921 0.1499 1.949 0.05686 .
PRCL 0.546 0.1721 3.173 0.00256 **
STABIL 4.0372 2.7122 1.489 0.14276
PROT 17.9297 6.2714 2.859 0.00614 **
CATH 2.242 4.2163 0.532 0.59721
ETHF 10.4336 6.4496 1.618 0.11189
LING 13.9763 6.6231 2.11 0.03976 *
RELF 1.1927 5.9927 0.199 0.84303
–
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘’ 1 Residual standard error: 7.503 on
51 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.8848, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8645. F-statistic: 43.54
on 9 and 51 DF, p-value: <2.2  1016
Source: Author’s collection
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15.3.2.3.2 Proportion of Roman Catholics
Much of the previous empirical literature report that Roman Catholicism, Orthodox,
and Islam religions correlate negatively with transparency (high corruption or low
CPI) (Paldam, 2001; La Porta et al., 1997; Chase, 2010). However, the negative
relation between Roman Catholics adherents in the population and corruption (CPI)
is not conclusive in my results. While Roman Catholics adherents are present with a
negative yet not particularly significant coefficient in the regression model, they are
absent in the regression tree. Treisman (2000) reported comparable results when
including proxy measurements for democracy and economic development in the
model similar to mine. Those factors are, as discussed, interrelated rather than
competing explanations.
As stated in the theoretical part (Sects. 3.3 and 8.1), prosperity, democracy, and
transparency might all be part of the same phenomenon. When regressing all those
variables together, the model might dull the influence of other variables
(e.g. Proportion of Roman Catholics). QCA further analyses this issue along with
different variables.
15.3.2.3.3 Fractionalisation Measurements
No clear pattern exists in ethnic, linguistic, or religious fractionalisation. Only
linguistic fractionalisation is significant in the regression analysis, but no
fractionalisation measurement appears in the regression tree analysis.
Fractionalisation indices express “how diverse” countries are regarding language,
religion, and ethnicities. Further, the indices aggregate and “pack” such diversity
into one figure (Alesina et al., 2003). Consequently, fractionalisation measurements
prevent analysing the interactions of each specific religion, language, or ethnicity
units using criterion (prosperity) variables. Such aggregation constitutes the main
limitation of fractionalisation measurements. Therefore, the QCA section uses a
disaggregated value to reflect the shares of the main ethnicities and languages
spoken in a given country or region (Central Intelligence Agency of the United
States [CIA], 2016).
15.3.2.3.4 Political Rights and Civil Liberties
As observed in the regression tree analysis, the political rights and civil liberties
(PRCL) variable is the most significant factor relative to CPI. This finding was
expected, on account of its theoretical relation with Protestantism (Sect. 8.2.2).
Woodberry (2012) and Becker et al. (2016) have provided ample empirical and
historical evidence for the essential role of Protestantism (i.e. Protestant missionar-
ies) in the rise and spread of stable democracies around the world.
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15.3.2.3.5 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita
As explained, GDP per head was expected to be a significant predictor variable and
is negatively related to corruption in the tree regression method.
15.3.3 General Conclusion: Models of Religious Population
(Competitiveness and Corruption)
Generally, the models presented here suggest that Orthodox and Roman Catholic
populations correlate negatively with competitiveness in Europe and the Americas.
However, their role in corruption appears less evident in the corruption model. In
contrast, a Protestant population might play an essential role in reducing corruption.
Nevertheless, the role of the Protestant population in competitiveness is less clear.
The next component (QCA) expands on the understanding of these variables along
with other proxies.
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Component 2 (Meso): Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA)
This chapter comprises three sections. The first explains the QCA research model
logic after a brief introduction. The second introduces the QCA methodology. The
third presents the QCA results for competitiveness and corruption and focuses on the
four case studies discussed here.
QCA: A Brief Introduction
QCA is a causal approach situated between qualitative and quantitative methods
(Giugni & Yamasaki, 2009; Ragin, 1987; Rihoux, 2003). QCA is appropriate for
studies involving small (5–55) observations or samples (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).
However, studies with a large number of samples also exist (Schneider &
Wagemann, 2012).
Unlike regression analyses, QCA is not a statistical technique that focuses on the
likelihood of the relations among variables. Instead, it is a method based on Boolean
logic, rooted in set theory, and founded on the notions of sufficiency, the necessity of
conditions, and conjunctural causation (Bara, 2014, p. 707; Ragin, 2000). The
necessary conditions for an outcome are more the exception than the rule in the
social sciences. Therefore, alternative combinations of conditions, which are jointly
sufficient to explain the outcome, can be more significant (Ragin, 2000).
QCA assumes combinatorial and multiple causalities. It means that in QCA an
outcome results from factors that react simultaneously with other conditions through
several possible paths (Giugni & Yamasaki, 2009; Ragin, 1987). As Giugni and
Yamasaki (2009) observe, QCA implies that causality is multiple and that various
“pathways” lead to a specific outcome. Thus, a phenomenon must not necessarily
require one single cause (or set of causes). Furthermore, causality is conjunctural,
which means that conditions interact “in concert” or “chemically” with each other.
Consequently, causality is combinatory rather than additive (Mill; Becker as cited in
Giugni & Yamasaki, 2009, p. 471).
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Therefore, QCA enables distinguishing paths to success from paths to failure,
which do not necessarily mirror each other (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 8).
Likewise, QCA allows identifying configurations of factors (conditions––in this
case, theories explaining prosperity differences––see Chap. 5) leading to an outcome
(e.g. transparency and competitiveness).
Furthermore, QCA bases its logic on set memberships. Whether a country
experiences high levels of corruption, for instance, can be expressed as a question
of set membership: Is country X a member of those states that remain transparent/
competitive or not? QCA clusters countries into affinity groups and enables nested
case studies to be conducted. It also allows the explanation of actual circumstances
in the investigated countries. QCA facilitates understanding differences and similar-
ities, as well as causal mechanisms, through within-case and inter-case comparisons
(Ragin, 2003).
Moreover, this study applies the fuzzy-set variant of QCA (fsQCA), which allows
cases to have varying degrees of set membership (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012,
p. 13). It means that fsQCA capture empirically “different shades of grey” instead of
“dividing the world into black and non-black” to inform the analysis and interpre-
tation of results (Schneider &Wagemann, 2012, p. 13). A case does not always have
to be a complete member (or a complete non-member) of a group; it may be also a
partial member of a set. The membership scores may drop at any point between the
two extremes (i.e. between the 0-full non-membership value and the 1-full member-
ship value) (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 13–14).
In sum, QCA helps to find explanations for outcomes based on associations of
necessity and sufficiency. It therefore allows comparing and analysing different
indicators associated with theories of prosperity and their causal effect on the
outcome.
I apply QCA to examine which combinations of conditions (for example, of
different variables linked to prosperity theories) associate regularly with transpar-
ency/competitiveness or, on the contrary, with corruption. The analysis covers
65 countries in Europe and the Americas (see Appendices 3–5 and Supplementary
Materials).
16.1 QCA Research Model
Appendix 3 contains a detailed model and definitions of the conditions, outcome,
sources, and qualitative anchors. Below, I merely briefly explain the underlying
rationale. I followed a mixed methods research approach (quantitative and qualita-
tive) and I based the variables selection on the primary prosperity determinants
identified quantitatively by theories from different fields (Fig. 16.1).
The database with prosperity variables in different countries constitutes the
outcome (Competitiveness: GCI and Corruption: CPI). On the other hand, the
data of the various theories of prosperity (Environment Performance (EPI), Religion
population, State Religion Legal Origin, Institutions, Ethnicities) constitute the
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causal conditions (for the conditions and outcomes of this study, see Fig. 16.1 or
Appendix 3).
Extensive empirical research supports the entire set of theories interrelated here
(see Part III; Fig. 16.1, Appendix 3). Further, the whole set of theories robustly
explains the prosperity differences in the examined countries. Indicators were chosen
to consider the theoretical discussions related in Part III and Fig. 16.1. These were
derived from a diverse range of publicly available sources. The latest available data
for the indicators provided a picture of present-day reality (2016 reports; this is
analogous to the quantitative part, i.e. Chap. 15). However, not all the variables
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Fig. 16.1 Categories of conditions and outcome and principal theoretical works (Source: Author’s
figure)
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3 contains the databases and sources used, as well as a more detailed explanation of
each indicator.
The different years of publication of the original data sources are not a significant
problem here. I have previously discussed the issue of long-term persistence (cen-
turies) of countries’ relative prosperity performance as well as religious and envi-
ronment variables (Chap. 8 and Sect. 15.2.1.1). Besides providing theoretical
support, the previous quantitative component of this research (regressions) used
cross-validation, trees, and an automated method of variables selection (Chap. 15).
This confirmed the crucial variables, thus making data selection more objective.
Below, I explain how outcomes and causal conditions were calibrated.
16.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis Methodology
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is used to analyse both quantitative and
qualitative data, thus enabling causal inferences. The QCA methodology allows for
up to seven variables to be tested for their impact on an outcome variable. A truth
table is built from qualitative, quantitative, or both kinds of data to show all possible
configurations of those variables. The truth table is then analysed algebraically
(rather than statistically) to generate one or more statements identifying various
conjunctions of sufficient conditions for the outcome to have occurred (Bazeley,
2012, p. 823).
16.2.1 Calibration of Outcome and Causal Conditions
Outcome requiring explanation: The corruption and competitiveness of different
countries (see Chaps. 3–4).
Relevant causal conditions: Theories discussed in the theoretical framework (see
Chaps. 5–12; Appendix 3 discusses calibration in detail).
The calibration process followed the strategy described by Schneider and
Wagemann (2012). The authors advise that empirical evidence and theoretical
information must be used to calibrate fuzzy-set membership scores. Also, the
calibration process may be guided by established social science information, obvious
evidence, and the researchers’ data. Likewise, quantitative data parameters and
statistical distributions can be helpful in terms of calibration (p. 41).
Accordingly, the following aspects informed the calibration of the fuzzy-set
membership scores: relevant theoretical and social scientific knowledge, and obvi-
ous facts (see Parts II and III); empirical evidence and the researcher’s data collec-
tion (see Appendices 1–2 and Supplementary Materials); statistical distributions and
parameters of quantitative data (see Chap. 15). However, the quantitative scales and
statistical parameters (Appendices 1–2 and Chap. 15) were not automatically
transformed to calibrate the fuzzy-sets by default. Schneider and Wagemann
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(2012) highly discourage such an automatic transformation because it fails to
achieve the criterion of using calibration parameters that are independent of the
data. Therefore, this is unlikely to result in set membership scores that correctly
represent the significance of the concept being captured (Schneider & Wagemann,
2012, pp. 41).
First, all relevant conditions were divided into five groups (1) predominant
religion (population), (2) state religion, (3) legal origin, (4) languages, and (5) eth-
nicities. Conditions were combined according to their theoretical relevance. Subse-
quently, data were calibrated with two goals in mind: to reflect reality as much as
possible while striking a balance (i.e. excluding two cases where the condition is met
out of 50).
Conditions were calibrated using the “direct method”, i.e. focusing on qualitative
anchors (Ragin, 2000). Anchors were chosen to reflect reality based on the distri-
bution of each condition in the data. At the same time, to understand the effects and
interaction of each condition, they required sufficient presence. Many possible
anchor configurations were tested to find the optimal solution for each condition.
Appendix 3 includes all the conditions and qualitative anchors, as well as a descrip-
tion of indicators.
16.2.1.1 EPI and Concordats Present in All Groups (Along
with the Outcome)
The only subcategories exhibiting merely one indicator were the Environment
Performance Index (EPI) and Concordats (Agreements with the Vatican). This
made including these subcategories in all the result groups feasible.
Concordats are a new qualitative indicator, established here based on Corral and
Petschen (2004). This indicator accounts for the international agreements signed by
countries with the Roman Catholic Church.
The Roman Catholic Church-State is the inheritor of the Roman Empire and its
imperial territoriality (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, Romanism is the only religious
system that, at one and the same time, is a state exercising political (and not only
symbolic) functions in today’s geopolitical order (Agnew, 2010). Therefore, “Agree-
ments with the Vatican: Concordats” is an essential proxy of the legal, institutional,
and political closeness of a state with the Roman See (see Appendix 3 for details on
the calibration and thresholds of the other indicators).
16.2.2 Truth Tables
After calibration, truth tables were created for each of the five condition groups to
measure both competitiveness and corruption. Each of the groups contains one truth
table for a positive outcome and another for a negation of the outcome (i.e. its
opposite). Accordingly, 20 truth tables were created in total (see Appendix 4).
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Inclusion cut-off (incl.cut) was between 0.85 and 0.9 in all cases. Venn diagrams
were created to facilitate orientation in truth tables. Sufficiency and necessity
analysis was conducted. As the last step, all truth tables and analyses were
interpreted both column-wise and row-wise.
Truth tables involve mixed-origin data analyses (quantitative, i.e. EPI, CPI;
qualitative, i.e. Concordats). Conclusions were drawn only from configurations
displaying high consistency and high coverage scores.
Consistency thresholds (incl.) were defined by a gap between truth table rows
with higher and lower consistency scores (see Schneider & Wagemann, 2012,
p. 128). Generally, scores below 0.75 should be avoided. Analysis strictly
disregarded consistency scores lower than 0.9, thus producing even more reliable
results.
16.2.3 Venn Diagrams
Venn diagrams visualise truth tables to facilitate analysis and the presentation of
results. However, truth tables contain more detailed information, for instance, which
countries belong to each combination of conditions and measures of belonging
(e.g. PRI and incl; see Appendix 4 for conventions and actual truth tables.
Section 16.3 presents Venn diagrams for competitiveness. For reasons of space,
please refer to Appendix 5 for the Venn diagrams of corruption).
16.2.3.1 Colours in Venn Diagrams
Green ¼ outcome 1 in the truth table. Green sections indicate that an outcome exists
for a specific condition.
Orange ¼ outcome 0 in the truth table. Orange sections indicate that no outcome
exists. In other words, such a combination does not lead to the outcome (e.g. low
corruption).
White ¼ logical remainder in the truth table (empty row). White sections indicate
that logical remainders exist (no cases exist for this combination of conditions).
16.2.3.2 Background Colours in Venn Diagrams
Background colours in Venn diagrams denote what happens if no condition is
present. Attention to green is called for as this means that if no condition is present,
then the outcome is high (it suffices to have one such case to cause a change in
colours in Venn diagrams, but not in interpretation). A white background means that
no cases exist where no condition is present. An orange background means that
when no condition is present, the outcome is not present, and at least one case exists
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to support this. A blue background indicates a logical contradiction between cases,
thus probably indicating a problem.
16.3 Analysis of QCA Results
Five different models and their opposites were tested. Together, they addressed the
most significant variables identified in the literature review (Chaps. 3–12) and in the
quantitative section of this study (regressions) (Chap. 15). Furthermore, the indica-
tors identified in the literature review were included, yet not considered in the
quantitative section (i.e. Concordats, due to their qualitative origin).
Given that QCA seeks to establish causal conditions, the present models identify
pathways to competitiveness and transparency and their opposite (i.e. low compet-
itiveness and corruption). No necessary conditions were found and merely a few
conditions with sufficient coverage. The truth tables cluster the countries as close to
reality as possible. The analyses are based on coverage (cov.r ~0.5) and consistency
(incl. ¼ or >0.9) (For a guide to interpretation and to the conventions used in the
truth tables, see Appendix 4. See Appendices 4–5 for truth tables, Venn diagrams,
and QCA minimisation using the enhanced Quine–McCluskey algorithm). The
Venn diagrams below summarise the most important findings for competitiveness
for all the groups of conditions. The Venn diagrams for corruption can be consulted
in Appendix 5.
16.3.1 Competitiveness
16.3.1.1 Predominant Religion (Proportion of Adherents)
and Competitiveness
For high competitiveness, high EPI suffices if Concordats with the Vatican are
low and if the Roman Catholic and Orthodox population is low (Fig. 16.2).
Sufficiency analysis determined with enough coverage (Cov.r) that low Concor-
dats, low Roman Catholic, and low Orthodox religions in the population are
sufficient for high competitiveness. Therefore, high competitiveness always occurs
if these conditions are met (but this may also happen in other cases).
Note: Agnostic and atheistic categories are not sufficiently present to affect the
model as results remain unchanged. Consequently, to simplify the model, these
categories were removed.
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16.3.1.2 State Religion and Competitiveness
No State Religion positively affects competitiveness. Having Concordats with the
Vatican negatively influences competitiveness (Fig. 16.3).
The truth table “State Religion and Competitiveness” (Truth Table 7 in Appendix
4.2) shows a cluster of Latin American countries with perfect coverage and consis-
tency for the negative outcome. Such Latin American cluster presents substantial
evidence for the negative outcome of competitiveness with high Concordats, low
EPI, and the presence of Catholic State religion.
Regression model 1 (“Competitiveness in the world,” Sect. 15.3.1.1) shows a
positive effect of Protestant state religion, which disappeared in the models of
Europe and the Americas. Cluster 11 in Truth Table 5 (Appendix 4.2) displays
those countries that produce the positive outcome with Protestant state religion
(DNK, FIN, GBR, ISL, NOR, SWE). Section 8.3.4 has shown that these countries
established their state religions under the influence of the Protestant sixteenth-
century revolution in Germany. The USA went one step further and removed state
religion.
Note: Albania, the only Muslim state country in the dataset, also presents perfect
coverage and consistency for the negative outcome of “State Religion and
emoctuoevitageNemoctuoevitisoP
EPI and Protestant religion in the population positively 
impact competitiveness. 
A combination of Concordats and Roman Catholic 
religion in the population decreases competitiveness. 
Orthodox religion in the population also has a weak 
adverse effect. 
Fig. 16.2 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Competitiveness with Predom-
inant Religion adherence in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure)
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Competitiveness” (Truth Table 7 in Appendix 4.2). However, Albania is not that
interesting, because it is only one country, which is not enough to draw any
definitive conclusions. Probably, if moreMuslim States were included in the dataset,
such analysis would be useful. In contrast, Latin American countries provide robust
evidence since ten of them are present in the outcome.
16.3.1.3 Legal Origin and Competitiveness
The most important factor for high competitiveness is EPI. Additionally, factors like
German, English, and Scandinavian legal origin help to increase competitiveness.
The positive outcome for Legal Origin and Competitiveness in the Fig. 16.4 (see
also Truth Table 9 in Appendix 4.2) shows that countries having high competitive-
ness are those influenced by the Protestant Reformation (Barro & McCleary, 2005;
Johnson & Zurlo, 2016; Woodberry, 2012; Obinger, 2009).
However, two countries are the exception to the previous rule in the present
clusters (Truth Table 9 in Appendix 4.2). The first is Ireland, a country with Catholic
State Religion (Barro & McCleary, 2005; Barrett et al. 2001). The second is Austria,
a historically Catholic country (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 36), whose population
has mostly been Roman Catholic (Johnson & Zurlo, 2016). Moreover, Ireland and
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A strong positive influence of EPI is clearly visible. 
Both Protestant and Catholic State religions have a 
neutral effect in this analysis. Not enough Muslim State 
countries exist in the dataset to judge the effect of Islam. 
Concordats negatively influence competitiveness. 
Fig. 16.3 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Competitiveness with State
Religion in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure)
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Austria are the only outliers in the group of traditional Roman Catholic countries,
which typically have French Legal Origin (La Porta et al., 1999). Ireland adopted
English Legal Origin (common law). Similarly, German Legal Origin profoundly
influenced Austrian jurisprudence (ibid).
Regression analysis also confirmed that German Legal Origin has a consistently
positive influence on competitiveness (Sects. 15.3.1.1.3 and 15.3.1.2.2). The theo-
retical framework corroborates this result (Sect. 8.3.4.1) (Witte, 2002; Berman,
2003). Further, German Legal Origin leads to high competitiveness despite the
presence of high Concordats. This applies to Austria and Germany, where Adolf
Hitler signed the Reichskonkordat with the Roman See in 1933 (valid to date). In
sum, competitiveness seems to follow the same pattern as corruption with regard to
Legal Origin (Appendix 5).
16.3.1.4 Languages and Competitiveness
The analysis of languages and competitiveness delivered no important results.
However, it confirmed the result of the previous analyses, for which the combination
of low EPI, high Concordats, and Roman languages is associated with low com-
petitiveness (Fig. 16.5).
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Countries with German legal origin (both with or without 
concordats) are highly competitive. English legal origin 
also helps to increase competitiveness but only in 
combination with high EPI. English and Scandinavian legal 
origins also enhance competitiveness (but it is not possible 
to determine their relationship to EPI and concordats due to 
lack of diversity). 
A large number of cases (12) support the claim that a 
combination of French legal origin, Concordats, and low 
EPI, is associated with low competitiveness. 
This trend is robust and demonstrated mainly by countries 
from Latin America. Also, countries with a socialist legal 
origin tend to have low competitiveness if they have low 
EPI.  
No group with high EPI exhibits low competitiveness. 
Conditions leading to low competitiveness are the same as 
those leading to high corruption (Appendices 4–5). 
Fig. 16.4 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Competitiveness with Legal
Origin in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure)
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In this group, coverage is not high enough to formally establish sufficient
conditions. Clusters created by languages are not as accurate as the groups differ-
entiated in the previous three analyses.
16.3.1.5 Ethnicities and Competitiveness
Sufficiency analysis suggests that if a country has high EPI and both high and low
white ethnicities, and if all other conditions are low (Concordats, Latino, Mestizo,
and other non-white ethnicities), then it always exhibits high competitiveness
(Fig. 16.6).
Many combinations of conditions in this group (Ethnicities and Competitiveness)
have low PRI. The evidence supporting these findings is not robust (Truth Tables 17
and 19 in Appendix 4.2).
Table 16.1 summarises the QCA results for corruption. Venn diagram analyses of
corruption often resemble those of competitiveness (Appendix 5).
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QCA did not identify enough groups to conclusively 
establish a positive outcome. However, EPI is again crucial 
for high competitiveness. Likewise, all countries with high 
competitiveness have low Concordats, excepting Germany 
and Austria. 
Truth Table 15 (Appendix 4) shows a cluster of 11 South 
American countries having low competitiveness. These 
countries have low EPI, high Concordats and speak 
Roman languages. Hence, a combination of these 
conditions leads to low competitiveness, but none of these 
conditions alone does. 
It seems that the Russian language is not an essential 
condition for low or high competitiveness. The Russian 
language is present in the cases of Ukraine and Moldavia 
(low EPI) and Lithuania (high EPI). 
Fig. 16.5 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Competitiveness with Lan-
guages in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure)
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16.3.2 QCA Results for Outcome Corruption
The results in Table 16.1 are generally in line with the different theories explaining
corruption/prosperity (Chaps. 5–6). Thus, factors associated with Protestantism as a
rule denote paths to low corruption (or high transparency), such as Protestant
adherents, Protestant State religion, German and English legal origin, and the
German and English language. In contrast, factors associated with Roman Cathol-
icism (or also Eastern Orthodoxy) involve paths to high corruption, such as Catholic
adherents and Catholic State Religion, French legal origin, or Roman/Russian
languages.
The various truth tables (Appendix 4) show that countries with similar conditions
often belong to the same clusters. All these results substantiate Volonté’s (2015)
finding, namely the overlapping of different cultural and institutional factors towards
the outcome. Thus, countries with similar conditions often appear in the same
groups. Clusters and group selections have therefore proven to work well. While
each path and condition could be analysed in-depth further to establish an even
broader theoretical understanding of the results, I analyse only four cases in detail.
These cases are the same case studies further considered in more detail in Part VI.
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Many (18) countries have white ethnicity, high EPI 
conditions and have high competitiveness. It seems that the 
combination of white, high EPI and high Concordats does 
not lead to high competitiveness, while white, high EPI and 
low Concordats does.  
To attain a negative outcome (low competitiveness), a 
country should have high Concordats, low EPI, 
predominantly no white ethnicities, but predominantly 
other non-white ethnicities (Truth Table 19 in Appendix 4). 
Fig. 16.6 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Competitiveness with Ethnic-
ities in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure)
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Table 16.1 Main QCA results for the five groups of conditions





High EPI and Protestant religion
adherence are associated with
lower corruption, especially if
both are present
Concordats in combination with
Roman Catholic religion adher-
ence increase corruption. Ortho-
dox religion has a similar
negative effect
2 State Religion EPI and Protestant State religion
again have a positive effect,
i.e. decrease corruption. The dif-
ference is that Concordats might
also have a positive effect only in
the absence of State Religion
Groups of countries with high
corruption indicate the substan-
tial adverse effect of Concordats
in combination with Roman
Catholic State religion. Concor-
dats combined with Roman
Catholic or Muslim state reli-
gion have a negative effect,
i.e. increase corruption
3 Legal Origin German and English legal origin
help reduce corruption, while
French and Socialist legal origins
and Concordats tend to increase
corruption.
All countries belonging to groups
with Scandinavian, German, and
English legal origins have low
corruption (and always high
EPI). Countries with Socialist
legal origin in combination with
Concordats and high EPI tend to
have low corruption
Most countries with high cor-
ruption are of French legal ori-
gin and have high Concordats.
This trend is robust (mainly
caused by 13 Latin American
countries).
No group with high EPI has high
corruption. Also, countries with
Socialist legal origin combined
with low EPI tend to have higher
corruption.
The adverse effect of French and
Socialist legal origins and Con-
cordats disappears if a country
has high EPI
4 Languages Every country with low corrup-
tion has high EPI. The German
language always leads to low
corruption. Some German-speak-
ing countries have high concor-
dats. No country belonging to a
group of Roman language has
low corruption
All countries belonging to
groups with high corruption
have low EPI (except for some
Russian- speaking countries). In
general, the Russian language
tends to lead to higher corrup-
tion. German and English-
speaking countries, in general,
do not have high corruption.
High EPI, low Roman, low
English and low Russian lan-
guage is a sufficient condition
for low corruption (in this com-
bination, corruption is undoubt-
edly low, although low
corruption may be achieved in
other ways)
5 Ethnicities High EPI and high white ethnici-
ties in combination with both
high and low Concordats leads to
Countries with high corruption
almost never have predomi-
nantly white ethnicities, are often
(continued)
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16.3.3 QCA Cases
This subsection analyses four qualitative cases (Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and
Colombia) from a QCA perspective (Please refer to Chap. 17 for further information
on the criteria for case selection and more detailed case analyses).
Regarding configurations that indicate enough coverage, high consistency, and an
actual outcome, only Colombia and Switzerland (the two extreme cases) exhibited
several consistent results. The other two cases (Cuba and Uruguay) only revealed
one or two consistent outcomes (see below). The respective outcomes for Colombia
and Switzerland are summarised in tabular form below. The extreme cases have
either positive outcomes without negative ones (Switzerland) or negative outcomes
without positive ones (Colombia) for both competitiveness and corruption.
16.3.3.1 Switzerland
Figure 16.7 summarises the solutions for competitiveness, Fig. 16.8 those for
corruption.
16.3.3.1.1 Competitiveness
The combination of the following factors explains (highly consistently)
Switzerland’s high Competitiveness (Fig. 16.7):
1. High Environment Performance (EPI);
2. Absence of State Religion;
3. Absence of a Concordat between the Swiss Confederation and the Vatican/
Roman Catholic Church-State;
4. High relative adherence to Protestant religion;
5. German legal origin;
6. High proportion of German-speaking population (Swiss);
7. High proportion of white ethnicity.
Table 16.1 (continued)
Group (condition) Positive outcome Negative outcome
low corruption. A sufficient path
to low corruption is high EPI,
high white, low Latino, low mes-
tizo, and low other non-white
ethnicities. Low corruption may
happen in other ways, but always
occurs in this configuration
non-white, and always have low
EPI. All predominantly mestizo
countries have high corruption.
The effect of other conditions is
not evident
Source: Author’s figure. See Appendix 4.3 for truth tables and Appendix 5 for Venn diagrams of
corruption
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Regarding legal origin and languages (groups 3 and 4), Switzerland stands alone
in its corresponding clusters. In group 3, this is probably because the other two
countries belonging to German legal origin (Germany and Austria) have high
Concordats. In group 4, Switzerland probably stands alone due to its multi-lingual
background (French, Italian, Romansh, and predominant (Swiss) German). The
other German-speaking countries exhibit no such condition.
16.3.3.1.2 Corruption
Unlike the competitiveness analysis, not all group solutions are consistent for
Switzerland with regard to corruption: State religion (2) and ethnicities (5) are not
consistent. However, the following conditions may be said to encourage low cor-
ruption (high transparency) in the case of Switzerland (Fig. 16.8):
1. High Environment Performance (EPI);
2. Absence of a Concordat between the Swiss Confederation and the Vatican State;
3. High relative adherence to the Protestant religion;
4. German legal origin; and.
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Fig. 16.7 Conditions, solutions, and clusters for competitiveness (Switzerland) (Source: Author’s
figure)
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Analysing corruption calls for the same considerations as when analysing com-
petitiveness. The outcome is the same: Switzerland appears on its own in the clusters
of groups 3 and 4 (legal origin and languages).
In Switzerland, most conservative Catholics escaped modernisation and central-
ism by relocating to the mountains, while Liberals and Protestants mostly remained
in flat areas that became industrialised (Obinger, 2009). The federal government has
been mainly liberal (anti-clerical) and close to Protestantism (ibid). Likewise, the
Protestant population was in the majority until the 1970s (Federal Statistical Office,
2017). Currently, the Protestant cantons are the most competitive, while the moun-
tainous Roman Catholic cantons are the least competitive in the Swiss Confederation
(UBS Switzerland AG, 2016).
16.3.3.2 Uruguay
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16.3.3.2.1 Competitiveness
Regarding the positive outcome—competitiveness related to predominant religion—
Uruguay clustered uniquely with Chile (incl. 0.88) in an outcome where one of the
most critical factors determining high competitiveness is EPI (Truth Table 1 in
Appendix 4.2).
Uruguay exhibits the highest levels of social progress in Latin America (Sect. 4.2)
as well as high safety (UNODC, 2013). Along with Chile, it is the only country in
Latin America with low perceptions of corruption (Transparency International,
2016). Likewise, Chile and Uruguay are liberal democracies with explicit anti-
clerical movements that never allowed concordats to be signed with the Roman
Church-State.
Further, Uruguay is by far Latin America’s most secular country with the lowest
religiosity and lowest proportion of Roman Catholics on the continent (Pew
Research Center, 2014, p. 46; Gallup, 2010). The Roman Catholic Church-State
did not significantly establish itself in Uruguay, unlike in most Latin American
countries. After gaining independence in 1828, Uruguay continued a secular direc-
tion with the recognition of civil unions in 1837. In 1917, the Uruguayan constitu-
tion completely separated church and state. Religious instruction was banned from
public schools and divorce became legalised. Consequently, Uruguayan govern-
ments have since progressively reduced the influence of the Roman Catholic
Church-State without, however, repressing religion as in Communist systems (Bar-
ber, 2012). Thus, for instance, the early and effective separation of church and state
meant that the State gained complete control over its education system already in
1877. This is unusual in Latin America (Da Costa, 2009).
16.3.3.2.2 Corruption
Like Cuba, the only condition with an incl. near 0.9 is the positive outcome for
corruption related to predominant religion in the population (incl. 0.831) (Truth
Table 21 in Appendix 4.2). In this group, Uruguay clustered with Chile and Cuba.
This cluster shows three countries with an unusual performance outside the entire
group of Latin American countries. First, they exhibit the relative lowest corruption
in the region. Second, Chile and Uruguay separated church and state in their
constitutions unusually early in Latin America (1925 and 1918, respectively);
Cuba did so in the wake of the Communist revolution (1959). Thirdly, none of
these countries has signed a Concordat with the Roman Catholic Church-State.
Some other Latin American countries such as Brazil also separated church and
state relatively early, but signed international agreements with the Roman See.
Fourthly, they exhibit favourable environmental performance (EPI). Geographically,
Argentina should also appear in this cluster for geographical and environmental
reasons. This, however, is not the case. Argentina has a Concordat with the Vatican/
Roman Catholic Church-State, and its constitution still privileges the Roman Cath-
olic Church.
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16.3.3.3 Cuba
16.3.3.3.1 Competitiveness
(Cuba has no data on competitiveness)
16.3.3.3.2 Corruption
In the case of Cuba, coverage and consistency are generally not high enough to draw
significant conclusions from the analysis. However, two important findings are:
1. Cuba appears, with high consistency (0.907), in the cluster MDA, MKD, UKR,
BIH, CUB for the negative outcome of corruption associated with legal origin
(Truth Table 31 in Appendix 4.2). All the countries in this cluster have a socialist
legal origin and are located mostly in Europe, except for Cuba.
2. The sole other consistent condition with an incl. near 0.9 is the positive outcome
of corruption for predominant religion in the population (incl. 0.831) (Truth
Table 21 in Appendix 4.2). In this group, Cuba clustered with Chile and Uruguay,
those countries with the lowest perceived corruption in Latin America (Trans-
parency International, 2016).
Cuba ranks in the middle of world distribution on the transparency index (Trans-
parency International, 2016). Compared to the cases studied (Europe and the
Americas), the countries clustering with Cuba exhibit moderate to high corruption
due to their Socialist Legal Origin. However, compared to the rest of Latin American
countries, the cluster including Cuba shows moderate to low corruption (i.e. not as
high as countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, or Paraguay). In other words,
separating the Catholic Church from the state had a positive influence (all three
countries in this cluster—Cuba, Chile, and Uruguay—have vigorously implemented
this separation). Nonetheless, adopting a socialist legal origin negatively impacts
transparency (as the cluster of socialist countries, including Cuba, shows). More-
over, Cuba does not exhibit as much transparency as either Chile or Uruguay. The
remaining clusters to which Cuba belongs do not exhibit high enough consistency
(Appendix 13.2).
16.3.3.4 Colombia
The analysis of Colombia is diametrically opposed to that of Switzerland.
Figure 16.9 summarises the solutions for competitiveness, Fig. 16.10 those for
corruption.
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16.3.3.4.1 Competitiveness
The analysis of competitiveness and corruption in the case of Colombia reveals
similar conclusions.
Note that Paraguay is the only country, alongside Colombia, that clusters for low
competitiveness (Fig. 16.9) and high corruption (Fig. 16.10). Therefore, the QCA
analysis for Paraguay may be expected to resemble Colombia with regard to
competitiveness and corruption.
16.3.3.4.2 Corruption
The combination of the following factors explains highly consistently the prevalence
of low competitiveness and high corruption in Colombia (as well as in Paraguay):
1. Low Environment Performance (EPI);
2. Concordat with the Vatican;
3. Roman Catholicism as state religion;
4. High adherence to Roman Catholicism;
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Fig. 16.9 Conditions, solutions, and clusters for competitiveness (Colombia) (Source: Author’s
figure)
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6. Roman language (Spanish); and.
7. High proportion of other non-white population.
Colombia is well-known in Latin America for its dominant Roman Catholic
Church and widespread religiosity (Levine, 1981, pp. 7–8) and is considered “the
most clerical Roman Catholic society of the continent” (Munevar, 2008, p. 389).
However, it follows Mexico on the blacklist of the top 50 countries where persecu-
tion of Christians is most severe in the world. Colombia and Mexico are the only two
countries in the Western hemisphere on that list, along with countries in the Middle
East and Africa (Open Doors, 2015). Colombia also exhibits very high homicide and
corruption rates compared to the rest of the world (UNODC, 2013; Transparency
International, 2016).
In conclusion, a “Catholic and conservative hegemony” has existed in Colombia
until 1991, when the Constitution of Rights was promulgated and religious pluralism
became legally recognised (Figueroa, 2008, pp. 256–270). However, as a result of
centuries of hegemony, the Roman Catholic Church-State still enjoys ample privi-
leges with the Colombian state (Munevar, 2008; Figueroa, 2016).
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252 16 Component 2 (Meso): Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
References
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity and
poverty. Crown Business.
Agnew, J. (2010). Deus Vult: The geopolitics of the Catholic Church. Geopolitics, 15(1), 39–61.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Sergio, K., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionaliza-
tion. Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 155–194.
Bara, C. (2014). Incentives and opportunities: A complexity-oriented explanation of violent ethnic
conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 51(6), 696–710.
Barber, N. (2012). Uruguay: A secular outpost legalizes abortion. Retrieved from http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/nigel-barber/uruguay-a-secular-utopia_b_1917005.html
Barrett, D. B., Kurian, G. T., & Johnson, T. M. (2001). World Christian encyclopedia (2nd ed.).
Oxford University Press.
Barro, R. J., & McCleary, R. M. (2005). Which countries have state religions? The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1331–1370.
Bazeley, P. (2012). Integrative analysis strategies for mixed data sources. American Behavioral
Scientist, 56(6), 814–828.
Becker, S., Pfaff, S., & Rubin, J. (2016). Causes and consequences of the protestant reformation.
Warwick Economics Research Paper Series.
Berman, H. (2003). Law and revolution II: The impact of the protestant reformations on the
Western Legal tradition. Harvard University Press, Belknap Press.
Chase, G. (2010). Religion’s impact on corruption. Journal of Business and Economics Perspec-
tives, 5(1), 102–112.
Cook, E. (2012). Roman Catholic hegemony and religious freedom: A seventh-day adventist
assessment of dignitatis humanae. Graduate Faculty of Baylor University.
Corral, C., & Petschen, S. (2004). Tratados Internacionales (1996-2003) de la Santa Sede con los
Estados. Concordatos Vigentes. Universidad Pontificia Comillas.
Da Costa, N. (2009). La laicidad uruguaya. Archives de sciences sociales des religions (146),
137–155.
Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, germs, and steel. The fates of human societies. W.W. Norton.
Federal Statistical Office. (2017). Language, religion and culture survey. Retrieved from https://
www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/surveys/esrk.html
Figueroa, H. (2008). Balance historiográfico sobre el protestantismo en Colombia. 1940-2007. In
GIERSP, Mirada pluridisciplinar al hecho religioso en Colombia: Avances de investigación.
Grupo Interdisciplinario de Estudios de Religión, Sociedad y Política, GIERSP.
Figueroa, H. (2016). La persistance des idées traditionalistes en Colombie. Religion et politique
(1886-1952). L’Harmattan.
Gallup. (2010). Religiosity highest in world’s poorest nations. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.
com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx
Giugni, M., & Yamasaki, S. (2009). The policy impact of social movements: A replication through
qualitative comparative analysis. Mobilization, 14(4), 467–484.
Grim, B. J., Clark, G., & Snyder, R. E. (2014). Is religious freedom good for business?: A
conceptual and empirical analysis. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion, 10(4),
1–19.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences. Comparing values, behaviours, institutions and
organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks: Sake.
Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional
values. American Sociological Review, 65(1), 19–51.
Johnson, T. M., & Zurlo, G. A. (2016).World Christian Database. Retrieved 04 2016, from Center
for the Study of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary. www.
globalchristianity.org
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The quality of government.
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1), 222–279.
References 253
Levine, D. (1981). Religion and politics in Latin America: The Catholic Church in Venezuela &
Colombia. Princeton Legacy Library.
Merryman, J., & Pérez Perdomo, R. (2007). The civil law tradition: An introduction to the legal
systems of Europe and Latin America (3rd ed.). Stanford University Press.
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2017). The long economic and political shadow of history—
Volume 3: Europe and the Americas. CEPR Press Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Miller, N. (2012). The religious roots of the first amendment. Oxford University Press.
Munevar, J. (2008). Transformación doctrinal y actitudinal de la participación política de las
iglesias cristianas evangélicas en Colombia. In GIERSP., Mirada pluridisciplinar al hecho
religioso en Colombia: Avances de investigación. Bogotá, Colombia: Grupo Interdisciplinario
de Estudios de Religión, Sociedad y Política.
Obinger, H. (2009). Religion and the consolidation of the Swiss Welfare State, 1848-1945. In
P. Manow & K. van Kersbergen (Eds.), Religion, class coalitions and welfare states
(pp. 176–209). Cambridge University Press.
Open Doors. (2015).World Watch List (WWL). The 50 countries where persecution of Christians is
most extreme. Retrieved from https://www.opendoorsusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
WWL2019_FullBooklet.pdf
Pew Research Center. (2014). Religion in Latin America. Widespread change in a historically
Catholic Region. Retrieved from: https://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-
america/
Ragin, C. (1987). The comparative method. University of California Press.
Ragin, C. C. (2000). Fuzzy-set social science. University of Chicago Press.
Ragin, C. (2003). Making comparative analysis count. COMPASSS Working Paper 2003-10.
Rihoux, B. (2003). Bridging the gap between the qualitative and quantitative worlds? A retrospec-
tive and prospective view on qualitative comparative analysis. Field Methods, 15, 351–365.
Rihoux, B., & Ragin, C. C. (2009). Configurational comparative methods: Qualitative comparative
analysis (QCA) and related techniques (Vol. 1–51). Sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/
9781452226569.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2006). International handbook on the economics of corruption. Edward Elgar.
Sachs, J. (2001). Tropical underdevelopment. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working
Paper, 8119 (NBER), 1–37.
Sachs, J. (2003). Institutions don’t rule: Direct effects of geography on per capita income. Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper, 9490 (NBER), 1–13.
Schneider, C., & Wagemann, C. (2012). Set-theoretic methods for the social sciences. Cambridge
University Press.
Transparency International. (2016). Retrieved from Corruption perception index http://www.
transparency.org/cpi2013/results
UBS Switzerland AG. (2016). L’indicateur de compétitivité des cantons 2016. UBS Switzerland
AG Chief Investment Office WM Case postale, CH-8098 Zurich.
UNODC. (2013). The Global Study on Homicide. Research and Trend Analysis Branch (RAB),
Division of Policy Analysis and Public Affairs (DPA). (D. o. under the supervision of Jean-Luc
Lemahieu, Ed.)
Volonté, C. (2015). Culture and corporate governance: The influence of language and religion in
Switzerland. Management International Review, 55, 77–118.
Weber, M. (1905).Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. Verlag Wirtschaft und
Finanzen.
Witte, J. (2002). Law and Protestantism: The legal teachings of the Lutheran Reformation.
University Press.
Woodberry, R. (2012). The missionary roots of liberal democracy. American Political Science
Review (APSR), 106(2), 244–274.
254 16 Component 2 (Meso): Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by




Component 3 (Micro): Case Studies
Switzerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia
This component analyses four case studies against the background of a literature
review and applying Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The case study approach is
holistic and seeks to understand generalisable processes and patterns to construct an
example of Grounded Theory (GT). In the present study, this approach combines
within-case and cross-case causal inferences (comparative cases and QCA) in order
to elucidate the causal mechanisms giving rise to empirical regularities (Goertz,
2017). To offer the broadest possible comparability, multiple case studies were
conducted rather than a single in-depth case study.
This part contains six chapters. While the following chapter describes the selec-
tion criteria and methods, the four subsequent chapters develop the four case studies.
The closing chapter compares and contrasts the four cases.
Reference
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Chapter 17
Case Selection Criteria, Methods, and Data
Treatment
Nested cases (at the opposite ends of a negative-to-positive scale) were selected from
the quantitative database (Appendices 1–4 and Supplementary Materials) for more
in-depth empirical (i.e. within-case) analysis. Four countries were compared: Swit-
zerland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Colombia. These cases are also linked to the correlated
variables in the quantitative model and to the sufficient conditions in the QCA.
Cases were selected based on the “extreme case method”. This consists of a
selection of cases exemplifying extreme or unusual values of one of the variables of
analysis. This approach is appropriate for exploratory research (Gerring &
Seawright, 2008). The QCA cases (Sect. 16.3.3) already mentioned some of the
variables that characterise these countries as extreme. Section 17.5 further illustrates
and compares some of the variables considered. The cases also analyse within-
country variations by region (whenever possible) (i.e. more Catholic versus more
Protestant areas in Switzerland, Uruguay, Colombia). Such analysis may also be a
source of inferential leverage. This approach combines within-case and cross-case
causal inferences to elucidate the causal mechanisms giving rise to empirical regu-
larities (Goertz, 2017). To offer the broadest possible comparability, multiple case
studies were conducted rather than a single in-depth case study.
17.1 Extreme Positive Case (Worldwide): Switzerland
Switzerland has the highest competitiveness score in the world (World Economic
Forum, 2016), one of the lowest homicide rates (0.6 (UNODC, 2013)), and one of
the lowest corruption indices in the world (85 (Transparency International, 2016)).
The country also enjoys widely acclaimed political, economic, and social stability.
Supplementary Information The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
030-78498-0_17) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
© The Author(s) 2022
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Its population and cantonal (i.e. federated) system exhibit a mixed distribution of
Roman Catholics and Protestants, making it an ideal case to analyse and compare the
historical influences of these denominations. Furthermore, the author developed this
research in Switzerland, which facilitated accessing and gathering primary and
secondary information.
17.2 Extreme Positive Case (Latin America): Uruguay
Uruguay has the highest social progress score in Latin America (Porter et al., 2015).
Besides Chile, it is also one of the most transparent countries in Latin America
(Transparency International, 2016) and one of the continent’s most secular countries
(Pew Research Center, 2014). These facts make Uruguay a worthwhile case for
examining whether the factors that made Uruguay less religious have also made the
country less corrupt and more equal. Consequently, this case provides vital infor-
mation for understanding the interrelations between the variables under study.
17.3 Cuba: A sui generis Case (Communist Proxy)
Cuba is the only Communist country in the Americas. Communism and secularism
are still in force in a country of contrasts: Cuba has one of the lowest homicide rates
in the Americas (4.2 (UNODC, 2013)) but also one of the continent’s lowest social
progress indexes (Porter et al., 2015).
The Cuban government actively suppressed religion for decades. However, since
the fall of the Soviet Union, the government has increased religious liberty by
opening up political space for religious belief and practice. This opening has resulted
in a dramatic flourishing of religious life in recent years (Goldenziel, 2009). Further,
Cuba might also serve as a proxy of former socialist countries that have tried to
eradicate the influence of religion on the state through adopting Marxist ideology.
Cuba currently faces corruption levels comparable to former Soviet countries
(Transparency International, 2016).
17.4 Extreme Negative Case: Colombia
Colombia is a proxy country in Latin America. It is characterised by pervasive
Roman Catholicism (i.e. with a valid Concordat, and one of the highest proportion of
adults raised as Roman Catholics worldwide (Pew Research Center, 2014)). Other
dominant features include high levels of corruption (Transparency International,
2016), and one of the world’s lowest equality (World Bank, 2016) and safety
rankings (World Economic Forum, 2017). Moreover, the author’s first-hand
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experience of working in government, civil society, and international agencies in his
native country provided direct insight (along with his extensive network).
17.5 Summary of Case Selection Criteria
Each of the selected countries serves as a proxy of a larger group of countries (Latin
American Strong Catholic, Secular, Communism, Protestant or mixed Old World.).
Comparing Switzerland and Latin American countries illuminates how religion and
prosperity indicators evolve differently within diverse political systems and against
the background of different historical roots.
Nested (extreme) cases were chosen for more in-depth empirical, quantitative and
QCA analysis (see Supplementary Materials). Table 17.1 summarises the four cases.
17.6 Methods and Data Treatment
The qualitative approach adopted here concentrated on which patterns in particular
(Silverman, 2005, p. 9) might trigger the observed effects, and hence complemented
the analysis of empirical correlations and QCA. The aim was to gain a greater
understanding of the research problem (Zikmund, 2003, p. 111), hence
complementing the statistical and QCA analyses of the previous chapters, even if
this approach implies that matters are “subjective in nature” (Zikmund, 2003,
p. 132).
17.6.1 Qualitative Method: Critical Discourse Analysis
(CDA) and Religion
Discourse analysis is central to this study, mainly because discourse, knowledge, and
power are closely related (Burr, 2003, p. 67; Carabine, 2001, pp. 267–268). One
especially fruitful type of discourse analysis was established by the French philos-
opher Michel Foucault. He suggested examining the interconnections between
discourse, knowledge, and power based on his key concept of “genealogy”. This,
as we will see, is related to institutions and prosperity.
Foucault (1972) developed an elaborate conceptual framework for discourse
analysis and proposed a rigorous methodological system to underpin such analysis.
However, he did not provide a “how to guide” to genealogy. Hence, methodologies
and applications vary (Carabine, 2001).
Importantly, CDA cannot be applied mechanically (Hjelm, 2014). Nor does any
universal CDA methodology exist (Fairclough, 2010, p. 6). On the contrary, every
17.6 Methods and Data Treatment 261
Table 17.1 A qualitative comparison of the four case studies
Item/Country Colombia Cuba Uruguay Switzerland
Social Progress
Index
Medium Low High High
Equality Low High High High
Crime and
homicide rate
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analytical approach to discourse requires specific design (Hjelm, 2014, p. 860).
Oswick (2012) shares similar views and sees CDA as the only discursive method
for considering ideology and power. CDA bridges cultural and linguistic studies in a
critical approach. Thus, it enables researchers to adequately examine the role of
religion in creating, transforming, reproducing, and sustaining inequalities (Hjelm,
2014, pp. 855–58).
Equally importantly, CDA is ethically committed to exposing the processes
through which discourses disseminate social structures that perpetuate hegemony
(i.e. maintain and assert the interests of dominant groups or classes) (Fairclough and
Wodak 1997; Wodak as cited in Heracleous, 2006, p. 4) and suppress alternative
constructions (Hjelm, 2014, p. 860).
CDA is one of the most used methodologies for analysing language and texts in a
wide range of fields, including management and organisation studies (The Editors,
2010, p. 1192). However, studies employing CDA are scarce in the sociology of
religion, and the valuable research potential of CDA has been underused as a result
(Hjelm, 2014; Moberg, 2013). Therefore, Hjelm (2014) has strongly encouraged
sociologists of religion to apply CDA, due to the obvious lack of critical approaches
to religion that take inequality and hegemony seriously (p. 857).
17.6.2 Critical Discourse Analysis Protocol
Fairclough (1992), Fairclough (2010), and Gee (2011) have developed stringent
guidelines for applying Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). According to Fairclough
(2010) selecting a CDA methodology involves developing a theoretical framework
relevant to a specific research project than choosing from an existing repertoire of
methods (Fairclough, 2010, p. 225).
What makes CDA unique is its division of analysis into three, cross-fertilising
aspects: (1) Textual analysis, (2) Analysis of discourse practice, and (3) Analysis of
social practice (including the relationship to existing hegemonies) (Hjelm, 2014,
p. 861; Fairclough, 1992, p. 73). These categories are of central interest for this study
Table 17.1 (continued)










(Source: Author’s figure. Based on Beltrán & Quiroga, 2017; Beltrán, 2008; Blanco, 2008;
Figueroa, 2016; Gill 1998, 2013; Koonings and Kruijt 2004; Crahan, 1979, 2017; Levine, 1981;
Munevar, 2008; Obinger, 2009; Open Doors, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2014; Transparency
International, 2016; World Economic Forum, 2016)
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as they help produce a comprehensive understanding of the impact of religion on the
three levels of analysis:
The first level of analysis (textual) involves closely studying a range of texts such
as political constitutions or Christian documents including The Holy Bible. Espe-
cially the Scriptures are central to analysing Christianity, as the text has remained
largely unaffected by time for centuries (i.e. King James or Martin Luther versions).
In contrast, Christian traditions have changed over time and vary among
denominations.
The second level (analysis of discourse practice) considers the paradigms and
public discourse of Protestants, Roman Catholic Church-State leaders, and govern-
ment and civil society stakeholders.
The third level (analysis of social practice) explores the coherence between
formal and de facto discourses, including the “commonsensical” language of social
practices. Typically, producing documents for their own sake neither relates to nor
explains social practice. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyse their coherence and
influence in institutions. Comparing lived reality beyond formal discourses allows
identifying patterns of social acceptance related to corruption and prosperity.
17.6.3 Data Treatment
Sixty semi-structured interviews were conducted and analysed using memos and
open coding. Protestant and Roman Catholic Church-State leaders, government,
academics, and civil society stakeholders were interviewed in a snowball system
between 2015 and 2017. Interviews were conducted in English, German, and
French, in the German and French-speaking regions of Switzerland. Interviews in
Latin America were conducted in Spanish and English (i.e. English speakers in the
Colombian Caribbean). All interviews were translated into English before coding.
For reasons of scope, not all the data or stakeholders interviewed appear in the main
body of this book. Table 17.2 shows the total number of interviews conducted in
each country.
Interviewees were mostly religious leaders or educated and informed stake-
holders. Many stakeholders interviewed were also university professors or academic
researchers. Protestants, Catholics, or non-religious interviewees were also asked
about their different ideologies.
Table 17.2 Interviews conducted in this research
Country Colombia Cuba Uruguay Switzerland Total interviews
Number of interviews 16 15 12 17 60
(Source: Author’s figure)
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17.6.3.1 Protecting Interviewee Identity
Before interviewing, stakeholders agreed to release their data on condition of
anonymity. Consequently, the discussion offered in this book and the corresponding
public datasets only contain stakeholders’ general institutional affiliations for com-
parison/triangulation purposes (e.g. government officer, university expert-lawyer,
Catholic priest, Protestant preacher). Other sensitive data possibly enabling identi-
fication were omitted.
17.6.3.2 Coding
Two qualitative researchers independently coded the data to align code application
and code definitions (a total of three independent researchers). Moreover, the author
took position in a separate memorandum (Appendix 5).
17.6.3.3 Triangulation
Triangulation is essential for crosschecking information through multiple procedures
and sources. It produces either corroboration or convergence in the case of agree-
ment or divergence in the case of disagreement.
The notion of identifiable Roman Catholic or Protestant traditions requires
gathering theoretical and historical data as well as qualitative data from interviewees.
Although interviewees shared their perceptions of religious traditions, these percep-
tions do not provide robust evidence of historical linkages or ramifications. Present-
day interviewees can only share their impressions of what their country has inherited
from its religious background.
Therefore, findings were triangulated using a triple strategy: (1) Diverse stake-
holder perspectives were included in each code (e.g. interviews with a government
officer, a Catholic priest, a Protestant pastor); (2) public documents or discourses;
and (3) other materials (e.g. historical, theoretical, textbooks).
The next four chapters provide background information on the religion–
prosperity–institution nexuses for each of the four cases. Each case study includes
charts that compare the different stakeholder principles identified in terms of
(1) Prosperity, (2) Corruption, or (3) Church-State relations. Each chart is followed
by a three-level CDA analysis.
Case details vary depending on historical importance, the information relevant for
comparison, and scope. More information is deliberately provided for Switzerland,
since this is the only European country compared and contrasted with the three
selected Latin American countries. Such detailed background information and three
empirical analyses concern prosperity, corruption, and church-state relations. Con-
sequently, the case of Switzerland also draws more detailed conclusions from its
three empirical analyses. By comparison, each Latin American case contains briefer
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background information and merely one empirical analysis (Uruguay: prosperity;
Cuba: corruption; Colombia: prosperity). The respective conclusions are synthesised
in Chap. 22.
Each case begins by characterising the background information and the main
features of the prosperity–corruption–religion nexus. This is followed by empirical
analysis.
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a) Switzerland: Extreme Positive Case
Study (Worldwide)
“In the name of God Almighty” (Preamble to the Federal
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 2018)
“Protestants value rationality and hard work, and see wealth
as a reward from God, an ethos which helped lay the
foundations of modern Swiss prosperity”. [. . .]
“Due to the influx of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese
workers, Catholics have outnumbered Protestants in
Switzerland since the 1970s” (Swiss Federal Department of
Foreign Affairs—FDFA Presence Switzerland, 2018).
These passages from official Swiss government sources reflect the obvious historical
importance of Christian religion in institutional affairs in Switzerland. This case
study seeks to briefly describe the possible impacts of the two major historical
religions (Protestants and Catholics) on Switzerland’s institutions, and thus on the
country’s prosperity.
Switzerland is the world’s oldest democratic nation-state, the oldest federal state
in Europe and the world’s most competitive country (World Economic Forum, 2016,
2017). By international standards, its institutional structure is exceptionally well-
organised. Such outstanding characteristics are worthy of admiration considering the
challenges facing an ethnically, linguistically, socioeconomically, and religiously
diverse society. Moreover, such social divisions do not necessarily all cluster
territorially (Gruner as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180). The following sections
consider the roots of prosperity and Christian religion in Switzerland.
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18.1 Religious Roots of Swiss Prosperity
Obinger’s (2009) detailed historical study concludes “that religion is indeed impor-
tant for explaining the developmental trajectory of the Swiss welfare state . . .”
(p. 177). It also extends significantly beyond Weber’s (1905) understanding of
Protestant rationality and hard work suggested by the FDFA (2018) (see citation at
the beginning of this chapter). For Obinger (2009), religion has impacted Swiss
social policy in complex and indirect ways. He identifies at least two channels of
influence: first, the country’s heterogeneous religious make-up, and thus its denom-
inational divide, which has profoundly impacted state and institution building in
Swiss society. Secondly, Switzerland’s party system reflects the impact of religion
on public policy in the “complexion of the federal government” (Obinger, 2009,
p. 177). Both channels concern the strong religious tensions that dominated the
modern Swiss state and nation-building from the outset. In this light, the next
sections analyse some historical institutional changes and several variations
concerning the country’s religious distribution.
18.2 Roman Catholics and Protestants in Switzerland
While Switzerland has traditionally been religiously diverse, Reformed Protestant-
ism has predominated since the Protestant Reformation (Baumann & Stolz, 2009).
However, since the 1970s Roman Catholicism has been the predominant religious
denomination (see initial FDFA citation). Figure 18.1 maps Switzerland’s denomi-
nations nearly two centuries after the beginning of the Protestant Reformation
(sixteenth century).
The dark grey areas represent those regions where Roman Catholicism persisted
after the Protestant Reformation. Notably, they correspond mainly to the central
cantons of Lucerne and its environs, Fribourg, north-western Bern (present-day
Jura), and the southern cantons of Valais and Ticino. The bright grey areas represent
the Reformed cantons. These are Zürich, Bern, and Basel (i.e. today’s German-
speaking region), and Lausanne and Geneva in the French-speaking part. The striped
and mid-grey areas represent mixed regions, some more Roman Catholic, others
more Protestant. Today’s cantons of St. Gallen and Grisons were fairly diverse.
This religious landscape was the result of successive wars between Roman
Catholics and Protestants during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Until the
nineteenth century, religion meant state religion. Changing denomination or marry-
ing across denominational boundaries involved losing one’s citizenship and led to
banishment. Therefore, Protestants and Catholics lived as “clearly defined political
entities” (Head-König, 2017, p. 24). Moreover, such traditional denominational
divides have determined the major trends and cultural characteristics of
Switzerland’s cantons to this day (Baumann & Stolz, 2009, p. 49).
270 18 a) Switzerland: Extreme Positive Case Study (Worldwide)
18.3 Federalism and Liberalism
In political terms, Catholic-Conservatives have traditionally been federalist. This
antecedent originated in the same founding document of the Confederacy, the
Federal Charter of 1291 between the communes of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden
(Catholic cantons until today) (Comité pour une Nouvelle Histoire de la Suisse,
2006). Liberals have been anti-clerical and centralist-oriented, and sided with the
Protestant endeavour to overthrow the ancient order from the 1830s onward (Gould
as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Liberal ideology inherently involved an attack on
the Roman Catholic Church-State and its preponderant role in education and other
areas of society (p. 180).
In 1848, the Swiss Federal State resulted from a late religious war (Gruner, 1977;
Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Protestants emerged victorious from this denominational
inter-cantonal civil war (Sonderbund), which meant that Protestants and
non-denominational liberals were largely responsible for writing the Federal Con-
stitution of 1848 (Obinger, 2009). Moreover, they have also dominated federal
power until recently. By contrast, Roman Catholics have mostly been a political
minority (not numerically) (Campiche & De Rham, 1977, p. 86; Girod, 1977). Social
Democrats and Christian (Catholics) Democrats together held the government
majority from 1959 to 2004. However, the existence of a significant and robust
Catholic Democracy is barely evident (Linder as cited in Haenni, 2009).
Fig. 18.1 Denominations in Switzerland (1700) (adapted from Montandon, Gilbert, & Altermatt
1991 as cited in Baumann & Stolz, 2009, p. 100); used with permission. Author’s translation of the
French original
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According to Obinger (2009), the 1848 Constitution, whose liberal principles
were largely preserved up until the introduction of the revised federal constitution of
1999), was imposed by the liberals (Freisinn) against the will of Catholic-
Conservative forces. Federalism “was a compromise between the more centralist-
oriented Liberals and the federalist Catholic-Conservatives” (Kölz as cited in
Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Consequently, the Federal Constitution realises core liberal
ideas such as “people’s sovereignty, secularism, and the creation of a national market
through the removal of trade barriers between the cantons” (Obinger, 2009, p. 180).
Also, the creation of the Swiss Federal Constitution and state organisation involved a
bottom-up process influenced chiefly by and borrowing from the “liberal constitu-
tions that emerged at the cantonal level from 1830 onward” (Kölz as cited in
Obinger, 2009, p. 180).
Furthermore, the Swiss Federal Constitution used United States federalism as a
blueprint (p. 180). This circumstance is linked to American Protestantism. In the
USA, a minority dissenting Protestant view of a separated church and state became
dominant in the Constitution and federalism (Miller, 2012). Similarly, in Switzer-
land, the demand for a strict separation of church and state was also rooted in
Protestantism (Haenni, 2009). In the Swiss Confederation, “the free, reformed,
nonconformist, dissenting currents of Protestantism have played an influential
role” in the country’s institutions (Manow, 2004, p. 5; Manow & van Kersbergen,
2009).
Swiss liberalism for its part forced the transition from a loose confederation to a
federal state and also sought to impose various ideas of the French Revolution
(Rosenberg as cited in Haenni, 2009). However, liberal religious ideals (mainly
Protestant) have also shaped the freedoms consecrated in the Swiss Federal Consti-
tution. The Constitutional preamble invoking God (cited above) indicates an obvi-
ously religious influence rather than a secular (laïque) one (Zeugin, 2006, p. 14).
18.4 Economic Backwardness of the Roman Catholic
Periphery
Following the 1848 Constitution, Swiss Roman Catholics perceived the liberal
centralist government as a threat to traditional Catholic norms and way of life.
Federalism provided local autonomy and an institutional shelter, and thus enabled
preserving the privileges and influence of the Roman Church-State in Catholic
regions. As a result, Catholics concentrated in rural areas where they maintained
their traditions, created a Catholic counterculture at the cantonal level against
modernisation, industrialisation, government centralisation, and secularisation.
They mostly remained firmly attached to the ancient order and opposed develop-
ments in science and technology (Obinger, 2009, p. 190). Moreover, the Catholic
periphery “reinforced antimodernist and anti-centralist attitudes” due to its economic
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backwardness and dependency on the more industrialised liberal centres (Altermatt
as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 190).
18.4.1 Education in Roman Catholic Cantons
Under the Federal Constitution of 1848, the cantons enjoyed almost exclusive
jurisdiction in education and welfare, among other matters. Catholics exploited
such local policies of autonomy to protect the strong influence of the Roman
Catholic Church-State on education and marital affairs (Obinger, 2009,
pp. 190–191).
Stadler (as cited in Head-König, 2017) mentions the difference between a con-
servative and a more liberal-radical Catholicism in what he calls “Catholic dualism”.
Conservative Catholicism was prevalent in rural regions where the first sector
(agriculture and livestock) was predominant (most Catholic cantons such as Valais,
Ticino, Jura, and Schwyz). In contrast, liberal Catholicism emerged “in regions
whose population tended to emancipate itself partially from the stronghold of the
Church” (p. 28; e.g. in Lucerne, where counter-Reformation Jesuits had influenced
the educational system).
Concerning the principal type of Catholicism in most Catholic cantons (conser-
vative), Head-König (2017) refers to the socio-economic power of the Roman
Church-State:
. . . rural Catholic societies were governed by and virtually saturated with religious precepts.
The Church not only controlled church attendance, the observation of the numerous reli-
gious holidays, the obligation to participate in religious processions (Joris 1973, 94) and to
receive Holy Communion at Easter, but also instructed adults not only on their moral
shortcomings and sexual disorders, but also in respect of evening gatherings and evening
schools (p. 45).
Head-König further dedicates a section of her discussion to “The Maintenance of
Ignorance”. This term describes the strategies for keeping people ignorant as one of
the most potent tools used by the Catholic Church-State to influence social behav-
iour. Such strategies were widely deployed in Catholic enclaves, at least until during
the interwar period, and included: limiting contact with the outside world, both
physically and intellectually; limiting access to information and to authorised liter-
ature; influencing the education system; overseeing emigration (Head-König, 2017,
pp. 46–47).
18.5 Cultural Struggle (Kulturkampf)
The cultural struggle between Catholic-conservative and liberal anti-clerical forces
erupted in Europe with the declaration of papal infallibility in 1870 and with the First
Vatican Council of 1871. The Council opposed the separation of church and state,
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secularisation, and scientific progress (Linder, 2005, p. 37; Haenni, 2009, p. 38;
Obinger, 2009, p. 181). At the time, the total revision of the 1874 Federal Consti-
tution constituted a response to the strictures of the Vatican Council. It included
denominational exemptions, which were directed particularly against the authoritar-
ianism of the Roman Catholic Church. Among others, Kulturkampfmeasures sought
to control Catholic religious education, Church appointments and properties. Con-
sequently, the Catholic Church no longer enjoyed undisputed influence, not even in
Catholic cantons (Head-König, 2017, p. 27). According to Gérard Pfulg, a Catholic
author, amidst the Kulturkampf, Catholics were presented as civilisation enemies;
they were reproached for their blind attachment to the Roman See, and their Swiss
patriotism was, therefore doubted (Pfulg as cited in Schmid, 1981, p. 70).
The Kulturkampf was strongly felt in the Bernese Jura and in the region of
Geneva (Hafner as cited in Schmid, 1981, p. 70). At the federal level, a critical
example of the Kulturkampf was the banning of the—consistently loyal to the
pope—Jesuit order in article 51 of the 1874 Constitution:
The order of the Jesuits and its affiliated societies shall not be accepted in any part of
Switzerland. Their members are prohibited from exercising any office in the Church or at
schools.1
Historically, the Jesuit order has been associated with the Counter-Reformation and
political intrigues (O’Malley, 1993). Several European and other countries (includ-
ing Catholic Spain and Portugal) forced them into exile. Even Pope Clement XIV
suppressed the Jesuit order from the Roman Catholic Church just before the French
Revolution. However, the Jesuits managed to gradually re-establish themselves in
the Church and in those countries from which they had been expelled. Switzerland
lifted their ban in 1973 via a national referendum (Gilles-Attinger, 2002).
18.6 Diplomatic Relations Between the Swiss Confederation
and the Roman See
The Protestant Reformation had a lasting influence on Swiss politics, at home and
abroad. Therefore, Swiss diplomatic relations with the Roman See have been fraught
by tensions since the Protestant Reformation (Python, 1994, p. 478). The Swiss
Federal Council ordered the papal nuncio in Lucerne to leave Switzerland in the
Kulturkampf in 1873. A nuncio returned to Bern 50 years later. However, the Swiss
Confederation remained without a diplomatic mission in the Vatican (Roman See)
until 1991, when a non-resident special envoy was appointed. Then, since 2004, the
Swiss government promoted this special envoy to a non-resident Ambassador to the
1Author’s translation of the German original: “Der Orden der Jesuiten und die ihm affiliierten
(angeschlossenen) Gesellschaften dürfen in keinem Teile der Schweiz Aufnahme finden, und es ist
ihren Gliedern jede Wirksamkeit in Kirche und Schule untersagt” (Schweiz – Bundesverfassung
1874).
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Vatican (Roman See) (currently the Ambassador of Switzerland in Ljubljana,
Slovenia) (Amrein, 2012; FDFA, 2018).
18.6.1 Cantonal Concordats
As the diplomatic relations between the Swiss Confederation and the Roman See
were consistently fragile, the possibility of a Concordat at the federal level would
have been inconceivable. However, valid agreements with the Roman Catholic
Church-State exist at the cantonal level, especially on administrative matters
concerning dioceses, bishops, and parishes. The following cantons and municipal-
ities have such agreements: Cantons: Aargau (1828); Bern (1828, 1864); Fribourg
(1924); St. Gallen (1845); Lucerne (1926); Thurgau (1828); Ticino (1884); Munic-
ipalities: Chur (1870); Basel (1884, 1968, 1978) (Corral & Petschen, 2004); (Corral,
2014).
18.6.2 Pontifical Swiss Guard
The pontifical Swiss Guard has existed since the Protestant Reformation (1506). It
participated in military combats during the Italian wars and was briefly disbanded
during the French Revolution. The current 100–110 “Defenders of the [Catholic]
Church freedom” (according to their papal title of 1512) must be Swiss Catholic
soldiers. Some even descend from Guard families (Python, 1994).
18.7 Current Confessional Ties in the Swiss Population
In Swiss politics, religion still plays a role at the institutional level. Examples include
(1) the involvement of ecclesiastical institutions in education and social aspects,
(2) the consultation of constitutional articles to the Churches before voting, (3) the
military chaplaincy in the army (Campiche & De Rham, 1977, p. 85).
Regarding population distribution, the distribution of Roman Catholics and
Protestants in the Swiss Confederation has long persisted. The mainly Protestant
enclaves of 1700 (Fig. 18.1) have largely remained Protestant as Fig. 18.2 shows.
The same generally applies to Roman Catholic enclaves.
Nevertheless, analysing data trends during the twentieth century reveals drastic
changes in population distribution. Table 18.1 shows demographic changes in the
last two centuries for both Roman Catholics and Protestants. A sustained decrease in
the Protestant population, a sustained increase of Roman Catholics, and particularly
an increase of “other” (religions and non-religions) are evident.
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Although the majority of the Swiss population officially belonged to the two main
churches (Catholic or Protestant) until 1960, early signs of secularisation had already
manifested in 1900 in larger Swiss towns. Besides, secularisation affected both
Catholics (in Basel, around only one third were practising members of the faith)
and Protestants (in Zürich, only one in ten attended church on Sundays) (Head-
König, 2017).
Subsequently, after the 1970s, not only did Roman Catholics outstrip Protestants
in numbers, but the most important historical change in the last half-century was the
profound “de-Christianisation” of Swiss society. Characteristic of this shift is a
profound decrease in the proportion of both Catholics and Protestants in relation to
the total number of inhabitants. This transformation was countered by an essential
increase in secular groups (agnosticism and atheism), non-membership, as well as by
Fig. 18.2 Denominations by Cantons (2000) (Stapferhaus Lenzburg 2006 as cited in Baumann &
Stolz, 2007, p. 44). © 2007 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld. This work is licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License (Author’s translation of this
figure’s legend: Protestantisch¼ Protestants; Römisch-katolisch¼Roman Catholics; Andere
Religionen¼Other religions; Keine Zugehörigkeit¼No affiliation; Absolute Zahlen¼Absolute
numbers; exklusive «Ohne Angabe»¼ excluding “not specified”)
Table 18.1 Changes in the demographic distribution of Protestants and Roman Catholics in
Switzerland in the last two centuries (adapted from Head-König, 2017; FDFA, 2018; Federal
Statistical Office, 2017)
Percentage of (%) 1837 1900 1960 2017
Protestants 59.4 57.8 52.7 24.9
Roman Catholics 40.5 41.6 45.9 37.3
Other 0.1 0.6 1.4 37.8
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other religious groups (see Fig. 18.3, and Tables 18.1 and 18.2). This pattern is
observable both in Switzerland and across other Western European countries
(Berger, 1999; Todd & Zurlo, 2016).
Roman Catholics are currently in the majority in most of the cantons and cities, as
well as in the entire Swiss Confederation. To compare the urban-rural divide in
Switzerland, Table 18.2 presents the proportion of religious adherents in some of the
main Swiss cities and cantons in 2018.
However, the current proportions of religious adherents alone do not speak of the
religiosity of the population, and even less, of the social effects of religion (Hayward
& Kemmelmeier, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Barro & McCleary, 2003;
McCleary & Barro, 2006), (see Sect. 5.3). In turn, “current social norms” are the
“legacy of prior religious beliefs” (Glaeser & Glendon, 1998, p. 431) and owe more
to the historical and institutional weight of religion than to its contemporary influ-
ence (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Arruñada, 2010; Chaves &
Cann, 1992; Wilde et al., 2010). Therefore, regardless of the higher proportion of
Roman Catholics or the secularisation of the society, the Swiss institutional structure
still responds to a traditional Protestant and liberal influence (Obinger, 2009;
Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Python, 1994,; Campiche & De Rham, 1977). Moreover,
Protestant churches have traditionally been entangled with the political structure of
Fig. 18.3 Evolution of religious landscape in Switzerland (1970–2000) (Federal Statistical Office,
2020)
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the cantons, as they are, in fact, “canton churches” (Gould, 1999 and Cattacin et al.,
2003 as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180).
18.8 Competitiveness of the Swiss Cantons and Religion
High competitiveness in Switzerland might be associated with the federal model of
government. Among other aspects, Swiss federalism is empirically related to sus-
tainable growth, business development, efficient government, and increasing social
Table 18.2 Proportions of religious adherents in different Swiss cantons and cities in 2018











49.0 15.4 6.4 5.6 22.3
Bern (city) 33.5 19.2 5.1 7.6 33.5
Zurich
(canton)
27.2 25.6 6.3 8.4 31.2
Zurich (city) 19.1 26.5 5.4 8.6 39.0
Geneva
(canton)
8.9 32.2 5.4 8.2 42.7
Geneva
(city)
7.2 31.4 5.9 9.2 43.5
Basel
(canton)
29.3 24.9 5.3 6.9 32.2
Basel (city) 14.4 15.5 5.8 11.6 51.4
Vaud
(canton)
22.3 28.7 6.1 6.6 34.4
Lausanne
(city)
12.7 29.1 6.5 10.1 39.6
St Gallen
(canton)
20.4 42.4 6.2 8.7 20.9
St Gallen
(city)
18.7 34.0 8.3 10.2 27.0
Lucerne
(canton)
9.9 59.2 4.5 5.8 19.6
Lucerne
(city)
10.9 48.3 5.4 6.7 27.6
Ticino
(canton)
3.9 63.5 5.2 3.0 22.8
Lugano
(city)
3.2 59.1 6.6 4.5 24.9
Total in
Switzerland
23.0 35.0 6.0 7.0 28.0
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capital. The federal system also encourages the cantons to compete over tax rates and
other business conditions (Feld et al., 2017).
The USA, which also has a federal government, is the second most competitive
country in the world (World Economic Forum, 2016). However, such an argument
cannot be generalised. Sudan, Iraq, India, and Mexico, among others, also have
federal-type governments and are not as competitive as the USA or Switzerland.
Likewise, federalism (although important) alone does not explain the significant
differences in competitiveness between Swiss cantons.
The previous maps (Figs. 18.1 and 18.2) show the predominant Protestant or
Roman Catholic historical enclaves that have existed in the Swiss Confederation
over the last few centuries until the present (2000). Compared in terms of current
competitiveness among Swiss cantons, Protestant Cantons are as a rule most com-
petitive, Roman Catholic ones least competitive.
Swiss competitiveness concentrates in the northern, central, and western regions.
The southern and eastern territories are the least competitive (see Fig. 18.4).
According to UBS Switzerland AG (2016), mountainous topography limits the
competitiveness of the large low-competitive southern cantons (Valais, Ticino,
Grisons) and other small mountainous cantons. Nonetheless, when compared inter-
nationally, even the least competitive cantons in Switzerland, achieve higher values
in innovation per capita than France, Italy, or Austria. Exceptionally, Uri, the least
innovative canton in Switzerland with the highest proportion of Roman Catholics,
attains similar innovation values per capita than Italy (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016;
Federal Office of Statistics, 2017).
Fig. 18.4 Cantonal competitiveness indicator (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016; used by permission of
the authors)
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The dark green areas show the most competitive regions (Fig. 18.4). They
correspond to Protestant cantons (e.g. Zürich, Geneva, Lausanne, Basel, Bern) or
mixed ones (e.g. Thurgau and St. Gallen). Decreasing to bright green, competitive-
ness drops to the dark red territories, the least competitive ones. These are Roman
Catholic cantons (e.g. Valais, Jura, and Ticino) or mixed ones (e.g. Grisons).
Exceptions are Lucerne and Zug, which, although predominantly Roman Catholic,
are also highly competitive.
This review suggests that various factors in combination explain the roots of
competitiveness in Switzerland. Two factors seem crucial for competitiveness. First,
environment and geography: Generally, a canton located in the mountains has more
difficulties in developing infrastructure and services than cantons in flat areas.
The second reason adds an important aspect to the first. Before the Protestant
Reformation (sixteenth century), even flat areas, where competitiveness is concen-
trated today (e.g. Zürich), had a mainly rural economy with no tendency towards
economic expansion. However, subsequent industrialisation increased literacy and
human capital, two of the principal contributions of the Protestant Reformation
(Cantoni, 2015; Becker et al., 2016; Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Comité pour
une Nouvelle Histoire de la Suisse, 2006).
Moreover, both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism persisted in Switzerland
after the Protestant Reformation (Figs. 18.1 and 18.2). Although the number of
adherents is not as significant as six decades ago, the longstanding consequences of
liberal and conservative ideologies are still evident in institutions. Conservative
Catholicism retreated to the mountains, thus preserving the privileges of the
Church-State and serving “The Maintenance of Ignorance” (Head-König, 2017).
Consequently, mountainous Catholic Cantons such as Uri, Jura, Valais, and Appen-
zell Innerrhoden have, even to date, the lowest human capital (i.e. education) in the
Swiss Confederation (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016, p. 13). Still, most of these
cantons are even more innovative per inhabitant than surrounding Catholic countries
with diverse geographical conditions (flat and mountainous). The influence of liberal
federal institutions may have nuanced the effect of low human capital, thus making
Catholic cantons more innovative.
On the other hand, liberal Catholicism mainly remained in the flat regions and
cities (e.g. Lucerne) and benefitted from educational centres, infrastructure, and
services (Clark & Kaiser, 2003). In this respect, both Catholic and Protestant regions
in Switzerland profited from the Reformation and its influence on federal
institutions.
More importantly, the long-term effect of the Reformation is still evident in
Switzerland today, culturally and institutionally (regardless of the current low
religiosity). Volonté (2015)’s empirical study of 753 firm-years found that Protes-
tants and Swiss-Germans tend to prevent concentrations of power (i.e. two-tiered
board structures in corporate management). Conversely, Roman Catholics and the
Swiss-French tend to tolerate strong leadership and hierarchical structures
(i.e. single-tier boards) in Switzerland.
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The following subsections (18.9–18.11) synthesise and analyse the empirical
information collected for Switzerland in terms of CDA (Critical Discourse
Analysis).
18.9 Empirical Analysis and CDA for Switzerland
(1. Prosperity)
18.9.1 Textual Analysis (Theological)
The Christian (i.e. biblical) principle of prosperity is associated with obeying the
Commandments (set of moral laws). A fairly harmonious discourse exists among
Protestant stakeholders regarding this principle. This might be due to conformity to
the original Sola Scriptura principle of the Protestant Reformation.
Among the below stakeholders (Table 18.3), the Protestant Free Pastor (g) refers
to the Old Testament and to more recent examples of disobedience wreaking havoc
on civilisations, whereas obedience to the biblical principles ensured prosperity.
Similarly, the Independent Protestant Believer (n) links Swiss precision and perfec-
tion with the New Testament principle of achieving perfection for a perfect God,
rather than for imperfect humans. On the other hand, Roman Catholic stakeholders
prefer a somewhat more secular (non-theological) approach to prosperity in Swit-
zerland. None of the Catholic interviews referred to a biblical principle. The Catholic
Church-Government Stakeholder intermediary (q) is skeptical about a possible
religious (or biblical) relationship between prosperity and industrialisation. None-
theless, (q) mentions “Catholic piety” and “Sacramental theology” as possible
explanations of the rural trend in Catholic cantons and cites other material reasons.
Protestantism has heavily criticised sacramental theology for lacking an entirely
biblical basis (Witte, 2002).
18.9.2 Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical
Triangulation)
Like Fukuyama (1995), the Free Church Pastor (f) links Swiss people’s trustworthi-
ness with high productivity and quality, and with a possible religious (Protestant)
influence à la Weber. The Protestant Free Pastor (g) mentions that the elite controls
education in hierarchical (e.g. Roman Catholic or Orthodox) societies. This argu-
ment is in line with Head-König’s (2017, p. 45) analysis of Swiss Catholic cantons
(Sect. 18.4.) Likewise, the Free Protestant Believer (n) establishes an explicit
theoretical relation with Fukuyama (1995). Lastly, for the non-practising Catholic
Academic (l) “Protestant chauvinism [. . .] perverts Max Weber’s original line of
reasoning”, which is frequently used to explain the prosperity of nations. After
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Table 18.3 Principles of prosperity according to stakeholders interviewed in Switzerland (Source:
Author’s figure)
Prosperity
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
The Holy Bible “Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may prosper




“The Swiss mentality is to stick to what is right. We stick to what we say [. . .
and this] lead us to trust in ourselves. Then we are proud of [. . .] the high
quality of what we produce”.
“[. . .] Protestants are hard-working. [. . .] Catholic Cantons tend to be agri-
cultural and livestock-oriented partly because they are in mountainous areas




“There is absolutely a relationship between occultism and development. The
more a culture is involved in occultism, the faster it is destroyed. [. . .] That
was the ‘cyclical’ history of the Jews [book of Judges]. [. . .] [C]ivilisations
that live with [according to] the Bible all manage very well. They have
prospered successfully such as the USA and Germany with Protestantism.
Using the Bible, they have become world powers. [. . .] [T]he economies of
Catholic countries are less well developed because the Catholic elites
manipulate the power to keep people low and poor in general (e.g. education).
They do not want people to know too much. Protestantism strengthens
education and culture attains high moral standards. European countries and
cultures like Spain, Italy, and Poland [mainly Catholics] or Romania or
Greece [mainly Orthodox] are influenced by corrupt ethical codes. The





“The [Protestant] Reformation is a major reason for development. At the
bottom of everything lies Protestant chauvinism, which perverts MaxWeber’s
original line of reasoning. To some extent, religion is not constant. Sometimes
religiosity strengthens and weakens in a cyclical development and runs in





“Catholics tend to be more conservative here in Switzerland. [. . .] In Schwyz
[. . .], where Catholics are a majority, people tend to be more helpful than in
the large cities of other Cantons. [. . .] [P]erhaps [. . .] the conservative mindset





“Francis Fukuyama says that trust, culture, and religion can explain devel-
opment. In Switzerland, 85% of industrialisation occurred in Protestant Can-
tons. [. . .] Huguenots [. . .] established the high-precision industry like watch-
making. The perfection evident in this work comes from the idea of doing any






“I am not so sure if the religious history of this country can really explain this
[Swiss prosperity]. [. . .] There might be a relation [between denomination]
and industrialisation. There must be a connection. But the influence might
come from both directions. [. . .] [I]n Zürich, it was more interesting for the
government [. . .] and also for the people to become Protestants than [. . .] in
Central Switzerland, because of the liberties; the distance they could maintain
from being ruled by the hierarchical [Catholic] Church. They could have
more freedom. [. . .] I do not think that Catholics are less intelligent or less
likely to work than others. It is more about interaction. Catholic piety, which
relates everything in everyday life to faith, asserts that it is easier to live on a
farm than in a city. It is less rational and more about nature, and perhaps also
about establishing greater affinity with sacramental theology”.
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harshly criticising Weber’s theory of the Protestant work ethic, stakeholder (l) refers
implicitly to the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). The latter
explains why society becomes more secularised when enough freedom and security
exist. Stakeholder (l) was most critical of a possible relationship between religion
and prosperity.
18.9.3 Analysis of Social Practice
The Roman Catholic Believer (m) positively associates a more conservative Catholic
mindset with examples of helpfulness. However, stakeholder (m) links a conserva-
tive mentality with a “medieval economy”, and thus partly explains the fact that most
Catholic cantons are not as industrialised as Protestant ones. Catholic Church-
Government intermediary Stakeholder (q) partly agrees with the relationship
established between a conservative mentality and a medieval economy, when
referring to “a less rational . . . Catholic piety”. Various authors, for instance,
Obinger (2009) and Head-König (2017) have provided evidence that the connection
between Catholicism and a medieval economy extends beyond an intuitive link (see
also Sects. 18.3–18.4). Likewise, the Protestant Free Pastor (f) states that most
Catholic cantons are located in the mountains, which also partly explains why they
are less competitive. This view concurs with a recent analysis of cantonal compet-
itiveness (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016). As such, this evidence shows that the
combination of at least two factors—geography AND religion, instead of one OR
the other—greatly determines cantonal competitiveness.
18.9.3.1 Law and Institutions
The Catholic Church-Government intermediary Stakeholder (q) recognises a mutual
relationship between denomination and industrialisation. Stakeholder (q) also pro-
vides relevant examples, including the causes of the Reformation in Zürich and in
Basel and the desire to free oneself “from the control of the hierarchical [Catholic]
Church”.
18.10 Empirical Analysis and CDA for Switzerland
(2. Corruption)
18.10.1 Textual Analysis (Theological)
The Scriptures explicitly encourage believers to refrain from accepting bribes
(Table 18.4). In addition, the three last Commandments of the Decalogue (8. Thou
shalt not steal; 9. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor; and 10.
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Table 18.4 Principles of corruption according to stakeholders interviewed in Switzerland (Source:
Author’s figure)
Corruption
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
The Holy Bible “Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and righteous slay thou
not: for I will not justify the wicked. And thou shalt take no gift: for the gift
blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous” (King James
Bible, 1769, Exodus 23: 7–8).
a) Roman Cath-
olic Priest 1.
“We are a small country with a very dense population. Very developed civil
societies work through associations. [. . .] That system works well in civil
society to organise citizens as well as in politics. [. . .] That keeps everyone
accountable to others [. . .]. . .the State was against Catholicism because the
Church was not democratic. [. . .] In the 19th century, we [Swiss] created a
Church law that is parallel to the canonical law of the Catholic Church. This
happened only within Catholicism because it was not acting according to legal
principles. For this reason, the Church, along with the state, had to create a law
according to democratic principles. This means that we now have a dual legal
structure that is unique in the world. [. . .] [Now] lay members who are in
associations, according to democratic law, manage the Church’s finances. The
money does not land in the hands of bishops but in those of lay people and
Church associations, which are responsible for financial affairs. [. . .] This is
the case in Switzerland, not because of Liberation Theology, but because the
State forced the Church to be more democratic in order to be accepted as a




“I think it is true that there is a much stricter discourse on responsibility and
honesty [in a Reformed context]. [. . .] I believe that in Switzerland, which is
very Reformed [Protestant], there is a dual discourse. [. . .] Corruption
[in Switzerland] is lived in another way. [. . .] many things do not meet the eye





“In the Protestant tradition, it’s very important that your life and principles are
the same [coherent]. In Catholic traditions [there] are double standards: You
have principles for monks, and for the poor, and [for] lay people. In Cathol-
icism, you have the doctrine on one side and reality on another. These things
[doctrine and reality] are always different, and the difference is accepted in
Catholicism. [. . .] In the Protestant tradition, you have lower standards, but
you are expected to meet them. Not, though, in Roman Catholicism [where
matters are the other way around]”. [. . .] “Rabbinic Judaism has similarities
with Protestantism [as] for both; the Scriptures come first and occupy a central
role. [. . .] When Jesus, a Jew, spoke about the truth to Pilate, a Roman, Pilate
asked Jesus, what is truth? [John 18, 37–38]. This shows how incompatible





“I don’t know why Catholics should be corrupt or shouldn’t. I’mCatholic, but
I’m not especially associated with it. I’m Catholic. . . [because] family
enforces this when you grow up. This is also true in other countries. ... As a
Swiss Catholic, I have more in common with a Nordic Protestant than with an






“Here in Switzerland, direct democracy and our type of government [Federal]
might mean more accountability and less corruption. It’s always better to
share decisions with a lot of people rather than to concentrate them [decisions]
on a few [people]. Perhaps, in a monarchy or a Republic, power is concen-
trated, which increases the risk of a totalitarian regime and corruption”.
(continued)
284 18 a) Switzerland: Extreme Positive Case Study (Worldwide)
Thou shalt not covet (. . .) any thing that is thy neighbor’s) should provide the
conscious Christian believer to abstain from corrupt activities.
Similar to the above prosperity analysis for Switzerland (Sect. 18.9), Protestant
stakeholders refer to guiding biblical principles. Stakeholder (n) (i.e. Independent
Free Protestant Believer) asserts that the Bible is the source of truth. This recalls the
Sola Scriptura principle of Protestantism and contrasts with the relative truth
characteristic of the Greco-Roman background. The Protestant Reformed Evangel-
ical Pastor (h) also reflects on the discussion of “truth” by drawing attention to the
biblical dialogue between Jesus, a Jew, and Pilate, a Roman. For stakeholder (h),
both Protestantism and Rabbinic Judaism consider the Scriptures the source of truth,
which is incompatible with relativistic Roman philosophy. Therefore, in line with
the previous prosperity analysis, Roman Catholic stakeholders do not refer to a
consolidated Scriptural basis, but instead to a variegated one, specifically associating
corruption with secular issues. Such variegated associations of Roman Catholic
stakeholders concur more with the Aristotelian “non-absolute” and “mean” relative
points that Selling (2018) considers typical of Roman Catholic ethics.
Table 18.4 (continued)
Corruption





“For us in the German-Swiss tradition truth and facts are perhaps more
important than relations, and it seems that in Latin contexts it is the other way
around. The Bible is our source of truth [Protestants]. Latin contexts are
influenced by Roman and Greek philosophy, where truth is relative. [. . .] The
indulgences were just the tip of the iceberg of corruption in the Catholic
Church. They allowed one to do as one pleased. If you repent, for instance,
contribute either money or say some Hail Mary prayers, you are completely
absolved by a priest. You could have even killed or abused people. [. . .] That
[corruption] is what Luther also fought in the Reformation as the Bible clearly
states that only God can forgive sins. [. . .] Pope Francis still offers indul-





“I think the whole system of Switzerland is such that everything next to your
town has a strong impact. Every unit has its own police, its own prison, etc.
[. . .] Social control is quite efficient because we have no big cities. [. . .] We
shouldn’t forget that our banks have money that shouldn’t have been there, so
we are not 100% clean. It was not illegal, but it was not very moral either. [. . .]
The state does not allow church taxes to flow directly into our hierarchical
structure, but to those who organise themselves to collect this source of
income. This idea also exists in the United States, where there is no taxation
without representation, and it is applied to the Church as well. This is a unique
case in the world. [. . .] The bishop formally proposes a priest, but if the local
Catholics do not elect him, he will receive no pay. This is quite a special
tradition. It goes back to medieval times in Switzerland, and was strengthened
by the Reformation. This led to the elimination of hierarchical thinking. And
then the state organised church life to a certain degree”.
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18.10.2 Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical
Triangulation)
For the Roman Catholic Priest (a), Switzerland is a small country where citizens can
organise themselves in associations in which they can participate and are account-
able for their actions. These characteristics, among others, distinguish Switzerland
(i.e. make the country more competitive and less corrupt) from other countries,
according to a Catholic priest (a). This argument concurs with Ostrom (2015), who
explains the mechanisms underlying participatory institutions (e.g. Swiss alpine
pastures management).
18.10.3 Analysis of Social Practice
The Roman Catholic Theologian (e) believes that corruption is concealed in Swit-
zerland. He mentions the dual Protestant discourse in this respect, but admits that
Protestantism has stricter honesty and responsibility principles. The Protestant
Reformed Evangelical Pastor (h) makes a similar observation on double standards,
which he identifies in Roman Catholicism, where doctrine and lived reality are
opposed or different, while in Protestantism lower standards are expected to be
fulfiled.
On the other hand, the Non-practising Catholic Academic (l) identifies with
Nordic Protestants rather than with Italian Catholics. This exemplifies
McSweeney’s (2015) argument about the impossibility of Roman Catholicism
constituting a self-contained cultural unit. Furthermore, in Switzerland, as in other
Protestant countries, the Reformation secularised both the state and local Roman
Catholicism (Becker et al., 2016; Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009; Inglehart &
Baker, 2000). Thus, the self-identification of a Catholic stakeholder (l) with a Nordic
Protestant is somewhat foreseeable.
Stakeholder (n) (i.e. Independent Free Protestant Believer) mentions a duality of
truth relations in the German-Swiss cultural context as opposed to a Latin context.
This view is linked to the concepts developed by Hall (1990) (low-context for
German-Swiss and high-context for Latin societies). Stakeholder (n) also refers to
the roots of corruption in Roman Catholic doctrines. These include the concept of
indulgences used by Jorge Bergoglio, also known as “Pope Francis”, to promote
events like the Catholic World Youth Day in 2013 (Kington, 2013).
18.10.3.1 Law and Institutions
Among the interviewed stakeholders, the Catholic priest (a) mentions that the Swiss
government forced the Roman Catholic Church-State to adopt democratic practices
on Swiss territory from the nineteenth century. He further asserts that the Swiss
286 18 a) Switzerland: Extreme Positive Case Study (Worldwide)
managed to create a parallel church law to Catholic canon law. This argument
concurs with the legal principles and Protestant revolutions explained in Sect. 8.
3.4. Here, the Catholic Church-Government Stakeholder (q) explains that the current
Swiss mechanisms of participation and transparency in the fiscal management and
elections of priests and bishops in the Swiss Catholic Church are unique worldwide.
The Catholic Stakeholder (q) links this to the Protestant Reformation. Such notions
complement Obinger’s (2009) and Python’s (1994) observations on the profound
influence of the Protestant Reformation on Swiss politics and institutions (Sects.
18.2–18.6).
Similarly, the Independent Catholic Believer (m) relates two essential factors to
the prevalence of high transparency in Switzerland: federalism and direct democ-
racy. Both factors have positively affected transparency (and prosperity) (Obinger,
2009) (Sect. 18.3). Democracy is also related to Protestantism (Woodberry, 2012).
Conversely, the Roman Catholic Church-State has a monarchic structure, which
historically has opposed democratic systems (Cook, 2012).
The Catholic Church-Government intermediary (Stakeholder q) points to the
efficiency of social control in small Swiss towns (in line with the Roman Catholic
priest (a). Also, similarly to the Roman Catholic Theologian (e), Stakeholder
(q) challenges the reputation of Swiss transparency with specific examples such as
the morality of the banks.
18.11 Empirical Analysis and CDA for Switzerland
(3. Church-State Relations)
18.11.1 Textual Analysis (Theological)
The New Testament clearly distinguishes between earthly (government) and spiri-
tual (heavenly) powers, which are and should maintain separated (Table 18.5).
According to the biblical principle of the separation of powers, the Protestant Free
Church Pastor 1 (f) asserts that the attitude of the Swiss federal government is
secular. Similarly, the Ecumenical Pastor (i) explains that the non-hierarchical
organisation of the federal government and the Protestant Church even influence
Roman Catholicism in Switzerland.
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Table 18.5 Principles of church-state relations according to stakeholders interviewed in Switzer-
land (Source: Author’s figure)
Church-State relations
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
The Holy Bible “Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world: [. . .]” (King James Bible,
1769, John 18: 36). “[. . .] Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are




“Catholic Churches within Switzerland are not organised on a national level
but on the cantonal level, as all Catholic affairs are organised this way. There







“Switzerland and the Holy See do have a bilateral agenda, but compared to a
regular sovereign nation, this cannot be considered a priority. [. . .]
The Holy See’s main interests would not go beyond keeping channels of
communication open and cultivating good relations with the [Swiss] Con-
federation. [. . .]
The specific character of Swiss democracy leaves little room for development
[of a new agreement with the Holy See (i.e. Concordat)]. Only some kind of
state crisis at the cantonal level might provoke discussion and perhaps facil-
itate negotiating some international agreement.
The principal work of the Nunciature in Bern has to do with the Catholic
Church in Switzerland. The Holy See is unique among embassies because it




“The general attitude of the [Swiss Federal] government is secular. The
relation between the state and the churches is getting weaker and weaker,
except for the Roman Catholic Church. Catholic [political] parties are strong
and the embassy of the Vatican in Bern has a far greater influence than the
Protestant churches, which have no embassy. Also, the Protestant population
is decreasing, and Protestant leaders have, in general, inferior feelings of





“Until 1970, living together without being legally married (cohabitation) was
forbidden in Switzerland. Uri was the last canton to accept cohabitation. In the
past, only the first son could inherit the parents’ land in Switzerland, perhaps
also due to the biblical tradition”.
i) Ecumenical
Pastor
“The Swiss Protestant Church is in many ways like the Swiss federal gov-
ernment. For example, there is not a single head but a multi-party system.
Here in Switzerland, even the Catholic Church is different because this is not a
hierarchical society. But Catholics are subject to the Vatican anyway. This is
why there is a branch of Catholics (Christkatholisch) that doesn’t accept the
Pope’s authority. Protestants and Catholics are not united here just because
Protestants refuse to accept the Pope’s authority in Switzerland”.
k) Academic
expert-lawyer
“Religious law has strongly influenced the Swiss legal system for many
centuries. [. . .] The influence of the Church was mostly dominant until the
mid eighteenth century. . . [until] a significant change occurred in 1798 with
the French Revolution. However, its influence [i.e. the French Revolution’s]
did not last because the Helvetic Republic ended already in 1803. [. . .] There
is a large gap between Protestant and Catholic cantons, most of which have
their own tradition of how religion influenced their laws. [. . .] Religion has
distinctively influenced inheritance law, Protestant marriage, natural law,
canon law, and others depending on denomination, area, period, and fields.
[. . .]
(continued)
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Table 18.5 (continued)
Church-State relations
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
Between 1840 and 1880, the Catholic and Protestant traditions even
strengthened their differences due to the Kulturkampf. [. . .] The influence of
the Catholic Church was strictly reduced at the federal level after the estab-
lishment of the Swiss Confederation in 1848. However, several Catholic
cantons continued to uphold canonical ideals, and the clergy was actively
involved in political processes. [. . .] Also, people’s religious beliefs strongly
influenced the political process of creating law via direct democracy. A certain





“There are several cases of [state–church] separations and mixtures. [. . .]
Nordic countries have high levels of trust in the state, which largely explains
why no conflict between church and state occurs. The contrary happens in
France, where the Church convinces people not to trust the state and vice
versa. In Switzerland, Protestants have maintained that the Catholic Church is





“In Switzerland, if you are Catholic, you have to pay much higher taxes than if
you belong to the Reformed Protestant Church. If you are an atheist or belong
to a Protestant Free Church, you do not even have to pay any Church taxes. I
think Catholic taxes are a lot higher because it [Catholicism] is like a ‘mafia
Church.’ Indeed, Catholics have huge cathedrals, frescoes, and lots of gold
icons and that, of course, costs much more to buy and maintain than having a
simple wooden cross in a Protestant Church.
In Valais, if you want to build a house, you have to sign up to the municipality
(Gemeinde) and then you have to go to the Catholic Priest who has the final
say [. . .] (if you have given enough money to the Church or have attended
Sunday mass often enough). In Italy, mafia members confess their sins in





“The Roman Catholic Church was very corrupt at that time [Reformation
time], and Reformers wanted to reform the Church, but not to separate it from
the state. But they [the Reformers] and Luther realised that this [reforming the
Church from within] was impossible. Therefore, Zwingli advocated the sep-
aration of church and state, but that was much later. [. . .]
The separation between church and state has never been complete here. Now,
for example, we have taxes [for Catholics and Reformed Protestants]. And we





“According to international diplomatic law, nothing regulates the relations
between the Holy See and the Swiss Confederation, except for the Vienna
Convention.
The main interest of the Swiss Confederation and the Holy See is to have
diplomatic relations, as is normally the case with sovereign states. Second, to
regulate bilateral issues, such as the Swiss pontifical guard at the Holy See.
There are also other issues, like the status of bishops in Switzerland.
There are no plans for the Swiss Confederation and the Holy See to sign a new
agreement [i.e. Concordat]. Switzerland used to have diplomatic relations but
did not appoint an ambassador to the Holy See. [. . .] And then, until 2004, we
started having an ambassador to the Holy See, but this official did not reside in
Rome. [. . .] The present Ambassador of Switzerland to the Holy See resides in
(continued)
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Table 18.5 (continued)
Church-State relations
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
Slovenia. He also accredited as the ambassador to another country.





“Legally and officially, there is a clear separation between the state and the
churches. Their relations are governed by the cantons [. . . and] are very
important for the financing and self-organisation of the churches. There are
twenty-six different [church taxes] systems. Even though they have some
similarities, especially in the German-speaking cantons, the French- and
Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland have very different systems. [. . .]
Geneva and Neuchatel work mainly under a French system. They receive no
state funds and have no church taxes. They [. . .] live especially on the
contributions of [. . .] their congregations.
[. . .] The bishop does not need to call the President of Switzerland to tell him
what to do [. . .]. The distance here is quite large and both sides respect it. [. . .]
In some cases, Church representatives offer their congregation voting advice.
Normally, this concerns religious aspects that are fundamental to life, like
abortion, suicide, etc. [. . .] I think Switzerland has a culture that is strongly
influenced by the Christian tradition, but nowadays secularisation and the
separation of church and state are plainly evident, [. . .]The [Christian] ten-
dency still exists, but it is less notorious [. . .] in the context of our direct
democracy.
[. . .] there was a time when Protestants strongly dominated the Swiss gov-
ernment [. . .]. The Swiss constitution of 1848 (and beyond) is a liberal
construct. [. . .] even within the Catholic Church, there were strong rivalries
between liberal and conservative Catholics as was the case in Ticino and
Lucerne. [. . .] Internally, the situation in the Catholic Church became more
difficult after the first Vatican Council in 1870, where the bishops defined the
infallibility of the pope. This led to polarisation. [. . .] We said that we would
not accept this new dogma about the infallibility of the pope. Thus we
separated. . . [Katholisch / Christkatholisch]. Ultramontane thought [beyond
the Alps heading to Rome] [. . .] was difficult for the young Swiss State. [. . .]
A Church-State had existed for a long time. [. . .] [Christkatholisch] reached
some agreements with the liberal Protestants over political questions. [. . .]
though they were quite a small group, they were influential. [. . .] Their
philosophy is, “We do not want to have the pope, and we have no celibacy
among our priests; they can marry” [. . .]
I would mention three important causes for the emergence of this special
[democratic] legal system for the Catholic Church in Switzerland. The first is
the [cooperative] corporations. [. . .] For example, if you go to [. . .] the Alps,
you will see that cattle farmers organise themselves in [cooperative] corpo-
rations [. . .]. The second cause is the Reformation, which strongly promoted
participation among its followers in taking church decisions. This practice
goes quite well together with democratic feelings in Switzerland. The third
influence stems from the time when the Reformed [and] Catholic denomina-
tions in Switzerland opposed each other. [. . .] [for example] in Cantons
St. Gallen and Grisons. [. . .] For decisions concerning religious affairs,
Parliament was divided Protestant deputies [. . .] decided on proceedings
relevant to Protestants, while Catholic members of Parliament decided Cath-
olic issues. In St. Gallen, this is called ‘Katholischer Konfessionsteil’ [Cath-
olic section of the Canton St. Gallen]. Or in Grisons, Corpus Catolico [body
(continued)
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18.11.2 Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical
Triangulation)
The Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary (q) describes the Reformation
and the liberal influence on the separation of church and state in terms of the
democratic scheme of the Swiss Catholic Church, which is unique worldwide. Such
historical analyses concur with Obinger’s (2009) review, while the Protestant influence
on the separation of church and state is consistent with Miller’s (2012) framework.
18.11.3 Analysis of Social Practice
18.11.3.1 Law and Institutions
Although the Swiss federal state is laic, church and state have never been totally
separate in Switzerland. Moreover, the influence of religion on institutions is evident
at the following levels:
a) Supranational: The Roman Catholic Church-State has gained ever greater
political influence through its embassy in Bern (Nunciature) that no other church has.
At the same time, the federal government increasingly acknowledges the state
sovereignty and legitimacy of the Roman Catholic Church-State (e.g. by strength-
ening diplomatic channels and by appointing an ambassador to the Holy See).
(Stakeholders: Roman Catholic Priest 2 (b); Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (f);
Swiss Federal Government Officer (p); s) Swiss Diplomatic Officer). These findings
substantiate Obinger (2009) and Python (1994).
Table 18.5 (continued)
Church-State relations
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
of Catholics], and [on another group] the body of Protestants. They agreed to
have peace because [. . .] they would decide in favour of their church[es] [. . .
instead of interfering] with the other denomination.
You cannot understand the relation between church and state in Switzerland
without understanding the political system. This is the most important aspect
to understand. [. . .] Direct democracy has a very high influence on this
system, and this does not exist in other countries. The pronounced form of






“No plans for possible future bilateral agreements with the Holy See, at the
federal or cantonal level, have been announced. [Education, Lands and
Properties, Religious Freedom, and Ecumenism issues] are discussed and
treated bilaterally [with the Holy See] in a similar way as with every other
state: diplomatic dialogue and channels (ambassador to the Holy See, with the
State Secretariat, or other authorities and services; nuncio or his deputy, with
the DFA or other authorities and services), or at the political level on the
occasion of bilateral visits, or between experts/persons or services in charge of
specific issues”.
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b) National: The Independent, Catholic Believer (m, employee) and the Indepen-
dent Free Protestant Believer (n, academic) both mention church taxes and cathedral
administration as two examples of a non-complete separation of church and state.
The Academic Expert-Lawyer (k) outlines a possible way of religious influence
taking effect, namely by people’s beliefs directly influencing laws and policies
through direct democracy. Both Stakeholder (k) and the Catholic Church-Swiss
Government intermediary (q) acknowledge that the former Protestant and liberal
influence diminished the power of the Catholic Church-State at the federal level; this
is in line with Obinger (2009).
c) Cantonal/regional/local: The Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermedi-
ary (q) explains pronounced differences between German-speaking, French and
Italian-speaking, and mixed-denomination cantons. The Academic Expert-Lawyer
(k) explains that the clergy has long been very present in the political process in
several Catholic cantons. Moreover, the Catholic Church (Roman See) has signed
Concordats with several cantons (Corral & Petschen, 2004). The Independent,
Catholic Believer (m, employee) provides an example of Church interference in
state affairs in the Catholic canton of Valais.
18.12 Conclusions
18.12.1 General
The strong religious tensions between Protestants and Catholics have shaped the
Swiss model of government and the country’s institutions. While Catholics have
defended a federalist, decentralised approach to escape modernisation, Protestants
and liberals successfully pushed for a predominantly liberal, anti-clerical constitu-
tion and for a federal state. As Obinger (2009) observed:
The retreat of Catholics form the federal arena in the wake of the events of the 1840s was a
strategic response to the secular Federal Constitution imposed by the Liberals. A federal
polity strongly based on the idea of local autonomy and the associated devolution of power
provided the institutional shelter that allowed Catholics to maintain their traditions, to
preserve the influence of the Roman Church in Catholic areas, and to create a Catholic
counterculture at the cantonal level. More specifically, Catholics considered the cantons as
bulwarks against modernization and its concomitants such as big government, bureaucrati-
zation, and secularization. Because they were mostly concentrated in rural areas and showed
strong leanings to the ancient order with its enshrined privileges of the Roman Church,
Catholics opposed industrialization and were highly sceptical of new developments in
science and technology. [. . .] Catholics therefore sought to gain political control at the
cantonal level in order to protect the Catholic subsociety from the intrusion by the Liberals
who then controlled the federal arena. Because the cantons enjoyed almost exclusive
jurisdiction in affairs such as education and welfare under the Federal Constitution of
1848, Catholics exploited local policy autonomy to protect the strong influence of the
Roman Catholic Church on education and marital affairs, at least until the constitutional
revision in 1874 (pp. 190–191).
Later, following the Kulturkampf, the Catholic Church-State could no longer
exercise its previously undisputed influence, not even in Catholic cantons.
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As a result, the Swiss Confederation has had weak diplomatic relations with the
Roman See. The absence of a Concordat at the federal level and the absence of a
Swiss resident ambassador in the Vatican still suggest that diplomatic relations
continue to be weak. However, Concordats with some Cantons exist. Moreover,
from 2004, the federal government has appointed a non-resident ambassador to
the Vatican, thus creating closer ties with the Roman Catholic Church-State. On
the other hand, although Catholic and Protestant enclaves persisted for a long time,
the Protestant share of the total population has decreased by more than half since the
nineteenth century. The greatest decline has occurred over the last 60 years, during
which other religious denominations and non-religions have sharply increased.
Today, Swiss society is highly secularised.
18.12.2 Competitiveness and Transparency
As a general rule, Protestant cantons are more competitive than the mountainous
Roman Catholic cantons. However, even these “low” competitive cantons score
higher on innovation/inhabitant values than the traditionally Catholic neighbouring
countries (e.g. Austria, Italy, or France).
The historical retreat to the mountains and the anti-modernising reaction against
the majoritarian liberal-Protestant federal government might partially explain the
lower competitiveness of most Roman Catholic cantons. Nevertheless, the liberal-
Protestant federal government seems to have influenced institutions in Catholic
cantons by decreasing the pervasive power of the Roman Church-State and by
forcing the hierarchical non-democratic Church to democratise. Switzerland’s
unique democratising of Catholicism may well be related to the principles of
accountability and transparency. Besides, such an influence may also partially
explain the relatively higher score on the innovation-per-habitant parameter attained
by “low-competitive mountain Catholic cantons” compared to Italy, Austria, or
France.
18.12.3 Prosperity (Competitiveness and Transparency)
and Biblical Moral Principles
Analysing the primary information shows that most Protestant stakeholders consis-
tently mention biblical concepts as the moral foundation of prosperity. The original
Protestant principle of the Sola Scriptura might lie at the heart of such consistency.
In contrast, Roman Catholic stakeholders do not consistently refer to the Scrip-
tures as a moral foundation. Instead, they tend to refer to diverse theories and
philosophical influences from secular sources. This would seem to corroborate
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McSweeney’s (2015) argument that several kinds of Roman Catholicism might exist
as philosophical currents and cultural backgrounds.
Accepting biblical principles as the truth might create a uniform moral standard
for enhancing trust, as argued by Stakeholder (f) in the prosperity analysis. On the
contrary, in the absence of a moral standard, corrupt ethical codes (see Stakeholder
(g)) might lead to a vast range of “negative” socially accepted norms, low produc-
tivity (Mockus et al., 2012), and low “spontaneous sociability” (low trust) (Fuku-
yama, 1995). Furthermore, individuals not only respond to the coercive power of the
law, but obey their own moral principles (Mockus et al., 2012, p. 7). This might
explain, perhaps even crucially, why the Protestant Reformation—based on the Sola
Scriptura principle—contributed, among other factors, to creating trust in Swiss
society.
18.12.4 Recommendations for Future Research
This case study has identified two promising fields on which little or no systematic
research exists and that would help better understand religion and prosperity in
Switzerland: a) the influence of religion on law and institutions at the cantonal level;
and b) the relevance and impact of the Concordats signed between several Swiss
cantons and the Roman Catholic Church-State.
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b) Uruguay: Extreme Positive Case Study
(Latin America)
All religious cults are free in Uruguay. The State does not
endorse any religion (Article 5 of the 1967 Constitution).
Uruguay is one of the highest-scoring Latin American countries in social indicators
such as transparency (Transparency International, 2016), political rights and civil
liberties (Freedom House, 2016), and social progress (Porter et al., 2015). Accord-
ingly, it has been closer to Western European countries rather than other Latin
American countries with regard to institutional performance, collective vision, and
demographic composition (Roniger, 2016, p. 416; Transparency International, 2016;
Porter et al., 2015). It has been the exception compared to the rest of Latin America
due to its stable democratic institutions, great political stability, and prosperity
(Klaiber, 1997). Therefore, Uruguay has been praised as “the Switzerland of Latin
America” (Fitzgibbon, 1956; Roniger, 2016, p. 416).
Uruguay has enjoyed a positive reputation and good performance for most of its
life as an independent nation. However, the sixteenth-century Spanish colonisers
considered this small country a “land without any profit”, due to its lack of precious
metals and modest indigenous civilisations (Corbo, 2011, p. 284; Da Costa, 2009,
p. 140). Consequently, the Spaniards’ colonial extractive institutions (e.g. the feudal
structures of the Roman Catholic Church-State) never became deeply rooted in
Uruguay, unlike in the rest of the continent (Fitzgibbon, 1956; Klaiber, 1997; Da
Costa, 2009; Corbo, 2011). This coincides with what Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012) have called a “reversal of fortune”, where the weakness of extractive insti-
tutions has decisively “flipped the coin”.
As a result, the Roman Catholic Church-State never gained the social importance
in Uruguay than it has had in the rest of Latin America. This facilitated various
liberal social measures in Uruguay, largely due to the absence of an institutional
apparatus and power quotas considered fundamental and asserted by the Roman
Church-State in other parts of the world (Da Costa, 2009, p. 140; Corbo, 2011,
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p. 285). The following sections briefly explain the progressive secularisation (anti-
clerical) that led to the liberal institutions of the Uruguayan (welfare) state.
19.1 Religion and Secularisation in Uruguay
Secularisation and religiosity levels in Uruguay are closer to Western European
levels than to Latin American averages. Among Latin American countries, Uruguay
has by far the lowest proportion of Roman Catholics (42%), yet the highest propor-
tion of religiously unaffiliated adults (37%) (Pew Research Center, 2014). Such high
levels of secularisation (and low relative Catholicism) are understandable when
considering the historical laicising process that began in the nineteenth-century
Uruguay (Caetano & Geymonat, 1997; Guigou, 2005; Da Costa, 2003 as cited in
Da Costa, 2016, p. 229).
The idea of medieval “Christendom” inherited from Hispanic times became
obsolete and residual in Uruguay already during the nineteenth century (which is
early compared to the rest of Latin America). Roman Catholicism represented a
religious and political culture that legitimised social and racial asymmetries. There-
fore, the country’s intellectual and political leadership agreed that totalising religion
(the Old Regime) needed to be overcome. Consequently, “critical” religious and
philosophical thinking succeeded—but did not entirely oust—the Old Regime
(Hernández, 2017, p. 111).
In this way, Uruguay closely followed the laïcitémodel of the French Revolution
without ever completely replicating it (i.e. including pluralist connotations). This
process resulted in the widespread secularisation of institutional fields, displaced
religion to the domestic sphere, and guaranteed the freedom of consciousness and
religion (Roniger, 2016, p. 414).
Like Switzerland, the Uruguayan understanding of laïcité also implied a mode of
collective life legitimated by state neutrality and popular sovereignty (Blancarte,
2006; Da Costa 2011 as cited in Roniger, 2016, p. 415). Table 19.1 summarises the
historical process towards secularisation in Uruguay.
A central and early innovation involved placing public education in Uruguay
under civic control and the total absence of any religious content in school curricula
since the nineteenth century (Asiaín, 2010). This process was related to persistent
human capital building and prosperity (Becker & Woessmann, 2009).
Roman Catholicism interpreted the 1917 Constitution as a severe blow to its
intentions. It became aware of the definitive loss of the old and longed-for medieval
“Christendom” and of the irreversible reality of living in a pluralistic and secular
society. This led to the Church retreating from public life and gradually reduced its
sociocultural influence (Corbo, 2011, p. 303).
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19.2 Role of Protestantism in Secularisation (Nineteenth
Century)
The modernisation of the Uruguayan state and society involved the promotion of
several core values, including religious pluralisation, freedom of worship, and the
desacralisation of political and civic activities. The legitimisation of the role of
religion in modern society became the subject of an intense polemic between
Catholics, Protestants, and liberals in Uruguay (Hernández, 2017, p. 143).
Anti-clericalism became the link between Protestants, liberals, and Freemasons in
their fight against Roman Catholicism as the common enemy. The objectives of this
alliance were fourfold: (1) absolute separation of church and state; (2) elimination of
all religious education from state schools; (3) creation of a secular registry of births;
(4) reduction of religious holidays to no more than four dates according to the French
model (the other holidays were suppressed as they were considered harmful to trade
and commerce) (Hernández, 2017, pp. 128–129; Da Costa, 2009, pp. 138–140).
Protestantism opposed the corporate conception of traditional Roman Catholic
society (corporatism). Consequently, Protestantism emerged as a religious alterna-
tive upholding the values of freedom, republicanism, and democracy. Its principal
interest was to achieve specific changes in social organisation in line with the Anglo-
American model (Amestoy, 1994, p. 617; Hernández, 2017, p. 116). Particularly
significant was the missionary activity of Methodism within Protestantism. Meth-
odism portrayed and compared itself with Roman Catholicism in the terms expressed
in Table 19.2.
Thus, Protestantism became coupled with the anti-clerical secularist programme
of liberalism. The dilemma of Protestantism as an ally of liberalism was, however,
dealing with the most radical liberal postures that considered religion (in general)
opposed to social progress. In this respect, Protestantism maintained a critical
attitude towards ideological radicalism within liberalism. This manifested itself
later in the inclusion of the freedom of religion and consciousness in the constitution,
Table 19.1 Historical steps of the secularisation process in Uruguay adapted from (Da Costa,
2009, pp. 138–140; Caetano and Geymonat as cited in Roniger, 2016, p. 414)
Year Steps towards secularisation in Uruguay
1837 The state recognises civil marriage
1861 Secularisation of public cemeteries (previously ran by the Roman Church-State)
1863 The Bishop of Montevideo was banished
1877 Education Act enacted, removing religion from the educational system
1879 Civil Registration Act enacted, passing registration from the Roman Church to the state
1885 Convents Act enacted, annulling the legal status of all convents
1906 Crucifixes removed from all public hospitals
1907 Divorce Act enacted.
Religious references deleted from the oath taken by members of Parliament.
1917 Constitutional reform establishes the legal and actual separation of church and state
1919 Renaming of holidays and towns (now given secular names)
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as opposed to the French model of laïcité (which radically subordinated any reli-
gious expression) (Hernández, 2017, p. 143; Roniger, 2016, p. 414).
19.3 The Role of Roman Catholicism
In the particular dispute that Roman Catholicism maintained with Protestantism, the
Roman Church-State resorted to political power. Roman Catholicism claimed that it
was the duty of the state to safeguard national religion against Protestantism and
liberalism. Therefore, according to the prevailing Roman Catholic opinion, religious
freedom was to be rejected. The Roman Church-State demanded eradicating biblical
and apologetic literature of Protestant origin, which in extreme cases resulted in the
burning of bibles (Hernández, 2017, pp. 127, 136, 144). However, the government
did not impede dissenting proselytism and refrained from intervening in the ensuing
anti-clerical demonstrations. Therefore, the state was no longer the “extended hand”
of the Church (Hernández, 2017, pp. 144–145).
The Roman Church-State made numerous attempts to reverse secularisation.
These, however, did not succeed in Uruguay (unlike in Argentina) due to the
Church-State receiving little support in Uruguay. The measures included: (1) creation
of a national clergy to promote the introduction of “regular corporations” and the
development of Catholic associationism; (2) establishing a press and media loyal to
the Church (i.e. opposed to the liberal press); (3) rural missions; (4) Catholic
congresses and a Catholic club; and above all (5) the foundation of educational
institutions to counteract secularism and anti-clericalism in education (Corbo, 2011).
19.4 Present-Day State-Church Relations
More recent controversies have revolved around the question of whether the Uru-
guayan Republic is regressing in its secular traditions. Examples of ample discussion
have been the state-funded installation of a cross on a public road to celebrate the
papal visit (1987), erecting a statue of John Paul II (2005), and other Roman Catholic
icons in public spaces (Da Costa, 2009, p. 142).
Table 19.2 Self-portraits of Protestantism (Methodism) compared to Roman Catholicism in the
nineteenth-century Uruguay (adapted from Mann as cited in Hernández, 2017, p. 116)
Methodism Roman catholicism
“Religion of common sense”, “of the right
reason”
“adverse to common sense, opposed to
reason”
“of the civilisation” “hindrances to civilisation”
“of freedom” “enemies of freedom”
“of the moral purity” “crude, petty, and degrading materialism”
“a spiritual religion” “vain pomp” and the “empty appearance”
“the religion of the Bible” “persecutors of the Bible”
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19.5 Empirical Analysis and CDA (Prosperity)
19.5.1 Textual Analysis (Theological)
None of the stakeholders interviewed referred directly to a Christian (i.e. biblical)
principle of prosperity being connected to obedience to the Commandments (Moral
Law). However, Protestant stakeholders provided the closest direct references to
biblical concepts (Table 19.3).
The Protestant Free Pastor 1 (f) refers to spiritual prosperity (in the heavenly
kingdom; John 14: 3, King James Bible, 1769) rather than to physical prosperity in
this world. Similarly, the Independent Free Protestant Believer (n) mentions that
after becoming prosperous (‘too well’), they forget about God, which implicitly
refers to the Old Testament proverb:
. . . feed me with food convenient for me: lest I be full, and deny thee, and say, Who is the
Lord? . . . (King James Bible, 1769, Proverbs 30:8–9).
The other stakeholders prefer a more secular (non-theological) approach to
prosperity in Uruguay. None referred directly to a biblical principle. This contrasts
with the other three cases (Switzerland, Colombia, Cuba), but can be expected
considering Uruguay’s high secularisation.
19.5.2 Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical
Triangulation)
The Ecumenical Academic Theologian (i) links trustworthiness, the respect for the
law, and prosperity (housing), similarly to Fukuyama (1995). When the Independent
Free Protestant Believer (n) mentions that after becoming prosperous (‘too well’),
they forget God, he is also referring implicitly to the theory of existential security
(Norris & Inglehart, 2004). This theory explains why societies become more
secularised when enough freedom and security exist, but become more religious in
times of crisis (see Sect. 7.2.1).
For the Independent Free Protestant Believer, causality tends to run from pros-
perity to secularism. This view, however, denies the historic “reverse of fortune”
resulting from progressive secularisation and subsequent human capital building in
Uruguay.
19.5.3 Analysis of Social Practice
Three stakeholders provide largely similar general descriptions of the different
colonies (towns with different religious backgrounds). Despite some minor
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Table 19.3 Principles of prosperity according to stakeholders interviewed in Uruguay (Source:
Author’s figure)
Prosperity
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
The Holy Bible “Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may




“I believe that the prosperity situation of Uruguay throughout history
does not provide a single answer. On the one hand, it is a small
country, and it is much easier to have an overview and know what is
happening throughout the country. It is a country that has a tiny
population, compared to other countries in Latin America, which also
allows the implementation of social policies. [. . .]”
f) Protestant Free Church
Pastor 1.
“In this Church, there are no promises of healing, nor prosperity. In
this respect, the soul and its orientation towards what is to come are
clearly important. From those promises, one can draw peace and
strength, but there is no promise that you will get better from your
illness or prosperity. This is a distinctly Christian church, but in
following Jesus. Jesus established a basis, and we want to prepare for
what is to come on that basis. Not for this world, since this world
passes away. But there is a future promise that Jesus will come to
seek his people [John 14: 3]”.
i) Ecumenical academic
theologian.
“The Swiss [from Nueva Helvecia] are still more closed; the Wal-
densians are more open, more progressive. But the working system is
the same, i.e. through associations, cooperatives, etc. A characteristic
of this area is that you will not find settlements (invasions). If land
belongs to someone, nobody builds on that land; it’s empty. If you go
to La Paz, you will see a plot of land in the corner next to the school
and the Plaza. Doroteo García donated that land to a Mr. Malcolm
(an Englishman) who had a field close to the little town and that
helped him when he came to mark the town, etc. Later, Mr. García, in
gratitude, gave him that land, but he never drew up the documents
and for that reason, this land has remained unbuilt to this day. No one
has built on that land. The same thing is happening here. You will
find only a few humble or derelict houses because, in general, the
level of housing in this area is good. You will find low-income
families, but with good housing. There are no settlements like those
in Montevideo and other cities.
Here, the Spanish colony was very methodical in its production; but
they were not progressive and were absorbed by these colonies
(Waldensians) that were always more hardworking and open to
progress”.
j) Ecumenical Pastor “Here in Colonia and in Uruguay, in general, many people prospered
thanks to the Swiss; even the government copied things from them.
We [Swiss colony] are an example in the country. The cheese we
make, the cheese colony, was born here. There are cheese factories in
the rest of the country. And they have learned the Swiss technique
from here.
We know how to save when there is plenty because that is what our
grandparents taught us and when there is not, the Swiss have a
reservation. Here you take good care of that. ‘Machete’ is our
(continued)
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differences, they generally identify Waldensians and Swiss colony inhabitants as
“hard workers” and “prosperous”, whereas Rosarians (Catholics) are seen as “not
progressive” and “carnivalesque”. These perceptions point to a Weberian Protestant




Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
expression for being stingy. To be ‘Swiss’ is to be a collaborator. The
immigrants came with nothing except tools. But they were hungry.
We even inherited the need to care; we save because it is very difficult
to have nothing and go hungry.
TheWaldensians came to colonise four years before the Swiss colony
(1858). Our immigrants [Swiss] began arriving in 1861 or 1862, and
the Swiss colony [Nueva Helvecia] prospered a lot. They [the Wal-
denses] did not prosper quite as well, because religion somehow
blocked them. This [Nueva Helvecia] was an open colony; maybe we
lost the language of being open, but the Swiss still keep some of the
traditions, for instance, dance, food, orchestras, etc., even 150 years




“Recently, Uruguay was said to be one of the least religious countries
in Latin America. I suppose that is because we are doing ‘too well’,
and therefore forget to look up (towards God). Uruguay has a very
‘light’ religiosity, nothing deep, in general”.
p) Government officer “To this day, Colonia is very prosperous. During the major crisis of
2002, Rosario [Catholic] closed five of its factories, and there was a
massive loss of jobs because it was purely manufacturing. In contrast,
Valdense [Protestant Waldensians] and Nueva Helvecia [Swiss
mixed], who worked more and lived more than their land yielded did
not have that problem, because they had a diversified economy.
All immigrants have strongly influenced this area. Although they
[immigrants] all have something in common, they are also very
different. The Waldensian is a little more closed than the Swiss
(Nueva Helvecia). Rosario’s inhabitant is carnivalesque. We have a
saying: ‘TheWaldensian does not drink mate herb, because he cannot
waste time; he has many tasks to do; the one in Nueva Helvecia
drinks mate herb, but in his house; and the one in Rosario drinks in
the shade of the parsley, because they never cut the parsley.’ The
Waldensians dedicate themselves first to their daily chores and reli-
gion; the Swiss (Nueva Helvecia) retire to the privacy of their house
while the Rosarians live the ‘crazy life’”.
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c) Cuba: A Sui Generis Case Study
(Communist Proxy)
It is illegal and punishable to oppose faith or religious belief
to the Revolution, to education or to the fulfilment of the duties
of working, to defend the country with arms, to revere its
symbols and the other duties established by the Constitution
(Article 54: (3) Political Constitution of 1976 of the Republic
of Cuba, valid until 1992).
The State recognises, respects, and guarantees religious
freedom. In the Republic of Cuba, religious institutions are
separate from the State. Different beliefs and religions enjoy
equal consideration (Article 8: Political Constitution of 1992
of the Republic of Cuba, valid to this day).
Since the socialist revolution, Cuba has exhibited one of the highest social indicator
scores in Latin America (e.g. health, literacy, and personal safety) (Feinberg, &
Piccone, 2014; Gold, 2015; United Nations Development Programme––UNDP,
2016; Vekemans & Segundo, 1963, p. 83). However, its communist regime has
made Cuba the third most hostile country to economic and political freedom
worldwide (after North Korea and Venezuela) (Miller & Kim, 2017; Freedom
House, 2016). On balance, however, the Cuban social progress index is one of the
lowest in Latin America (Porter et al., 2015).
The religious overview is as contradictory as Cuba’s social indicators. Histori-
cally, direct political influence and formal participation in religion have been low
compared to most Latin American countries, even from before the Cuban Revolu-
tion. However, widespread religiosity and syncretism strongly permeate religious
and secular belief systems in Cuba. Consequently, the institutional influence of
religion has been relatively weak compared to the pervasive cultural influence of
religion in Cuba (Crahan, 2017, pp. 386, 388; Crahan, 1979, p. 159).
The overall indifference to institutionalised religion in Cuba stems from anti-
colonial/anti-imperial sentiments. The Roman Catholic Church-State has been per-
ceived as tied to colonial Spain. Protestant churches have in turn been linked to US
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030-78498-0_20) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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interests. For instance, the Roman Catholic hierarchy strongly opposed Cuba’s
independence from Spain, and the US government recommended that US churches
ought to use humanitarian aid to promote democracy in Cuba (Crahan, 1979, p. 159;
Goldenziel, 2009, p. 206; Ramírez, 2009, p. 169).
The Cuban Revolution impacted the institutional strength of religion (i.e. by
abolishing Church privileges, reducing formal membership, and spreading secular
education). However, the level of belief among the Cuban population maintained
remarkably stable from the 1950s to the present (ca. 75 to 85%) (Crahan, 2017,
p. 390).
20.1 Colonial Times Until the First Half of the Twentieth
Century
As in the rest of Latin America, Spanish colonisation introduced Roman Catholicism
in Cuba. Consequently, the Catholic Church has always had a strong presence in
Cuba, and has formed a complex relationship with the political establishment
(Contreras, 2013, p. 177; Ramírez, 2009, p. 167).
Independence from Spain (1898) and relations with the USA led to an influx of
Protestant missionaries. As a result, several Protestant denominations have been
installed in Cuba since the late nineteenth-century, including Methodist, Baptist,
Lutheran, Adventist, Presbyterian, and Quaker (Contreras, 2013, p. 178; Ramírez,
2009, p. 171).
Before the Revolution, the Roman Church-State did not have a strong influence in
Cuba, unlike in most Latin American countries (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 182; Crahan,
2017, pp. 386, 388; Crahan, 1979, p. 159; Ramírez, 2009, p. 171). Nevertheless, the
Roman Church-State privileged de facto or de jure relations with the government,
thus enforcing the hegemonic power exerted by Rome until the Cuban Revolution.
For instance, the state obliged Protestant churches to register officially, while the
Roman Church-State was exempt from such an obligation (Ramírez, 2009, p. 171).
Such privileges promoted elitism and created a highly non-egalitarian
pre-revolutionary society (like in most Latin American countries) (Crahan, 1979,
p. 170).
20.2 The Revolution: 1960s to the Present
Among other factors, the relative weakness of the Roman Church-State in Cuba
provided opportunities for liberals, US Protestants, and communists, and ultimately
led to the Revolution. Naturally, Protestants were more progressive and less counter-
revolutionary than Roman Catholics (Crahan, 1979, pp. 159, 170, 172).
When the revolutionary regime adopted Marxism and forged ties with the Soviet
Bloc, it adopted an atheistic constitution and became hostile to any form of religion.
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The law on education gave the state the exclusive right to build schools and provide
education. Private schools became state property. This severely affected religious
and, above all, Roman Catholic schools, which had outnumbered other types of
schools before the Revolution (Contreras, 2013, p. 179; Crahan, 1979, p. 179).
The general reaction of Cuban society to the adoption of Marxism in the 1960s
was negative, due to the religious implications. Accordingly, the hostilities to
religion led to exiling Roman Catholic priests and Protestant pastors. Properties
were seized and dozens of clerics and laypersons were tortured (Crahan, 1979,
p. 174; Ramírez, 2009, p. 173).
In the 1970s and 80s, the Cuban Revolution stimulated other social movements in
Latin America, including Liberation Theology within Roman Catholicism and later
also in Protestantism (Berges & Cárdenas, 1993; Ramírez, 2009). Fidel Castro,
Cuba’s communist leader for almost five decades, publicly expressed a positive
view of religion for the first time in 1985. Castro admitted that religion could also
have the potential to alter reality, revolutionise a nation, end oppression, and restore
justice (Castro & Betto, 2006, p. 5).
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s resulted in a severe economic
crisis in Cuba, (known as the “special period”) (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 202). This, in
turn, led to a revival of religious activity, which was closely linked to the unfolding
socioeconomic crisis during the 1990s (Ramírez, 2009, p. 174). This fairly typical
phenomenon corroborates the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart,
2004). Accordingly, Afro-Cuban and Pentecostal religions have witnessed rapid
growth, like other faiths in Cuba (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 202).
The Cuban regime responded to the crisis by implementing a new constitution
(1992), which included religious freedom and the substitution of an atheist state with
a secular one (Goldenziel, 2009; Contreras, 2013). Granting greater religious free-
dom was part of a strategic political ploy to strengthen the socialist regime
(Goldenziel, 2009).
Three aspects are worth mentioning in this respect:
1. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the crucial role of the Roman Church-State
at the time. The Cuban regime realised the value of an important political trade-
off: counting on Rome as an ally (not as an enemy) to maintain dictatorship. Thus,
greater religious freedom allowed the regime to cultivate relations with the
Catholic hierarchy (Goldenziel, 2009; Crahan, 2017; Contreras, 2013);
2. Religious freedom helped the regime to legitimise itself in a religious society
(whose religiosity underwent a revival after the 1990s crisis) (Goldenziel, 2009);
3. Constitutional religious liberty permitted the Cuban regime to circumvent US
trade regulations, thus enabling economic aid to flow into Cuba via religious
groups. Furthermore, the Cuban establishment took various measures to avoid
US-like Protestant opposition by co-opting and regulating the Council of
Churches through a clientelistic-corporatist scheme. This mechanism allows
Council members to benefit from increased political power while limiting their
autonomy to censure the government (Goldenziel, 2009).
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After Cuba opened itself in 1991, Afro-Cuban organisations also came into the
corporatist fold (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 201).
Finally, the break between the Roman Church-State and the Cuban government
after the Revolution demonstrated Rome’s ability to survive and adapt to
unfavourable conditions (Contreras, 2013, p. 177). The Cuban revolution showed
the Roman Church-State that it could include Marxist elements in its dialectic and
thus support left-wing dictators to gain political revenue. Consequently, despite
initial resistance to liberation theology, the Roman Church-State hierarchy accepted
this to a certain extent, as an element integral to upholding its hegemony (see Sect.
10.4.1.4.1).
Although the Catholic Church-State still does not achieve the same power in
Cuba as in other Latin American countries, it still has the necessary elements to
achieve this goal. It relies on a centuries-long legacy and on a well-consolidated
hierarchical structure, from the Vatican down to Cuban priests and believers
(Contreras, 2013, p. 193). Indeed, the Roman Catholic Church has the richest and
most ancient, extensive, and organised presence of any religion, both in Cuba and
worldwide (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 195).
In turn, the Protestant experience in Cuba largely confirms the findings of various
scholars (e.g. Helmsdorff, 1996; Schäfer, 2006; and Martin, 1999) for other Latin
American countries: The Council of Churches (which represents most Protestant
denominations) has adopted the same established practices of corporatism and
clientage (Goldenziel, 2009).
20.3 Religion Adherents and Prominent Syncretism
in Cuba
Protestants have amounted 3 to 6 percent of the Cuban population according to
different estimates (Goldenziel, 2009, p. 206; Crahan, 2017, p. 397). About 70% of
Cubans claim to practice spiritism. Also, roughly two-thirds of Cubans have tradi-
tionally identified as Roman Catholics, thus indicating the high degree of syncretism
in the country (Crahan, 2017, p. 384; Hearn, 2008, p. 17; see also Sect. 10.5.1.1.2).
20.4 Empirical Analysis and CDA for Cuba (Corruption)
20.4.1 Textual Analysis (Theological)
None of the interviewed stakeholders refers directly to a Christian (i.e. biblical)
principle of corruption potentially linked to the moral law. However, the Protestant
Methodist Pastor (h) mentioned the role of the Protestant (Methodist) Church in
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Table 20.1 Principles of corruption according to stakeholders interviewed in Cuba (Source:
Author’s figure)
Corruption
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
The Holy Bible “Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and righteous
slay thou not: for I will not justify the wicked. And thou shalt take
no gift: for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of
the righteous” (King James Bible, 1769, Exodus 23:7–8).
b) Roman Catholic
Priest 2.
“Corruption comes from below, from people with limitations.
Cuban people survive from the ‘black bag’ [black market and
rubbish]. And there is a struggle to see whom to damage, [which is]
typical of the black market that is unscrupulous. And that struggle




“As people live badly, they cheat on the state. And the Church
[Catholic] says this is not a sin. Why so? Because it’s Fair Com-
pensation, a Catholic doctrine. The state has taken the properties of
the people; it is fair that people seek their compensation. In this
sense, it’s okay to cheat on the state or to steal like Robin Hood.
In 1961, the relations between church and state were impossible.
The Church was the largest landowner in Cuba and then the
US. The Church supported the revolution and thought its lands
would be protected. That was not the case.
Now, the closeness between the pope and state are necessary
because it suits the state and it is convenient for the Church. The
Church wants to receive privileges and status, and the state wants to




“Christians [Protestants] also do unlawful things but to a lesser
extent than the rest. Christians [Protestants], in general, do not
party; do not drink alcohol; are not adulterers. They do not commit
idolatry. We are committed to God and keep a high [moral] stan-
dard here in Cuba.
[But] in Cuba, you live outside the law. Cubans think with their
bellies. The US has the Cuban Adjustment Act (dry and wet feet). I




“There is a culture of ‘to solve’ in Cuba: in society, in general in the




“[. . .] Nowadays, what is said is not done. No one abides by
the laws.
The difference between before the revolution and now is that now
corruption is widespread and before it was not.
If we go out walking in the street, I can give you 10,000 examples
of corruption. For example, in that little corner, in that cafe, most of
their products are not legal. They are not selling what they have to
sell, and so on.
Or, for example, if we go to a flea market selling agricultural
products, they do not measure a fair weight. They are trying to
deceive people and are burdening the system. They are evading
(continued)
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preventing cheating from spreading in Cuban society. This is indirectly in line with
Exodus 23 (King James Bible, 1769) (Table 20.1).
The Roman Catholic Theologian (e) mentions the Roman Catholic doctrine of
Fair Compensation, which “justifies” stealing or cheating in certain situations (like
Table 20.1 (continued)
Corruption
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
taxes, and so on.
If we go to a government institution or we go to a ticket agency
there will be “no tickets”. But if you pay a bribe of $20 or $10,
regardless of the destination, you can get a ticket. This has become
a culture, a culture of corruption.
I am an evangelical [Methodist], and we evangelicals are very
concerned about these issues. For us, in our Church, when we do an
event and have to buy food, we think twice, because it is a matter of
conscience and we know where the products come from”.
k) Non-Christian (atheist,
agnostic) (Academic)
“You have to pay more [a bribe] for a government certification with
good spelling. Otherwise, they will give you with bad spelling,
sometimes on purpose. [Also] Many Cubans watch television
through an illegal package. Cubans normally are seeking to break
the law and do what they want.
Corruption was minimal after the revolution, and now it has
increased. Buying a car was a reward only for good workers”.
m) Employee, Independent
citizen
“Unnecessary bureaucracy and corruption is eating away Cuba”.
n) Tourism professional Here it is common to evade the law and to pay bribes to get things
done. Otherwise, you could wait all your life without anything
happening.
Here we have a saying: ‘The government pretends to pay me, and I
pretend to work’ (El gobierno hace como que me paga y yo hago
como que trabajo).
p) Government official “In Cuba, we now have ‘indirect democracy,’ which means that
you vote for representatives who vote for governors. Here, Cubans
say that ‘Fidel gives everything’ [to the people] and the state is
infallible, like God.’ However, the ‘new man’ whom Che Guevara
dreamt of has become the corrupt Cuban and a hooker (Jinetera).
Today there are very low moral standards here. Immorality is rife,
Jineteras. Rampant state corruption and everywhere else. Unnec-
essary bureaucracy. But before the Revolution, there was much
more corruption, aristocracy and Catholicism.
To whom shall the needy look? Shall they look to the government
or the church? They are both immoral, and if we focus on them, we
will become more immoral. We can be better and lower corruption
only by looking at God’s perfection.”
Note: No quantitative data on competiveness is available for Cuba and little qualitative data resulted
from coding prosperity.
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Robin Hood). This doctrine is opposed to Exodus 23 (King James Bible, 1769)
(Table 20.1). Likewise, the “necessary Mafia kiss” between church and state is
against another biblical principle: “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which
are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s” (King James Bible, 1769,
Matthew 22:21).
20.4.2 Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical
Triangulation)
The atheist, socialist legal principle of the “goodness of humankind” (Berman 2003,
p. 18) resembles Roman Catholic natural law, in that it trusts the human capacity to
discern good from evil (Selling, 2018, p. 9; Gula, 2002, pp. 120–21). Arruñada
(2010) explains that Roman Catholicism enhances corruption due to the relativistic
contents of its moral code and its dubious enforcement mechanisms (p. 895). These
statements are valid in Cuban society, as exemplified above in various ways: (1) by
the practice of Fair Compensation (see Roman Catholic Theologian (e)); (2) by the
Protestant Methodist Pastor’s comments on cheating and stealing (h); (3) by the
common Cuban proverb “The government pretends to pay me, and I pretend to
work” (Tourism professional (n)); and (4) by the non-Christian atheist’s example of
cheating to pay a bribe (k).
20.4.3 Analysis of Social Practice: Law and Institutions
The Tourism professional (n) highlights the evasion of laws and payment of bribes
as the natural way of life in Cuba. Likewise, the non-Christian atheist (k) refers to
similar examples of breaking the law. Such examples are consistent with the
systematic separation of law, culture, and morals common in most Latin American
countries (Mockus et al., 2012; see also Sect. 10.3.1.2).
The Government Official (p) argues in a similar direction and indirectly chal-
lenges the socialist legal tradition (Sect. 8.3.4.7). His criticism refers to what Marxist
theory calls the ideal “new man”. In practice, however, this has produced a corrupt
Cuban and the hooker (Jinetera). Stakeholder (p) expands this perspective, observ-
ing that low moral standards pervade the government and the Church. What remains
is the need to consider God’s perfection the sole point of reference.
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d) Colombia: Extreme Negative Case Study
The Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion is that of the
Nation; the public powers will protect it and make it respected
as an essential element of the social order (Article
38, Political Constitution of Colombia of 1886, valid
until 1991).
Public education shall be organised and directed under the
Catholic Religion [. . .] (Article 41, Constitution of Colombia
of 1886, valid until 1991).
The State is not atheist, agnostic, or indifferent to the
religious feelings of Colombians (Article 2, Law 133 of 1994,
currently valid).
For most of Colombia’s history, most “Colombians have been in absolute poverty and
plagued by violence and insecurity” (Robinson, 2016, pp. 10, 11). Indeed, serious
security risks (violence and terrorism) mean that Colombia ranks bottom of the
136 countries rated for tourists and businesses. In the 2017 Travel & Tourism Compet-
itiveness Report, Colombia scored 2.6 on a scale of the most dangerous countries
worldwide (min 2.59; max 6.65; median 5.60) (World Economic Forum, 2017).
Colombian levels of corruption are also very high (Transparency International, 2016),
and Colombia is one of the most inequitable countries in the world (World Bank, 2016).
Robinson (2016) convincingly argues that the causes lie in the country’s histor-
ical extractive political institutions (low quality of democracy and weak state).
However, he disregards the crucial and profound institutional influence of Roman
Catholicism on moulding Colombian political institutions.
The vital role of Roman Catholicism in establishing the social, political, institu-
tional, and religious status quo in Colombia is plainly evident and well-documented
(Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981; Blanco, 2008; Munevar, 2008; Beltrán, 2008). The
largely successful project pursued by the Roman Church-State in Colombia
(so-called Christilandia according to the Jesuit Felix Restrepo) consists of three
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030-78498-0_21) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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pillars: (1) political (a confessional state); (2) economic (a corporatist state); and
(3) cultural (a Catholic and conservative “Hispanicism”) (Figueroa, 2016).
Roman Catholicism deployed Hispanicism (characterised by its triad of language,
religion, and race) as its best cultural weapon. Hispanicism shielded the interests of
the Roman Church-State against the threats of Bolshevik-Socialist atheism, French
liberal anti-clericalism, and triumphant Anglo-Saxon Protestant modernity. Like-
wise, its feudal-medieval corporatism enabled the Roman Church-State to respond to
both modern “right-wing” capitalism/neoliberalism and “left-wing”, socialist
threats. The whole package needed to be tied politically and legally to a confessional
state and constitution legitimised by a Concordat (Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981).
Despite the mild erosion of the hegemony of Roman Catholicism in recent
decades, the coherence of the Roman Church-State project is still pervasive in
Colombia (Figueroa, 2016); (Beltrán, 2008). The Christilandia project of Colom-
bian society has been a product of the country’s most conservative and intolerant
wing of Roman Catholicism. Such conservative views have been dominant in
Colombia, regardless of the existence of less intransigent sectors, which have
traditionally been weaker (Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981; Munevar, 2008; Beltrán,
2008). Consequently, Colombian Romanism (Catholicism) has forcefully advocated
such a theocratic, hierarchical, organic, and corporate society (Figueroa, 2016).
21.1 Brief Historical Background
Contrary to popular belief in Colombia, the Roman Catholic Church-State is not a
Colombian institution. It has, however, been very present since independence from
Spain and even before. Colombia was a strategic ecclesiastical, political, and
economic centre for Spain and the Roman Church-State in the colonial period.
After independence, Simon Bolivar petitioned the Roman Church-State
(so-called “Holy” See or Roman See) to sign a Concordat with Colombia (New
Granada). This move allowed legitimising the newly independent state and to
continue the “patronato” without the Spanish Crown. Consequently, the Roman
Church-State recognised Colombia as the first independent Latin American Nation
in 1835 (Salinas, 2013).
Politically, several historical periods alternated between anti-clerical liberals and
conservative Catholic “hegemonies” (as well as federalists and centralists), leading
to traumatic civil wars. The liberal principles of the French Revolution had a decisive
influence, especially in the first five Colombian constitutions until 1886 (Uribe,
1985). The extent of this liberal influence, which can be traced back to John Locke,
led former president Lopez Michelsen to affirm that Colombian institutions descend
from “Calvinism” (Lopez Michelsen, 1966). Far from that, Protestant and liberal
ideals and influence were severely and systematically avoided in the following
centuries in Colombia. Moreover, the Calvinist influence on liberalism occurred
only indirectly via the French Revolution (Sect. 8.3.4.4).
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21.2 The Progressive and Short-Lasting Liberal
Constitution of 1863 (Rionegro)
Ironically, Colombia became the first Latin American country to decree the separa-
tion of church and state in 1863. The Rionegro Constitution of Colombia (1863) was
an anti-clerical effort promulgated under the auspices of the Liberals in power. It was
a very progressive and pioneering Constitution that provided full freedom of religion
and other individual liberties. However, it only lasted 23 years. No other religion
rivalled the primacy of Roman Catholicism in Colombia, where the state was weak
and poor. After a Conservative revolt that resulted in a civil war of marked religious
character, Colombia discarded the liberal Constitution of Rionegro and undid much
of the Liberal effort to lessen the power of the Roman Catholic Church. It then
promulgated its most conservative, intransigent, and long-lasting Constitution in
1886. The 1886 Constitution declared Roman Catholicism to be the religion of the
nation, and public authorities were empowered to enforce respect for it. The consti-
tutional provisions of 1886 led Colombia to sign a concordat that reiterated the
establishment of Catholicism as the state religion (Delpar, 1980). Thus, Colombia
did not formally separate church and state until its current Constitution (1991).
21.3 The Constitution of 1886 (Valid Until 1991)
and the Concordat
The Conservative victory in the nineteenth-century civil wars ensured the substantial
removal of liberal principles from the Constitution of 1886. The Roman See imposed
the conditions on the state to grant constitutional privileges to the rights of the
Roman Catholic Church. These rights were ratified in the Concordat of 1887. Thus,
Colombia retained its well-rooted colonial institutions, a powerful Roman Church-
State, a unified social and economic elite, and a strong central state (Levine, 1981;
Figueroa, 2016).
The Concordat of 1887 was progressively modified, favouring the Roman See,
until 1973. Since the Middle Ages, no other country has enforced such a complete
integration of church and state (ideal medieval Christendom), as reflected in
Colombia’s Concordat (Salinas, 2013; Levine, 1981; Figueroa, 2016). Several
articles of the 1886 Constitution were identical to those of the Concordat. Among
others, under the Colombian Concordat, the following legal instruments were
enforced. For instance, Article 3 accepts the force of canon law: “Canon Law is
independent of civil law and is not part of it, but the authorities of the Republic will
respect it” (Concordat 73, Art. 3). Consequently, civil courts cannot judge the
Church hierarchy, only the Roman See can.
In the Colombian Concordat, the Roman Church-State is defined as an “essential
element of the social order” (Art. 1). Consequently, the Roman Church-State has
played a major role in various areas of society:
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1. Public and private education at all levels, which had to be maintained “in
conformity with the dogmas of the Catholic religion” (Art. 12) (religious instruc-
tion was mandatory);
2. More than 63% of Colombia’s territory are “mission territories”, in which the
Church exercised broad civil powers (Art. 31) (Levine, 1981; de Roux, 2001);
3. The armies of the republic enjoy exemptions known as “military privileges”,
which are determined by the pope in a separate decree (Art. 20);
4. Registering births and marriages (Art. 17–19), and the management of death,
including cemeteries (Art. 30). Parish records had preference over civil records.
Moreover, the Colombian government is obliged to pay the Roman Church-State
an annual fee (Art. 22, 25), in addition to granting tax exemptions for Roman
Church-State properties (Art. 6). Regarding education, the Concordat enforces
further contentious measures: The government is obliged to prevent “the propaga-
tion of ideas contrary to the respect and veneration of the Church and Catholic
dogma” in literary and scientific subjects and, in general, in all branches of
instruction. Diocesan ordinaries, personally or by delegates, should inspect and
revise the texts of religion and morals. In the universities, the archbishop of Bogotá
identified those books that would serve as texts for religion and morality. Also, to
ensure the uniform teaching of these subjects, the archbishop, together with the other
prelates, would choose the texts at public schools (Art. 13).
Levine (1981) notes that it is hard to envisage a more powerful tool of
ostracisation, or a more revealing indication of the convergence of religious and
civil forces, than these structures (p.71). Neothomism inspired such conservative
arrangements by opposing social change based on the belief of an indisputable
“Roman Catholic truth” (Figueroa, 2016, p. 298). Thus, Colombia’s large Roman
Catholic population is a natural result of such an intransigent institutional regime
rather than of the free choice of believers. Colombia has the highest proportion of
adults raised as Roman Catholics in the world (92%), after Paraguay (94%) (Pew
Research Center, 2014, p. 12) (Colombia and Paraguay share the same clusters for
low competitiveness and high corruption in QCA; Sect. 16.3.3.4).
During the conservative regime, the presence of liberals, and even more of
Protestants, was strictly limited. Liberals and Protestants, as opponents of the
regime, were stigmatised as heretical and dangerous groups (Beltrán, 2008). The
president was empowered to take away their civil rights, imprison them, and
condemn them to exile (Figueroa, 2016, p. 58). Such a tyrannical social order led
to radicalisation and bloody conflicts, for instance, between liberals and conserva-
tives (e.g. La Violencia) (Levine, 1981; Figueroa, 2016).
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21.4 The Corporatist State
In the Middle Ages, the corporations enjoyed enormous privileges. Political power
and social organisation depended entirely on them. The authority of the Roman
Church-State was beyond question. All social expressions formed part of a unique
organism described by Thomas Aquinas as “harmonious”. The Protestant Reforma-
tion, and thus the rise of nation-states, as well as the French Revolution, led to a crisis
of the corporatist model. This also explains the attacks of the Roman Church-State
on modernity and democracy in Colombia (especially before Vatican II, but also
afterwards) (Figueroa, 2016; Levine, 1981).
In Colombia, corporatism has maintained a medieval oligarchic society by the
corporations relentlessly defending their interests to the detriment of public welfare.
The state continues to approve laws and policies for the benefit of corporate
associates. As a result, this hierarchical inequality has produced endemic violence
across the country, which increased significantly during the same years in which
corporatist proposals were implemented (Figueroa, 2016, pp. 15, 19; Levine, 1981).
Moreover, corporatism, violence, and deadly conflicts have exacerbated in the
country’s most conservative departments (e.g. Antioquia, Norte de Santander,
Nariño) (Figueroa, 2016).
21.5 Partial End of a Totalitarian Roman Catholic
Hegemony
The 1990s began with a new constitution. This was the result of a student movement
and of a peace agreement that the liberal government signed with a liberal-
intellectual guerrilla (M-19) (Buenahora, 1992). The new Constitution of 1991
included (although only to a modest extent) the views of ethnic minorities, Protestant
Christians, and other social groups. Accordingly, the new Constitution questioned
the pervasive presence of Roman Catholicism and removed its privileged status as a
“state religion”, at least formally. Moreover, the new constitution opened up the path
for religious pluralism (Munevar, 2008; Beltrán & Quiroga, 2017).
The participation of Protestants in drafting the Constitution of 1991, in the
Religious Freedom Law (Law 133 of 1994), and in the Convention of Internal
Public Law (Decree 354 of 1998), has helped dismantle the denominationally
Catholic character of the Colombian State (Beltrán & Quiroga, 2017, p. 205).
Thus, one of the fruits of the 1991 Constitution is the decline in poverty over the
last decade, and an unusual series of clashes and crises for the elites (Robinson,
2016, p. 75). However, Protestant intervention in politics failed to abolish the
Concordat altogether (Beltrán & Quiroga, 2017, p. 206). The Concordat of 1973
had to be renegotiated with the Roman See and was reduced to six articles (7, 8,
12, 14, 19, and 20) out of the 33 articles in the original text (Garzón, 2011). As the
Attorney General formally put matters in 1993:
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. . . the Concordat does not recognise several jus cogens rules of international human rights
law, namely: religious freedom; equal rights in marriage, during it and in case of dissolution
of the bond; the freedom of teaching; respect for the autonomy, rights, and freedoms of
indigenous people; and the right to education (Procuraduría General de la Nación, 1993).
In spite of these reforms, the Colombian government is still required to pay a
perpetual fee to the Roman See. Religious instruction in public schools according
to the Roman Church Magisterium for Catholics also remains firmly in place.
In practice, the Roman Church-State still has considerable privileges, despite
being compelled to participate in a meanwhile competitive religious market. Roman
Catholicism enjoys the prerogatives arising from more than four centuries of
monopoly: First, a privileged relationship with the Colombian State, as guaranteed
by the Concordat, which remains in force with modifications despite the 1991
Constitution. Second, clear educational privileges based on the Concordat and its
past institutionalisation. Third, an enormous amount of property and cultural wealth,
as evident in a solid corporate organisation and extensive infrastructure. And lastly,
access to domains otherwise reserved for powerful institutions, such as the mass
media (Beltrán, 2008, p. 189).
Thus, the centuries-long Catholic monopoly and hegemony have lastingly
impacted Colombian culture, as is visible today. The traditions, styles of action,
practices, procedures, and axes of conflict are well established everywhere in
Colombia and are often characteristic of feudal-medieval times (Levine, 1981,
p. 58; Blanco, 2008; Munevar, 2008). Moreover, the influence of the Roman
Church-State is still closely bound up with politics in Colombia. The ideological
function of the Roman Church (with a less direct link to religious beliefs) still plays a
vital role as a cultural point of reference underpinning the Colombian ethos (Figue-
roa, 2016; Munevar, 2008; Beltrán, 2008). Moreover, even after religious freedom
was guaranteed in the 1991 Constitution, 79% of the population remains Roman
Catholic (Pew Research Center, 2014).
21.6 Protestantism in Colombia
As Roman Catholicism was closely linked with conservatism, Protestantism was
naturally allied to liberalism and anti-clericalism. Accordingly, Protestantism gained
ground mainly during liberal periods. Protestants were, however, discriminated and
excluded from wider society as “second-class citizens” (Beltrán, 2008). The situa-
tion has improved since the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), and especially
the Pentecostal movement has flourished since the 1960s (Beltrán, 2008). However,
Pentecostal and Neopentecostal movements have played only a marginal role in
Colombian public life (Munevar, 2008, p. 389). Moreover, whenever Protestants
participate in politics, they often fall into the same corrupt behaviour as traditional
politicians; the longstanding practices are too well established (Helmsdorff, 1996).
324 21 d) Colombia: Extreme Negative Case Study
21.7 Empirical Analysis and CDA for Colombia
(Prosperity)
21.7.1 Textual Analysis (Theological)
The Christian (i.e. biblical) principle of prosperity is closely linked to obedience to
the Commandments (Moral Law). A quite harmonious discourse exists among the
different Protestant stakeholders regarding this principle. Thus, for instance, the
Protestant Free Pastor 1 (f) refers to San Andres and Providence Island as a
prosperous place before the arrival of “Catholics from mainland Colombia”
destroyed the local system of values. Similarly, the Protestant Free Pastor
2 (g) refers to the importance of biblical values: They create trust in society. The
Independent Protestant believer (n) cites examples from the Old Testament, for
instance, Israel prospered whenever it obeyed God, but struggled and suffered
whenever disobedience prevailed (Table 21.1).
In contrast, Roman Catholic stakeholders prefer a somewhat more secular
(non-theological) approach to the prosperity issue in Colombia. None refers to a
biblical principle. Roman Catholic Priest 1 (a) mentions the change of discourse,
towards progress, after the Second Vatican Council (1965). Roman Catholic Priest
3 (c) mentions that “development” resulted from liberalisation after the introduction
of the 1991 Constitution (as corroborated in previous sections). This discourse is
expected and in line with the previous sections. It also coincides with the views of
similar stakeholders (i.e. Catholics) in the case study of Switzerland.
21.7.2 Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical
Triangulation)
The Free Church Pastor (f) and the Government Official (p) link trustworthiness,
values, and prosperity, similarly to Fukuyama (1995). Stakeholder (n) cites the exam-
ple of Israel as a society that was (cyclically) obedient to God whenever in crisis. Yet
no sooner did Israel prosper, disobedience soared—until the next crisis. This principle
refers implicitly to the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004), which
explains why societies become more secularised whenever freedom and security exist
in sufficient measure, but become religious in times of crisis (Sect. 7.2.1).
21.7.3 Analysis of Social Practice: Law and Institutions
The Roman Catholic Priest 3 (c) argues that the liberalisation of education
(i.e. emancipation from Roman Catholicism) after the introduction of the 1991
Constitution has caused corruption and crime. He advocates a conservative
approach, one in line with old-regime Roman Church discourse (pre-Vatican II).
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Table 21.1 Principles of prosperity according to stakeholders interviewed in Colombia (Source:
Author’s figure)
Prosperity
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
The Holy Bible “Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may




“The enemies of the Catholic Church were Communism, liberalism,
and the Secret Societies (Freemasonry). In 1965, the Second Vatican




“After 1991, Colombia opened up to free markets, imports and
exports, which generated development, but also sparked much cor-




“. . .Protestantism remained here, and over the years the values of our
society were marked by that essence. San Andres was a prosperous
territory. They could also sleep with their doors and windows open at
night and hang their clothes outside [. . .] to dry. You did not have to
worry about [. . .people] stealing anything from you. They would
have farms far away from their homes and no one would steal. People
would end up in trouble just for stealing a coconut. When someone
was killed on this island, it was an island-wide crisis. It shocked
everybody that blood was shed. It was a major episode. All the church
bells would ring because there was a murder. That was a society that
Colombia came to found here. It was a society that was built by
Protestantism and its values, but was eventually [. . .] destroyed by a




“You could say that while society is based on biblical principles and
values, the lives of others will be more respected and more valuable.




“Garcia Márquez tries to explain why we [Colombians] are the way
we are. He says that we are a cultural blend of the types of Spaniards
who arrived, the indigenous people we were ancestrally, and mixed
with Africans. This makes us a paradoxical country, a country full of
cultural contradictions. Colombia is a society of narcos. [. . .] Con-
gress and the presidential campaigns have been ruled by drug money.
We want to excuse and cover things up, but the structure of Colom-




“Whenever the law of God and moral standard as found in the Bible
declines, the economy goes down, morality goes down, the crime rate
goes up, and the result is a degenerated society. The closer you live in
harmony with biblical principles, the more harmoniously you will
live. [. . .] This principle comes down to us historically and repeti-
tively, for example, from the book of Judges [. . .] the more Israel
obeyed God’s law in the Bible, the better [they] got, whereas when-
ever they strayed far from God’s commandments, they faced the
worst crises. [. . .] this pattern is repeated cyclically over and over
again in history, leading to social failure and oppression whenever
(continued)
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Table 21.1 (continued)
Prosperity
Stakeholder Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
people disobeyed God. In the same sense, you can explain society
today. For example, how do you explain that humans suffer famines
and animals have enough to eat and are fit in Africa? Voodoo and
spiritist practices [that humans do and animals do not do] can give
you the answer”.
p) Government official “Some of the factors that may affect our productivity are that we have
a low level of trust in our public institutions since their accountability
and transparency are dubious. Likewise, many government
employees are not doing their duties. Instead, they are checking
personal e-mails, Facebook, etc. [. . .] The sense of public property
here is not that they belong to everyone but that they belong to no one
and that we have to take advantage of them”.
s) Colombian Embassy
Official
“[. . .] there is no legal framework for cooperation between Colombia
and the Holy See. Caritas Internationalis develops its work through
the National Secretariat of Social Pastoral (Cáritas Colombiana). This
includes rural development, helping the population (the victims of the
conflict), prevention and attention to emergencies, promotion of
human rights, gender equality, peacebuilding and social inclusion.
The payment of the Concordat fee (per the Concordat of 1887) by the
Government of Colombia to the Catholic Church is still in force. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs processes this payment, but the resources
to make it effective are consolidated by the Ministry of Finance and
Public Credit within the annual national budget.
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Chapter 22
Summary Overview of the Four Case
Studies
Historically, Switzerland’s population and cantonal system have been characterised
by mixed denominational distribution (Roman Catholics and Protestants). Even if
the two main denominations have not always coexisted harmoniously, and despite
internal differences, Switzerland is nowadays the most competitive (prosperous)
country worldwide with well-recognised political, economic, and social stability.
The Swiss case (Chap. 18) explored the nexuses of prosperity and of a religiously
mixed society in which the Protestant Reformation played a prominent historical role
in shaping federal institutions. Following the 1848 anti-clerical Constitution, many
Conservative Catholics remained in mountainous and rural areas, in an attempt to
maintain the old order, including the pervasive influence of the Catholic Church-
State on education (also, to ensure the “maintenance of ignorance”) (Obinger, 2009;
Head-König, 2017). In turn, liberals and Protestants mostly remained in flat areas
that were subsequently industrialised. Currently, the historical Protestant cantons
tend to be the most competitive, and the mountainous Roman Catholic cantons the
least competitive, in the Swiss Confederation (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016) (see
Figs. 18.2 and 18.4). Historically mixed confessional cantons (e.g. Thurgau and
St. Gallen) perform in the middle of the cantonal ranking of competitiveness (11th
and 13th, respectively, out of 26 cantons) (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016) (see
Figs. 18.1, 18.2, and 18.4). As the case study has suggested, Protestantism in
Switzerland may have also contributed to prosperity via democratisation, state
secularism and the creation of trust and moral standards. Yet, the influence of
Protestantism owes more to its accumulated historical impact on institutions than
to the proportion of current followers. Institutionally, “Protestant churches were
traditionally ‘canton churches’ and thus strongly enmeshed with every canton’s
political structure” (Gould 1999 and Cattacin et al. 2003 as cited in Obinger, 2009,
p. 180). In turn, the proportion of Protestants has been outnumbered by Roman
Catholics since the 1970s in Switzerland, and Catholics are in the majority in most
Swiss cities and cantons nowadays (FDFA, 2018; Federal Statistical Office, 2020)
(see Tables 18.1 and 18.2).
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In Uruguay, as well as in Switzerland, Protestantism has played a crucial role
along with liberalism in introducing anti-clericalism (and religious freedom) in its
constitution and therefore also in its institutions. Protestantism, then, has played a
decisive role in shaping the trajectory of democracy, human capital, ethics, trans-
parency, secularisation, and social progress.
The anti-clerical elements of the Revolution helped Cuba succeed in various
indicators (e.g. education quality and coverage, equality, health). The Cuban regime
seized, dismantled, and limited the institutional influence of Roman Catholicism on
these areas of public life. However, a strong cultural influence of a highly syncretised
Roman Catholicism persists in Cuba even if its institutional influence has been
curbed. Also, the Communist regime, by adopting Marxism, “threw the baby out
with the bathwater” through persecuting all types of religion, including Protestant
liberals. Finally, the Cuban regime conveniently turned to Rome to legitimise itself
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and to silence Protestantism with a corporatist
strategy. The socialist legal tradition had an effect opposite to its claims (e.g. lack of
freedom, corruption), even if its anti-clerical element was an advantage. Comparing
the Cuban experience to other Latin American countries with leftist dictatorships
(e.g. Venezuela) helps understand their failure to achieve the Cuban indicators
(e.g. education). Evidently, there is much stronger polarisation and a younger, leftist
government in Venezuela, but even there, the Catholic “Church has long had a bias
in the use of its resources towards the middle and upper classes” (Smilde, 2018, p. 1;
Levine, 1981). The crucial factor in this regard is whether or not the power and
influence of the Roman Church-State are reduced.
In Colombia, liberal attempts failed repeatedly and resulted in violent conflicts in
which the Roman Catholic Church-State closed ranks with conservatives and
imposed a corporatist medieval-like state. A “Catholic and conservative hegemony”
has existed in Colombia until 1991 (Figueroa, 2008). In the 1991 Constitution,
Protestantism allied itself with liberal forces. This alliance made it possible to finally
introduce religious freedom, among others, by removing most of the contentious
articles from the Concordat (nevertheless, the Concordat remains valid, as does
institutional corporatism).
Subnationally, the four cases studied here confirm the trend of Protestant versus
Roman Catholic influence although under the national umbrella (e.g. Catholic areas
in Switzerland are far more prosperous than liberal regions in Colombia). Swiss
Protestant cantons are generally more prosperous than Roman Catholic ones. More
conservative regions in Colombia tend to experience more violence and conflict than
liberal ones. Uruguayan towns (e.g. in Colonia) tend to be perceived as more
prosperous when under Protestant influence.
Although several theories were useful in the analysis of interviews, a common,
salient notion in all four case studies was the theory of existential security (Norris &
Inglehart, 2004, 2010) (see Sect. 7.2). After coding in relation to prosperity, the
theory of existential security was sufficiently exemplified: in Switzerland, the
non-practising Catholic stakeholder (l) claimed that religiosity runs in parallel cycles
to the economy. In Uruguay, the Independent Free Protestant Believer (n) mentioned
that after becoming prosperous (‘too well’), they forget God. In Cuba, the revival of
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religious activity was closely linked to the severe socioeconomic crisis after the
collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s (Ramírez, 2009; Goldenziel, 2009). In
Colombia, the Independent Protestant believer (n) mentions the book of Judges
(King James Bible, 1769), in which Israel prospered after obeying God, but strug-
gled and suffered after disobedience prevailed.
Finally, the textual analyses (theological) in the four cases revealed that Protestant
stakeholders provided the closest direct references to biblical concepts as the moral
foundation of prosperity. In contrast, Roman Catholic stakeholders do not consis-
tently refer to the Scriptures as a moral foundation. Instead, they tend to refer to
diverse theories and philosophical influences from secular sources. This finding,
consistent in diverse geographical settings, corroborates Arruñada’s (2010) expla-
nation that Protestants possess more homogeneous moral standards compared to the
varied moral values in Roman Catholicism (Sects. 10.3; 10.4.1.1.1). Likewise, this
outcome supports McSweeney’s (2015) argument that several kinds of Roman
Catholicism might exist as philosophical currents and cultural backgrounds.
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Overall, the results of this study are remarkably consistent across methods and
models. Its main findings may be summarised as follows:
(a) Competitiveness:
The combination of the following factors induces competitiveness in Europe
and the Americas: (1) high Environment Performance (EPI); (2) German legal
origin; (3) the absence of a French legal origin and of a Concordat with the
Roman See; (4) the absence of a socialist legal origin; (5) low proportion of
Roman Catholicism or Orthodoxy.
(b) Corruption:
The combination of the following factors causes high corruption in Europe
and the Americas: (1) low Environment Performance (EPI); (2) Roman Cathol-
icism as a state religion; (3) low adherence to Protestantism; (4) a Concordat
with the Roman See; and (5) French legal origin.
Likewise, and consistent with the corresponding theory, the quantitative model
on corruption (Sect. 15.3.2) corroborates a high correlation of prosperity, democ-
racy, transparency, and Protestantism. The model thus fulfils empirical
expectation 3.1
The consistency of the theoretical framework (Part III) with the findings across
methods (quantitative, QCA, case studies) confirms my hypotheses (Sect. 2.3 and
empirical expectations 1 and 2). The following sections expand the conclusions per
condition and empirical expectation.
Integrative conclusions are also called “meta-inferences” (Johnson, 2016). “A meta-inference can
be defined as a conclusion generated through an integration of the inferences that have been
obtained from the results of the qualitative and quantitative strands of a mixed methods study”
(Teddlie and Tashakkori as cited in Stolz, 2017).
1Please refer to Part V for a recapitulation of hypotheses and empirical expectations in this study.
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23.1 Environment Performance Index (EPI)
The EPI is the most critical variable for explaining prosperity (GCI and CPI)
differences. It correlates strongly with prosperity in the quantitative models, while
QCA substantiated a direct and robust causal relation. In the quantitative part, the
EPI helped to increase model fitness, while in QCA, it was that condition that was
closest to being necessary. Removing EPI from the quantitative and QCA analyses
considerably reduces the explanatory power of the respective models (e.g. Model 1,
see Sect. 15.3.1.1.1). However, if EPI is removed, the remaining variables
(or conditions) continue to be significant or still maintain their presence, thus
yielding similar results (although with less fitness in the regression models, for
instance). Thus, EPI explains most of the prosperity variability, whereas the other
significant variables also play a vital role in modulating the outcome.
EPI robustness, as causal for prosperity, provides rich evidence in support of the
“environment and prosperity theory” (Sachs, 2001; Diamond, 1997). Thus, my
results confirm the inferences anticipated in the literature review, thus also fulfiling
empirical expectation 12. Moreover, the case study on Switzerland found a particular
relation between environmental factors (geography or topography) and competitive-
ness. Swiss cantons located in mountainous regions tend to exhibit lower compet-
itiveness than non-mountainous ones. Flat topography may facilitate access and
trade, for instance. Still, this alone does not explain why some Swiss mountainous
cantons are more innovative per inhabitant than other, neighbouring countries
(e.g. Austria or Italy).
23.2 Legal Traditions
The second variable most consistently related to prosperity (GCI and CPI) is legal
origin. This is true of the corresponding quantitative models and also explains the
QCA outcome of legal origin. German legal origin has a consistently positive effect
(correlations and QCA), while QCA also identifies Scandinavian legal origin as
positive in terms of competitiveness and transparency. The Protestant Reformation
heavily influenced German and Scandinavian legal systems (Witte, 2002; Snyder,
2011; Berman, 2003; Sect. 8.3.4).
In contrast, Socialist and French legal origins negatively influence GCI and
transparency (as confirmed by QCA and partly by correlations). Both legal origins
have diminished the influence of the Church on state affairs. However, their impact
as legal systems as a whole is detrimental to competitiveness and transparency
compared to “Protestant” legal origins (German and Scandinavian). English legal
origin appears to have neither a robustly positive nor a negative influence on
prosperity. However, some scholars (La Porta et al., 2008) have reported a strong
positive influence of English, German, and Scandinavian legal origins on
institutions.
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23.2.1 Legal Traditions, Religion, and Prosperity
My empirical results show a strong relationship between prosperity indicators
(competitiveness and transparency) and various other indicators (legal origin, reli-
gious institutions, and denomination). Theoretically, my results are in line with the
findings of La Porta et al. (1999, 2008) on legal origins; with Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008, 2012) on institutions; and with Witte
(2002) and Berman (2003) on the influence of religious denominations on law and
institutions.
The underlying logic is that the Sola Scriptura principle of the Protestant Refor-
mation influenced German, English, and Scandinavian legal origins (Witte, 2002;
Doe & Sandberg, 2010; Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009). On the other hand,
French legal origin stems from the French Revolution, which had strong secularising
effects in Europe, but whose influence was not entirely “exported” overseas (e.g. to
Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America). Socialist legal origin originates
in the Bolshevik Revolution and contains atheist elements (Miller 2012; Berman
2003). While all of these modern legal origins replaced medieval canon law, each
borrowed certain of its elements to a different extent. Canon law owed more to Greek
philosophy than to the Scriptures (Selling, 2018; Gula, 2002). However, canon law
is still valid today, above all in the Roman Catholic Church-State, and especially in
(but not limited to) countries under its direct influence.
The incorporation of several principles originating directly in the Holy Scriptures
via the Protestant Reformation was one of the main triggers of change in medieval
legislation codes (i.e. medieval canon law)—and thus in the institutions of Protestant
countries (Witte, 2002).
The Protestant Reformation demanded that papacy’s far-reaching powers in
medieval canon law be refuted. However, canon law could not be ousted entirely
anywhere. Thus, certain aspects have been preserved (through indirect influence),
although to a lower degree, even in Protestant countries such as the USA. In
Lutheran territories, for instance, canon law was tested against the Holy Scriptures,
and only those aspects that passed exacting scrutiny were upheld (Helmholz, 1992).
In theory, common law is one of the legal traditions exerting the least influence on
Roman and canon law. This study, however, has shown that Scandinavian and
especially German law (which in theory belong to Roman Civil Law) yield better
results than common law countries. Protestant anti-clericalism has permeated both
common law and German-Scandinavian legislations. The present QCA results help
explain the different prosperity outcomes in terms of the greater heterogeneity of
English common law countries, along with various other conditions: 1) EPI: English
common law countries are located in distant geographies (and have dissimilar EPI
rankings) from the British Isles and North America (high) to the Caribbean (low). In
contrast, Scandinavian and German law countries are more EPI homogeneous (high)
and share similar geographical/environmental conditions in northern Europe. 2)
State religion: Common law countries have Protestant (e.g. UK), no (e.g. US), or
even Catholic (e.g. Ireland) state religion. In turn, Scandinavian and German law
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countries have either Protestant or no state religion (i.e. absent Catholic state
religion). 3) Ethnicities: Common law countries exhibit higher ethnical heterogene-
ity, ranging from mostly white (e.g. the British Isles and North America) to mostly
black (e.g. Jamaica) ethnicities. In contrast, Scandinavian and German law countries
are more homogeneous (i.e. mostly white ethnicities). The different ethnicities and
their associated cultural attributes (e.g. informal institutions) may interfere in the
implementation of formal codes (law) (Lambsdorff, 2006; Alesina et al., 2003;
Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Volonté, 2015) and in the syncretisation of religion
(see the Cuban case).
The legal code of the French Revolution exhibits another pattern: It yields good
results only if anti-clericalism is present. Countries with strong anticlerical move-
ments such as France, Italy, Uruguay, or Chile provide better results than countries
with a strong influence of the Roman Church-State on their legal and institutional
systems (e.g. most Latin American countries).
One of the crucial elements determining prosperity differences in countries of
French legal origin is the level of anti-clericalism adopted in legislation. Uruguay
adopted the French legal code and boldly incorporated the secular-democratic
principles descending from the French Revolution in its constitution and other
institutions (e.g. education). Consequently, Uruguay is one of the highest-scoring
Latin American countries in social indicators such as transparency (Transparency
International, 2016), political rights, and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2016), and
has achieved the highest social progress in Latin America (Porter et al., 2015), due
partly to the persistence of such institutional arrangements.
In contrast, while Colombia also adopted the legal code of the French Revolution,
until 1991 it completely neglected the anticlerical principles of this code by signing a
Concordat and by implementing a series of denominational constitutions. Conse-
quently, medieval extractive institutions have persisted, making Colombia one of the
most inequitable and dangerous countries in the world to date.
Cuba, by comparison, adopted the socialist legal tradition. Moreover, the Cuban
Revolution in the 1960s led to strong anti-clericalism (and atheism). Accordingly,
Cuba has achieved higher than average levels of equality, literacy, and public health
compared to other Latin American countries. While corruption is moderate, low
social progress and highly restricted liberties (Porter et al., 2015) tip the balance
towards an overall negative outcome.
The German legal tradition widely influenced Switzerland, although the Napole-
onic code took root in some cantons (La Porta et al., 2008). The Swiss Constitution
(1848) is profoundly anticlerical, but not atheist (e.g. its preamble invokes God). Its
liberal-Protestant principles, combined with the country’s federalist structure, make
Switzerland the most competitive country worldwide. Thus, the results for legal
origin entirely fulfil empirical expectations 4, 5, 6, and 7.
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23.3 State Religion
Quantitative analysis partly revealed that establishing Protestantism as a state reli-
gion has an almost twofold effect on competitiveness compared to a high Protestant
population. This confirms the higher importance of religious institutions compared
to the proportion of adherents. Also, the higher importance of state Protestantism
over a Protestant population seems in line with the historical claim that no single
Protestant-Catholic conflict resulted in a Protestant victory without state or external
support (te Brake as cited in Nexon, 2011, p. 152). Historically, political leaders
(including the pope) have more strongly influenced the institutionalisation of reli-
gion than theologians. Current adherence rates reflect such institutionalisation in
many countries (Barro & McCleary, 2005).
Nonetheless, QCA has shown that establishing any state religion, including
Protestantism, is detrimental to prosperity (GCI and transparency) in most cases.
This seemingly contradictory result may explain the positive effects of separating
church and state (secularisation) as an advance of Protestant state religion
(e.g. Switzerland, USA; see Sect. 15.3.1.3). However, secularisation per se
(e.g. French or socialist revolution) may not always lead to positive outcomes.
This becomes clear when state religion results are analysed along with the results
of the last condition (legal origin).
Together, both conclusions (about legal origin and state religion) corroborate
empirical expectation 4. The reason is that legal origins commonly associated with
Protestantism are positive for prosperity. English legal origin is the exception as its
outcome seems to be neutral (considering the nuances previously discussed). On the
other hand, French legal origin (typically associated with Roman Catholicism)
negatively influences prosperity and transparency.
23.4 Religious Affiliation in the Population
Religious adherence (by denomination) is mostly negatively correlated with GCI or
is insignificant in quantitative models. Especially consistent, however, are the
negative correlations of Orthodox and Roman Catholic adherents with GCI. Protes-
tant adherence is not conclusively correlated with GCI and exhibits a positive
influence on transparency (for models, see Sect. 15.3). QCA also produces mixed
results. Changes in magnitude, from one to two digits, in the Protestant population
do not significantly change corruption levels, as shown by the two clusters of Latin
American countries (for Truth Tables, see Appendix 4).
Therefore, the influence of a Protestant population is not one of the essential
conditions (compared to state religion or legal origin, for instance). However, Barro
and McCleary (2005) have stressed the importance of the proportion of religious
adherents as directly triggering a state religion (whose effect on prosperity almost
doubles that of the population). Consequently, although the direct influence of a
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Protestant population is not conclusive, it helps to build institutions that partially
remove old hegemonic structures (e.g. feudal-hierarchical elitists from the medieval
papalist monarchical order). This conclusion concurs with Woodberry (2012), who
demonstrated the importance of the Protestant population in initiating democratic
processes worldwide (except for Pentecostalism).
Also, the Swiss case study shows how liberals and Protestants closed ranks in the
federal government to democratise the Catholic Church in Switzerland. Saying that,
in Latin America, the Protestant population is not necessarily less corrupt than the
Catholic one (Helmsdorff, 1996; Schäfer, 2006; Martin, 1999). This may be directly
related toWoodberry’s findings, given that most Protestant growth in Latin America,
Asia, and Africa generally comes from Pentecostalism. This, however, does not
exert a positive social influence, unlike historical forms of Protestantism
(Woodberry, 2012).
Another potential effect is that historically Protestant countries may become more
emancipated than “new-world Protestant” ones profoundly influenced by Pentecos-
talism. Therefore, a Protestant population may be relevant when it can bring about
institutional changes capable of decreasing the detrimental influence of institutional
Roman Catholicism. While Protestant adherents might prove less important than
deinstitutionalising the public sphere of the Roman Church, they may be needed to
drive forward the latter process.
Denominational ties (proportion of adherents) are important modulators, but not
as decisive as the legal (institutional) ties associated with religion. For example,
Ireland and Austria are predominantly Roman Catholic countries; and yet, their
competitiveness is higher than predominantly Roman Catholic Spain or Portugal
(dominated by French law). Ireland shares common law (and the English language)
with the United Kingdom, while Austria shares the German legal tradition (and the
German language) with Germany. However, neither Catholic Ireland is as prosper-
ous as Protestant Great Britain, nor is Catholic Austria as prosperous as mostly
Protestant Germany.2
These findings on religious adherents partly fulfil empirical expectation 9, as
population mostly influences prosperity only indirectly. Direct influence is rather
weak. However, these results do fulfil empirical expectation 10. The different Latin
American clusters that formed due to slightly different proportions of Protestants do
not exhibit significant differences in corruption outcomes (Appendix 4).
2Subnationally, highly productive Catholic regions in Germany also exist (e.g. Bavaria today),
evidently under the effect of a historically mostly Protestant and liberal influenced Federal Gov-
ernment. Hughes (1935) empirically identified a pattern of industrialisation of Catholic regions in
Germany, during which Catholic farmers were dragged away from their land to work in surrounding
industries established by Protestant capitalists. The author further concludes that (1) the advance-
ment of modern industry in Germany’s Catholic regions was a kind of non-Catholic invasion;
(2) Catholics, as a whole, held inferior positions in their workplaces; and (3) the industrial invasion
impacted Catholic areas unevenly. (pp. 287; 290). Each region has different industrialisation
triggers (e.g. the availability of raw materials, or the “push” of companies such as Audi or Siemens,
which fled the communist expropriation in East Germany) (Hughes 1935; Schaal & Wehling,
2020).
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23.5 Concordats
The findings on concordats were highly consistent and confirmed a negative causal
relation between Concordats with the Roman Catholic Church-State and prosperity
(GCI and Transparency). This variable has proven decisive in case analysis, along
with EPI, legal origin, and state religion. Therefore, empirical expectation 6 was
fulfiled. Countries with valid concordats have implemented domestic legislation
subject to canon and Roman law.
Concordats in Latin America have lawfully perpetuated hierarchical power rela-
tions, control over education, and other Church privileges. Thus, education, family,
and social values are permeated by a relativistic Roman Catholic theology based on
Aquinas and Aristotle. In practice, this means that central Roman Catholic values
such as familialism, double standards, elitism, and a relativistic ethic pervade the
institutions and culture of countries under Catholic influence. As shown, the obvious
result is low prosperity (i.e. high corruption and low competitiveness).
Countries with Concordats and German legal origin—Germany and Austria—are
the exceptions to the previous rule. The longstanding influence of anti-clericalism on
law and institutions (Sect. 8.3.4) and on language (Sect. 11.1) ever since the
sixteenth-century German Protestant Revolution has remained pervasive to this
day. On the positive side, the persistence of anticlericalism may counteract some
detrimental aspects of the Concordats in both countries.
Countries with a German legal origin (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) also have
comparable geographical and environmental conditions. They are also highly com-
petitive. Predominantly Roman Catholic Austria is the least prosperous of the three.
Protestant Germany is more prosperous than Austria but less prosperous than
Switzerland. Germany has a valid Concordat that Hitler signed with the Roman
Church-State, Austria also has a Concordat, yet Switzerland has none. Evidence
shows that Switzerland is the most prosperous of these three countries (see Sect. 16.
3.1, Fig. 16.3; Supplementary Materials; and Truth Tables 9 and 11 in Appendix
4.3.3). Likewise, another contributing factor that is a common denominator in the
two most competitive countries (Switzerland and the USA) is that their (federal)
constitutions are explicitly anticlerical (and neither have Concordats). Concordats
are proxies of state-church relations and thus, of the institutional influence of religion
on society. Therefore, the absence of concordats may well indicate a certain degree
of laicism in government affairs such as education, military, or real estate (see Sects.
8.3.4.6.2 and 16.2.1). However, having a Concordat does not constitute a
monocausal explanation of lack of prosperity, as this research has emphasised in
multiple combinations of triggers.
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23.6 Languages
Quantitative model 4 (Sect. 15.3.1.2.1) shows that the German language positively
correlates with competitiveness. The German language is also positively associated
with transparency (QCA, Table 16.1; Appendices 4.3.4 and 5.4). I discussed the role
of the Bible translations in standardising languages (German) and in unifying
kingdoms (Great Britain), thus contributing to spreading cultural values conducive
to enhancing competitiveness and transparency (Sect. 11.1).
Conversely, Roman languages (combined with high Concordats and low EPI)
are associated with low competitiveness in QCA (Sect. 16.3.1.4). The Colombian
case has shown how the Roman Church-State used Hispanicism as a powerful tool to
isolate countries from the anticlericalist dynamics of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism,3
French liberalism, and Soviet communism (Figueroa, 2007).
In Colombia, conservative traditionalists identified Hispanicism as a cultural
weapon for maintaining corporatist ideals, a medieval-type hierarchical society,
and for upholding the principles of seigneurial and counter-reformist Spain (Figue-
roa, 2016, p. 21). The Hispanicist triad illustrated by Figueroa (2016)—language,
religion, and race—grew stronger with the rise of institutional (legal-political con-
fessionalism) and economic corporatism, both part of a concerted corporate strategy
to maintain hegemony. Consequently, such features are part of the same phenome-
non. Rather than competing explanations, they are intervening ones. Therefore,
empirical expectation 11 was fulfiled.
23.7 Ethnicities
Caucasian ethnic values exhibited a positive influence in QCA and in two quanti-
tative models (Sect. 15.3.1). For Huntington, being “overwhelmingly white, British
and Protestant” (Huntington, 2004, p. 31) is fundamental to US prosperity. Although
the author has received fierce criticism for stating racist, stereotyping generalisations
(McSweeney, 2015), the empirical results of this study suggest that Huntington’s
assertion may not be misguided (see Sect. 15.3.1 and Truth Tables 17 and 19 in
Appendix 4.2). However, the QCA clusters reveal that ethnicities are not a critical
condition (unlike legal origin or state religion). As shown, ethnicities are the least
important condition in plausible groups and empirical evidence for QCA.
Moreover, the quantitative model of corruption (Sect. 15.3.2) has indicated that
the measure of “ethnic fractionalisation” produced no obvious conclusion, thus
3Hispanicism has been effective at preventing the success of anticlerical movements. Yet, it has
been counteracted to a certain degree by other political or legal influences—for instance,
US-American constitutionalism, which has succeeded throughout Europe and the Americas
(Merryman & Pérez, 2015) (see Sect. 8.3.4.6.1). Likewise, Hispanicism does not prevent Colombia
being the closest political ally of the USA in Latin America (Brock, 2011).
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corroborating empirical expectation 8. Nonetheless, ethnicity results for Latin Amer-
ica might approximate the level of religious syncretism. Countries with a larger
African or indigenous population (or both) exhibit higher levels of syncretism, for
instance, spiritistic rituals and Roman Catholicism or Protestantism (see the Cuban
and Colombian cases) (Contreras, 2013, p. 177; Ramírez, 2009, p. 167; Sánchez,
1992, pp. 90–91). Accordingly, multicultural countries such as Cuba, Brazil,
Jamaica, Bolivia, or Colombia can be expected to display higher religious syncre-
tism than more homogenous ones like Uruguay or Argentina. This issue needs to be
further explored, theoretically and empirically.
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24.1 The Institutional and Cultural (Adherents) Influence
of Religion1
Institutional factors related to religion exert a stronger structural and long-term
influence on prosperity (competitiveness and corruption) than the cultural influence
of religion (adherents). Several pieces of evidence corroborate this conclusion:
(1) the abundant historical, theological, and theoretical information; (2) the empirical
results on State religion, Concordats, and Legal origin; (3) the analysis of specific
cases.
Models 1 and 3 (Sect. 15.3.1) confirmed empirically that the influence of Protes-
tant state religion almost twice exceeds that of adherents, for instance. Further,
seriously considering the role of the Roman Catholic Church as a state actor has
profound implications. The importance of Roman Catholicism is based more on its
institutional and political ideology, rather than on its belief system (although reli-
gious belief is also necessary for maintaining political ideology and the status quo).
However, empirical works considering religion and prosperity variables have mostly
concentrated solely on the influence of religious adherents. This has resulted in a
minimisation paradigm that disregards the institutional influence of religion. There-
fore, the relationships between prosperity and religion have tended to be trivialised
or misunderstood when analysing religion as a background prosperity factor.
Incorporating the institutional influence of religion allows understanding, for
example, why Switzerland has lower levels of corruption (and higher prosperity)
1Some parts of this chapter were originally published as “General Conclusions” in: Garcia Portilla,
J. (2019). “Ye Shall Know Them by Their Fruits”: Prosperity and Institutional Religion in Europe
and the Americas. Religions, 10(6), 362. MDPI AG. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3390/
rel10060362
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
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when the majority of its population is currently Roman Catholic (i.e. given its 1848
anticlerical, liberal, and Protestant-friendly federal constitution). Uruguay is a sim-
ilar case to some extent. The majority of Uruguay’s population is Roman Catholic
(although Uruguay is the most secular country in Latin America) (Pew Research
Center, 2014) and one of the least corrupt (and with the highest social progress) in
the region. Uruguay’s constitution is markedly anticlerical.
The opposite case is Colombia, where the still valid and modified Concordat
(1887), pre-1991 constitution, and other arrangements represent a classical Catholic
Christendom prototype of a full state-church fusion (Levine, 1981, p. 71). These
arrangements have meant that the high proportion of Roman Catholics in Colombia
resulted naturally from such restrictive conservative policies and legal instruments.
In Switzerland, Protestant-liberals won the Sonderbund war, thus paving the way for
the 1848 anticlerical constitution. In Colombia, the opposite happened:
Conservative-Catholics won the war that led to the 1886 Constitution. In 1991, the
new constitution included some liberal elements after a peace process with liberal
guerrillas.
A key to understanding the pervasively negative influence of Roman Catholicism
on state relations/performance is hierarchy. Hierarchy in church and state is opposed
to democracy and transparency, thus promoting power abuse from the higher
echelons down.
Thus, the historical institutional influence of Roman Catholicism or Protestantism
affects corruption/prosperity rates more directly than the current proportion of
believers (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Nonetheless, institutional religion and the
proportion of believers are well connected empirically (Barro & McCleary, 2005).
The cases of Switzerland, Colombia, and Uruguay show that the current population
adherents result visibly from the historical institutional influence of religion.
24.2 Models
The models developed and applied in this study allow analysing determining factors
layer by layer. For example, geography and environment are the first determinants.
However, variation within zones may be mediated (or moduled) not only by
environment, latitude, topography, and climate but also by institutional background,
as best represented by legal traditions. Moreover, legal traditions have a direct
historical relationship with the successive legal revolutions against the status quo
(Roman and canon law part of Roman Catholicism or Orthodoxism). The crucial
role of Protestantism (and anticlericalism) in such legal revolutions paved the path
for modernity and democratic institutions.
This fresh perspective enables us to understand why countries in similar geo-
graphic and environment settings exhibit marked differences. For instance, Argen-
tina, Chile, and Uruguay share similar environmental and geographical conditions,
and yet Argentina is less prosperous (i.e. more corrupt) than Chile and Uruguay. The
reason being that Argentina is far more clerical than the other countries
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(i.e. Argentina has a Concordat) (see Truth Tables 1 and 3 in Appendix 4.3.1). The
same consideration of multiple causalities, given in Sect. 23.5, applies here. The
Argentinian Concordat indicates direct interference of the Roman Catholic Church-
State in the secular affairs of Argentina, and the presence of a more clerical society
than in Uruguay and Chile.2
24.3 Returning to the General Research Interest: “Ye Shall
Know Them By Their Fruits” (The Social Experiments)
24.3.1 The Roman and Catholic Ancien Régime
Roman Catholicism has had more than enough time to enforce its Aquinian-
Aristotelian social experiment through applying the corresponding theological con-
cepts to politics, law, and social organisation. Romanism has deployed its ancien
régime for over a millennium, from the European Middle Ages to the present
(especially in several Latin American countries).
The Roman and Catholic experiment shows that applying Aquinian-Aristotelian
principles creates undesirable prosperity scenarios in wider society (while
maximising the power and prosperity of the Church). These principles contrast
sharply with what Roman Catholicism claims would make a society prosperous
and harmonious (Ratzinger & Pera, 2006; Restrepo, 1939). This, as shown, is a
medieval society of greatest benefit of the Catholic Church.
It remains debatable (as during the Reformation) the “natural law” that the Roman
Church-State bases on the human capacity discerning between right or wrong. The
Roman Church-State has adopted natural law as the foundation for its teachings on
sexual behaviour, freedom of religion, justice, fair societies, human life, medical
practice, and the connection between societal morals and civil law (Gula, 2002,
pp. 120–121). In practice, the application of Roman Catholic “natural law” has often
produced the opposite to its intended principles: centuries-long hegemony and—to
this day—corruption and low competitiveness. In the end, the legitimacy of the
Roman Catholic Church-State has not been reliant on the capacity of its “truth” to
persuade, but on its legal right as the bearer of authority to subordinate and command
(Sanks, 1974, pp. 11–13).
Thousands of years of hegemony characterise the Roman Catholic Church as a
global political-religious institution. The associated corruption in all the countries
under its influence may well be related to the corrupt fruits for which “we shall know
2For instance, Gill (1998) explained that Chile and Argentina are the two Latin American cases that
more appropriately resemble a scientifically controlled experiment, since they share many constant
variables (within acceptable limits). The Chilean episcopate became an ardent opponent of the
Pinochet dictatorship, even at the cost of the extreme repression of its clergy. On the contrary, the
Argentine bishops are recognised not only for ignoring the military’s violations but also for
engaging effectively in public administration (Gill, 1998, p. 121).
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them” in the parable of Jesus (King James Bible, 1769, Matthew 7:15–23). Among
others, these fruits have also been the abuse scandals, maintenance of ignorance, and
persecution of God’s Word, in the name of Jesus Christ.
24.3.2 Protestant Reformation
The application of Protestant (i.e. biblical) principles (Fig. 8.4) on law instead of
relativism has produced an ethical code that enhances trust, transparency, and
prosperity (see Sects. 8.3, 9.1.2, 10.3, 15.3, 16.3.1, Fig. 8.3, Appendix 4.3; and
Supplementary Materials). The influence of biblical principles in the legislation of
Protestant countries also concurs with the following verse of the Scriptures:
And what nation is there so great, that hath statutes and judgments so righteous as all this
law, which I set before you this day? (King James Bible, 1769, Deuteronomy 4: 8).
Prosperity and educational differences between Protestants (higher) and Roman
Catholics (lower) are still evident in Germany and Switzerland. Such differences are
even higher comparing national levels (cross-country). Scandinavian countries are
all prosperous and have embraced Lutheranism even more strongly than Germany to
the point of making it their state religion (see Sect. 8.3.4.1 and Chap. 9).
However, the present and future do not seem encouraging as the world progres-
sively returns to Rome. On the one hand, many historical strands of Protestantism
that previously resisted the Catholic hegemony have now relinquished their
founding principles and accept ecumenism in “Rome terms”. On the other, the
Pentecostalist trend within Protestantism has weakened the latter’s historical socio-
political impact (Sect. 10.4.1.3).
24.3.3 The French Revolution
An experiment similar to (and deriving from) the various Protestant revolutions was
the French Revolution. This, too, diminished the hegemonic power of the Church
and its associated aristocratic-oligarchic-elitist privileges. Such privileges were
curbed in France and Belgium, for instance. Nevertheless, this trend continued in
Spain and Portugal, although in weaker form, and has been almost inexistent in most
of Latin America (Sects. 8.3.4.5, 8.3.4.6, 8.3.5).
24.3.4 Communism
Nor have the social experiments of communism (e.g. seizing the liberties and
property of ordinary people in the Soviet Union and Cuba) produced ideal results
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either. In contrast, the social experiment of the Protestant revolutions (or of the
French Revolution) initiated positive social developments in the long term
(e.g. seizing the privileges and properties of the Roman Church-State, not of those
of common people). Unlike the ancien régime, all the other social experiments have
invested more in human capital building through making education public and state-
controlled. On balance, the Protestant Reformation has produced the highest pros-
perity for society as a whole.
24.4 Suggestions for Future Research
The results of this study open up various avenues for future research. The QCA
evidence generated here allows further analysis of every country in Europe and the
Americas. Future research might also continue to apply the vast amount of informa-
tion collected and already codified in this study.
Further research on the institutional influence of religion could complement the
present analysis through (quantitative) time series and (qualitative) cases studies
(e.g. Venezuela and the USA). Other indicators of potential value for further
qualitative and quantitative analyses might include the number of years since
officialising relations with the Roman See per country, the number of dioceses,
diocesan priests, persons per diocesan priests, the total number of priests, and the
total number of persons per priest/per year/per country.
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Chapter 25
Concluding Remarks
The cross-method results of this study show that prosperity and transparency
respond mainly to three reinforcing (rather than competing) explanatory mecha-
nisms. They are, in order of importance: (1) Environment, geography, topography,
latitude; (2) Religion (considering its institutional influence, legal origin, proportion
of adherents, syncretism) and; (3) Other non-religious political factors such as
communism.
More specifically, a combination of factors causing corruption and low compet-
itiveness in countries in Europe and the Americas includes: (1) low Environmental
Performance (EPI); (2) Roman Catholicism as a State Religion; (3) high adherence
to Orthodoxy or Roman Catholicism; (4) Concordat with the Vatican; and (5) French
(clerical) or socialist legal origin.
Consequently, the influence of the Protestant Reformation in Northern Europe,
and later, its extended effect in North America, have produced a loop of trust,
transparency, and prosperity. In contrast, the hegemony of the Roman Catholic
Church-State has not yet been broken in most Latin American countries. The results
are high corruption and low prosperity.
Methodologically, Woodberry’s conclusion to his in-depth study of the explan-
atory influence of Protestantism on democracy also applies here:
Although any piece of this evidence can be critiqued, the cumulative evidence makes finding
a consistent alternative explanation extremely difficult. If alternative explanations are not
consistent between contexts and methods, it is not clear why we should prefer them over an
explanation that works consistently across such a wide variety of contexts and methods
(Woodberry, 2012, p. 268).
I wish to end this book with some thought-provoking lines from the Old
Testament:
Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord; and the people whom he hath chosen for his
own inheritance (King James Bible, 1769, Psalms 33:12; original emphases).
The previous verse shall in no way be understood as otherness or exclusion, since
the Scriptures also state:
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Thus saith the Lord, [. . .] For I know their works and their thoughts: it shall come, that I will
gather all nations and tongues; and they shall come, and see my glory (King James Bible,
1769, Isaiah 66: 1, 18).
For thus saith the Lord of hosts; Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the heavens, and
the earth, and the sea, and the dry land; and I will shake all nations, and the Desire of all
nations shall come: and I will fill this house with glory, saith the Lord of hosts (King James
Bible, 1769, Haggai 2: 6–7).
And it shall be to me a name of joy, a praise and an honor before all the nations of the earth,
which shall hear all the good that I do unto them: and they shall fear and tremble for all the
goodness and for all the prosperity that I procure unto it (King James Bible, 1769, Jeremiah
33: 9).
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statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
354 25 Concluding Remarks
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I. Appendices to Component 1 (Macro) (Quantitative
Analysis––Correlations, Chap. 15)
© The Author(s) 2022
J. García Portilla, “Ye Shall Know Them by Their Fruits”, Contributions to
Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78498-0
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1. QUAN Appendix A. Competiveness Variables (Models 1–5;
Chap. 15, Sect. 15.3.1)
Note: This appendix does not include the entire set of variables (>70) analysed at the
beginning but the selected ones after the data treatment in steps 1 and 2 (as well as























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































II. Appendices to Component 2 (Meso) (Qualitative
Comparative Analysis––QCA, Chap. 16)
364 Appendices
3. QCA Appendix A. Calibration Thresholds and Description
of Conditions and Outcome According to Indicators,





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4. QCA Appendix B. Truth Tables and “QCA Minimisation
Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm”
4.1 Interpretation Guide
4.1.1 Truth Tables
In the truth tables, especially the rows exhibiting outcome¼1 (entire rows in yellow)
merit attention. These are the rows where the outcome is present. The combination of
ones and zeros for each row refers to the combination of conditions leading to the
outcome.
Exceptionally, I have also highlighted in yellow two clusters (but not the entire
row) and their incl proximate to 0.9 (sufficiency inclusion). Such clusters are of
interest for the analysis of QCA cases (Cuba and Uruguay; see Chap. 16 in main text
and truth Tables 1 and 21 in Appendix 4.2).
Conventions:
OUT: outcome value
n: number of cases in configuration (with the same combination of conditions)
incl: sufficiency inclusion score
PRI: Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency
Both incl and PRI are parameters of fit. If we wish to draw any conclusion from
the rows, “incl” ought to be at least close to 0.9 or higher (better). The higher the
number of cases, the better.
4.1.2 Sufficient Conditions in the Tables “QCA Minimisation Using
the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm”:
Two parameters of fit inform the interpretation of QCA results: the consistency and
the coverage scores. The consistency score indicates the degree to which the
empirical data is entirely in line with a result, or how much deviation is evident. If
the findings pass a plausible consistency threshold, they can be considered signifi-
cant (scores below 0.80 should be avoided). The coverage score provides informa-
tion on the share of cases that explain results, which is how comprehensive or trivial
the findings are. Both scores run between 0 (worst) and 1 (perfect) and are provided
for each path as well as the entire solution (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 128;
Fiedler, Graevingholt, & Mross, 2018, p. 11).
The Quine–McCluskey algorithm is used to simplify Boolean algebra expres-
sions based on finding all prime implicants. The rules of Boolean algebra help to
minimise logical expression (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 115). While similar
to Karnaugh mapping, it is better suited to computer algorithms. It also allows testing
whether minimisation of Boolean functions has been reached.
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Conventions:
CAPITAL LETTERS: the presence of the condition (e.g. 1 for high
COMPETITIVENESS).
Lowercase letters: negation or absence of the condition (e.g. 1 for not high
competitiveness ¼ usually low competitiveness).
For example, “EPI*LATINO”means high EPI index and high Latino population,
while “epi*latino” means something like low EPI index and low Latino population.
: Each line is one possible way of attaining the outcome (e.g. low corruption, high
competitiveness).
incl.: (consistency¼inclusion). This is the inclusion score for sufficiency relations
(should be at least 0.9).
cov.r: Coverage. If it is lower than 0.5, the results do not have enough power.
* Means that these conditions must be all present (logical AND). The logical
operator AND describes the necessity of each condition combined with another
condition for an outcome of interest to be in place.
+ Means that at least one of the conditions must be present—alternative ways for
an outcome (logical OR). The logical operator OR denotes that it is sufficient for any
condition (or combination) separated by OR to be present for the outcome of interest
to be also present.
Applied to sets of elements, AND (*) yields the intersection of sets while OR (+)
results in their union (Fiedler, Graevingholt, & Mross, 2018).
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4.2 Truth Tables and “QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–
McCluskey Algorithm” for Outcome Competitiveness
4.2.1 Predominant Religion (Proportion of Adherents) and Competitiveness
A. Positive Outcome
1. Truth Table
CONCOR EPI DOM_CAT DOM_PROT DOM_ORT OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.951 0.835 BIH
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0.717 0 MDA,MKD,MNE,SRB,UKR
3 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.912 0.769 JAM,TTO
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0.882 0.676 CHL,URY
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0.847 0.59 HND,NIC,PAN
9 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.996 0.987 CZE
10 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 0.833 0.244 BGR,GRC,ROU,RUS
11 0 1 0 1 0 1 11 0.975 0.958
CAN,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,CHE,ISL,NLD,
NOR,SWE,USA
13 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 0.933 0.827 BEL,IRL,LUX
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.898 0.642 ALB
21 1 0 1 0 0 0 7 0.649 0.164 ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN
23 1 0 1 1 0 0 5 0.65 0.199 BOL,BRA,DOM,GTM,SLV
27 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 0.907 0.795 DEU,LVA
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 11 0.773 0.519
AUT,ESP,FRA,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,
PRT,SVK,SVN
31 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0.773 0.375 CRI,HUN
2. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1  concor*dom_cat*dom_ort 0.904 0.841 0.539 0.033
2  concor*EPI*dom_prot*dom_ort 0.948 0.851 0.393 0.081
3  EPI*dom_cat*DOM_PROT*dom_ort 0.957 0.932 0.473 0.031





CONCOR EPI DOM_CAT DOM_PROT DOM_ORT OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.75 0.165 BIH
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 1 1 MDA,MKD,MNE,SRB,UKR
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0.705 0.231 JAM,TTO
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0.753 0.324 CHL,URY
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0.78 0.41 HND,NIC,PAN
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.698 0.013 CZE
10 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 0.946 0.756 BGR,GRC,ROU,RUS
11 0 1 0 1 0 0 11 0.41 0.002
CAN,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,CHE,ISL,NLD,
NOR,SWE,USA
13 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0.679 0.173 BEL,IRL,LUX
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.817 0.358 ALB
21 1 0 1 0 0 1 7 0.931 0.836 ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN
23 1 0 1 1 0 1 5 0.913 0.801 BOL,BRA,DOM,GTM,SLV
27 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0.637 0.205 DEU,LVA
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 11 0.704 0.374
AUT,ESP,FRA,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,
PRT,SVK,SVN
31 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 0.864 0.625 CRI,HUN
4. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine-McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 23/37/0
Total: 60
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 concor*dom_cat*dom_prot*DOM_ORT 0.886 0.733 0.275 0.239
2 CONCOR*DOM_CAT*DOM_PROT*dom_ort 0.889 0.769 0.284 0.023
3 CONCOR*epi*DOM_CAT*dom_ort 0.941 0.882 0.383 0.122
M1 0.902 0.809 0.657
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MUSLIM OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0.668 0.291 BIH,JAM,MDA,MKD,MNE,NIC,SRB,TTO,UKR,URY
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0.787 0.476 HND,CHL,PAN
9 0 1 0 0 0 1 11 0.889 0.772 BEL,BGR,CAN,CZE,EST,GRC,CHE,NLD,ROU,RUS,USA
11 0 1 0 1 0 1 6 0.936 0.932 DNK,FIN,GBR,ISL,NOR,SWE
13 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0.874 0.594 IRL,LUX
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.795 0.496 ECU,MEX
18 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.5 0 ALB
21 1 0 1 0 0 0 10 0.456 0 ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
25 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 0.812 0.699 AUT,DEU,FRA,HUN,LVA,POL,SVK
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 8 0.677 0.3 CRI,ESP,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,PRT,SVN
6. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 19/41/0
Total: 60
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 concor*EPI*st_cathol*st_muslim 0.903 0.845 0.494 0.155
2 concor*EPI*st_protest*st_muslim 0.884 0.733 0.483 0.144









MUSLIM OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0.811 0.596 BIH,JAM,MDA,MKD,MNE,NIC,SRB,TTO,UKR,URY
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0.803 0.515 HND,CHL,PAN
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 11 0.597 0.171 BEL,BGR,CAN,CZE,EST,GRC,CHE,NLD,ROU,RUS,USA
11 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 0.064 0 DNK,FIN,GBR,ISL,NOR,SWE
13 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.815 0.406 IRL,LUX
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.798 0.504 ECU,MEX
18 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 ALB
21 1 0 1 0 0 1 10 1 1 ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
25 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 0.564 0.301 AUT,DEU,FRA,HUN,LVA,POL,SVK
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 8 0.789 0.543 CRI,ESP,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,PRT,SVN
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8. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 11/49/0
Total: 60
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 CONCOR*epi*st_cathol*st_protest*ST_MUSLIM 1 1 0.024 0.024
2 CONCOR*epi*ST_CATHOL*st_protest*st_muslim 1 1 0.287 0.287
M1 1 1 0.311
4.2.3 Legal Origin and Competitiveness
A. Positive Outcome
9. Truth Table
CONCOR ENGLISH SOCIALIST FRENCH GERMAN SCANDIN EPI OUT n incl PRI cases
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 0.927
0.92
1 DNK,FIN,NOR,SWE,ISL
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 CHE
9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 0.727
0.43
9 HND,NIC,PAN,URY,CHL
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 0.864
0.70
1 BEL,GRC,NLD,LUX
17 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.712 0 MDA,MKD,UKR,BIH
18 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 0.844 0.48 BGR,CZE,EST,RUS,ROU
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.748 0.6 JAM,TTO
34 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 1 1 IRL,GBR,CAN,USA
70 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 AUT,DEU






74 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 0.729 0.41 FRA,ITA,PRT,ESP,MLT,CRI
81 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.863 0 ALB





10. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 12/46/0
Total: 58
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 english*socialist*french*GERMAN*scandin*EPI 1 1 0.063 0.063
2 concor*english*socialist*french*german*SCANDIN*EPI 0.927 0.921 0.137 0.137
3 concor*ENGLISH*socialist*french*german*scandin*EPI 1 1 0.105 0.105









DIN EPI OUT n incl PRI cases
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 0.073 0
DNK,FIN,NOR,SW
E,ISL
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 CHE
9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 0.741 0.468
HND,NIC,PAN,UR
Y,CHL
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 0.681 0.299
BEL,GRC,NLD,LU
X
17 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 0.946 0.811
MDA,MKD,UKR,BI
H
18 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 0.805 0.35
BGR,CZE,EST,RUS,
ROU
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.622 0.4 JAM,TTO
34 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0.303 0 IRL,GBR,CAN,USA
70 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 AUT,DEU





74 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 0.734 0.42
FRA,ITA,PRT,ESP,
MLT,CRI
81 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 ALB
82 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 7 0.871 0.721
HRV,HUN,LVA,LT
U,POL,SVK,SVN
12. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 17/41/0
Total: 58
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 english*SOCIALIST*french*german*scandin*epi 0.953 0.842 0.255 0.255
2 CONCOR*english*socialist*FRENCH*german*scandin*epi 1 1 0.326 0.326
M1 0.979 0.953 0.581
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ENG OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0.784 0.523 BIH,MKD,MNE,SRB,TTO
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.874 0.799 JAM
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0.748 0 MDA,UKR
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 0.748 0.554 HND,CHL,NIC,PAN,URY
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 12 0.898 0.818
BEL,BGR,CZE,DNK,FIN,GRC,ISL,
LUX,NLD,NOR,ROU,SWE
18 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 4 1 1 CAN,GBR,IRL,USA
19 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.997 0.985 EST,RUS
25 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.99 0.985 CHE
33 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.774 0 ALB,ARG
37 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 0.389 0
BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,M
EX,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
49 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 0.816 0.489
HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,SVK,SV
N
51 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.75 0 LVA
53 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0.699 0.33 CRI,ESP,FRA,PRT
57 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0.833 0.8 AUT,DEU,HUN
14. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 7/53/0
Total: 60
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 concor*EPI*lan_ger*lan_rom*lan_rus*LAN_ENG 1 1 0.123 0.103
2 concor*EPI*lan_ger*lan_rom*LAN_RUS*lan_eng 0.997 0.985 0.092 0.082
3 concor*EPI*LAN_GER*lan_rom*lan_rus*lan_eng 0.99 0.985 0.031 0.01











ENG OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0.735 0.413 BIH,MKD,MNE,SRB,TTO
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.498 0.201 JAM
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 MDA,UKR
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 0.646 0.372 HND,CHL,NIC,PAN,URY
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 12 0.521 0.146
BEL,BGR,CZE,DNK,FIN,GRC,ISL,LUX,NLD,N
OR,ROU,SWE
18 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 0.336 0 CAN,GBR,IRL,USA
19 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0.785 0.015 EST,RUS
25 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.34 0.015 CHE
33 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 ALB,ARG
37 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 11 1 1
BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,MEX,PER,PR
Y,SLV,VEN
49 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 0.824 0.511 HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,SVK,SVN
51 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 LVA
53 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0.802 0.559 CRI,ESP,FRA,PRT
57 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0.333 0.2 AUT,DEU,HUN
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16. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 16/44/0
Total: 60
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 CONCOR*epi*lan_ger*lan_rus*lan_eng 1 1 0.407 0.371
2 concor*epi*lan_ger*lan_rom*LAN_RUS*lan_eng 1 1 0.096 0.06
3 CONCOR*EPI*lan_ger*lan_rom*LAN_RUS*lan_eng 1 1 0.047 0.011
M1 1 1 0.478
4.2.5 Ethnicities and Competitiveness
A. Positive Outcome
17. Truth Table
CONCOR EPI WHITE LATINO MESTIZO
NON_
WHITE OUT n incl PRI cases
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0.823 0.382 JAM,TTO
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0.76 0.381 CHL,NIC,PAN
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.868 0 UKR
6 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.8 0 BIH
9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 0.834 0.602 HND,MDA,MKD,SRB,URY
13 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.917 0.5 MNE
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 DNK






34 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0.578 0 BOL,DOM,PER
36 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 0.417 0 COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV
37 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.333 0 VEN
41 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.813 0.389 ALB,ARG
42 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0.714 0.2 BRA,GTM
49 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.784 0.565 FRA,ITA,MLT,PRT
53 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.596 0.323 ESP





18. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT = 1/0/C: 21/39/0
Total: 60
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 concor*epi*LATINO*mestizo*non_white 0.863 0.327 0.133 0.021
2 concor*EPI*latino*mestizo*non_white 0.944 0.904 0.546 0.433




CONCOR EPI WHITE LATINO MESTIZO
NON_
WHITE OUT n incl PRI cases
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0.891 0.618 JAM,TTO
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0.85 0.613 CHL,NIC,PAN
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 UKR
6 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 BIH
9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 0.749 0.398 HND,MDA,MKD,SRB,URY
13 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.917 0.5 MNE
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.623 0 DNK




34 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 1 1 BOL,DOM,PER
36 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 1 1 COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV
37 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 VEN
41 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.881 0.611 ALB,ARG
42 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0.929 0.8 BRA,GTM
49 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.648 0.291 FRA,ITA,MLT,PRT
53 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.602 0.333 ESP
57 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 10 0.772 0.541
AUT,CRI,DEU,HRV,HUN,LTU,
LVA,POL,SVK,SVN
20. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 14/46/0
Total: 60
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 concor*epi*LATINO*mestizo*non_white 0.934 0.673 0.167 0.059
2 CONCOR*epi*latino*mestizo*NON_WHITE 0.945 0.877 0.203 0.047
3 concor*epi*white*LATINO*mestizo 1 1 0.119 0.011
4 CONCOR*epi*white*latino*NON_WHITE 1 1 0.225 0.082
5 epi*white*LATINO*mestizo*non_white 1 1 0.119 0.012
M1 0.951 0.895 0.463
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4.3 Truth Tables and “QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced
Quine–McCluskey Algorithm” for Outcome Corruption
4.3.1 Predominant Religion (Proportion of Adherents) and Corruption
A. Positive Outcome
21. Truth Table
CONCOR EPI DOM_CAT DOM_PROT DOM_ORT OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.865 0.675 BIH
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0.574 0 MDA,MKD,MNE,SRB,UKR
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0.798 0.6 GUY,JAM,SUR,TTO
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0.831 0.674 CUB,CHL,URY
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0.721 0.463 HND,NIC,PAN
9 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.911 0.769 CZE
10 0 1 0 0 1 0 5 0.65 0.122 BGR,BLR,GRC,ROU,RUS
11 0 1 0 1 0 1 11 0.958 0.934
CAN,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,CHE,ISL,N
LD,NOR,SWE,USA
13 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0.879 0.733 BEL,IRL,LUX
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.83 0.496 ALB
21 1 0 1 0 0 0 7 0.598 0.142 ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN
23 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 0.561 0.154 BOL,BRA,DOM,GTM,HTI,SLV
27 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 DEU,LVA
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 11 0.849 0.677
AUT,ESP,FRA,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,P
OL,PRT,SVK,SVN
31 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0.818 0.496 CRI,HUN
22. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 14/51/0
Total: 65
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 concor*EPI*dom_cat*dom_ort 0.943 0.907 0.487 0.049
2 EPI*dom_cat*DOM_PROT*dom_ort 0.962 0.941 0.475 0.038




CONCOR EPI DOM_CAT DOM_PROT DOM_ORT OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.718 0.325 BIH
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 1 1 MDA,MKD,MNE,SRB,UKR
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0.698 0.4 GUY,JAM,SUR,TTO
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0.65 0.326 CUB,CHL,URY
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0.76 0.537 HND,NIC,PAN
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.704 0.231 CZE
10 0 1 0 0 1 1 5 0.952 0.878 BGR,BLR,GRC,ROU,RUS
11 0 1 0 1 0 0 11 0.417 0.066
CAN,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,CHE,ISL,N
LD,NOR,SWE,USA
13 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0.668 0.267 BEL,IRL,LUX
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.833 0.504 ALB
21 1 0 1 0 0 1 7 0.933 0.858 ARG,COL,ECU,MEX,PER,PRY,VEN
23 1 0 1 1 0 1 6 0.92 0.846 BOL,BRA,DOM,GTM,HTI,SLV
27 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0.64 0 DEU,LVA
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 11 0.632 0.213
AUT,ESP,FRA,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,P
OL,PRT,SVK,SVN
31 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0.821 0.504 CRI,HUN
24. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 23/42/0
Total: 65
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 concor*dom_cat*dom_prot*DOM_ORT 0.893 0.802 0.275 0.253
2 CONCOR*epi*DOM_CAT*dom_ort 0.944 0.899 0.375 0.353
M1 0.92 0.857 0.628
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MUSLIM OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0.568 0.279
BIH,GUY,JAM,MDA,MKD,MNE,N
IC,SRB,SUR,TTO,UKR,URY
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0.695 0.43 CUB,HND,CHL,PAN
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 0.781 0.606
BEL,BGR,BLR,CAN,CZE,EST,GR
C,CHE,NLD,ROU,RUS,USA
11 0 1 0 1 0 1 6 1 1 DNK,FIN,GBR,ISL,NOR,SWE
13 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.824 0.571 IRL,LUX
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.705 0.407 ECU,MEX
18 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.5 0 ALB
21 1 0 1 0 0 0 11 0.408 0
ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,H
TI,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
25 1 1 0 0 0 1 7 0.938 0.898
AUT,DEU,FRA,HUN,LVA,POL,SV
K
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 8 0.82 0.605
CRI,ESP,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,PRT,
SVN
26. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 13/52/0
Total: 65
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 concor*EPI*st_cathol*ST_PROTEST*st_muslim 1 1 0.153 0.153
2 CONCOR*EPI*st_cathol*st_protest*st_muslim 0.938 0.898 0.142 0.142









MUSLIM OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0.809 0.682
BIH,GUY,JAM,MDA,MKD,MNE,NIC,SRB,SU
R,TTO,UKR,URY
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0.767 0.564 CUB,HND,CHL,PAN
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 0.637 0.349
BEL,BGR,BLR,CAN,CZE,EST,GRC,CHE,NLD
,ROU,RUS,USA
11 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 DNK,FIN,GBR,ISL,NOR,SWE
13 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.766 0.429 IRL,LUX
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.798 0.593 ECU,MEX
18 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 ALB
21 1 0 1 0 0 1 11 1 1
ARG,BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,GTM,HTI,PER,PR
Y,SLV,VEN
25 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 0.447 0.102 AUT,DEU,FRA,HUN,LVA,POL,SVK
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 8 0.65 0.234 CRI,ESP,HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,PRT,SVN
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28. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 12/53/0
Total: 65
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 CONCOR*epi*st_cathol*st_protest*ST_MUSLIM 1 1 0.022 0.022
2 CONCOR*epi*ST_CATHOL*st_protest*st_muslim 1 1 0.298 0.298
M1 1 1 0.32
4.3.3 Legal Origin and Corruption
A. Positive Outcome
Conditions for low corruption
29. Truth Table
CONCOR ENGLISH SOCIALIST FRENCH GERMAN SCANDIN EPI OUT n incl PRI cases
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 1 1
DNK,FIN,NOR,SWE,IS
L
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 CHE
9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 0.592 0.369
HND,NIC,PAN,URY,CH
L,SUR
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 0.783 0.583 BEL,GRC,NLD,LUX
17 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 0.614 0.105
MDA,MKD,UKR,BIH,C
UB
18 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 0.697 0.293
BLR,BGR,CZE,EST,RU
S,ROU
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.697 0.571 JAM,TTO,GUY
34 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 1 1 IRL,GBR,CAN,USA
70 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 AUT,DEU




74 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 0.767 0.49
FRA,ITA,PRT,ESP,MLT
,CRI
81 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.878 0 ALB
82 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 7 1 1
HRV,HUN,LVA,LTU,P
OL,SVK,SVN
30. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 19/44/0
Total: 63
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 english*socialist*french*GERMAN*scandin*EPI 1 1 0.058 0.058
2 concor*english*socialist*french*german*SCANDIN*EPI 1 1 0.136 0.136
3 concor*ENGLISH*socialist*french*german*scandin*EPI 1 1 0.106 0.106
4 CONCOR*english*SOCIALIST*french*german*scandin*EPI 1 1 0.145 0.145
M1 1 1 0.446
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B. Negative Outcome
Conditions for high corruption
31. Truth Table
CONCOR ENGLISH SOCIALIST FRENCH GERMAN SCANDIN EPI OUT n incl PRI cases
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 0 0
DNK,FIN,NOR,SWE,
ISL
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 CHE
9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 0.76 0.629
HND,NIC,PAN,URY,
CHL,SUR
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 0.696 0.417 BEL,GRC,NLD,LUX
17 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 0.907 0.784
MDA,MKD,UKR,BI
H,CUB
18 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 0.83 0.604
BLR,BGR,CZE,EST,
RUS,ROU
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.596 0.429 JAM,TTO,GUY
34 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0.273 0 IRL,GBR,CAN,USA
70 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 AUT,DEU





74 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 0.698 0.337
FRA,ITA,PRT,ESP,
MLT,CRI
81 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 ALB
82 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 7 0.547 0
HRV,HUN,LVA,LTU
,POL,SVK,SVN
32. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 19/44/0
Total: 63
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 english*SOCIALIST*french*german*scandin*epi 0.918 0.805 0.258 0.258
2 CONCOR*english*socialist*FRENCH*german*scandin*epi 1 1 0.334 0.334
M1 0.963 0.932 0.592
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RUS OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0.717 0.471 BIH,MKD,MNE,SRB,SUR,TTO
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0.443 0 MDA,UKR
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0.657 0.515 CUB,HND,CHL,NIC,PAN,URY
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0.798 0.713 GUY,JAM
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 12 0.903 0.845
BEL,BGR,CZE,DNK,FIN,GRC,ISL,L
UX,NLD,NOR,ROU,SWE
18 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 0.547 0.162 BLR,EST,RUS
21 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 1 1 CAN,GBR,IRL,USA
25 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 CHE
33 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.782 0 ALB,ARG
35 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 0.307 0
BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,HT
I,MEX,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
49 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 0.955 0.872 HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,SVK,SVN
50 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 LVA
51 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 0.749 0.435 CRI,ESP,FRA,PRT
57 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 1 1 AUT,DEU,HUN
34. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 28/37/0
Total: 65
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 EPI*lan_eng*lan_rom*lan_rus 0.914 0.868 0.61 0.056
2 CONCOR*EPI*lan_ger*lan_eng*lan_rom 0.957 0.886 0.209 0.009
3 concor*EPI*lan_ger*lan_rom*lan_rus 0.913 0.861 0.496 0.056











RUS OUT n incl PRI cases
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0.721 0.478 BIH,MKD,MNE,SRB,SUR,TTO
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 MDA,UKR
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0.634 0.482 CUB,HND,CHL,NIC,PAN,URY
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0.497 0.287 GUY,JAM
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 12 0.471 0.155
BEL,BGR,CZE,DNK,FIN,GRC,ISL,LUX,
NLD,NOR,ROU,SWE
18 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 0.912 0.838 BLR,EST,RUS
21 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0.308 0 CAN,GBR,IRL,USA
25 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.34 0 CHE
33 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 ALB,ARG
35 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 12 1 1
BOL,BRA,COL,DOM,ECU,GTM,HTI,ME
X,PER,PRY,SLV,VEN
49 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 0.693 0.128 HRV,ITA,LTU,MLT,POL,SVK,SVN
50 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.758 0 LVA
51 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 0.755 0.449 CRI,ESP,FRA,PRT
57 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0.172 0 AUT,DEU,HUN
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36. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 19/46/0
Total: 65
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 CONCOR*epi*lan_ger*lan_eng*lan_rus 1 1 0.409 0.376
2 concor*lan_ger*lan_eng*lan_rom*LAN_RUS 0.869 0.804 0.143 0.11
M1 0.96 0.935 0.519




OR EPI WHITE LATINO MESTIZO
NON_
WHITE OUT n incl PRI cases
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0.643 0.194 GUY,JAM,SUR,TTO
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0.636 0.158 CHL,NIC,PAN
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.496 0 UKR
6 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.6 0 BIH
9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 0.766 0.594 CUB,HND,MDA,MKD,SRB,URY
13 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.769 0.25 MNE
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.824 0.626 DNK




34 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0.396 0 BOL,DOM,HTI,PER
36 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 0.417 0 COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV
37 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.333 0 VEN
41 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.764 0.335 ALB,ARG
42 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0.643 0.167 BRA,GTM
49 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.784 0.561 FRA,ITA,MLT,PRT
53 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.596 0.323 ESP
57 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 10 0.923 0.855
AUT,CRI,DEU,HRV,HUN,LTU,LVA
,POL,SVK,SVN
38. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 29/36/0
Total: 65
incl PRI cov.r cov.u
1 EPI*WHITE*latino*mestizo*non_white 0.874 0.818 0.598 –




CONCOR EPI WHITE LATINO MESTIZO
NON_
WHITE OUT n incl PRI cases
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 0.914 0.806 GUY,JAM,SUR,TTO
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 0.929 0.837 CHL,NIC,PAN
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 UKR
6 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 BIH
9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 0.657 0.405 CUB,HND,MDA,MKD,SRB,URY
13 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.923 0.75 MNE
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.706 0.374 DNK




34 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 1 1 BOL,DOM,HTI,PER
36 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 1 1 COL,ECU,MEX,PRY,SLV
37 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 VEN
41 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.881 0.665 ALB,ARG
42 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0.929 0.833 BRA,GTM
49 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.65 0.289 FRA,ITA,MLT,PRT
53 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.602 0.333 ESP
57 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 10 0.548 0.145
AUT,CRI,DEU,HRV,HUN,LTU,LVA
,POL,SVK,SVN
40. QCA Minimisation Using the Enhanced Quine–McCluskey Algorithm
n OUT ¼ 1/0/C: 22/43/0
Total: 65
incl PRI cov.r cov.u (M1) (M2)
1 epi*white*latino*NON_WHITE 0.931 0.887 0.443 0.111 0.244 0.111
2 concor*epi*LATINO*mestizo*non_white 0.938 0.835 0.165 0.066 0.066 0.066
3 CONCOR*epi*latino*mestizo*NON_WHITE 0.953 0.918 0.22 0.044 0.044 0.044
4 epi*white*LATINO*mestizo*non_white 1 1 0.11 0.011 0.011 0.011
5 concor*epi*white*LATINO*mestizo 1 1 0.11 0 0.011
6 concor*epi*white*mestizo*NON_WHITE 0.918 0.823 0.244 0 0.011
M1 0.921 0.863 0.639
M2 0.921 0.863 0.639
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5. QCA Appendix C. QCA Venn Diagrams of Outcome
Corruption
5.1 Predominant Religion (Proportion of Adherents) and Corruption
emoctuoevitageNemoctuoevitisoP
High EPI and Protestant religion adherence
are associated with lower corruption, 
especially if both are present. 
Concordats in combination with Roman 
Catholic religion adherence increase 
corruption. Orthodox religion has a similar 
negative effect. 
Fig. A.1 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Corruption with Predominant
Religion adherence in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure).
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5.2 State Religion and Corruption
emoctuoevitageNemoctuoevitisoP
EPI and Protestant State religion again have 
a positive effect, i.e. decrease corruption. 
The difference is that Concordats might also 
have a positive effect only in the absence of 
State Religion.  
Groups of countries with high corruption
indicate the substantial adverse effect of 
Concordats in combination with Roman 
Catholic State religion. Concordats
combined with Roman Catholic or Muslim 
state religion have a negative effect, i.e. 
increase corruption. 
Fig. A.2 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Corruption with State Religion
in Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure)
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5.3 Legal Origin and Corruption
German and English legal origin help reduce corruption, while French and Socialist
legal origins and Concordats tend to increase corruption.
The adverse effect of French and Socialist legal origins and Concordats disap-
pears if a country has high EPI.
emoctuoevitageNemoctuoevitisoP
All countries belonging to groups with 
Scandinavian, German and English legal 
origins have low corruption (and always 
high EPI). Countries with Socialist legal 
origin in combination with Concordats and 
high EPI tend to have low corruption.  
Most countries with high corruption are of 
French legal origin and have high 
Concordats. This trend is robust (mainly 
caused by 13 Latin American countries).  
No group with high EPI has high 
corruption. Also, countries with Socialist 
legal origin combined with low EPI tend to 
have higher corruption. 
Fig. A.3 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Corruption with Legal Origin in
Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure)
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5.4 Languages and Corruption
The analysis of languages and corruption confirmed the results of the previous
analysis: (1) a robust influence of EPI and German language on low corruption and
(2) Russian and Roman languages are connected with higher corruption. Enough
coverage also exists for a sufficient condition for low corruption: high EPI, low
Roman, low English and low Russian languages.
emoctuoevitageNemoctuoevitisoP
Every country with low corruption has high 
EPI. The German language always leads to 
low corruption. Some of the German-
speaking countries have high concordats. 
No country belonging to a group of Roman 
language has low corruption. Also, Russian-
speaking countries, except for Lithuania, do 
have high corruption.     
All countries belonging to groups with high 
corruption have low EPI (except for some 
Russian speaking countries). In general, the 
Russian language tends to lead to higher 
corruption. German and English-speaking 
countries, in general, do not have high 
corruption. High EPI, low Roman, low 
English and low Russian languages is a 
sufficient condition for low corruption (in 
this combination, corruption is undoubtedly 
low, although low corruption may be 
achieved in other ways). 
Fig. A.4 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Corruption with Languages in
Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure)
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5.5 Ethnicities and Corruption
In the truth tables (Appendix 13.2), we can check the belonging of countries to
different groups. Countries with similar conditions are often in the same groups,
therefore, clusters and group selections have proven to work well.
High EPI and high white ethnicities in 
combination with both high and low 
Concordats leads to low corruption. A 
sufficient path to low corruption is high EPI, 
high white, low Latino, low mestizo, and low 
other non-white ethnicities. Low corruption
may happen in other ways, but always 
occurs in this configuration.   
Countries with high corruption almost never 
have predominantly white ethnicities, are 
often non-white, and always have low EPI. 
All predominantly mestizo countries have 
high corruption. The effect of other 
conditions is not evident. 
emoctuoevitageNemoctuoevitisoP
Fig. A.5 Venn diagrams with positive and negative outcomes for Corruption with Ethnicities in
Europe and the Americas (Source: Author’s figure)
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III. Researcher Identity Memo
How my personal experience has shaped my research interests
I have divided this memo into five parts (A, B, C, D, E) and thirteen stages to
explain how each has influenced my beliefs and assumptions in relation to this study.
A. The Dark Ages
Like 92% of Colombian adults, I was raised as a Roman Catholic without ever
questioning why I was (or should be) Catholic. Interestingly, Colombia has the
second highest proportion of adults raised as Roman Catholics worldwide while it is
also one of the most unequal, corrupt, and violent countries.
1. Childhood
I was born to middle-class parents in a very conservative town in Colombia. I was
educated at a regional (and privileged) high school owned and administered exclu-
sively by the Roman Catholic Church to this day (like most important educational
centres in Colombia, where access to education is limited to the few).
In Colombia, people remember my hometown (Pasto) for opposing independence
in favour of the Spanish Catholic monarchy. Such submissive subservience of the
population to the Roman Catholic Church remains to some extent until today.
I had not met a single non-Roman Catholic until I was 15 years old. At school and
at home, I learned that people who were not Catholics were “sons of the devil” and
were dangerous.
I received a repressive education, especially at school. The guiding principle was
that “it is forbidden to think beyond what is established”. We were forced to attend
mass at school and religious instruction was compulsory.
Nevertheless, the society in which I grew up accepts a set of values where “evil is
good, and the one who cheats is a hero”. Great respect and admiration existed for
well-known gangsters, drug dealers and “cool criminals” among my classmates and
neighbours.
Aside from this, I had some friends who practised “white magic rituals” with the
saints worshipped in the Roman Catholic Church. I soon became involved in
sorcery, as we believed these practices were “sacred”. A few weeks later, one of
my “magic friends” committed suicide with his girlfriend (and their baby). My life
became miserable in every respect. It was determined by suffering, fear, superstition,
ignorance, want, and disgrace.
Moreover, I was nearly kidnapped twice. The robbers threatened to kill me just to
steal my watch or phone. I struggled a lot with evil people, bullying, ignorance, and
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Philosophers such as Nietzsche or Marx were unknown in my entire elementary and
high school education. I was fortunate to meet a “crazy outsider”, who introduced
me to these philosophers, whose ideas opened up a completely new world to me at
that time. I understood that like all those people who believe or follow a religion I
had been deliberately manipulated with a “people’s opium”. As a result, I ended up
declaring myself a complete materialist and atheist. I became a truth-seeker and
embraced science and reason in search of a more coherent and rational framework of
values.
This quest for knowledge freed me from most of my superstitions. I understood
that the power of the mind could create all kinds of enchantments. There was no
longer any such thing as witchcraft in my life, but only positive and negative energy.
I became an advocate of scientific positivism. I began searching for explanations
through science, which led me to move to Bogota (the capital) to pursue a scientific
career in the natural sciences. My life started to change for the better. I had found the
path to a better life. I firmly believed that nothing in my life would stop me from
embracing my chosen materialistic and rationalistic perspective.
Bogota is an enormous city where people tend to be better educated and where
services are better than in the rest of the country. I also realised that people were less
fervent Catholics than in my hometown. In fact, not everybody was Catholic in
Bogota’s cosmopolitan environment. I discovered that not everybody admired Pablo
Escobar and other criminals as heroes. Quite the opposite in fact. I also had to adapt
my values to a more balanced and secular society where I had begun finding more
like-minded people.
3. My Father’s Crisis
I received news about my father, who had forged a successful career for himself as a
singer after abandoning us. He had fallen into a profound depression and eventually
ended up using all kinds of drugs. His state deteriorated drastically and he lost
everything he had. He was admitted twice to rehabilitation clinics. After recovering,
his situation grew even worse, until he ended up a homeless and begging for money
in the streets. His addiction was extreme and lasted about a decade.
I was ashamed of my father and did not want to hear anything about him. At the
same time, I was establishing my career and professional network. One day, my
father was approached in the street by a Christian group (Protestant) and told him
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about Jesus. Miraculously, in only one day, he was completely and forever healed.
This was unbelievable for all his relatives and friends as no doctor had managed to
help him.
Soon, he joined a Christian (Protestant) Church and became a singer there. His
life was wholly renewed, and he became a new and very faithful man. He looked for
my mother and me to ask for forgiveness. My mother had forgiven him, but did not
want to hear about him anymore. I was more hard-hearted and did not forgive him; I
said that for me, he had already died years ago. I also mentioned that it was good that
he had recovered from his addiction, but between being a drug addict and a
fundamentalist Christian, his was the “least worse” option. This deeply saddened
my father. He started to cry and prayed fervently and earnestly for my mother and me
for about one year.
4. My Crisis
After haughtily rejecting my father, many strange things started to happen in my life
during that year. One of the most important was that despite a successful career start
and an extensive network I was—incredibly but true—unable to find a proper job. I
started to feel what scarcity means. Nobody wanted to hire me, regardless of my
impressive CV and professional network.
As a result, for nearly 2 years I subsisted on borrowing money from banks,
friends, relatives, neighbours, etc. Having to pay off debts often made me feel
desperate. I owed money to everyone I knew.
C. The Reformation
5. The Paradigm Change
After nearly a decade of atheism, I met someone who suggested a business oppor-
tunity: selling quality environmental American products through a well-recognised,
multi-level transnational corporation (Amway). The idea of selling sounded disgust-
ing to me, but I did not have other income option, so I accepted the offer.
The company is very successful worldwide. It is based firmly on Calvinist values,
which the company disseminates through its training programmes and literature.
One of the principles they taught me was that for a business to be successful, it was
essential to donate at least 10% of net profits to a charity or a philanthropic project.
This made no sense to me at all, and I thought the idea was fundamentalist. I said I
would be happy to give when I became a millionaire.
However, book after book written by successful entrepreneurs confirmed that
giving came first and the quintessential prerequisite for success. This fundamental
stance was even confirmed by an unlikely source: a highly respected professor from
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MIT. I was impressed and convinced, and decided to start donating 50% of the net
profits of my sales (although I was still paying off my debts).
Impressively, from the very first time I gave, I experienced a new and pleasant
feeling, which encouraged me to keep on giving for the sole pleasure of doing
it. Inexplicably, that month I started selling much more and began receiving vast
amounts of money from different sources. By the end of the month, I had paid off all
my debts.
6. An Experiment to Prove God’s Existence
One of my clients was a devout Protestant Christian, and she was always speaking
about Jesus. I listened, since I did not want to disappoint her, but still thought
Evangelicals were crazy fundamentalists.
She challenged my atheism and asked me to do a rational experiment to prove the
existence of God. The experiment involved kneeling down alone in my room and
asking God whether he existed; he should give me a proof of his existence in a
defined period of time. If nothing happened (as one could expect), I would continue
my life as usual, but if I had an affirmative reply, I had to recognise his existence.
I accepted the challenge, and I did the experiment. I gave God one month to
demonstrate his existence. After feeling ridiculous, after all I was talking to walls, I
forgot about the experiment, and my life continued.
During that month, my profits soared. My cash flow increased substantially, and
my debts decreased. Unexpectedly, I was offered my dream job (the salary was three
times higher than my expectations!). Unbelievably, after much financial hardship, I
bought my own flat. I was so impressed with how giving had worked and had solved
my financial crisis!
Another client that month also happened to be a Protestant Christian and talked to
me about God. I was not paying attention until she mentioned that the Bible states
that we can prove the existence of God. She did not have to say so, as she was
unaware of everything that was happening to me!
I asked where the Bible said so, as I had never adequately read its teaching. She
replied that in Malachi 3:10 (King James Bible, 1769), the Lord says:
Bring ye all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in mine house, and prove
me now herewith, saith the LORD of hosts, if I will not open you the windows of heaven,
and pour you out a blessing, that there shall not be room enough to receive it.
I could not believe these events had all happened in the same month in which I
had asked for proof, and I had actually forgotten about it. I quickly went to search for
a Bible, and when I found the corresponding passage, I was extremely impressed. It
described what was what actually happening to me. I had been living a life of
scarcity for nearly two years, not to mention the past hardships, and now I was
receiving money and things to an extent I had never considered possible.
I knelt impressed and asked God to forgive my scepticism. All these changes had
happened precisely in the same month that I asked God for proof of his existence! It
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was improbable that this change of fortune had happened by chance. These events
would definitely impress any rational mind, like all of God’s gifts!
I began reading the Bible and found that this book was alive, unlike any other
book I had read. Everything I was reading in the Bible started to happen in my own
life. My eyes were opened and I started to understand how life and the world work. I
also gained insight into many mysteries that I would otherwise never have
understood.
7. Reconciliation: Meeting My Father Again
Following the principles of the Bible improved my life more than I could ever have
imagined. I started experiencing unlikely miracles every single day of my life.
One of the biblical principles that I repeatedly encountered was: “Honour thy
father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy
God giveth thee” (King James Bible, 1769, Exodus 20:12).
So I was amazed by the biblical promise of living longer if honouring one’s
parents. Realising how mercilessly I had behaved towards my father, I decided to
travel to my hometown. I convinced my mother to come and visit my father to
forgive him.
My suggestion pleased her very much, as she saw a renewed and faithful son.
And so we went to my father’s place! He was expecting us, came towards us,
embraced us and cried. Our reunion was unbelievable!
My father exclaimed: “Glory to the Lord Jesus as He has listened to my prayers
and crying and made the miracle I requested, that you two, come to my house and
search me to forgive me”.
8. Box of Blessings Unlocked
Ever since I started believing in God and following the biblical principles, all my
dreams became true one after the other. It was like unlocking a large container of
gifts and blessings that I had desired all my life!
Among many other miracles, I won two of the most prestigious scholarships to
study in the United Kingdom and Switzerland, the countries of my dreams.
Then I understood how real Psalm 37:4 is: “Delight thyself also in the LORD: and
he shall give thee the desires of thine heart” (King James Bible, 1769). I was also
growing in understanding and wisdom.
My studies in England
In England, I had the opportunity to visit Lewes, a small town near London full of
history. I attended a fair that reenacted how British people used to live in the Middle
Ages. To my surprise, I felt like home there. It was pretty similar to how my parents
and grandparents used to live in my Colombian hometown.
I immediately wondered how Colombia and England could feel that similar if
they were so different geographically and culturally? I assumed that perhaps the only
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difference was time. I asked one of the experts at the fair how people in England had
experienced the change from medieval times to a heavily industrialised country?
Her answer kindled my curiosity even more: “England was a country of peasants
without education. It was not until the Reformers came and taught peasants to read
the Bible and write that they eventually became entrepreneurs. Roman Catholic
peasants remained uneducated”. Her comment was a revelation.
When I was studying my Bachelor’s degree in ecology in Bogota (1999–2004), I
had observed the existence of several developmental patterns that were associated
with climatic and environmental conditions. However, I also noticed a missing factor
that would help better explain the differences between countries. In England, I began
finding various clues to this missing element.
D. My Personal Experience and My Doctoral Research
Afterwards, it occurred to me that countries with a Roman Catholic tradition
struggled with similar problems: corruption, insecurity, inequality, poor education,
or violence (e.g. Latin America, as well as Italy, Spain, and Portugal in Europe). In
contrast, those with a Protestant background exhibited the lowest indicators of these
variables and were industrialised, developed countries (e.g. United Kingdom, Swit-
zerland, Germany, USA, etc.).
I realised that the Roman Catholic traditions are more important for the Church
than what the Bible says, and in fact that many traditions directly contradict it! This
insight prompted me to explore the history of “the Reformers”: Martin Luther in
Germany, John Calvin and Huldrych Zwingli in Switzerland, William Tyndale and
John Wycliffe in England were among other courageous men who had dared to
question the authority of the papacy.
I started feeling that the history of Western civilisation during the last two
thousand years had happened in my own life: a period of obscurantism marked by
a strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church; a period of atheist enlightenment;
and a period of Protestant Reformation (except that the last two were in inverse
order). I started reading any literature on the topic. The more I discovered, the more
passionate I became.
I also started speaking to different academics and experts. Despite the scientific
literature available on the topic, to my surprise, most scholars did not take this
subject very seriously. At an academic conference, one simply said that developed
countries were just “lucky”. Another even called Max Weber a “pseudo-theorist”.
However, a recognised economist told me that economic theories do not work, but
that “Weberian Protestant Ethics” were an important field in which to do research.
After this, while working in a UN development agency, I told myself that if I ever
had the opportunity to do a PhD, I would be eager to develop this research idea (the
influence of religion on countries’ prosperity) further.
All these successive events made change my career focus completely. I now feel I
have found what indeed makes sense in my life.
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9. Advantages of My Personal Experience for My Doctoral Research
After travelling to more than four dozen countries around the world, learning four
different languages, and discovering how significant religious values are, I bring
various attributes to academic research:
• a transdisciplinary and multi-lingual perspective;
• a passion to discover the roots of human freedom;
• devoting several years before starting my PhD to seeking different sources;
• first-hand experience of my research topic through living around one-third of my
life in each of the systems investigated (Roman Catholic, atheist, dissenting
Protestant).
My personal life means that I am very well aware of the advantages and
disadvantages of these three systems, based on living in different countries and on
practical experience. My scientific research complements my experience, while my
study informs both theory and practice.
10. Disadvantages of My Personal Experience for My Doctoral Research
A significant disadvantage of this study is that it will create much controversy and
encounter fierce criticism. The Protestant Reformers and scholars like Weber also
faced similar challenges in their times. Controversy is needed to bring about
changes.
I am aware that the results of this study will be very uncomfortable for many and
will prompt harsh criticism. They might make more enemies than friends as they are
“politically incorrect” by today’s standards. I am, however, confident that this is the
only way to change the paradigm of ignorance in which our society is caught up.
One apparent disadvantage of this study is that its author lacks a scientific
background in sociology or economics. Nevertheless, my studies in environmental
and political sciences provide me with a broader perspective. After all, many good
signs of progress in science come from scholars working in different fields, most
likely because they bring fresh approaches and biases to the debate.
11. Audience
The transdisciplinary nature of this research makes it interesting for social and
natural scientists alike. Equally, it will speak to Roman Catholics, Protestants,




The following personal experiences from each belief system influence my biases:
Roman Catholicism:
• I grew up in a Roman Catholic family in Colombia, a strongly Roman Catholic
country;
• I was educated for 12 years in Roman Catholic schools and received Catholic
religious instruction;
• I studied for 5 years at a Pontifical Jesuit university.
Atheism (after being a firm Catholic believer):
• I spent ten years living as a self-confessed atheist who embraced atheistic values;
• I was socialised in and applied the paradigm of scientific materialism
(positivism).
Dissenting Protestantism (after being a convinced atheist):
• I spent 12 years living as converted free Christian and I have studied the Bible on
my own;
• I have lived and studied in the United Kingdom and Switzerland (two historically
Protestant countries) (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).
13. Strategies for Objective Data Treatment:
I employed the following strategies to ensure objective data treatment: (1) Two
independent quantitative researchers were engaged to select the variables solely
using quantitative criteria (e.g. cross-validation) in regressions and QCA. (2) Two
independent qualitative researchers were engaged to impartially validate the quali-
tative coding (a total of four independent researchers). (3) The selected variables
(chosen from a pool of more than 70 indicators) were associated with qualitative
codes to prioritise them from a mixed methods perspective. (4) The quantitative and
qualitative (QCA) databases and the twelve codes applied comparatively to the four
case studies’ qualitative data are available for inspection (see Supplementary Mate-
rials). However, the names and original interviews conducted as part of this study
will not be made publicly available to protect the interviewees’ identity.
E. Supplement: What Happened to My Father and My Faith
My father began encouraging me to find a place to congregate with other believers in
Jesus. I disliked the idea, as I never wanted to become what I have always criticised
as an atheist: a fundamentalist who faints and jumps in ugly, dark, and smelly
churches on Sundays.
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So we decided to pray together with my father, and I asked God that he might
show me the truth. I was tired of hearing every single religion declaring that it alone
possessed the truth. My father said he would not rest until he saw me in a
congregation.
A few days after praying with my father, I received a good job offer in a distant
city. The place was a bit unfriendly, as I had no friends or relatives there. The food
also complicated matters, because as a vegetarian, I had never seen so many people
eat such vast amounts of meat three times a day. There were almost no options
for me.
One day at lunchtime in that strange city, I felt alone and realised I had no money,
not even to buy food. So I started complaining to God about why I was experiencing
scarcity if I was sharing my money giving to the poor. Immediately, walking down
the street, I found a banknote, which allowed me to buy a meal. I knelt down and
gave thanks to God for such a miracle.
However, I continued complaining about the fact that there was nothing vegetar-
ian to eat! I walked two more blocks with no orientation and found an incredible
vegan restaurant that served delicious food.
The people were friendly and told me I could eat there, even if I had no money.
They were definitely different from the rest of the world for their gentleness,
wisdom, knowledge, and kindness, among other values. I was delighted and began
eating there every day.
One day, a kind person came and sat beside me to share the table and asked me
where I was attending church. I replied that I was not going to any church. She was
surprised; she told me that the restaurant was run by a Christian group that she
belonged to and that I was very welcome to join.
When I asked her more questions about their philosophy, she explained that in the
Bible, the ideal diet recommended by God was vegan, which was why the restaurant
was vegan. She also told me that this Christian group existed all over the world as a
result of the Protestant Reformation and based on its faith on the Lutheran principle
of “Sola Scriptura”, which I had begun looking for after finding out about Martin
Luther.
I was so impressed that I asked if I could visit her Church next Sunday, but she
replied that this was impossible: “On Sundays, we work. It’s the first day of the week,
we congregate on the true day of the Lord, the Sabbath”.
For in Exodus 20:9-11, the Lord says:
Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work: But the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord
thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy
manservant, nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates:
For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the
seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day and hallowed it (King James
Bible, 1769).
I was even more impressed after this. The following Saturday, I went to that
place, which was just beautiful, quiet, and harmonious. The atmosphere was most
congenial and the people amazing. I decided that this is the place where I wanted to
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be! I immediately called my father and told him that I had found the right place for
me to congregate: the Seventh-day Adventist Church.
My father was so happy and exclaimed:
Hallelujah, praise The Lord, He has answered our prayers, now I am in peace for my son is
in your ways.
Only 3 days later, my father died of fulminant pancreatitis. He passed away
peacefully, and I understood that he had achieved his purpose in his life, among
others, to accompany me until I found the right way.
My story illustrates that if you persist in finding answers, the truth or whatever
purpose, you will have it. As Jesus says in Matthew 7:7–8: “Ask, and it shall be given
you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you: For every one
that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be
opened” (King James Bible, 1769). This is precisely what I have experienced.
We must work on our dreams, and finally, we will attract what we long for. My
personal experience leads me to conclude that we can achieve many goals, dreams,
and purposes in our life by struggling on our own. That, I am convinced, is the
longest and hardest way. However, if we have God with us, by our side, this is the
most efficient and shortest way to a fulfilling life.
As it is written: “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free”
(John 8:32). Jesus is “the way, the truth, and the life” (King James Bible, 1769,
John 14:6).
And my desire for you is: “Therefore God give thee of the dew of heaven, and the
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